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to PauLi!
Pauli Kettunen began his academic career as a researcher of the history of 
the social democratic labour movement and especially of the trade union 
movement. After completion of a master’s degree – he had not turned 21 at the 
time of graduation – he was recruited to a research collective which brought 
out a history of the Finnish labour movement in 1976. In the same year, Pauli 
published his own first book, on the history of the Finnish locomotive drivers’ 
union. Pauli’s work on labour history resulted in his doctoral dissertation 
(1986) which was regarded as a milestone for social science history in Finland. 
In the next decade Pauli’s interests expanded to control policies and industrial 
relations more generally, leading to a massive monograph (1994) on labour 
protection and the social modes of thought and action in Finland in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. Since then, the themes of Pauli’s work have 
widened both in scale and scope resulting in books, chapters and articles on 
globalization and nationalism, on the welfare state, conceptual history and 
the history of education in Finland. 
Over the course of the years Pauli’s interest in ‘the social’ and its relationship 
with ‘the political’ and ‘the economic’ has been long-lasting, gaining new 
nuances from decade to decade, from theme to theme. Questions on the 
formation and representation of collective interests are at the centre of Pauli’s 
thinking whether examined through wage work and workers, construction 
of national interests, or welfare state. One of the pervasive themes of Pauli’s 
ouevre is to the relationship of national, international and transnational to 
each other; and the asking of how historically-embedded conceptualisations, 
such as ‘us’, ‘competitiveness’ and ‘society’, have been used politically at various 
points of time. The use of ‘the Nordic’ as a wider frame of reference and source 
for models in the making of welfare policies has been especially present in 
Pauli’s research.
In Pauli’s work history meets social sciences in a manner that renders 
distinctions between the two unnecessary. Pauli’s reflexive approach to the 
past and analyses on how the various layers of the past are always present or 
potent challenge simplistic views of history as ‘a background’ or ‘development’. 
They open up sophisticated perspectives to many up-to-date debates on, for 
instance, nationalism and globalization or, as has been the case most recently, 
the Nordic welfare models.
Pauli’s way of seeing history has transformed the ways of seeing within the 
political history discipline. Pauli has held the chair of political history at the 
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University of Helsinki since 2003 and in this role he has supervised numerous 
young researchers and created an inspiring research milieu. If anyone has been 
a keen advocate of the discipline of social science history (yhteiskuntahistoria, 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte) – combining the perspectives of the economic, social 
and political history – it is Pauli. 
Since 2007, Pauli has acted as the leader of the Nordic Centre of Excellence 
NordWel (The Nordic Welfare state – Historical Foundations and Future 
Challenges). Through NordWel, many of the themes that have been central to 
Pauli’s research for years have transformed into an inspiring research network 
and contacts that reach across the Nordic countries and way beyond to Central 
Europe, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and China. The 
various exchange, seminar and summer school activities within the NordWel 
scope have made Pauli travel frequently in recent years and greatly increased 
the international visibility of his own work – thematically and in regard to 
his distinctively multi-layered approach to history. Beyond that, NordWel has 
provided a platform for enormously rich and rewarding scope of scholarly 
exchanges, including generous mobility programmes, travel grants and 
publication opportunities for a great number of scholars at various stages 
of their careers. NordWel has provided particularly great opportunities for 
a large number of younger scholars. Among and through them Pauli’s and 
NordWel‘s legacy will carry on for years to come, having already branched 
off in many different directions. 
This book celebrates Pauli on his sixtieth birthday in May 2013. It gathers 
articles from colleagues in Finland and abroad, all discussing themes and 
questions that have been central to Pauli’s research in the course of the past four 
decades. We would like to thank all the writers and others who have contributed 
to this book; and Paul Wilkinson for his proof-reading and Riikka Hyypiä for 
the graphic design. People and organizations who joined us in congratulating 
Pauli on the Tabula Gratulatoria made the book possible – thank you!
And to Pauli, our most cordial and heart-felt congratulations: onneksi 
olkoon, grattis, many happy returns!
Helsinki, May 2013
Heidi Haggrén, Johanna Rainio-Niemi and Jussi Vauhkonen
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TowArds hisToricAl sociAl science 
The making of Pauli Kettunen’s dissertation  
Poliittinen liike ja sosiaalinen kollektiivisuus (1986)
SEPPO HENtILä
Pauli Kettunen’s dissertation1 will remain the foundation work of historical 
social science in Finland. This was clearly concluded by the opponents, 
Professors Raimo Blom and Jorma Kalela, in the public defence of Kettunen’s 
doctoral thesis on 14 March 1987 at the University of Helsinki. 
‘no other work had been published in Finland before in which the rela-
tionship between history and social sciences would have been theorized 
so brightly. [...]The avalanche of documents, original research material 
and literature is slashing ... [but] at the same time Kettunen makes theo-
retically constructed and theoretically generalized historical research of 
high-quality.’ 2 
‘so far no other presentation has been published in Finland before in 
which the relationship between historical research and social sciences had 
been thematized in theoretical standards as articulately as in this work.’ 3
Kettunen’s visionary approach has been proved by the fact that his dissertation 
has been studied during the last 25 years by following generations of students 
as one of the most excellent examples of theoretically oriented historical 
research. This is undoubtedly the most important and longest lasting issue 
of the dissertation. In this article I will review Pauli Kettunen’s learning years 
as an eyewitness, having belonged during the 1970s to the same group of 
1 Kettunen, Pauli (1986) Poliittinen liike ja sosiaalinen kollektiivisuus. Tutkimus sosialidemokratiasta ja 
ammattiyhdistysliikkeestä Suomessa 1918–1930. [Political movement and social collectivity. On social 
democracy and trade union movement in Finland 1918–1930.] Historiallisia tutkimuksia 138, Suomen 
historiallinen seura: Helsinki 1986. – In continuation references to the dissertation will be as follows: 
(p. page number).
2 Opponent’s statement to the Faculty of Social Sciences on 23 March 1987 (Raimo Blom). – Opponent’s, 
pre-examiner’s and examiner’s statements are available in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University 
of Helsinki.
3 Opponent’s statement to the Faculty of Social Sciences on 23 March 1987 (Jorma Kalela).
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younger researchers of political history at the University of Helsinki. Being a 
few years older than Pauli I was also one of his first academic teachers. 
Why did Pauli Kettunen (born in 1953) matriculate to the Faculty of Social 
Sciences in the beginning of the autumn term 1971? I am not even aware of 
his motivation for choosing political history as his main subject. At that time 
students were accepted to the Faculty and were not compelled to commit 
themselves immediately to a certain main subject. If I am right Kettunen 
started originally to study sociology which he kept then as the largest minor 
in his Master’s and Licentiate’s exams. This gives me a reason to assume 
that originally Kettunen wanted to become a social scientist. Like many other 
students at that time he ‘landed’ to political history by chance. 
Between history and social sciences
The chair of Political history was founded in 1947 in the Faculty of Social 
Sciences which was started two years earlier. The aim was to train competent 
civil servants for administration. Political history was understood as a ‘natural 
supplement to political science’, supporting it by possessing a useful knowledge 
on contemporary history. Since 1952 the chair of political history was held by 
Lauri Puntila. One of his leading ideas was to bring historical research to serve 
as practical policy. He wanted to train his elite students to become competent 
leaders for Finland. As an influential person, Puntila succeeded to recruit a 
considerable number of postgraduates to his team. Most of them came from 
the History Department of the Faculty of Arts. Their dissertation topics were 
thematically contemporary political history but methodologically their work 
did not differ from so-called conventional history.
Regardless of the substantial growth of the number of students during the 
1960s, the position of political history turned more and more troublesome in 
the Faculty. As a result of growing research visits of Finnish social scientists to 
renowned North American universities new ideals of Western social sciences 
were transferred to Finland. Scientific research should be based on theories, 
models and quantitative techniques and social sciences should be as ‘pure’, 
‘systematic’ and ‘exact’ as natural sciences. This paradigm offered absolutely 
no room or use to history. In this situation political history needed – no more, 
no less – a strategy for survival. 
In 1967 Lauri Hyvämäki edited a Festschrift in honour of Professor Puntila’s 
60th birthday titled oman ajan historia ja politiikan tutkimus4 [Contemporary 
4 Otava: Helsinki 1967.
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history and political science]. Since Puntila had been elected as a Member 
of Parliament in 1966 Hyvämäki was substituting him as acting professor. 
Hyvämäki defended the position of contemporary history by sound arguments 
of bridge building policy and emphasized the possibilities for cooperation, 
especially in the empirical research of the Finnish society. Neither the title of 
the book nor the selection of authors was arbitrary. In addition to Puntila’s 
former doctoral students, four distinguished social scientists, sociologists Erik 
Allardt and Paavo Seppänen and political scientists Pertti Pesonen and Onni 
Rantala, contributed to the Festschrift. 
Since the mid-1960s initiatives for the substantial reformation of the 
teaching and research of political history were put forward by Osmo Apunen 
and Jorma Kalela. They were Puntila’s first doctoral students who had started 
their studies in the Faculty of Social Sciences. According to them, the renewal 
of political history would succeed only by determined cooperation with social 
sciences. In his methodological textbook, published in 1972, Kalela crystallized 
how it would happen in practice: ‘ … tools for reasoning should be borrowed 
from other social sciences’5. This was naturally a rough generalization, but still 
it hits the point. Kalela’s proposal is very much reminiscent to the model which 
was used by West German historians Hans Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka 
when they designed the foundations to the so-called historical social science 
(Gesellschaftsgeschichte) as an answer to the crisis of traditional German 
historicism. Despite certain similarities, it should be recalled that Kalela did 
not make any use of the German example.
During the autumn term 1971 Jussi Turtola and I, Seppo Hentilä, working 
as assistants at the Department of Political history, took initiatives for the 
improvement of doctoral training at the Department. The postgraduate 
seminar was divided thematically into subgroups. Actually only one of them 
was working actively for several years: the Research Group in the labour 
movement’s history (in continuation: RG). In addition to Turtola and Hentilä, 
at least half a dozen other postgraduates were preparing a dissertation on 
labour movement’s history.6 At the same time another half a dozen students 
had chosen the labour movement as their thesis topic in the master’s seminar. 
Some of these students, among them Pauli Kettunen, joined the RG in 1972–
1973. He was writing his Master’s thesis on the Social Democrats and the 
dissolution of the Finnish Trade Union in 1929. I am not aware why a fresh 
5 Kalela, Jorma (1972) Historian tutkimusprosessi. Gaudeamus: Helsinki (citation from the back cover 
text of the book).
6 In the 1970s the research objective was expressly called labour movement’s (accentuation, S. H.) 
history, and only in the 1980s the topic as well as its definition changed to labour history.
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student from Eastern Finland Savo, the son of a small entrepreneur and a 
school teacher, chose a topic like this which did not seem to have much in 
common with his growth milieu. Anyway he finished his thesis7 in 1974 and was 
awarded the highest possible grade, laudatur. It was at that time, and still is, 
granted to only a few per cent of graduates from the Faculty of Social Sciences. 
It was self evident that Kettunen continued his studies in order to doctorate 
and to work as a professional historian. However, it was not possible for him 
to start his dissertation project immediately after the graduation. The first full-
time subsistence was offered to Kettunen in 1974 by Finland’s Engine Drivers’ 
Union which commissioned him to write the history of the engine drivers’ trade 
union movement through one hundred years. Kettunen completed the work 
(388 pp.)8 in two years. It was an impressive performance from a historian at 
the age of only 23. Kettunen’s work belongs undoubtedly even today to the top 
of Finnish trade union research. The text and the documentation were carefully 
finished to the last detail. Kettunen did not want to give any chance to those 
who would criticize his work from the perspective of conventional history. 
The increasing popularity of the labour movement’s history was based, 
also in Finland, on the rise of the leftist students’ movement during the latter 
half of the 1960s. Along with the students’ movement grew also the interest in 
Marxism as a social theory. Most of the members of the RG were left-wing Social 
Democrats but nowhere near were all of them party-politically committed. 
However, for the activities of the RG it was essential to establish contacts with 
the Social Democratic Adult Education Union [Työväen sivistysliitto, TSL]. 
The TSL offered not only formal political backing but supported the RG and 
its members with travel allowances and by financing meetings and seminars. 
Additionally through the TSL useful contacts with many leading persons of 
the labour movement were established. These contacts resulted later, e.g. in 
several commissioned works to the members of the RG on the history of 
Finnish labour organizations. 
Incomparably, the most important common achievement of the members 
of the RG was the book suomen työväenliikkeen historia (445 pp)9 [History 
of the Labour Movement in Finland], an overview to the history of Finland’s 
7 Kettunen, Pauli (1974) Sosialidemokraatit ja Suomen Ammattijärjestön hajoaminen vuonna 1929 
(available in the Library of the Faculty of Social Sciences).
8 Kettunen, Pauli (1976) Anoen, taistellen, neuvotellen – Veturimiesten ammattiyhdistystoiminnan kehitys 
vuoteen 1976 [Entreating, Fighting, Neogotiating – the Devolopment of the Engine Drivers’ Trade Union 
until 1976]. Suomen Veturimiesten Liitto ry: Helsinki.
9 Haataja, Lauri, Hentilä, Seppo, Kalela, Jorma & Turtola, Jussi (eds) Suomen työväenliikkeen historia. 
Työväen Sivistysliitto: Joensuu 1976 (3rd edition 1978).
17
TOWARDs HisTORiCAl sOCiAl sCiENCE
labour movement. The book was published in 1976 by the TSL and edited by 
Lauri Haataja, Seppo Hentilä, Jorma Kalela and Jussi Turtola. Additionally to 
them, the other authors of the book were Eino Ketola, Pauli Kettunen, Heikki 
Laavola, Päivö Puhakainen and Tero Tuomisto. The RG presented itself as a 
collective author of ten persons. It was told, however, that each author had 
written on his speciality but which part of the book this speciality was, was 
not revealed. Because this kind of collective authorship was used in the Soviet 
Union and other Socialist countries the conduct of the RG looked suspicious.
The aim of suomen työväenliikkeen historia was to challenge traditional 
presentations of labour history which operated by ideas and events. Instead 
of that, a ‘total’ interpretation about the history of Finland’s labour movement 
should be offered. Based on rough Marxist-oriented theory on the crisis of 
capitalism, the editors divided the socio-economic development in Finland 
into certain periods into which they inserted the real historical processes. 
The book was criticized harshly from almost every imaginable angle. Maybe 
the most important outcome of suomen työväenliikkeen historia might be 
the self-criticism which some members of the RG, including Pauli Kettunen, 
practiced later. 
Kettunen delivered a manuscript for the book on the development of the 
Finnish labour movement during the 1920s. He knew this period best on the 
basis of his fresh master’s thesis on the trade union movement. Furthermore he 
made valuable comments to the whole manuscript. In the preface of the book 
the editors express their gratitude especially to Kettunen for his contribution. It 
was just in those innumerable meetings in which the manuscript was discussed 
when Kettunen proved his extraordinary qualification.
The academic environment of the 1970s in which Pauli Kettunen studied 
and trained himself to become a professional scholar was full of tensions 
and breaches. The position of political history in the Faculty was questioned 
by social sciences. The renewal process of political history brought new 
contradictions into the discipline itself. Would it be possible to use the theories 
of social sciences in historical research? Would it be allowed to use Marxist-
oriented methodology in academic research? The constellation of the debates 
concerning the position of political history in the beginning of the 1970s can 
be summarized as follows:
(Political) History vs. Social Sciences
History vs. Theory
Contemporary History vs. ‘Conventional History’
‘Conventional History’ vs. Marxist History
18
sEPPO HENTilÄ
Since 1972, Pauli Kettunen was one of the most active representatives of the 
students’ association in the renewal work of the exam requirements. He was 
also thoroughly informed of the debates on the position of political history. In 
the first volume of the students’ journal Poleemi (1–1975), Kettunen published 
a review article on the development of political history as ‘science and 
discipline’. Together with his fellow student Kimmo Turunen he presented, 
in February 1976, a memorandum at a seminar for examination reform in 
political history. Soon after that Kettunen and Turunen published, on the 
basis of their memorandum, a review article in historiallinen Aikakauskirja.10 
The authors described the renewal process of political history since the mid-
1960s as a ‘search for a living space’. They concluded that from about 1972 
certain signs of clearing up the identity crisis of political history could be 
observed. International contacts had been established and, due to several 
new research projects which had been started in 1972, research activities 
had become much livelier. 
International contacts
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the members of the RG who worked at 
the University, Haataja, Hentilä, Kalela and Turtola, resolutely sought 
international contacts. At that time, Finnish historians did not have very 
many of them. If research visits abroad were made, in most cases the aim 
was to acquire archival material for one’s own research work. So, as a matter 
of fact, the young scholars of the RG stood at that time at the forefront of the 
incipient internationalization of Finnish historians. It was important to the 
Group to establish contacts with the international top of labour historians 
and to search new methodological impulses. The aim was also to attain more 
effective tools for facing the challenges which were related to the disputed 
situation of political history. 
In the first half of the 1970s three important fora opened to the RG for 
international contacts:
1. Seminars with the Departments of History and Nordic Research of the 
University in Greifswald (G.D.R.)
2. Nordic seminars on labour movement’s history
10 Kettunen, Pauli & Turunen, Kimmo (1976) ’Elintilan etsintää: näkökohtia poliittisen historian historiasta 
Suomessa’. In Historiallinen Aikakauskirja, Vol. 2, pp. 240–250.
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3. Participation to the International Conferences of Labour and Social 
historians, organized annually in Linz, Austria. 
The seminar exchange between the Department of Political history in Helsinki 
and the aforementioned Departments in Greifswald was initiated in 1972. Four 
years later the cooperation was accepted to the official agreement on cultural 
cooperation between Finland and the G.D.R. The cooperation resulted in twelve 
history seminars and lasted until 1990. In the G.D.R. research on Finnish 
history, society and language was concentrated to Greifswald. However, in 
the long run, also historians and social scientists from other East German 
and Finnish universities contributed to the seminars. The exchange with the 
University of Greifswald offered an interesting lookout spot for the Finnish 
participants to observe the East German science world. 
The first Nordic seminar on the labour movement’s history was organized 
at the initiative of the Finnish RG in April 1974 at the Helsinki University 
Biological research centre in Lammi. Most of the participants from Finland 
and the other Nordic countries were young historians. Interest in labour 
history united them in general but their methodological approaches varied 
from conventional history to strict Marxism. The members of the RG were 
active in the Nordic labour history cooperation to the 1980s. Except for some 
breaks, these seminars were organized until only a few years ago. 
Since 1964 the labour history conferences in Linz offered one of the very 
few opportunities for historians and social scientist from the East and West 
to meet each other. Notwithstanding some political incendiaries, the standard 
of the seminars was high. The Finnish participants were able to benefit from 
the neutral position of their country and move flexibly, e.g. between East 
and West Germans who were all the time moping suspiciously around each 
other. Now and then one or another curious German colleague came and tried 
to find out by interrogating the Finns what the “other” Germans had been 
talking about. Perhaps the best profit from Linz to the novices from Finland in 
their first international conferences was making acquaintances with renowned 
labour and social historians like Wolfgang Abendroth, Helga Grebing, Eric J. 
Hobsbawm, Jürgen Kocka, Klaus Tenfelde and others. These contacts were 
by no means limited to so-called name dropping; in the following years all 
the aforementioned scholars visited Helsinki, and vice versa; some members 
of the RG were even able to hold guest lectures at their universities. 
Since his graduation in 1974 Pauli Kettunen belonged to the core of the 
RG. He presented his first international conference paper in the first Nordic 
labour history seminar in Lammi on 26 April 1974. He reviewed in his 
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paper the research situation on the labour movement’s history in Finland.11 
Next year, in May 1975, Kettunen participated in his first G.D.R. seminar in 
Greifswald, in which he presented an elaborated version of his review on the 
research situation in the labour movement’s history in Finland.12 The same 
year, in September 1975, six members of the RG participated with a collective 
paper13 to the international Labour history conference in Linz. The theme of 
the conference was the people’s front politics in the 1930s. Later, during the 
1970s, Kettunen presented several corporate papers at the G.D.R. seminars, 
especially with Jussi Turtola. The sincere aim of them was to test their Marxist-
oriented methodological approach and interpretations on labour history by 
international experts. Most of the papers were dealing with organizational 
forms or functional preconditions of the labour movement from the viewpoint 
of Social Democracy or trade unions. 
At least at those conferences where I was present, the response to Kettunen’s 
and Turtola’s presentations was certainly not as rewarding as they had 
expected. However, in international conferences it often happens that the 
most interesting talks are taking place in small groups during the free time. 
This was the case in Linz as well as in Greifswald. To avoid misunderstandings, 
Pauli Kettunen did not adopt his Marxist-oriented theoretical learning from 
Greifswald or Linz. As regards to the colleagues in the G.D.R., from their part 
the communication had to be held in a given framework which was ruled by the 
strict postulates of Marxism-Leninism. It was practically impossible for them to 
deviate from these postulates. Therefore their readiness or in some cases even 
capacity to open theoretical debate was limited. More important to Kettunen, 
too, were personal contacts which he established in Linz, especially to the 
so-called Marburg school. The figurehead of this group of younger scholars 
was the renowned Marxist political scientist Wolfgang Abendroth. Kettunen 
and some other members of the RG upheld vivid contacts with Abendroth’s 
younger colleagues Georg Fülberth, Frank Deppe and Reinhard Kühnl. This 
11 Kettunen, Pauli (1974) ’Forskningsläget i Finland’. In Hentilä, Seppo & Saarinen, Hannes (eds) 
Forskningsläget inom arbetarrörelsens historia i Norden. Material från det första nordiska seminariet för 
forskningen rörande arbetarrörelsens historia, hållet i Helsingfors och Lammi 25–28 april 1974. Helsingin 
yliopiston Poliittisen historian laitoksen julkaisuja 2/1974, pp. 93–106.
12 Kettunen, Pauli (1975) ‘Die Forschung der Geschichte der finnischen Arbeiterbewegung‘. In Nordeuropa-
Studien. Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität Greifswald. Sonderheft 
1/1975. Materialien des dritten gemeinsamen Seminars der Sektionen Nordeuropawissenschaften und 
Geschichtswissenschaft der Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität Greifswald und des Instituts für Politische 
Geschichte der Universität Helsinki. Greifswald 1975, pp. 38–57.
13 Haataja, Lauri, Hentilä Seppo, Kalela Jorma, Kettunen Pauli, Saarinen, Hannes & Turtola, Jussi (1978) 
‘Die finnische Volksfrontpolitik und ihre Aktionsvoraussetzungen in den 30er Jahren‘. In Internationale 
Tagung der Historiker der Arbeiterbewegung. XI. Linzer Konferenz 1975. Wien 1978, pp. 139–151.
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group of sociologists and political scientists was one of the most important 
Marxist-oriented scholarly communities in West Germany. The publications 
of the Marburg colleagues were dealing with problems like Marxism and trade 
unions, class consciousness of the workers and theories on fascism.14
Probably the longest lasting profit from the international conferences, also 
for Kettunen, was the preparation work of the papers, connected with the 
intensive reading of theoretical texts and other literature, to say nothing of 
the laborious finishing of texts in German, which was the lingua franca of 
Marxist-oriented historians and social scientists during the 1970s.15 This was 
undoubtedly a very important learning process for Kettunen. The problems 
he was dealing with in the seminar papers reflect the development of his 
theoretical learning through the years. On Kettunen’s website there is a link to a 
complete list of his scholarly publications by 1990, in which we can find eleven 
articles, based on conference papers presented in the G.D.R. seminars, at Linz 
conferences or in the Nordic labour history seminars.16 Six of these conference 
papers has Kettunen also listed in the bibliography of his dissertation (see 
pp. 518–519). 
Political movement and social collectivity
Since 1976 Pauli Kettunen was provided with full-time funding by the post of 
research assistant at the Academy of Finland. This assignment was prolonged 
until 1981 and followed by a researcher posts in two projects of the Academy 
until 1987 when Kettunen’s dissertation was finished.17 During the 1970s 
it was obligatory to the postgraduate students to take the licentiate’s exam 
which included a thesis. Kettunen’s licentiate thesis on Social Democracy and 
the Labour Union movement in Finland, 1918–1930,18 was finished in 1979. 
The subtitle of the study, ‘Social Democracy as “Carrier” of Workers’ Social 
14 We can find several references to the publications of the Marburg colleagues in Kettunen’s dissertation; 
see eg. pp. 45, 47, 93–94, 101–102.
15 Therefore it is not by chance that Kettunen enclosed a German ‘Zusemmanfassung’ to his dissertation. 
16 Kettunen, Pauli: Complete list of scholarly pulications  
<http://blogs.helsinki.fi/ptkettun/files/2005/05/kettunen_publ.pdf> [accessed on 29 Oct 2012]. 
17 Also in continuation, from 1987 to 2000, Kettunen was employed by the Finnish Academy as project 
researcher, research fellow as well as project leader. Since 2000 he is professor of Political history at 
the University of Helsinki.
18 Kettunen, Pauli (1979) Sosiaalidemokratia ja ammattiyhdistysliike Suomessa 1918–1930. Tutkimus 
suomalaisesta sosialidemokratiasta työväestön sosiaalisen kollektiivisuuden kantajana. Unpublished 
Licentiate Thesis in political history. University of Helsinki (523 pp.).
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Collectivity’, crystallized the methodological approach which Kettunen was 
elaborating further for his dissertation.
The licentiate thesis was often meant to be a preliminary study for the 
doctoral dissertation and the results of theoretical as well as empirical work 
should be accumulated in the dissertation. This was also Kettunen’s aim and 
the procedure which he followed. In his statement to the Faculty of Social 
Sciences, the examiner of the thesis, Hannu Soikkanen, acknowledged the 
excellent credit of Kettunen’s work: ‘... the endeavour to a total interpretation 
and a successful and rich empirical analysis unite exceptionally” in the thesis.19 
The other examiner, Jorma Kalela, finished his statement with a surprising 
proposal which was meant to accentuate the extraordinary merits of Kettunen’s 
work: ‘... the study undoubtedly fulfils the requirements, decreed to a doctoral 
dissertation’ (accentuation, S. H.).20 According to Kalela, the research work 
was definitively finished: it was not possible to improve it any more. Therefore 
he advised Kettunen to choose a new research topic. As we can see Kettunen 
did not abide by the advice of his supervisor.
In the first phase of his work, during the 1970s, the most important scholarly 
community to Kettunen was the so-called West German University Marxism. 
There were several groupings and tendencies which could be counted to this 
school. However, it was common to them all that they were searching for 
‘original Marx’. Marxism should be cleaned from different theoretical layers 
which had been attached to it during the later decades. ‘Original’ or ‘genuine’ 
Marx could be found in the capital logic, which was the form of Marx’s critic 
of political economy. (pp. 33–36)
Kettunen defined his key concept, Social Collectivity, on the basis of Marx’s 
economy critic, in which the form of wage labour as a mercantile is a form 
of capitalist subordination and the condition for adding surplus value to the 
capital. According to Kettunen, the indispensible condition for the organising of 
the labour movement was that the immediate needs of the wage workers and 
their interests could be collectively experienced and articulated by the workers. 
Therefore Kettunen definitively disclaimed the efforts of some West German 
Marxists who tried to explain the formation of the state by returning it to the 
capital logic. (p. 40) This so-called staatsableitung debate, and especially the 
contribution of the strictest representatives of the West German school of 
19 Examiner’s statement to the Faculty of Social Sciences on 30 October 1979 (Hannu Soikkanen).
20 Examiner’s statement to the Faculty of Social Sciences on 11 December 1979 (Jorma Kalela).
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capital logic, was followed and debated also by some other Marxist-oriented 
social scientists in Finland.21
The way how Kettunen constructed his research problem and method can 
be described as the systematic exclusion of incorrect or inadequate theoretical 
approaches and historical interpretations. This exclusion was based on an 
exhaustive critic of previous literature. As mentioned above, Kettunen was 
actively involved with the research project of the RG, which resulted in 1976 
in the book on the history of the labour movement in Finland (suomen 
työväenliikkeen historia). I dare to claim that the participation to intensive 
debates in the book manuscript was the most beneficial part of Kettunen’s 
postgraduate training. Therefore, it is not surprising that a thorough critic on 
the book was one of the cornerstones when Kettunen started to construct his 
methodology. The genuine aim of the RG had been to present an alternative 
interpretation to the traditional way of writing history which limits itself on 
the description of events and ideas and explains the course of history by the 
motives of contemporaries. In the new ‘total’ interpretation the history of 
capitalist society and the history of the labour movement should be united, 
and politics and ideology should be returned to class interests which originated 
in the economy. 
In his critic, Kettunen stated that the exaggeration of the economic factors 
was by no means the most serious failure of the interpretation in suomen 
työväenliikkeen historia. More problematic was that economy, politics and 
ideology were taken as isolated categories, and the relations between them 
were researched without discussing the historical character of the differences 
between them. The approach was reductionist. It returned the phenomena of 
‘superstructure’ (politics, ideology) to ‘basis’ (economy). While the history of 
events operates inside politics and ideology, historical materialism searches 
causal relations between these categories by explaining politics with economy. 
The main problem of this approach was, according to Kettunen, that it is not 
able to reach the history of ‘happening and making’ in which time is measured 
by clock and calendar. However, Kettunen acknowledges that the way how the 
‘total’ interpretation of suomen työväenliikkeen historia had been achieved – 
by neglecting the decisions and motives of living people – was one of the most 
important challenges when he started to construct his own methodological 
approach. (pp. 27–28) 
21 See especially the dissertation by Hänninen, Sakari (1981) Aika, paikka, politiikka. Marxilaisen 
valtioteorian konstituutiosta ja metodista. Oulu: Tutkijaliiton julkaisusarja n:o 17.
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It is interesting to note how Kettunen defines his position to historical 
conceptualisation although he presents it en passant in a footnote. According 
to him, it is possible to describe conceptualisation as a series of stepwise 
deepening questions: to describe WHAT is a question of a chronicle; to describe 
HOW is a question of Rankean historiography; to explain WHY is a question 
of research which is searching for external causal relationships. According to 
Kettunen, the explanandum and the explanans should be faded out and the 
analysis should be made to reach the multi-layered and non-linear character 
of history behind them. Then it is possible to formulate the question to explain 
HOW.(p. 31, footnote 18; accentuations, S. H.) 
Kettunen’s aim in his dissertation was to clarify how political and social 
collectivity are united as constitutive prerequisites of the labour movement.
(p. 43) The relationship of workers’ social collectivity and the political nature of 
the labour movement is crystallised in the organisation forms of the movement. 
Therefore, the organisation should stay in the focus of the study. The view 
from inside the movement makes it possible to take the subjectivity of the 
movement into account. Kettunen admits that this approach would restrict 
possibilities to observe the everyday life and experiences of the ‘carriers’ of 
the movement. Also the main sources of the study were the files of the central 
organisations of the labour movement. However, an important part of the 
source material was correspondence between the central organisations and 
the active members of the local associations. (p. 45) 
Breakthrough of reformism
The development of the labour movement in Finland after the Civil War 1918 – 
as in many other European countries just during and after the First World War 
– has been described as breakthrough of reformism. Hannu Soikkanen had 
asked in his article in 1967 ‘Why didn’t revisionism find support in Finland’s 
‘old’ [before 1918 – S.H.] labour movement?’22 On the other hand, why had 
reformism broken through in the Swedish labour movement already before 
1914, as Seppo Hentilä had asked in his dissertation, published in 1979?23 
Kettunen takes these two observations of earlier research as his starting point. 
22 Soikkanen, Hannu (1967) ’Miksi revisionismi ei saanut kannatusta Suomen vanhassa työväenliikkeessä?’ 
In Hyvämäki, Lauri (ed.) Oman ajan historia ja politiikan tutkimus. Otava: Helsinki, pp. 183–199.
23 Hentilä, Seppo (1979) Den svenska arbetarklassen och reformismens genombrott inom SAP före 
1914. Arbetarklassens ställning, strategi och ideologi. Historiallisia tutkimuksia n:o 111: Helsinki; 
<https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/28228>
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Soikkanen and Hentilä, although approaching the problem of reformism from 
different angles, gave, as a matter of fact, parallel answers to the problem. In 
the comparison between the organisations of Finnish and Swedish labour 
movements, a considerable difference became evident: nowhere near as 
in Sweden had the labour movement in Finland risen from the immediate 
collective experience of wage labour. This important perception was clearly 
justified by the fact that the political labour movement in Finland was much 
stronger than the trade union movement, and when the Social Democrats 
lost their lead in the trade unions to the Left Socialists and Communists they 
were able to keep their majority in parliamentary and municipal elections 
throughout the 1920s. (p. 47)
In his dissertation Hentilä had tried to give an empiric explanation to the 
early breakthrough of reformism in the Swedish labour movement by falling 
back to the dominance of so-called labour aristocracy in the trade unions 
which were as collective members of the Social Democratic Labour Party the 
absolute core of the whole movement. The concept of labour aristocracy dates 
back to Lenin’s theory on imperialism and Engels’ writings on the situation 
of the English working class. References to labour aristocracy can be found in 
literature quite often, e.g. in some texts by Eric J. Hobsbawm. Without taking 
any position to the theory of labour aristocracy as such, Kettunen points out 
that in this approach one’s attention is drawn to the organisation of the trade 
union movement as a possible basis of reformism. (pp. 10–11)
Firstly, one could ask, whether reformism was the natural mainstream in 
the development of the labour movement or was it a deviation from the original 
revolutionary destination. Secondly, the phrase ‘breakthrough of reformism’ 
implied that there might have been a revolutionary phase in the development 
of the labour movement before reformism. But had this kind of phase existed 
in the Swedish or Finnish labour movement or was the constellation just 
imagined or theoretical? At least in the historiography on the Swedish labour 
movement, the interpretation has quite often been such that the movement 
has actually never been revolutionary. (p. 25) 
In his dissertation Kettunen definitively disclaimed such a uni-levelled and 
linear contemporary history, which tries to explain the past with the present 
by taking as its starting point processes which it has first separated from the 
present. On the other hand, historical research should not be contented to 
break false generalisations and myths. It should search relationships between 
continuity and change as well as the general and specific. (pp. 17–18)
The contribution of Kettunen’s dissertation both to the history of the 
labour movement and to Finnish historical research in general, is by no means 
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restricted only to the theoretical strength of the study. More valuable is that 
Kettunen also succeeded to implement his methodology to practical research. 
His narrative is not ruled, as conventionally, by a chain of events but by the 
relationship between political and social collectivity as constitutive prerequisites 
of the labour movement. The structure of the dissertation corresponds to 
Kettunen’s theoretical approach and the results of the research are crystallized 
in the formulation of the subheadings of the chapters.24 Findings from real 
history serve as arguments and Kettunen’s narrative is based on them.
No historian before Kettunen had researched the development of the Finnish 
labour movement from 1918 to 1930 as thoroughly as he did. His empiric study 
on original source material, contemporary newspapers and literature is, as a 
work presentation just incomparable. The text has been finished off carefully 
to the finest detail. Kettunen’s documentation is exemplary and his references 
are informative. In his footnotes Kettunen conducts debates on interpretations 
of earlier research which could have been situated to the text as well. Many 
of his footnotes are as such independent miniature studies. 
Between historical social science and history of everyday life
Pauli Kettunen’s aim to develop his methodology to something which could be 
defined as ‘historical social science’ was recognized already by the examiners of 
his licentiate thesis, Jorma Kalela and Hannu Soikkanen, in 1979. According 
to Kalela, the way how Kettunen conceptualized historical processes referred 
to a new scientific discipline, ‘historical social science’. At least in Finland 
there were no previous examples of applying this kind of methodology to 
practical research.25
The term ‘historical social science’ (historiallinen yhteiskuntatiede) was in 
Finland since the mid-1970s, quite often connected to the so-called Bielefeld 
School of younger historians in West Germany who called their methodological 
approach ‘historische sozialwissenschaft’ or ‘Gesellschaftsgeschichte’. As 
regards concept of ‘social science history’ (yhteiskuntahistoria), it was used 
in 1978 more or less as terminus technicus in the examination reform of the 
Faculty of Social Sciences to name the combination of two historical disciplines, 
Political history and Economic and social history. As these two disciplines were 
24 The subheadings of the dissertation are as follows: Tendencies of workers’ social collectivity (4); 
Organizational relationship of Social Democracy to workers’ social collectivity (5); Social Democracy 
and State (6); Social Democratic Labour Union movement (7). 
25 Examiner’s statement to the Faculty of Social Sciences on 11 December 1979 (Jorma Kalela).
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united in 1995 to a common Department, the name of the new institution 
became the Department of Social Science History.26 
In Kettunen’s dissertation we can find only a couple of mentions of the 
concept ‘historical social science’ (historiallinen yhteiskuntatiede). The term 
‘social science history’ (yhteiskuntahistoria) does not appear even once. It is 
an important thing to note that Kettunen does not construct his methodology 
on the basis of conceptual history but on the profound critic of different 
approaches of historical research. He argues for his own methodology by 
systematic closing out the approaches which are insufficient to his use. When 
Kettunen once or twice describes his methodology as historical social science, 
he will prevent misunderstandings by pointing out: ‘The aim is not to attach the 
approach of this research to the concept of historical social science (Historische 
Sozialwissenschaft) which uses theories of social sciences as e.g. modernization 
theories to prove historical entities, structures and causal relations, advocated 
by the West German historians Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka.’ (p. 
17, footnote 39) 
Every reader of Kettunen’s dissertation has certainly perceived that the 
appropriation of the author’s argumentation is an exceptional hard piece of 
work. It is not only because of the thorough theoretical conceptualization 
but also of the avalanche of empirical arguments which make the reading 
most challenging. Even the examiners of Kettunen’s thesis, Soikkanen and 
Kalela, complained about the problems with the language, although from 
different angles. Professor Soikkanen confessed that some parts of Kettunen’s 
licentiate thesis were downright incomprehensible to him. Kettunen’s aim to 
develop history to a social science brought him further and further from the 
standard language and his text became more and more abstruse. According 
to Soikkanen the better Kettunen’s new concepts helped to specify, the more 
clarity and legibility suffered. ‘If we continue longer in this direction there is 
a risk that historiography loses its readers.’27
In his pre-examiners statement, Kalela pointed out that Kettunen’s 
dissertation manuscript consisted of 747 pages, but there was not a single 
chapter in it which could be described as ‘soft’ or ‘loose’ text. ‘The dissertation 
is heavy reading’.28 However, Kettunen’s language is grammatically perfect 
26 This was not only a formal organisational reform. During the following years social science history was 
developed in teaching and research cooperation in the new Department. Since 2000 Pauli Kettunen 
has been as Professor of political history one of the strongest advocators of the cooperation in social 
science history. 
27 Examiner’s statement to the Faculty of Social Sciences on 30 October 1979 (Hannu Soikkanen).
28 Pre-examiner’s statement to the Faculty of Social Sciences on 6 October 1987 (Jorma Kalela).
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and his narrative is fluent. An ingenious saying from Savo in Eastern 
Finland, where Kettunen was born, comes to mind: ‘When someone from 
Savo opens his mouth the responsibility will be moved immediately to the 
listener.’ Of Kettunen’s critics, Kalela was one of the few who were ready to 
take the responsibility. According to Kalela, the main problem in Kettunen’s 
presentation was rooted to the fact that ‘European man’ is used to understand 
history as a chain of events following each other and located into a certain 
time dimension in a chronological order.29 Therefore we have to consider, 
what kind of preconditions we should put to the conceptualization of real 
historical processes, in order to be able to fill the requirement of attaching 
our presentation to the historical consciousness of our own contemporaries. 
Kalela admits, however, that Kettunen does not even claim that his work is 
‘normal’ historical study, but instead its aim is to be historical social science. 
Still, he doubts if social scientists would possess sufficient basic knowledge of 
Finnish history to be able to follow Kettunen’s argumentation.30
In his pre-examiner’s statement on Kettunen’s dissertation in 1986, Kalela 
was wondering, how reasoned it had been to work out an ensemble which 
was based on a performance, enough to produce several dissertations of high 
quality at the same time: ‘Seven years ago I presented to the Faculty of Social 
Sciences my statement on Kettunen’s licentiate thesis which was dealing with 
the same thematic and was almost identically structured as this thesis.’ Why 
on earth had Kettunen continued to elaborate on the research work which 
had been completely finished already in 1979? However, Kalela was ready to 
acknowledge that compared to the licentiate thesis, the theoretical as well as 
the empirical analysis especially concerning the contents of the political had 
been significantly enlarged and deepened.31
More important than those seven years as such are the new trends which 
had become predominant in the theoretical debates on historical research 
since the so-called linguistic turn in the second half of the 1970s. Kettunen 
is ready to admit that debates on the so-called new history movement did 
not influence his theoretical premises. When he had started to construct the 
methodological approach of his dissertation in the mid-1970s, the triangle 
Conventional history – Social sciences – Marxism had been standing 
in the focus of the theoretical discussion. (p. 17). Although history from below 
29 Kalela, Jorma (1987) ‘Historiallisen prosessin käsitteellistäminen ja historiallinen aika’. Historiallinen 
Aikakauskirja Vol 2, p. 119.
30 Ibid. pp. 126 –127.
31 Pre-examiner’s statement to the Faculty of Social Sciences on 6 October 1987 (Jorma Kalela).
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had accentuated the subjectivity of people as makers of their own history it 
would be, according to Kettunen, clumsy eclecticisms to try to construct the 
‘Method’ for the research of the labour movement’s history by uniting Marx’ 
critic of political economy and history of everyday life. (p. 32) 
Kalela is clearly discontented with Kettunen’s way to face the challenges 
of the postmodernist critic on historical research. This is easy to understand 
because Kalela was at the time of the completion of Kettunen’s dissertation 
one of the leading advocates of the history movement in Finland. In his project 
on the history of the Finnish Paper Mill Workers’ Union, Kalela had organized 
several history workshops and study circles in which union members were 
writing their own. He also published theoretical articles on memory research.32 
Kalela refers to the topical cultural debate of the 1980s in which one of the 
main arguments was that the historical modernity which had taken shape in 
the eighteenth century Enlightenment was dissolving. This debate has not been 
Kettunen’s starting point. However, Kettunen had delivered by his dissertation 
a brilliant contribution to the need of defining the special characteristics of 
political history as a historical discipline.33 Towards the end of the 1980s the 
discussion on the nature of historical research had turned to a new angle.
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The Finnish Society for Labour History1 was established in January 1984. 
The aim of the society was to provide a joint forum for both professional and 
non-professional labour historians, and to promote research on the history, 
theory and culture of the working class, the labour movement and working 
life. Another goal of the society was to promote an interest in labour history 
among the Finnish working class. The first seminars organised by the society 
attracted not only academic scholars but also trade union activists and factory 
workers who were involved in study circles (history workshops) and were 
thus themselves doing ‘history from below’. During its first years, the society 
brought together labour history scholars from several universities, in particular 
the Universities of Tampere and Helsinki. One of the young social science 
historians from the University of Helsinki was Pauli Kettunen, whom the first 
chair of the society, Professor Olli Vehviläinen, remembers as having been 
particularly keen on developing theoretical discussions about labour history.2 
Many of Kettunen’s contributions to the first publications of the society dealt 
with the ongoing historiographical and theoretical discussions that reflected 
various approaches in labour history.3 In 1993 Pauli Kettunen followed Olli 
Vehviläinen as chair and led the society until 1998.
1 The Finnish title is Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura. Originally, the English translation 
was the Finnish Society for Labour History and Cultural Traditions, but later the Society’s website 
assumed the shorter version of the name in English. http://www.helsinki.fi/jarj/thpts/intro.html 
(accessed 20 January 2013). 
2 Vehviläinen, Olli (2004) ’Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura 20 vuotta’. Työväentutkimus 
2004. Available http://www.thpts.fi/mika-thpts/tyovaen-historian-ja-perinteen-tutkimuksen-seura-
20-vuotta/ (accessed 1 December 2012); Vehviläinen, Olli (1985) ’Alkusanat’. In Jaakkola, Jouko & 
Vehviläinen, Olli (eds), Työväen historiaa ja perinnettä. Väki voimakas I. Tampere: Työväen historian ja 
perinteen tutkimuksen seura.
3 On labour history in Finland, see Kettunen, Pauli (1985) ’Työväen historian tutkimus Suomessa’. In 
Jaakkola, Jouko & Vehviläinen, Olli (eds), Työväen historiaa ja perinnettä. Väki voimakas I. Tampere: 
Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura, 9–22; On the historiography of trade unions, 
see Kettunen, Pauli (1987) ’Ammattiyhdistysliikkeen historiallinen ja kriittinen tutkimus – onko sillä 
edellytyksiä?’. In Hyrkkänen, Markku, Vehviläinen, Olli & Hannikainen, Juha (eds), Näkökulmia työväen 
ammatilliseen ja paikalliseen historiaan. Väki voimakas 3. Tampere: Työväen historian ja perinteen 
tutkimuksen seura, 9–22.
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Another explicit ambition of the society was to promote international, 
especially Nordic, co-operation in labour history. In addition to Väki voimakas, 
a publication series in Finnish, the society launched Papers on labour history, 
with volumes in English, German and the Scandinavian languages. Pauli 
Kettunen’s contribution has been significant in the international outreach of 
the society. det nordiska i den nordiska arbetarrörelsen, the first volume of 
Papers on labour history, was edited by him in 1986, only two years after 
the foundation of the society and soon after the first collection of essays was 
published in Finnish. Among the first six volumes there were four publications 
in Swedish, three of which were edited by Kettunen. In addition to det nordiska, 
he edited the volume Arbete och nordisk samhällsmodell together with Tapio 
Rissanen in 1995 and the volume lokalt och internationellt. dimensioner i 
den nordiska arbetarrörelsen och arbetarkultur in 2002. The publications of 
the Finnish Society for Labour History in themselves indicate that since the 
1980s Pauli Kettunen has been concerned with Nordic comparisons, Nordic 
co-operation and the conceptualization of ‘Nordic’ as a transnational concept. 
He has made a patent contribution to connecting the Finnish and the Nordic 
historiography, in particular in the field of labour history, and he has discussed 
Finland in its Nordic context.
My aim in this essay is to present one of Pauli Kettunen’s scholarly 
environments, the Finnish Society for Labour History, from two particular 
perspectives. The first perspective is the Nordic dimension, which was developed 
by Kettunen already in the 1980s. Finnish historians, including scholars in the 
field of labour history, have traditionally had close Nordic contacts. The oldest 
institution is the Nordic History Conference, nordiskt historikermöte, which 
has been held ever since 1905; moreover, several specialized conferences and 
inter-Nordic research projects have served as common arenas for knowledge 
exchange and comparisons.4 The second perspective discussed here is related 
to gender issues, which clearly gained ground in Finnish labour history during 
Kettunen’s term as the chair of the society in the 1990s. In the 1970s and 
1980s, Finnish research in labour history had sought inspiration not only 
from German labour historians but also from British Marxist historians. The 
latter, in particular, struggled with ‘the unhappy marriage of Marxism and 
Feminism’, as the well-known British feminist scholar Heidi Hartmann has 
4 On research on Nordic co-operation, see Haggrén, Heidi, Hemstad, Ruth & Marjanen, Jani (eds) (2005) 
Civilsamhällets Norden. Papers presenterade på ett seminarium om nordiskt samarbete i januari 2004. 
Helsinki: CENS; Stenius, Henrik & Götz, Norbert, Forskning om det nordiska samarbetet: Bokslut och 
framtidsperspektiv. http://www.helsinki.fi/cens/pdf/ns_PMnordisktsamarbete.pdf (accessed 1 February 
2013).
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aptly put it.5 Therefore, my second focus is on gender and labour, i.e. the 
ways in which the relationship between gender history or feminist history 
and labour history was addressed in the publications of the Finnish Society 
for Labour History. A parallel discussion on the Nordic dimensions of Finnish 
labour history and the gender perspective in Finnish labour history is also 
motivated by the fact that Nordic women’s history conferences have been 
regularly organised since 1983.
Labour history goes Nordic
The Nordic dimension has been important for labour history in Finland. In 
addition to the Nordic History Conferences, specialized conferences on labour 
history have been arranged since the 1970s. After the first Nordic Conference for 
Labour History, held in 1974 in Finland, labour historians met approximately 
every second year in the different Nordic countries; in 1983 the conference 
was back in Finland, and the Finnish Society for Labour History published 
the conference report as the first volume of Papers on labour history. Pauli 
Kettunen edited the volume and wrote a short preface, although his own 
contribution to the conference was not among the presentations published in 
the volume.6 In the Preface, he pointed out that the Nordic conferences, in the 
same way as the national Finnish conferences, were open to both academic 
and non-academic historians interested in different aspects of labour history. 
The themes of the fifth Nordic conference in 1983 were ostensibly divided 
between the Labour movement and the welfare state in the Nordic countries 
on the one hand, and the working-class movement and cultural traditions in 
the Arctic Region on the other. However, according to Kettunen, the concept 
‘Nordic’ was the common denominator, and he asked what ‘Nordic’ meant in 
the Nordic working-class movement.7
The Nordic conferences dealing with the labour movement and working life 
seemed to be close to the publication profile of the Finnish Society for Labour 
History. While the second volume of Papers on labour history concentrated 
5 Hartmann, Heidi (1979) ‘The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive 
Union’. Capital & Class, Vol. 8, Issue 3, 1–33.
6 Kettunen, Pauli (ed.) (1986) Det nordiska i den nordiska arbetarrörelsen. Femte nordiska konferensen 
för forskning i arbetarrörelsens historia, Tammerfors, den 23–27 augusti 1983. Papers presented at the 
Fifth Nordic Conference for Labour History. Papers on Labour History I. Tampere: Finnish Society for 
Labour History and Cultural Traditions.
7 Kettunen, Pauli (1986a) ’Preface’. In Kettunen 1986.
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on the collapse of the Second International and was published in German, the 
third volume returned to the Nordic context. It consisted of the conference 
report from the 1989 Third Nordic Conference on Working-Class Culture, with 
‘Everyday Life, Consciousness and Class’ as its main theme. These conferences 
were initiated in the 1980s and the first meeting was held in Copenhagen in 
1983; they brought together Nordic scholars in particular from the fields of 
ethnology, folklore and the history of the working-class.8 Thus, one aspect of the 
multidimensional profiles of the society was reflected in the first international 
publications, too. In addition to connecting professional and non-professional 
labour historians, the society aimed to bridge research done by historians, 
ethnologists, folklorists and other scholars of working-class culture.
In 1995 the society served as a publication forum for the Fourth Nordic 
Conference on the History of Industrial Relations. Pauli Kettunen was both 
a co-editor of the collection and one of the authors. The major theme of the 
conference was ‘The Nordic Model’, and the papers were organised into three 
thematic sections: the Nordic model of industrial relations, the history of 
the Nordic welfare state and the changing meanings of work.9 The Nordic 
Conferences on the History of Industrial Relations were also initiated in the 
1980s: the first conference took place in Kungälv in Sweden in 1985. The 1980s 
were in many ways a period during which new Nordic platforms for labour 
history and other so-called new histories were established.10 Kettunen’s own 
contribution, which discussed wage labour and Nordic democracy in Finland, 
was a good example of his endeavour to set Finnish labour relations in the 
Nordic context.11
In September 1999, the Tenth Nordic Conference for Labour History was 
organised in Turku in Finland, and the Finnish Society for Labour History, 
one of the organisers, was again willing to provide a publication forum for the 
8 Jokela, Paavo (ed.) (1988) Der Zusammenbruch der Zweiten Internationale. Konferenzvorträge, 
Tampere, 23.–24. November 1985. Papers on Labour History II. Tampere: Finnish Society for Labour 
History and Cultural Traditions; Båsk, Katia, Metsänkylä, Antti & Koskiranta, Katarina (eds) (1991) 
Arbetarklassen i samhällets vardag. The Working Class in the Everyday Life of Society. Tredje nordiska 
arbetarkulturseminariet i Tammerfors, Finland 4.–6. september 1989. Papers on Labour History III. 
Tampere: Finnish Society for Labour History and Cultural Traditions.
9 Kettunen, Pauli & Rissanen, Tapio (eds) (1995) Arbete och nordisk samhällsmodell. Texter från den fjärde 
nordiska konferensen för historisk arbetslivsforskning, Helsingfors och Kiljava den 16–19 september 1993. 
Papers on Labour History IV. Tampere: Finnish Society for Labour History and Cultural Traditions.
10 The concept ‘new histories’ refers to labour history, oral history and women’s history, among others. 
In the 1980s several new Nordic networks were created.
11 Kettunen, Pauli (1995) ’Lönarbetet och den nordiska demokratin i Finland’. In Kettunen & Rissanen 
1995.
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revised papers presented at the conference.12 The theme of the conference, 
‘Local and International – Dimensions in the Nordic Labour Movement’, 
was reflected in the introduction written by Pauli Kettunen. He justified the 
choice of the theme by problematizing the nation state as a given unit of 
historical analysis and stated that local and global perspectives in the labour 
movement and in the history of working-class culture provided fruitful tools 
for questioning the predominance of the national perspective in labour history 
and historical research in general. The labour movement was an international 
movement, but it was, according to Kettunen, anchored in locally structured 
daily practices, national organisations and national cultures which formed 
structures that gave the movement a particular direction and reciprocally were 
themselves influenced by the movement. Furthermore, Kettunen suggested 
that the on-going scholarly discussions concerning the concepts ‘global’, ‘local’ 
and ‘national’ could provide fruitful perspectives on the history of the labour 
movement and working-class culture. While labour history might traditionally 
have understood ‘local’, ‘national’ and ‘international’ as referring to different 
organisational levels, in the light of new theoretical discussions Kettunen 
would rather conceptualise them as different aspects of one and the same 
agency.13 Local and global perspectives challenged Nordic labour historians to 
problematize not only the local and international dimensions of labour history 
but also the national as a primary way of understanding labour organisations 
and working-class cultures.
In his problematization of the concept ‘Nordic’ after the 1980s, Pauli 
Kettunen was clearly moving towards transnational conceptualisations. In 
1986, he asked what the Nordic meant in the Nordic labour movement. In 
2002, when he discussed the local and international aspects of Nordic labour 
history, he interpreted norden (the Nordic Countries) as an international 
and transnational (inter- och övernationell) context in which the national 
institutions, identities and popular movements were shaped in the five Nordic 
countries.14 In none of these volumes, published by the Finnish Society for 
Labour History, did Kettunen take the concept ‘Nordic’ for granted; rather, 
‘What is Nordic?’ has remained one of the key questions in his scholarly work.
12 Kettunen, Pauli (ed.) (2002) Lokalt och internationellt. Dimensioner i den nordiska arbetarrörelsen och 
arbetarkulturen. Papers on Labour History VI. Tammerfors: Sällskapet för forskning i arbetarhistoria i 
Finland.
13 Kettunen, Pauli (2002a) ’Inledning’. In Kettunen 2002, 7–8.
14 Kettunen 2002a, 9.
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Gendering labour history
In the 1980s, women and gender remained invisible as scholarly topics in the 
labour history publications issued by the Finnish Society for Labour History. 
Women were present in the society, and they contributed to the first volumes, 
but the ways in which they problematized women’s issues or integrated gender 
perspectives in their analyses remained rather cautious. Among the ten essays 
published in the first volume of Väki voimakas, only one was written by a 
female scholar, Marja Järvelä, who discussed changes in life style as challenges 
in workers’ communities.15 In the course of her essay she demonstrated the 
ways in which women’s and men’s experiences of work and family differed in 
a changing society and the ways in which women and men encountered new 
challenges in industrial communities. Järvelä was very clear that women’s road 
from working on small farms to industrial labour differed from that taken by 
men.16 In my reading, Järvelä did not explicate gender as an analytical category, 
nor did she raise the question of gender as such, but gender difference was 
an explicit starting point in her biographical approach.
While Marja Järvelä was a social scientist who carried out research on 
current changes in industrial communities, some other contributions in the 
first volume were written by social historians who were interested in the history 
of the daily life of the working classes. Jouko Jaakkola and Heikki Näreikkö, in 
particular, mentioned several gender-related matters and in doing so showed 
that in the 1980s Finnish labour historians did not take it for granted that the 
so-called ‘ordinary worker’ was a man. Jaakkola presented women’s history as 
one of the new approaches in social history; furthermore, he drew attention 
to some aspects of agency among female factory workers, female servants, 
married working-class men and female paupers, among others. Näreikkö, 
for his part, used estate inventories of working-class widows to illustrate the 
character of typical working-class homes.17 Women were present in the social 
history of everyday life, but the gender perspective was not developed as a 
systematic approach.
15 Järvelä, Marja (1985) ’Elämäntavan muutos työläisyhteisön ja yksilöiden kehityshaasteena’. In Jaakkola, 
Jouko & Vehviläinen, Olli (eds), Työväen historiaa ja perinnettä. Väki voimakas I. Tampere: Työväen 
historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura, 119–145.
16 Järvelä 1985, 121.
17 Jaakkola, Jouko (985) ’Työläisten arkipäivän ongelmat Tampereella teollistumisen alkuvaiheessa’. In 
Jaakkola, Jouko & Vehviläinen, Olli (eds), Työväen historiaa ja perinnettä. Väki voimakas I. Tampere: 
Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura, 71–88; Näreikkö, Heikki (1985) ’Tampereen työväestön 
aineellinen elintaso vuosina 1850–1910’. In Jaakkola, Jouko & Vehviläinen, Olli (eds), Työväen historiaa 
ja perinnettä. Väki voimakas I. Tampere: Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura, 89–106.
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The presence of women was acknowledged quite commonly by Finnish 
labour historians in connection with poverty, homes and housing or industrial 
labour. However, initially the works published by the Finnish Society for 
Labour History did not treat the history of politics, the labour movement and 
trade unions, or other similar subjects, as gendered. This bias is obvious in the 
third volume, which concentrated on the history of trade unions and workers’ 
organization at the local level. Most contributions concerning the labour 
movement ignored the gender perspective and did not reflect women’s and 
men’s differing positions on the labour market; Tenho Takalo’s contribution, 
however, was an exception. His article on the textile industry in the 1940s 
paid attention to the disparity between women’s and men’s wages, which was 
partly due to the fact that the textile industry did not follow the same model 
as most branches of industry during the post-WWII era.18
The gender-blind or gender-neutral tendency continued in the fourth 
volume of Väki voimakas, which concentrated on the impact of the Russian 
Revolution in Finland. Most of the authors were men, and the concepts they 
applied were not particularly gender-sensitive. Women authors entered the 
scene in the section where working-class people and the labour movement were 
discussed in the context of the situation after the Finnish Civil War of 1918. 
Ulla-Maija Peltonen’s contribution on memory culture, Tarja Hautamäki’s 
text about workers’ music and Mervi Kaarninen’s chapter on ‘Red orphans’ 
brought to the fore the impact of the Russian Revolution and the ensuing 
social processes that took place in Finland.19 In general, neither the volume on 
the history of trade unions nor the volume on war and revolution suggested 
that Finnish labour historians considered gender to be a crucial question to 
ask or a relevant category of analysis. However, numerous female scholars, 
including even some of those who contributed to these gender-neutral volumes, 
raised questions in other arenas about women’s and men’s participation in 
the labour movement and the significance of gender difference in the local 
18 Takalo, Tenho (1987) ’Kutomateollisuuden murros 1940-luvun lopulla’. In Hyrkkänen, Markku, 
Vehviläinen, Olli & Hannikainen, Juha (eds), Näkökulmia työväen ammatilliseen ja paikalliseen historiaan. 
Väki voimakas 3. Tampere: Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura, 81–118, especially 89–92.
19 Peltonen, Ulla-Maija (1990) ’Virkavalta ja muistitieto – punaisten elämäkerralliset muistelmat vuodesta 
1918’, Hautamäki, Tarja (1990) ’Keskusjohtoinen työväenmusiikki – työväen torvisoittokunnat’, 
Kaarninen, Mervi (1990) ’Punaorpojen huolto – köyhäinapua ja kasvatusta'. In Hannikainen, Juha, 
Hyrkkänen, Markku & Vehviläinen, Olli (eds) Suomi 1917. Väki voimakas 4. Tampere: Työväen historian 
ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura.
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context.20 Thus if we look at one only forum of historical discussion, we can 
easily draw misleading conclusions about the whole field of research. Rather, 
the single publication series reflects the preferences of the board members 
and other active members of the society at a given point.
The 1990s was in many ways the period during which women’s history 
and gender history became established in Finnish historiography. While in the 
1980s only a couple of pioneers conducted research on the history of women, 
there was nevertheless an evident upsurge in enthusiasm for women’s history 
among Finnish PhD students, and in the 1990s the first whole generation 
of women’s historians published their doctoral dissertations.21 Thus, it is 
no wonder that in this decade, during Pauli Kettunen’s reign (1993–1998), 
an increasing number of historians focusing on women and gender both 
attended the seminars organised by the Finnish Society for Labour History and 
contributed to its publications. In 1994, the seventh volume of Väki voimakas, 
edited by Raimo Parikka, contained three articles on women and women’s 
work. Anne Ollila, who had recently defended her doctoral dissertation on 
the history of Martta organisation (a Finnish home economics organisation), 
submitted two articles on rural women, and Maria Lähteenmäki, who was 
finalising her dissertation on the Social Democratic women’s movement, wrote 
about working mothers. In the following volume, published in 1996 and edited 
by Pauli Kettunen, Raimo Parikka and Anu Suoranta, two articles focused on 
the history of working-class women: one discussed working-class women’s 
participation in religious organisations and the other studied the ways in which 
working-class women were presented in films.22
Since the 1990s, two trends in women’s history and gender history have 
become evident in the publications of the society. On the one hand, articles 
explicitly dealing with women and gender have been published regularly, but 
20 For example, the collection of essays Tuntematon työläisnainen, edited by Leena Laine and Pirjo 
Markkola (1989) included Marjaana Valkonen’s essay on women in trade unions and Mervi Kaarninen’s 
essay on the education of working-class girls. In 1989 Ulla-Maija Peltonen published her highly 
interesting study Naisia turvasäilössä. Poliittisena naisvankina Suomessa 1930–1944.
21 In the first half of the 1990s, Alexandra Ramsay, Anne Ollila, Vuokko Lepistö, Pirjo Markkola, Maritta 
Pohls, Arja-Liisa Räisänen, Maria Lähteenmäki, Mervi Kaarninen and Marianne Liljeström were among 
those students of women’s history who defended their doctoral dissertations. Markkola, Pirjo (2003) 
’Suomalaisen naishistorian vuosikymmenet’. Historiallinen Aikakauskirja, Vol 101, Issue 1, 56–57.
22 Ollila, Anne (1994) ’Maalaisnaisen työn muuttuminen’ (59–65) and ’Emäntä’ (335–350). In Parikka, 
Raimo (ed.) Työ ja työttömyys, Väki voimakas 7. Tampere: Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen 
seura; Lähteenmäki, Maria (1994) ’Ansioäidit arvossaan’. In Parikka 1994; Markkola, Pirjo (1996) 
’Työväenhistoria taivastielle. Työläisnaiset ja kristilliset yhdistykset’. In Kettunen, Pauli, Parikka, Raimo 
& Suoranta, Anu (eds) Äänekäs kansa, Väki voimakas 8. Tampere: Työväen historian ja perinteen 
tutkimuksen seura; Katainen, Elina, Salmi-Niklander, Kirsti, Suoranta, Anu & Vuori-Mattila, Liisa (1996) 
’Vaarallisia ja tempoilevia naisia’, in the same volume.
41
THE NORDiC AND GENDERiNG DiMENsiONs OF lABOUR HisTORY iN FiNlAND
on the other hand, articles dealing with gendered or gendering subjects have 
not necessarily indicated this explicitly in their titles. The history of working-
class women and the gender perspective in labour history was launched in 
the 1990s; however, it was not until 2011 that the first volume focusing openly 
on the gendering nature of industrial relations was published.23 Nevertheless, 
compared to the first publications, in which women and men were discussed 
without any explicit reference to feminist theory or the conceptualisation of 
gender, the later research on labour history is characterized by either a more 
overt treatment of gender or a tendency to hide distinctions between women 
and men between the lines in a new, more complicated way.
Concluding remarks
The Finnish Society for Labour History is a child of its era. In the 1980s, when it 
was founded, it reflected several radical tendencies in historical research. First, 
it wanted to bring together professional and non-professional historians under 
the same organisation, in the same conferences and in the same publications. 
The history workshop movement was keenly followed by Finnish labour 
historians, and Jorma Kalela’s research project in which factory workers 
were involved in writing their own history in study circles was prominent in 
the seminars organised by the society. Non-professional historians were even 
provided with a publication forum in the first volumes of the publication series 
Väki voimakas.24 However, another trend, which required labour historians to 
be better aware of the theoretical approaches of their work, was also present in 
the society, and Pauli Kettunen’s contributions in the volumes of Väki voimakas 
sought to introduce new ways of conceptualisation in the historians’ craft.
The third tendency in Finnish labour history was its attempt to establish 
better and deeper international contacts and to communicate beyond national 
borders. Participation in the ITH conferences25 became common practice in the 
23 Hytönen, Kirsi-Maria & Koskinen-Koivisto, Eerika (eds) (2011) Työtä tekee mies, nainen. Väki voimakas 
24. Tampere: Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura.
24 E.g. Korkeamäki, Esko (1987) ’Harrastajatutkijan kokemuksia työväen paikallishistorian tutkimuksesta’, 
Anttila, Anja (1987), ’Tervakosken paperiteollisuusyhdyskunnan kehitys’, Kultanen, Kyösti (1987), 
Elämänmuodon muutokset Imatran Niskalammin ja rantakasarmien asuntoalueilla 1896–1986’. In 
Hyrkkänen, Markku, Vehviläinen, Olli & Hannikainen, Juha (eds) Näkökulmia työväen ammatilliseen ja 
paikalliseen historiaan. Väki voimakas 3. Tampere: Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura.
25 The International Conference of Labour and Social History was originally established in 1964 under 
the title Internationale Tagung der Historiker der Arbeiterbewegung. The current German name of the 
conference is Internationale Tagung der HistorikerInnen der Arbeiter- und andere sozialer Bewegungen, 
which reflects the new challenges in labour history.
42
PiRJO MARkkOlA
1980s among the members of the society. Another aspect of internationalisation 
consisted in the regular organization of Nordic Conferences in Labour History, 
the History of Industrial Relations and Working-Class Culture, and other 
similar meetings. This was again an arena where Pauli Kettunen was active 
and to which his contribution was crucial.
Attempts to find interdisciplinary approaches and to cross the borders 
between the social sciences and the humanities and research on the past and the 
present constituted the fourth new trend in Finnish labour history. Women’s 
history and gender history are part of these interdisciplinary tendencies in 
labour history, but the aims of the discipline are not limited to the gender 
perspective. The history of the present, often emphasised by Pauli Kettunen, 
is another aspect of this attempt to dispel the past-present dichotomy which 
fails to explicate the multi-layered historicity of contemporary societies.
In the field of labour history, Pauli Kettunen developed a constant interest 
in the concept ‘Nordic’. His role in giving shape to the international publication 
series Papers on labour history and giving it a strong Nordic orientation 
was significant. Thus it is no wonder that Kettunen’s scholarly interests have 
led him to engage deeply in Nordic and international co-operation; in this 
his directorship of the Nordic Centre of Excellence: The Nordic Welfare State 
– Historical Foundations and Future Challenges appears as a logical step in 
his academic profile, as logical as his current Sino-Nordic projects dealing 
with the history of welfare. The question ‘What is Nordic about the Nordic 
welfare state?’ is highly relevant in the discussions held with Chinese social 
scientists, who are keen to learn more about the Nordic understandings of 
welfare policies.
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And socioloGy
RIStO ALAPURO
Pauli Kettunen, in an interesting fashion, straddles the border between history 
and historically oriented sociology. My argument is that during his career he has 
approached sociology, due both to a reorientation in his personal perspective 
and to a simultaneous reorientation in the social sciences generally. His early 
work prepared ground for an orientation that was to gain a foothold in the 
social sciences especially from the 1980s and the 1990s on.
Scholars’ language and contemporaries’ language
Concerning the historians’ use of theory, Kari Teräs notes:
[T]he historian must reflect on the relationship of the concepts he uses 
with the concepts used by the contemporaries, or, more generally, with 
their language and culture. (…) when the historian ponders what the 
contemporaries meant, for example, in speaking about the “worker 
movement,” (s)he may relate the meanings to different theories of social 
movements, thereby bringing the concepts of contemporaries and the 
current theoretical discussion into interaction with each other.1
This is what Pauli Kettunen, as many of his colleagues, indeed does. As a 
theoretically oriented historian he brings ‘the concepts of contemporaries and 
the current theoretical discussion into interaction with each other’, for example 
when he conceptualizes the Finnish worker movement by such concepts as 
‘worker collectiveness’ and ‘needs’ and ‘interests’ as its preconditions2, or when 
1 Teräs, Kari (2005) ’Suhtautuvatko historiantutkijat teorioihin välineellisesti?’. In Andersson, Marja, 
Anttila Anu-Hanna & Rantanen, Pekka (eds), Kahden muusan palveluksessa. Historiallisen sosiologian 
lähtökohdat ja lähestymistavat. Turku: Turun Historiallinen Yhdistys, 146.
2 Kettunen, Pauli (1986) Poliittinen liike ja sosiaalinen kollektiivisuus. Tutkimus sosialidemokratiasta ja 
ammattiyhdistysliikkeestä Suomessa 1918–1930 (with a summary in German: Politische Bewegung und 
soziale Kollektivität. Eine Untersuchung über die Sozialdemokratie und die Gewerkschaftsbewegung 
in Finnland 1918–1930). Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 34–35.
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he relates labour protection to ‘risk’ as a specific concept3, or when he speaks 
of ‘virtual circles’ in describing the Nordic class compromises in the 1930s4.
And this is also, not surprisingly, what sociologists usually do5, including the 
historically oriented scholars among them. By historically oriented sociology 
I mean both the branch of the discipline that explicitly identifies itself as 
historical sociology, and the historical institutionalism which has allegedly 
even become a dominant historically oriented mode of analysis in sociology 
and political science.6 Neither of them constitutes a uniform body of research, 
albeit traditionally both have mainly worked on states and other societal macro 
institutions. As ‘research devoted to understanding the nature and effects 
of large-scale structures and fundamental processes of change’7, historical 
sociology proper, for example, has stressed processes of (political) change, 
such as democratization, proletarianization, state formation, nation-building, 
revolutions, and the like.8 These processes have been seen to result from various 
constellations of structures, conceptualized as institutions, class relations, 
forms of collective action, etc. Here as well the experience of contemporaries 
is captured through concepts specifically designed by scholars.
Yet Kettunen’s perspective is different from that of historical sociology 
understood in this sense or in the somewhat modified, recent sense that 
nevertheless remains in the same methodological frame. For the purposes of 
contrasting Kettunen’s approach with the conventional sociological-historical 
3 Kettunen, Pauli (1994) Suojelu, suoritus, subjekti. Työsuojelu teollistuvan Suomen yhteiskunnallisissa 
ajattelu- ja toimintatavoissa (with a summary in English: Protection, Performance, and Subject: Labour 
Protection and the Social Modes of Thought and Action in Finland, c. 1880–1950). Helsinki: Suomen 
Historiallinen Seura, 28.
4 Kettunen, Pauli (2001) ‘The Nordic Welfare State in Finland’. Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 
26, No. 3, 229–231; Kettunen, Pauli (2011) ‘The Transnational Construction of National Challenges: 
The Ambiguous Nordic Model of Welfare and Competitiveness’. In Kettunen, Pauli & Petersen, Klaus 
(eds), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 26–31.
5 To be sure, the distinction is not always clear, when sociologists and those they study are contemporaries. 
Sociological concepts can trickle down and have trickled down into the non-scholarly language.
6 Wittrock, Björn (2009) ‘History and Sociology: Transmutations of Historical Reasoning in the Social 
Sciences’. In Hedström, Peter & Wittrock, Björn (eds), Frontiers of Sociology. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 
95.
7 Skocpol, Theda (1984) ‘Sociology’s Historical Imagination’. In Skocpol, Theda (ed.), Vision and 
Method in Historical Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4; see also Mahoney, James 
& Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (2003) ‘Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas’. In 
Mahoney, James & Rueschemeyer , Dietrich (eds), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3–38.
8 On other, broader definitions of historical sociology, see, e.g., Adams, Julia, Clemens, Elisabeth S. & 
Orloff, Ann Shola (2005) ‘Introduction: Social Theory, Modernity, and the Three Waves of Historical 
Sociology’. In Adams, Julia, Clemens, Elisabeth S. & Orloff, Ann Shola (eds) Remaking Modernity: 
Politics, History, and Sociology. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1–72. 
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approach, I take an example from this more recent historical sociology. In it 
a critical reorientation has taken place from concepts of the state and other 
macro structures and ‘master processes’ towards concepts allegedly better 
able to catch the historical dynamics. The change was epitomized by Charles 
Tilly, one of the great names in structural historical sociology, who in his 
late work adopted ‘mechanisms’ and ‘processes’ as key concepts in historical-
sociological analysis. His focus was on interactive, reciprocal and contingent 
relationships, which take into account the historical dimension, because ‘social 
processes operate differently as a function of their placement in space and 
time’.9 Tilly characterized the logic of social processes and mechanisms for 
example in this way:
Mechanism-process accounts (…) positively welcome history, because 
their explanatory programme couples a search for mechanisms of very 
general scope with arguments that initial conditions, sequences, and 
combinations of mechanisms concatenate into processes having expli-
cable but variable overall outcomes. Mechanism-process accounts reject 
covering-law regularities for large structures such as international 
systems and for vast sequences such as democratization. instead, they 
lend themselves to ‘local theory’ in which the explanatory mechanisms 
and processes operate quite broadly, but combine locally as a function of 
initial conditions and adjacent processes to produce distinctive trajecto-
ries and outcomes (…).10
What Tilly meant by mechanisms can be exemplified by ‘boundary activation’ 
and ‘brokerage’ in the study of collective violence.11 The former term refers to 
an identity-creating (and at the same time antagonism-creating) mechanism, 
and the latter term to a mechanism establishing new connections between 
two or more social sites. Combined, these mechanisms effect processes, such 
as ‘polarization’, which tend to produce collective violence. 
9 Tilly, Charles (2001a) ‘Historical Sociology’. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral 
Sciences. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 6754.
10 Tilly, Charles (2007) Mechanisms of the Middle Range. Paper prepared for presentation to the conference 
on the work of Robert K. Merton and its implications for sociology and related fields today. Columbia 
University, 9–10 August 2007.
11 Tilly, Charles (2001b) ‘Mechanisms in Political Processes’. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 4, 
21–41; cf. Hogan, Richard (2004) ‘Charles Tilly Takes Three Giant Steps from Structure Toward Process: 
Mechanisms for Deconstructing Political Process’ (review essay). Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 
3, 275.
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For example, the increasing hostility and the gradual consolidation 
of opposite camps preceding and during the Finnish Civil War, could 
be analysed through boundary activation and brokerage that led to an 
irreversible polarisation by the end of January 1918. The contemporaries’ 
views and experiences in the tumultuous year 1917 would be reformulated in 
the theoretical language of mechanisms and processes ‘of very general scope’ 
(exactly as the theories of social movements are of general scope). But at the 
same time the historical dimension of the Finnish upheaval is taken seriously, 
because the mechanisms and the processes operated in specific ways in the 
particular conditions Finland underwent in 1917 and 1918.
A crucial feature of the ‘general scope’ of the mechanism-process accounts 
is their explanatory approach in the sense of causal analysis or causal thinking. 
In order to be able to propose explanations for social phenomena, the analyst 
portrays them through concepts which have at least some generality. This 
approach and this kind of conceptual consciousness or reflexivity are deeply 
entrenched in the mainstream sociological approach to social phenomena 
manifest, on the one hand, in basic sociological concepts like class, role, or 
norm that go beyond individual cases. On the other hand, there is the idea of 
the operationalization of concepts in individual cases. This view implies that 
ultimately the existence of the social phenomena to which the concepts refer, 
is not seen as problematic; it is taken for granted.12
‘External explanations’ 
As stated, also Kettunen ‘reflects on the relationship of the concepts he uses 
with the concepts used by the contemporaries’, and I think that in many 
passages in various essays and studies he indeed routinely adopts the practice 
proper to sociology (some examples were presented above). Yet his approach 
seems different from the one just delineated. He displays not only a conceptual 
consciousness but a highly developed conceptual self-consciousness or self-
reflexivity. Not only does he capture the object of study, drawing elements 
from a supposedly valid toolkit of the ‘current theoretical discussion’ and its 
concepts (as one could describe Charles Tilly’s approach), but he also takes 
a sceptical distance to these tools, being highly aware of their contingency.
12 Wagner, Peter (2006) ‘As Intellectual History Meets Historical Sociology: Historical Sociology after the 
Linguistic Turn’. In Delanty, Gerard & Isin, Engin F. (eds), Handbook of Historical Sociology. London: 
Sage, 172.
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This sensitivity may take different forms. An illustrative variant appears 
in the way Kettunen distinguishes himself from the earlier research, both 
historical and social scientific, in his doctoral dissertation about social 
democracy and the trade union movement in Finland from 1918 to 1930. 
He criticizes the common characterization of that period as an epoch of the 
‘breakthrough of reformism’. In trying to make sense of those years the earlier 
research has reflected on the relations between the trade union movement 
and the worker parties as ‘external relations of influence or utilization’ or as 
‘relations of interaction’ between them.13 In this kind of ‘external explanation’, 
which hopes to find answers to why-questions by looking for ‘external causal 
relations’, the ‘breakthrough of reformism’ is seen to result from a change in 
‘worker parties’ (notably the Social Democrats) and their relation to ‘trade 
unions’.14 These entities are accepted, without reflection, as the entities through 
whose (causal) interaction the ‘breakthrough’ is explained. Questionable in 
this conceptualisation and (external) explanation is, according to Kettunen, 
that ‘worker parties’ and ‘trade unions’ are taken for granted, without 
problematisation, exactly as, at a more general level, ‘politics’ and ‘economy’ 
are accepted as given separate categories, between which the existence of 
cause and effect relations will then be shown.15
This criticism can be seen as a form of taking distance from the social 
scientific turn of the 1960s and the 1970s in political history. Kettunen’s stance 
undoubtedly echoes the Marxist influence of his early years as a historian, and 
perhaps also the linguistic, or cultural, turn that was gaining ground in social 
sciences and history at the time of the publication of his doctoral dissertation 
(1986) and that assumed a strong position in the 1990s.16
Obviously this kind of criticism could be extended to the whole approach 
exemplified by Tilly’s mechanism-process accounts. Common with them 
are, first, the causal perspective and, second, the idea of operationalization 
of concepts that go beyond individual cases and are required in the causal 
analysis. 
13 Kettunen 1986, 15.
14 Kettunen 1986, 14, 31.
15 Kettunen 1986, 27.
16 Cf. Kettunen, Pauli (2003a) ’Poliittisen historia poliittisessa historiassa’. Ennen ja nyt. Historian 
tietosanomat, No. 3. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.ennenjanyt.net/3–03/kettunen.htm> 
(accessed 19 February 2013). I will return to this.
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Conceptualization of the historical process
Which, then, is Kettunen’s own view of the use of concepts in historical 
analysis? In his dissertation he says: ‘[T]he conceptualization of the real 
historical process requires that the independent and the dependent factors 
are dissipated [and] that one goes beyond them, into the multilevel and non-
linear character of history’.17 The answer is that instead of considering trade 
unions and the social democratic party as ‘externally’ related to each other, one 
should ‘include the meaning of the trade union movement in the determination 
(…) of the social democracy of the epoch’. Instead of postulating conceptually 
separate factors and their causal configuration, ‘[t]he relationship between the 
social democratic party and the trade union movement must be analysed as 
an attribute of the social democracy itself’.18
This undertaking can succeed by adopting a perspective that goes beyond 
the organisational level and sees ‘the history of the worker movement as 
the history of the articulation of collective needs and collective interests’. 
‘[W]orker collectiveness is created in a sphere within which materialises the 
union between workers’ needs and interests. To this sphere (…) refers (…) the 
concept of the social. The constitutive precondition of the worker movement 
is the workers’ social collectiveness.’19
The point in this effort to deconstruct and then conceptually reconstruct 
the object of study is that the sheer description of the object becomes the 
essential part in catching the phenomenon, in analysing it, in ‘explaining’ it. 
It is not that concepts are mobilized to launch the analysis (as ‘mechanisms’ 
and ‘processes’ are) or that the analysis proper only begins after the object 
has been caught by way of the theoretical concepts, but rather the essence of 
the analysis is the conceptual capture itself.
Two things follow. First, the concept formation is closely dependent on 
the case under study: in principle the concepts should be re-considered in 
each case to capture the specific historical process in question. As Kettunen 
states, regarding the needs and interests in his post-doctoral monograph: 
‘these categories themselves, needs and interests, have to be understood as a 
historically specific structuration of life.’20 
17 Kettunen 1986, 31.
18 Kettunen 1986, 15, 16.
19 Kettunen 1986, 16, 35; emphasis in the original.
20 Kettunen 1994, 28.
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Second, it is here that Kettunen’s anti-causal principle lies, or at least an 
uneasiness in relation to a causal way of thinking. He is interested in the 
conceptual relation between phenomena, not causal relations. A characteristic 
example is his view on the meaning and role of the political in the worker 
movement before 1918. Instead of considering the movement’s predominantly 
political character as a consequence of its extensive support among the 
agrarian proletariat (which would have made the trade unions a relatively 
modest part of the movement vis-à-vis the party), he turns the connection 
on its head and says that the political character of the movement was also a 
precondition for its extensive support. At the same time he problematizes the 
meaning of the ‘political’ in the analysis: ‘The worker movement caught the 
agrarian proletariat, because it was a political movement.’21 Another example 
is Kettunen’s repudiation of the common-sense causal image of the emergence 
of labour protection in his second monograph: ‘Labour protection was not only 
a reaction to the changes in labour processes but was rather shaped as an 
element of these changes.’22 He favours an interpretation which links together 
the presumed independent and dependent factors. Rather than emerging to 
restrict the employer’s authority in the form of the old paternalism or the new 
liberalism, ‘labour protection modified paternalism to become part of modern 
factory order and turned labour relations into contractual relationships 
compatible with liberalism’.23 Rather than resulting from a social political 
reaction or from ‘a realization of the employers’ business economic security 
concept, (…) [l]abour protection was (…) institutionalized as an element of 
the formation of such discourses and practices’24
Conceptual history
It can be argued that Pauli Kettunen approached the social sciences notably 
through conceptual history in the broad sense of the term. This view requires 
an argument that is associated both with conceptual history itself and its 
relation to the social sciences.
First, understood as a scholarly undertaking that puts an emphasis 
on language and considers concepts as historically specific phenomena, 
21 Kettunen 1986, 50; emphasis in the original.
22 Kettunen 1994, 460; emphasis added.
23 Kettunen 1994, 461; emphasis added.
24 Kettunen 1994, 462; emphasis added.
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conceptual history gained ground in Finland from the 1990s on in its 
different manifestations of which the most important were the conceptual 
history developed by Reinhart Koselleck and his fellow historians and the 
so-called linguistic contextualism25 by Quentin Skinner and others. Kettunen 
took an active part in this activity, and a common perspective of conceptual 
history has remained an essential part of his methodological arsenal since 
then. Characteristically, in his inaugural lecture after having been nominated 
as Professor of Political History at the University of Helsinki in 2003, he 
stressed, in the spirit of conceptual history, that a crucial point in historicising 
the political lies in ‘taking distance to such things which in [the historian’s] 
present are given or self-evident’. The historian’s starting points belong ‘both 
in the sphere of the methodological reflection and in the field of the research. 
This is true in the conceptualisation and treatment of time, history, society, 
and gender’. Finally, also ‘what is political, is an historical question’.26 This is 
a highly self-reflexive stance and is in full agreement with his earlier views.
But conceptual history was an innovative perspective not only in the field of 
history. As Björn Wittrock, for example, states, ‘conceptual history, emerged as 
an integral part of the discipline of history (…) has been increasingly successful 
in attracting the interest and attention of social scientists and humanities at 
large’.27 This characterisation fully holds in Finland, where conceptual history 
soon became a meeting ground for historians and social scientists alike.28 
From the perspective of the social sciences, conceptual history appears 
as one manifestation of the linguistic turn from the 1980s onward.29 In that 
turn the significance of the language in the relations between human beings 
in general was stressed, and more specifically the idea that the categories 
of thought are constitutive of social reality and thereby historical products. 
At the same time conceptual history was a non-relativist approach to social 
phenomena, in contrast to many other manifestations of the linguistic turn.
Through this turn, that is, through the adoption of a strand in the discipline 
of history that at the same time made room for increasing historical sensitivity 
25 Wittrock 2009, 91.
26 Kettunen 2003a, 2, 4, 1.
27 Wittrock 2009, 91.
28 See, e.g., Palonen, Kari (1999) ‘Rhetorical and Temporal Perspectives on Conceptual Change: Theses on 
Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck’. Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought, Vol. 3, 41–59; Hyvärinen, 
Matti, Kurunmäki, Jussi, Palonen, Kari, Pulkkinen, Tuija & Stenius, Henrik (eds) (2003) Käsitteet liikkeessä. 
Suomen poliittisen kulttuurin käsitehistoria. Tampere: Vastapaino.
29 Wagner 2006, 172–173.
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in the social sciences,30 Kettunen took one step – or one step more – towards 
the social sciences. This may sound inappropriate, because it was rather a part 
of the social sciences that approached history than Kettunen who approached 
them. My point is that for him it became more natural and easy to work 
with social scientists than in the epoch of ‘a language-unconscious historical 
sociology’.31
The most remarkable result of Kettunen’s work in conceptual history proper 
are his analyses of the notion of ‘society’ in Finnish and the Scandinavian 
languages.32 Of particular interest is his account of the conflation of ‘state’ and 
‘society’ in these languages – the Nordic use of ‘society’ for the state, or the 
‘notion of state as society’. In other words, he postulates a conceptual relation 
between the two terms, a relation that serves as the point of departure for 
understanding the nature of the ‘state’ as ‘capable of involving the associative, 
integrative and inclusive principles of “society” and the “social”’.33
A point in this conceptual analysis is, once more, the establishment of an 
‘internal’, ‘historical’ relationship between the two phenomena, not an ‘external’ 
view, so common in causal-type sociological analyses of the relationship 
between the state and civil society.
Comparisons
Moreover, it seems to me that Kettunen’s more recent scholarly work is 
also really closer to the social sciences in a conventional sense than it was 
in his early years as a historian. This appears most clearly in his work on 
comparisons. Even though it is critical of (mostly) social scientists, it seems 
to me that a dialogue exists, implying a largely common language with those 
he criticises. The criticism clearly takes place in the same discursive space. 
Yet, in the criticism itself some features also appear that are characteristic of 
Kettunen as a historian.
30 This was so, even though a historical sensitivity was no necessary consequence of the linguistic turn 
in the social sciences.
31 Wagner 2006, 173.
32 Kettunen, Pauli (2000) ’Yhteiskunta – ”Society” in Finnish’. Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought, Vol. 
4, 159–197; Kettunen, Pauli (2003b) ’Yhteiskunta’. In Hyvärinen, Matti, Kurunmäki, Jussi, Palonen, Kari, 
Pulkkinen, Tuija & Stenius, Henrik (eds) Käsitteet liikkeessä. Suomen poliittisen kulttuurin käsitehistoria. 
Tampere: Vastapaino, 167–212.
33 Kettunen, Pauli (2011) ‘The Transnational Construction of National Challenges: The Ambiguous Nordic 
Model of Welfare and Competitiveness’. In Kettunen, Pauli & Petersen, Klaus (eds) Beyond Welfare 
State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 24.
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Kettunen’s analyses of ‘society’ in Finland and in Finnish in relation to 
the corresponding concept in the other Nordic countries and languages show 
that comparisons are not alien to him. Given the breadth of his conceptual 
orientation it would be strange if they were lacking, and it is indeed easy to 
find comparative remarks in his studies. Yet characteristically enough, his main 
interest in comparisons is not on them as tools of analysis, as is usually the 
case in the social sciences, in which they mainly serve in causal interpretation 
or explanation – including the historical sociology, also referred to as the 
‘comparative-historical analysis’ in the social sciences.34 On the contrary, once 
again his self-reflexive gaze is critically directed towards the presuppositions 
in the use of this tool. Indeed, the historian’s starting points belong ‘both in 
the sphere of the methodological reflection and in the field of the research’.
Instead of accepting cross-national comparisons as a taken-for-granted 
starting point for the research, he looks at comparisons as an object of study, 
as social practice, which is susceptible to criticism, including the ‘models’ as a 
major element in comparisons. In Kettunen’s view the notion of isolated units 
has been adopted far too easily in comparative research, and especially in social 
scientific welfare state research. He sees the production and reproduction of 
the conception of separate national units both as a part of the making of the 
nation-state and as an inherent part of current globalization. In a familiar 
vein to his earlier work he criticizes the (causal) view that considers national 
units as adapting themselves to ‘external’ constraints. What serves as a point 
of departure in this erroneous perspective is ‘the distinction between the actor 
and the external environment (…). Globalization and often even European 
integration are conceived as phenomena of the external environment of 
national societies and welfare states. The actors, in turn, the nation-states like 
the Nordic countries, appear as carriers of internal historical properties (…) 
adapting to external challenges’.35 But in fact, instead of forcing the national 
states to react to inter- and transnational processes, these processes ‘have 
been constitutive of the making of national welfare states’.36
In this context a favourite concept of Kettunen also appears, the ‘immanent 
criticism’; one more example of his reflexivity. ‘Nordic society’ is for him no 
simple concept in comparative analysis but a criterion or an instrument serving 
34 Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003; Lange, Matthew (2013) Comparative-Historical Methods. Los Angeles, 
London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC: Sage, 3.
35 Kettunen, Pauli & Klaus Petersen (2011) ‘Introduction: Rethinking Welfare State Models’. In Pauli Kettunen 
& Klaus Petersen (eds) Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social 
Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 4.
36 Kettunen & Petersen 2011, 5.
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the ‘immanent criticism’ of Finnish society, implying that Finland does not 
fulfil the normative standards included in that term.37
Kettunen’s analysis hits the mark as a criticism of welfare-state research 
and even of the cross-national research more generally. This research has 
been predominantly done in the social sciences. But in criticizing it he speaks 
largely the same language as numerous social scientists. It is no coincidence 
that social scientists may predominate in his references.38 His stress on 
interaction, transnational processes, globalization, etc., moves terminologically 
and intellectually in the field of the social scientific research, or, perhaps more 
accurately, comparative (welfare) research is a good example of a subject in 
whose analysis it is difficult to draw any more distinct boundaries between the 
social sciences and history. Even though Kettunen is critical of the view of the 
isolated national units, his criticism draws from the same conceptual arsenal 
that prevails in the social sciences, including the critique of ‘methodological 
nationalism’.39 One could also point out that in historical sociology and in 
historical anthropology there are honoured traditions, for which the political 
units and their formation are subordinate to various inter- and transnational 
processes.40
Conclusion
In a larger perspective Kettunen’s itinerary is a telling indication of the 
increasingly blurred boundary between history and social sciences. It is a 
consequence of reorientation on both sides, which clearly appears in Kettunen’s 
work. But in his case two features seem specific in this relationship. First, 
for him taking the language seriously does not only mean sensitivity to the 
objects of study, but a highly developed self-reflexivity as a historian. This is 
clear from his early studies to the recent analyses of comparisons. The second 
feature, not separate from the first feature, is his ‘anti-causal principle’. There, 
as well, the linguistic sensitivity appears in a personal way.
37 Kettunen 2006, 56–58. I thank Johanna Rainio-Niemi for directing my attention to this point.
38 E.g., Kettunen 2011, 13–15.
39 See, e.g., Alasuutari. Pertti (2013) ‘Spreading Global Models and Enhancing Banal Localism: The Case 
of Local Government Cultural Policy Development’. International Journal of Cultural Policy, Vol. 19, No. 
1, 103–119.
40 E.g., Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974) The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of 
the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press; Wolf, Eric R. (1982) 
Europe and the People Without History. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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The collapse of the Soviet Union is often seen as marking a major turning point 
in the study of the history of the Finnish labour movement. Since that time, 
indeed, ground-breaking studies have provided both critical perspectives and 
new information, especially concerning the history of Finnish communism and 
the dependencies of Finnish political actors on the Soviet leadership.1 On the 
other hand, the opening of the Moscow archives has meant that since 1991 
the politics of the Finnish left has been studied more than ever in relation 
to the Soviet communist party and its politics. Paradoxically, even critical 
examination of the discoveries of the Moscow archives has tended to narrow 
the frame in which the politics of the Finnish left have been analysed. In some 
cases, this has re-enforced the politically motivated tendency to study the 
labour movement as a more or less conscious advocate of Moscow interests.2 
Fortunately, alternative framings of politics have also been considered, but 
even these have often appeared in the form of more or less fixed models of 
the East-West juxtaposition – for example, the case of examining the post-
war politics of the Finnish Social Democrats as reflecting a choice between 
an eastern model of the Peoples Republic and a western model of the Nordic 
Welfare State.3
This study seeks to identify alternative framings of the Cold War politics of 
the Finnish left by reassessing the post-war political writings of Raoul Palmgren 
(1912–1995), a newspaperman and politician who played a prominent role in 
the formulation and public introduction of the politics of the Democratic Union 
of the Finnish People (suomen Kansan demokraattinen liitto, SKDL) during 
the post-war years. In the 1930s, Palmgren was one of the leading figures of 
the radical social democratic student organization, the Academic Socialist 
1 See e.g. Rentola, Kimmo (1994) Kenen joukoissa seisot? Suomalainen kommunismi ja sota 1937–1945. 
Helsinki: WSOY; Rentola, Kimmo (1997) Niin kylmää että polttaa. Kommunistit, Kekkonen ja Kreml 
1947–1958. Helsinki: Otava; Saarela, Tauno (1996) Suomalaisen kommunismin synty 1918–1923. Tampere: 
KSL; Saarela, Tauno (2008) Suomalainen kommunismi ja vallankumous 1923–1930. Helsinki: SKS.
2 See e.g. Rautkallio, Hannu (1993) Neuvostovallan asialla. NKP:n vaikutus Suomessa 1960-luvulla. Helsinki: 
Tammi.
3 Majander, Mikko (2004) Pohjoismaa vai kansandemokratia? Sosiaalidemokraatit, kommunistit ja Suomen 
kansainvälinen asema 1944–51. Helsinki: SKS.
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Society (Akateeminen sosialistiseura, ASS). After imprisonment during the 
war he joined the communist party when he was released from prison in1944.4 
During the post-war years his activities were concentrated, however, not in the 
party but in the SKDL that functioned as a broader cooperation organization 
of communists and left-wing socialists. His writings came to manifest new 
perspectives of the left in an original manner that shook up the fixed ideas of 
East and West in Finnish politics. In 1952 his political career ended in a split 
with the leadership of the Communist Party and dismissal from his post as 
editor-in-chief of the main organ of the SKDL, the newspaper Vapaa sana 
(VS).5
My work takes inspiration from approaches elaborated by Pauli Kettunen 
in influential studies on labour movement history dating from different points 
in his career. A theme often present in his work is the critical examination 
of the idea of a Nordic model, or for that matter, any compass-bound fixed 
model of labour movement politics.6 Another pioneering innovation is the 
application of a conceptual history approach to the study of the Finnish labour 
movement.7 The closest example of this is his study of the key concepts of the 
leading Finnish social democratic politicians, K. H. Wiik, V. A. Tanner and E. 
A. Vuori. The study goes beyond one-dimensional models of social democratic 
politics and paints a nuanced picture of the key concepts used to frame inter 
and post-war political circumstances, opportunities, allies and enemies.
4 After the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939, Palmgren participated as a frontline soldier in the so-
called Winter War. When Finland joined Hitler’s operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union in the 
summer of 1941 Palmgren went underground and was soon arrested as a deserter and sentenced to 
imprisonment. Palmgren, Raoul (1997) Vankilapäiväkirja: Raoul Palmgrenin epitafi 1940-luvulle. (Ed.) 
Marja-Leena Palmgren. Oulu: Pohjoinen.
5 During his political career, Raoul Palmgren did not hold top positions in the party apparatus or state 
institutions. As a party-man, Palmgren was mainly active as a journalist and writer (he ended up 
as Professor of Literature in his later career). For many a later commentator, the most well-known 
episodes of his party career are the much debated dismissals from both labour parties, from the Social 
Democratic Party in 1937 and from the Communist Party in 1952.
6 This critical line can be recognized from the early anthology on the Nordic labour movement (Kettunen, 
Pauli (1986, ed.) Det nordiska i den nordiska arbetarrörelsen. Femte nordiska konferensen för forskning 
i arbetarrörelsens historia. Tammerfors, den 23–27 augusti 1983. Papers on Labour History. Helsinki: 
Finnish Society for Labour History and Cultural Traditions) to the present-day work of the Nordic 
Centre of Excellence: The Nordic Welfare State.
7 Kettunen drew conclusions related to labour movement politics in his influential contribution to the 
anthology on Finnish political language (Kettunen, Pauli (2003) ‘Yhteiskunta’. In Hyvärinen. Matti et 
al (eds) Käsitteet liikkeessä. Suomen poliittisen kulttuurin käsitehistoria. Tampere: Vastapaino, 167–
212) and further elaborated the approach in his recent study of key political actors of the post-war 
labour movement, Kettunen, Pauli (2012) ‘Työväki ja sen liike sosiaalidemokratian itseymmärryksessä’. 
In Majander, M. & Rentola, K. (eds) Ei ihan teorian mukaan. Helsinki: Työväen historian ja perinteen 
tutkimuksen seura / Yhteiskunnallinen arkistosäätiö, 67–84. 
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During the Cold War years, the perspectives of the politics of the left 
were dominated by the global geopolitical division between East and West. 
Bipolar visions of battle between the socialist and the imperialist camps or 
the free world and totalitarian communism were hegemonic and directed the 
framing of the post-war political spielraum of the Finnish left. This framing 
was, however, only gradually adopted and not necessarily in terms of choosing 
between fixed eastern and western models. This article looks to depict this 
complex setting from an actor’s point of view by applying a conceptual history 
approach to the post-war writings of Raoul Palmgren and the key concepts 
he used in analysing the political situation and the opportunities it opened 
for left wing politics.
Finnish dissident or Western Marxist: perspectives of earlier research
In later evaluations of Raoul Palmgren’s political activities, his well-known 
schisms with both social democratic and communist party leaders are often 
the main topic of focus, and he is frequently presented as a theory-centred 
eternal dissident. In cultural historical studies, he is well remembered as an 
outspoken polemicist and an ironic columnist who, especially under his post-
war pen-name hapan, cheerfully attacked his opponents in a manner that 
frequently placed him at odds with the political elite. As a journalist, Palmgren 
was placed under indictment in 1937 for putting ‘legitimate social order under 
contempt’, and after the war his writings led more than once to libel actions 
against him from offended political rivals. All this is reflected in Palmgren’s 
later reputation as an eternal resistance man, a ‘Finnish dissident’ as Kalevi 
Kalemaa summarises in the title of his biography of Palmgren.8 Palmgren 
certainly excelled in struggles inside the labour movement but the notion of 
an eternal dissident has also distorted the picture of his political thinking. 
Instead of examining the content of his analysis of the political situation, he 
is often made to stand as an antithesis to the stereotypic models of left wing 
politics, to Väinö Tanner’s rightwing line in the Social Democratic Party and 
to Stalinist Communism within SKDL.9
This type of stereotypical modelling has seldom been avoided even in 
estimations of Palmgren as a political theoretician and thinker. The seminal 
8 Kalemaa, Kalevi (1984) Raoul Palmgren. Suomalainen toisinajattelija. Helsinki: Tammi.
9 Kurjansaari, Matti (1966) Veljeni merellä myrskyävällä. Helsinki: Tammi; Wirtanen, Atos (1972) Poliittiset 
muistelmat. Keuruu: Otava. 
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text which identified and recognized Palmgren’s position as a key figure in 
Finnish Marxist research and theoretical discussion is Risto Alapuro’s article 
on the Marxist research tradition in Finland, published in 1977.10 Alapuro goes 
beyond the stereotypical political juxtapositions by analysing Palmgren’s role 
in terms of the tradition of ‘Western Marxism’, introduced by Perry Anderson.11
Palmgren’s writings do indeed remind us in many senses of the thinking 
of such European Marxist scholars as Lukacs, Adorno, Horkheimer, and 
Fromm who often had similar problems with the ideological control of the 
Communist Parties. Especially, the reference to ‘Western Marxism’ underlines 
fittingly the distance of Palmgren’s thinking from the textbook Marxism-
Leninism of the post-war Communist Party. Personally, Palmgren never 
used the concept of Marxism-Leninism. On the other hand, when compared 
to the philosophically oriented writings of Western Marxists, there are not 
too many articles in Palmgren’s production which would have been intended 
primarily as contributions to theoretical scientific debate. Alapuro does not 
picture Palmgren as a master theorist either. Instead, he sees a similarity in 
the way that Palmgren and the Western Marxists set their focus on cultural 
issues. The notion of concentrating on cultural debate is also present in 
Kalevi Kalemaa’s biography where it is connected especially to the disputes 
and polemics between Palmgren and Armas Äikiä, a poet and communist 
journalist, who is presented as a prototype of Stalinist thinking. Raoul 
Palmgren was a master of words who shone among his contemporaries with 
his vast scholarship and historical knowledge, but this kind of juxtaposition 
easily creates and reproduces stereotypical models of eastern and western 
political culture. At worst it projects the political schisms in the differences 
in the parties’ educational level, intellect and ability in the use of the pen.12
Alapuro is not satisfied with these kinds of personal level explanations 
connected to the dissident image. According to him, the conflict between 
Palmgren and the Communist Party derived from different areas of interest: 
10 Alapuro, Risto (1977) ’Marxilaisesta yhteiskuntatutkimuksesta Suomessa vuosisadan alkupuolella’ [On 
Marxist Social Research in Finland in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century]. Tiede ja Edistys 2, 14–
21. In the same edition of the journal Tiede & Edistys in which Alapuro’s article appeared, there were 
no less than three responses which fiercely denied Palmgren’s role as a representative of Western 
Marxism. The overriding argument (typical to Finnish radicalism of the 1970s) was that no significant 
Marxist research was possible outside the Communist Party and the Marxist-Leninist tradition, not in 
the West and definitely not in Finland.
11 Anderson, Perry (1976) Considerations on Western Marxism. London: New Left Review Books.
12 See for example: Kalemaa 1984, 198–220. The theme is elaborated with more sophistication in many 
studies examining Palmgren as an intellectual in the labour movement, e.g. Koivisto, Hannele (2011) 
Politiikkaa, erotiikkaa ja kulttuuritaistelua. Kirjoituksia suomalaisesta vasemmistoälymystöstä 1930–
luvulla. Helsinki: Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura. 
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Palmgren focused in the manner of the Western Marxists on cultural 
phenomena and ‘superstructure’ whilst the Communist Party’s education 
centred on the practical questions of post-war ‘economy and class struggle’.13 
If we accept this interpretation, the crucial question from a conceptual history 
perspective is how the actors themselves understood what constituted the 
foremost ‘class struggle issues’ in the post-war situation and how the objectives 
of the labour movement were to be advanced in practice.
Hegemony, culture and the praxis of the labour movement
How did Raoul Palmgren understand the praxis of the labour movement 
in the post-war situation, and how did he define the relationship between 
class struggle and cultural issues? Evidently, Palmgren’s post-war writings 
focused to a high degree on cultural issues from the outset. When defining 
the tasks of leftist writers at the beginning of 1945, Palmgren set as a primary 
objective the establishment of organic contacts with the bourgeois culture of the 
country. According to him, the task was to build ‘an alliance of all progressive, 
constructive, creative cultural forces, to fight for a hegemonic position in the 
country’s cultural life’.14
It is important to note, however, that the political line of fighting for cultural 
hegemony that Palmgren embarked upon in Vapaa sana was not, as such, 
inconsistent with SKDL’s post-war politics. During the period that SKDL 
participated in the Finnish government (1944–1948), the Communist Party’s 
leadership’s assessments were in no way on a direct collision course with the 
line Palmgren sketched in Vapaa sana. In fact, Palmgren’s considerations 
were used to a substantial degree in the formulation of SKDL programmes. 
He played a major role in the writing of the approved 1947 SKDL cultural 
programme and was also involved in the drafting of the SKDL principal 
programme in 1949.
In this sense, Palmgren’s relationship to the movement’s practical politics 
had been tried and recognized. At the same time, Palmgren’s perception of the 
demands of the political situation differed sharply from the Communist Party’s 
educational activities which focused on the training of new party cadres. The 
most authoritative teaching tools of cadre training conveyed an understanding 
13 Alapuro 1977, 18–21. The interpretation actually is reminiscent to a high degree of the views presented 
by Tuure Lehen already in the 1950s, see below.
14 Palmgren, Raoul (1945) Kiila ja työväen kulttuuripolitiikka, Kommunisti, 24.
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of Marxism-Leninism as providing a universal strategy for an unavoidably 
approaching revolution. In fact, the accusation levelled at Palmgren of his 
line being detached from the praxis of the labour movement may well be 
turned around. With good grounds it can be asked what the relationship of the 
communist revolutionary education was to the praxis of the labour movement: 
what kind of support could the scenarios of the escalation of the crisis of 
capitalism and the inevitable outbreak of revolution find among the working 
population and the rest of society?
In retrospect it is easy to say that the strategy model offered by the 
communist education system did not even seek to justify itself in analyses of 
the political circumstances after the war, but rather focused upon universal 
visions of the collapse of capitalism and the outbreak of a new revolutionary 
situation. There was an in-built tendency to present preparation for the 
inevitable socialist revolution as an immediate task and to replace any concrete 
assessment of the situation with propaganda surrounding the escalation of the 
crisis of capitalism and the maturation of conditions for revolution.15 This type 
of party cadre education was in sharp contrast with Palmgren’s assessment of 
the situation and his ideas of the political conclusions to be drawn. As long as 
the communists participated in government, textbook Marxism-Leninism did 
not play a major role on the political plane but the differences in assessments 
mainly erupted around controversies concerning cultural issues, especially 
between Palmgren and Äikiä.
European revolution and a new type of democracy
From the studies of Kimmo Rentola we learn that the Communist Party’s 
immediate post-war assessments of the political situation were far from the 
textbook definitions. The general starting points were in line with the popular 
front tactics elaborated in the 1930s, but to a large degree the political line was 
constructed by improvising and anticipating the potential Soviet Communist 
Party’s position. In practice, Finnish Communist Party leaders left their political 
line open, and apparently deliberately avoided more explicit definitions.16
15 Majander, Mikko (1998) Uuno Hiironen toverituomioistuimessa eli kommunistit ammattiyhdistys- ja 
puoluelogiikan välissä. Saarela, Tauno (ed.) Aave vai haave, Väki Voimakas 11. Tampere: Työväen historian 
ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura. s. 237–273.
16 See e.g. analysis of post-war correspondence between Hertta and Otto Wille Kuusinen in Rentola 
1994.
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In the post-war situation, this provided more leeway for debate inside the 
SKDL regarding the appropriate line than has generally been understood. 
In fact, it could be said that the perceptions of the new world historical 
situation and the corresponding political line are the key issues in gaining an 
understanding of the tensions in the relationship between Palmgren and the 
Communist Party. In his post-war writings, Palmgren did not concentrate on 
cultural issues but, on the contrary, closely followed the situation in Europe and 
sought to define a new phase of development corresponding to the situation 
of the Western European labour movement. In his editorials and political 
articles, he developed the notion of ‘European revolution’ that would provide 
an alternative to the Russian Revolution and a peaceful road to socialism.17 
Palmgren’s central concept was that of ‘a new type of democracy’ with the help 
of which he outlined the road for a gradual movement towards socialism that 
built on the experiences and perspectives of the Popular Front governments 
in Western Europe.
In elaborating the concept of ‘European revolution’ and a ‘new type 
of democracy’, Palmgren took as a starting point the problems that the 
working-class faced after the war in the conditions of advanced capitalism. 
He emphasized that revolution in the west could not be achieved by an 
assault, led by a conscious vanguard. ‘European revolution’ called for broad-
based organization and the cooperation of the labour movement.18 After the 
war Palmgren complemented this notion, which he had already adopted as 
far back as the 1930s, with findings of the ability to resist which western 
capitalism possessed thanks to its advanced cultural superstructure. According 
to Palmgren, the struggle for state power in the west required in the first place 
stabilisation of political democracy and advancing on a cultural front, a drive 
17 Uuden tyypin demokratia (New type of democracy), VS 06/19/1945; Eurooppalainen vallankumous 
(European Revolution), VS 01/20/1946.
18 Hapan, Kahteen vai yhteen (Two or one), VS 03/09/1946.
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for cultural hegemony, and gaining a leading position in national culture and 
consciousness.19
Before 1948, ideas of a national or peaceful road to socialism were elaborated 
in most European communist parties.20 Even in Finland, Palmgren was not 
alone. Inside the communist party elite, the powerful couple Hertta Kuusinen 
and Yrjö Leino were inclined to understand and support these ideas in internal 
discussions of the movement.21 When the international situation started to 
polarize after 1947, the Communist movement began to promote its ideological 
and political unity. A new ideological and propagandistic centre, Kominform 
was established to co-ordinate the ideological work of the communist parties. 
In 1948, the 8th Assembly of the Finnish Communist Party set up as its main 
task to reinforce ‘the ideological strength and battle spirit of the party’. Yrjö 
Leino lost his position in the party, and Hertta Kuusinen adapted to the policies 
streamlined according to the Kominform line. The Marxist-Leninist concepts 
that thus far had been dominant mainly in the cadre education of the party 
began to have an increasing influence in defining the politics of the Communist 
Party and started to contribute to the formulation and introduction of practical 
policies in the party press.
At first, the intensification of the Cold War and the expulsion of the 
Communists from Western European governments were reflected in the 
writings of Raoul Palmgren by an increasing identification with the Eastern 
European countries with communist led governments. In the longer run, the 
19 Uuden tyypin demokratia (New type of democracy), VS 06/19/1945; Kulttuuri ja demokratia (Culture 
and Democracy), VS 03/19/1946. In previous papers, I have tried to illustrate Palmgren’s political line 
with comparisons to Antonio Gramsci’s political thought and more generally the political assessments 
developed by the Italian Communists after the Second World War. I am not convinced if it is worthwhile 
on a theoretical level to try to make Palmgren out to be a Finnish Gramsci or a Finnish Togliatti. It 
is, however, essential to note that the key concepts of his political analysis were close to those of 
the Italian Communists, when he sought to outline the political strategy which would apply to the 
realities of advanced capitalism. The fundamental conclusions were the same as those reached above: 
revolution in the West required the winning of cultural hegemony in society and it was not possible 
through a storming led by a conscious vanguard that would turn the social struggle of the masses 
into a struggle for political power. Cf. e.g. Pons, Silvio (2001) Stalin, Togliatti, and the Origins of the 
Cold War in Europe. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 2001, pp. 3–27; Gramsci, Antonio 
(1971) Selections from Prison Notebooks. Trans. and ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith.   
New York: International Publishers, 206–276.
20 Urban, Joan Barth (1986) Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: From Togliatti to Berlinguer. London: 
I.B.Tauris; Weitz, Eric D. (1997) Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to 
Socialist State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. s. 315–316.
21 Hertta Kuusinen was the daughter of the influential communist leader Otto Wille Kuusinen who had 
expatriated to the Soviet Union, and she was generally considered as his voice inside the Finnish 
Communist Party. Her husband Yrjö Leino was the Minister of the Interior 1945–1948 who dramatically 
lost his position in the government and authority within the party in 1948, according to his own later 
view, because of his line of national communism. Rentola 1994.
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same factors led to the escalation of the conflict between Palmgren and the party 
leadership. The thoughts of a new strategy for European revolution encouraged 
after the war were now interpreted as highly disruptive revisionism. In the 
intensifying Cold War situation, the traditional Marxist-Leninist doctrines 
were proclaimed to provide the only road to socialism. In connection with the 
crisis between the Soviet leadership and the Yugoslavian communist leader 
Tito, the Finnish Communist Party press began to publish statements which 
strongly condemned the ideas of a distinctive national or democratic road 
to socialism. After this revision in the line of the communist movement the 
conflict between Palmgren and the Communist cultural workers was raised for 
the first time to the level of conceptualizing political situation, opportunities 
and tasks.22
The fight for hegemony and the line of the press
Differences of opinion concerning the political line suitable for the post-war 
situation crystallized in disputes on the practical work of the press. Palmgren 
saw the duties of the press in the frame of the fight for hegemony and 
emphasized that the work of the press could not be limited to date-specific social 
and political issues. On the contrary, the main task was to strive for cultural 
hegemony, to constantly conquer new positions in the national consciousness, 
to serve human progress in the long run and enrich the picture of human 
life.23 The key issue was not an ideological orthodoxy but an assessment of 
the political situation that met the experiences of the audience. ‘The task of 
Marxist critique is not only to analyse the world but also to change it, but 
in order for the latter to be possible, the former must be based on facts, not 
demagogy, it has to reveal reality and not to shadow it.’24
The line Palmgren elaborated in Vapaa sana was in many ways opposite to 
the party stand emphasized in the Communist Party’s training of cadres which 
22 I have elaborated the argument earlier in the studies, Liikanen, Ilkka & Manninen, Pauli (1982) Realisti 
vai utopisti? Raoul Palmgrenin kirjallisen tuotannon maailmankatsomuksellisista ja poliittisista linjoista. 
In Liikanen , Ilkka & Sallamaa, Kari (eds), Palmgrenin työ. Oulu: Oulun yliopiston kirjallisuuden laitos, 
and Liikanen, Ilkka (1998) Kamppailu kansakunnan menneisyydestä. Raoul Palmgrenin Suuri linja 
kansakunnan synnyn tulkintana ja 1940-luvun poliittisena dokumenttina. In Viikari, Auli (ed.), 40-luku. 
Kirjoituksia 1940-luvun kirjallisuudesta ja kulttuurista. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura. In the 
course of 2012, I have taken the theme up again in two seminars organized in Helsinki and Tampere 
in commemoration of Raoul Palmgren’s one hundredth anniversary.
23 Ei niin, toveri Kriticus! (Not in that way, Comrade Kriticus!), VS 4/28/1946.
24 Postikortti Armas Äikiälle (A postcard to Armas Äikiä), VS 11/12/1948.
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after 1948 received more and more room in the press work of the movement, 
especially through the news material of the international press service of the 
communist movement. In the course of daily journalistic work, this led to 
disputes between Palmgren and Armas Äikiä who had become the head of the 
Democratic Newspaper Service, DLP. Palmgren interpreted the material of 
DLP as being alien to the line of Vapaa sana. According to him, newspapers 
had to be able to speak across class and party lines and to contribute to the long-
term building of a democratic front. Disputes with Äikiä and DLP can be seen 
in the background of a speech at the International Organization of Journalists 
Congress in 1950, when Palmgren almost demonstratively emphasized facts 
as being the best propaganda of the left-wing press. Palmgren acknowledged 
the importance of a clear ideological view but stressed at the same time that 
it could not lead to any negligence in details or a direct manipulation of them 
in order to achieve immediate targets. ‘No rhetoric contributes to propaganda 
like facts, facts are the best propaganda.’25
The final battle regarding the political line of press work was fought at the 
end of 1952. At a SKDL Assembly in the summer, Palmgren examined the 
relationship between the practical work of the press and the programmatic 
objectives accepted for the movement, and directly criticized the line of DLP. 
Palmgren estimated that the practical forms of press work were lagging behind 
the programmatic principles. Propaganda work was to be corrected in a way 
‘that it can reach a neutral or a social democratic worker ... peasantry and 
progressive intelligentsia and is not directly pushing them away.’ He continued: 
‘Unfortunately, DLP sends its news and articles usually in a form that, at least 
in Vapaa sana, they have to be re-written. And when it equips our regional 
press with circuit articles, the tone of the newspapers becomes such that it 
hopelessly violates the principles that were accepted for the activities of SKDL 
here yesterday.’26 At the Assembly, the Communist Party’s top leadership was 
represented by Hertta Kuusinen who recognized in principle the legitimacy of 
Palmgren’s critique, but in practice defended the line of Äikiä and the DLP. 
They were based largely on Soviet and international communist movement 
propaganda texts, and so to openly criticize those was going too far. In 
November of the same year, the press line controversy was dealt with at the 
SKDL executive committee, which also supported the DLP’s position. In late 
November 1952, Palmgren resigned from the Communist Party’s membership. 
25 Tosiasiat parasta propagandaa (The facts are the best propaganda), VS 09/20/1950.
26 Palmgren, Raoul (1974/1952) ’Työtyyliä vara parantaa’, lyhennelmä Raoul Palmgrenin puheenvuorosta 
SKDL:n 3. liittokokouksessa 1952. In Hentilä, Jorma (ed.), Paremman elämän puolesta. Asiakirjoja ja 
lausuntoja SKDL:sta ja sen tavoitteista vuosilta 1944–1964. Helsinki, Kansankulttuuri, 62–65.
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The party responded by organizing a public campaign against Palmgren - and 
his formal dismissal from the post of the editor of Vapaa sana.
The key implementer of the new line in communist ideological work was 
not the poet Armas Äikiä but the experienced Komintern heavyweight Tuure 
Lehen, who in his books and writings defined the orthodox line of Marxism-
Leninism and the working-class worldview.27 Lehen took on the task of 
providing a communist assessment of the work of Palmgren, and especially 
his famous study ‘Suuri linja’ (The Great line, 1948). He criticized Palmgren 
for granting national cultural heritage and the educated elite too prominent a 
role in history. Instead, Lehen suggested that the bourgeois intelligentsia that 
had joined the labour movement should give up its old thinking modes and 
learn from the working class and the writings of scientific socialism.28 What 
is interesting in this connection is that the first estimates of Lehen on ‘Suuri 
linja’ had been unreservedly positive. Between these and subsequent critiques 
there occurred a crucial change in the politics of the Communist Party and 
the international Communist Movement, which probably explains much of 
Lehen’s change of mind. The core of Lehen’s critique was that he turned the 
question from the key concepts of defining topical political tasks to the role of 
the intelligentsia in the labour movement, and by so doing he paradoxically 
laid the ground for later discussions of Palmgren as a Finnish dissident or a 
culturally oriented Western Marxist.
Raoul Palmgren and the East and West of the Finnish Left
If we look at the visible conflicts which marked Palmgren’s relationship to the 
party, they indeed seem largely related to cultural struggle and its relationship 
to the praxis of the labour movement. Even the dispute over the line of press 
work can be interpreted as a cultural issue rather than a traditional ‘class 
struggle’ issue. In a broader context, Palmgren’s post-war activities concerned 
the very key concepts of politics and especially the post-war praxis of the labour 
movement and class struggle. At the core of his writings was precisely how to 
define the new post-war situation and the politics that might be suitably applied 
to the conditions of developed capitalist countries. In the background of the 
escalation of internal conflicts within the party, can be seen a deeper split in 
27 Lehen, Tuure (1949) Kansallisuusaatteen nykyinen sisältö, Kommunisti, 5; Lehen, Tuure (1953) 
Kommunistit ja isänmaa, Kommunisti, 9.
28 Lehen, Tuure (1948) Elävää yhteiskunta ja kulttuurihistoriaa, Kommunisti, 4; Lehen, Tuure (1954) 
Työväenluokka ja sivistyneistö, Kommunisti,10.
72
ilkkA liikANEN
the political assessment of the situation, which sheds light on the forgotten 
side of post-war left-wing politics.
In relation to the political history writing of today, Raoul Palmgren 
represents an alternative conceptualization of politics that was not tied to 
fixed Eastern or Western models. His innovative elaboration of new political 
key concepts reminds us that, during the immediate post-war years, politics 
in the labour movement featured attempts to build a political line that was 
suitable for specific European and national conditions. In the end, the national 
and European framings of left-wing politics were narrowed down by the 
development of the international situation. Raoul Palmgren’s line of battle for 
hegemony was linked to a more general perspective of the European left, and 
to the elaboration of the strategy of ‘European revolution’ in a situation where 
Eastern and Western models of the politics of leftist parties had not yet totally 
departed from one another. As long as the Left seemed to broaden its support 
in Western Europe, it was also possible in Finland to seek opportunities to 
break the old power structures through peaceful means. When the Cold War 
divided the political spectrum into opposite camps, this window of opportunity 
was closed. During the post-war years however, the European perspective and 
Raoul Palmgren’s strategy of the struggle for hegemony were an integral part 
of left-wing politics that went beyond the later East-West division.
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What – and how – to define?
In his 1926 essay on nation and nationalism, Carlton Hayes admits that there 
is no consensus on the exact meaning of the nation. Even fifty years on, in 
1977, after decades of intensive research had been conducted on nationalism 
in various academic fields, Hugh Seton-Watson could only agree: the nation 
defies a precise scientific definition. A few years later, while aiming at a Marxist 
analysis of nationalism, Tom Nairn stated that the biggest historical failure of 
Marxism was the inability to formulate a theory of nationalism.1 
In this essay, I will focus on some ‘classical’ texts of theories of nationalism, 
and will not go to the latest discussions on primordialist, ethno-symbolist or 
populist essence of nationalism.2 I will also omit many typological discussions 
on the nature of nationalism’s origin. In this way, I take the privileged and 
risky role of the historian by selecting my sources.
This does not mean that the recent rich discussions on the nature of 
nationalism would be entirely excluded – but it is honest to say that I situate 
myself in the modernist school of ‘explanation’ of nationalism. 
In short, it has been taken as given both in the liberalist, positivist, 
structuralist and post-Marxist academic tradition that the rise of nation-
states and nationalism is an inevitable historical development. The progress, 
or civilization process, assumed to have a linear nature, will by definition 
lead towards more developed social structures. The age of nation-states 
1 Hayes, Carlton (1926) ‘What is Nationalism?’ In Essays on Nationalism. New York: MacMillan Co., 2; 
Seton-Watson, Hugh (1977) Nations and States: An Inquiry Into the Origins of Nations and the Politics 
of Nationalism. Boulder: Westview Press, 5; Nairn, Tom (1981) The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-
Nationalism. London: Verso, 305. See also, Palmer, Steven (1990) A Liberal Discipline: Inventing the 
Nation in Costa Rica and Guatemala, 1870–1900, Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 22.
2 See more, Billig, Michel (1995) Banal nationalism. London: Sage; Özkirimli, Umut (2000) Theories of 
Nationalism. A Critical Introduction. New York: St. Martin’s Press; Pakkasvirta, Jussi & Saukkonen, Pasi 
(eds) (2005). Nationalismit. Helsinki: WSOY.
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and nationalism(s) could therefore be seen as part of the continuum.3 Most 
academic traditions have considered the liberal or bourgeois state a key 
ideological construct, while anthropological scholarship, in particular, has 
aimed to interpret nationalism as a cultural process. One of the main issues, 
still today, seems to boil down to the question of whether culture comes first 
in the processes that produce nationalism (or give rise to interpretations and 
ideological reflections of new historical situations in general) or whether 
‘culture’ is a product of historical politico-economic processes. 
All derivatives of the word natio4 in social and historical sciences appear 
conceptually contested. The nationalist debate in social sciences resembles 
the historical debate on the origins of capitalism. At a general level, there 
is certain historical consensus of the nature of capitalism, industrialisation 
and of the globalised modernization process that was set in motion by 
capitalist expansion. At the outset, nationalism would appear to be part of 
this Eurocentric ‘civilisation process’. We also often talk about nationalism 
as a problem-free phenomenon brought about by the liberal state, as a 
‘second-generation’ ideology of the bourgeois society. And yet, there is no set 
definition of nationalism acceptable to all. Is nationalism a cultural process, 
or an ideology, a style of political community, a mental state arising from the 
changing perceptions of historical time, a kinship relation or a neo-religious 
phenomenon, a haven of safe communality in a modernising and secularising 
world? Nationalism seems, in fact, to be all of these. In the course of its 200-
year history, it has become clear that rather than just an inevitable product of 
nation-state development, different kinds of nationalism have been and are 
produced by different historical situations. 
The study of nationalism has long remained Eurocentric. This is 
understandable, as the concept of the nation-state and the concomitant 
ideology are the offspring of European Enlightenment, Romanticism and 
Liberalism. The birth of nationalism is often dated to the American and French 
revolutions, even if most of the current ‘nation-states’ are less than 65 years 
old. Also, even in the latest text books on nationalism, the cradle of nineteenth-
century republicanism, Latin America, is side-tracked and only visited for 
illuminating examples. The scholars who have made the most interesting 
3 The idea to connect nationalism with the development and progress is evident in classic works of 
liberalists (Adam Smith), romanticism (Johann Gottfried von Herder) and Marxism (Karl Marx, Friedrich 
Engels). Also Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel understands the nation-state as a perfection of human 
development.
4 Other Latin concepts related to nationalism are gens, populus, civitas, res publica – even though coming 
from different etymological roots. See also Kemiläinen, Aira (1964) Nationalism: Problems Concerning 
the Word, the Concept and Classification. Jyväskylä Studia Historica Jyväskyläensia III, 18–25.
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contributions to the theory of nationalism have mostly focused on Europe. 
This is despite the fact that nations beyond Europe are a fascinating area for 
the study of nationalism even within the European tradition and, at the same 
time, a necessary focus when studying transplanted European nationalism in 
the developing countries. 
The idea that people of the same race inhabiting the same geographical 
area and sharing a language, religion and culture (an ethnic identity) also make 
up a natural national entity, spread in the nineteenth century in conjunction 
with a liberal state ideology. The peculiar nature of the history of nationalism 
is also evident in that the first ‘nation-states’, based on a republican idea of 
government, did not originate in Europe but in the Americas. The age of 
nationalism began when the United States became independent in 1776 and 
when the Latin American Creole states came into being in the early nineteenth 
century, although they cannot yet be seen as representing a ‘pure’ nation-state 
ideology. For example, the basis of the Americanism of the United States 
(‘USAnism’) was not in the ethnic or cultural identities, but in the definition 
that arose from mass immigration: ‘Americans are those who wish to be’.5 
Traditions of research
It has proved tricky both historically and theoretically to define universal and 
totalising concepts such as nation and nationalism, but there is wide consensus 
as to the elements connected with these concepts. For example, most scholars 
of nationalism deny the ‘nationalist’ claim that their states or ‘people’ have 
existed as nations since time immemorial. A pioneer in the modern study of 
nationalism, Hans Kohn maintains that nationalism ‘as we see it’ in history 
does not date further back than the eighteenth century and that the first 
nationalist representations were the American and French revolutions. At 
the same time, Kohn makes it clear that the sentiments usually identified as 
the basis of nationalism (including patriotism or love of your native area or 
home region) do not necessarily generate or count as nationalism. Rather, they 
are to do with certain facts – such as the geographical area, shared language 
and racial/ethnic background – which are present in nationalism, too, but in 
5 Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1990) Nations and Nationalisms since 1780. Programme, Myth and Reality. Cambridge 
University Press, 88. Other obvious roots of Americanism are in Christian religion and in certain 
mysticism of the eighteenth century Constitution and Bill of Rights.
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totally different guises. Kohn traces the roots of nationalism to eighteenth-
century social and intellectual history of the European Enlightenment.6
Like Kohn, most social scientists and historians have located the origins 
of nationalism in the Enlightened and Romantic notions (especially those of 
Herder) of national sovereignty, and in the extension of Kantian rationality 
in the political community. Hegel’s philosophy of history took the idea even 
further: the nation-state was the ‘absolute spirit of the world’ come true. 
Each culture had a right to live and develop in accordance with its own 
‘national’ traditions. These ideas were condensed in nineteenth-century 
national movements. Nationalism was made into a necessary cultural and 
political framework in the ideology of the modern secular capitalist state7. 
This European model was transplanted to other continents in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. 
The expansion of nationalism is thus part of the process which changed the 
institutions and communal bonds upholding traditional or ‘feudal’ agrarian 
societies. The new focus on industrial capitalism and secular state has 
traditionally been seen as the key in the transformation. In a way, nationalism 
in the nineteenth century became the new ‘civic religion’ of the more ‘modern’ 
intellectual elites. 
But how did nationalism – a new recipe for cultural and political hegemony 
in the nineteenth century – become universal? Applying European intellectual 
history into the study of political communities, Carlton Hayes and Hans 
Kohn suggest that nationalism spread almost unchanged and in tandem 
with the expansion and globalization of European/Western culture. We 
could therefore see nationalism as a by-product of European expansionism. 
This tradition of liberalistic idealism has also affected the hypotheses made 
within the modernization theory. These theorists, focusing on, for example, 
how European ‘modern’ values have been transplanted in cultures outside 
Europe, see nationalism as part of a linear development, which spread in 
stages from the European ‘centres of modernization’ – mainly Britain, France 
and Germany – to Eastern Europe and beyond. How well the copied and 
6 Kohn, Hans (1944) The Idea of Nationalism: a Study in its Origins and Background. New York: MacMillan 
Co., 3–6. See also Kemiläinen 1964, 7–12. 
7 The German concept Volk is originally more tolerant and ‘universal’ than what it was interpreted 
later by Herder, Hegel – or Hitler, see, Kemiläinen1964, 37–46. See also Pulkkinen, Tuija (1996) The 
Postmodern and Political Agency. Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 143–165.
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transplanted model of nationalism took root depended on how well the modern 
Western values had been integrated in the various societies around the globe.8
A more economic focus is found in the so-called ‘world-system theory’, 
which also takes a longer historical perspective. One of the chief proponents 
of the theory, Immanuel Wallerstein, considers nationalism a mere ideological 
side-track in the modern world system, that is, in the capitalist world economy. 
In his theory, historical capitalism is a system of constantly expanding capital 
accumulation. The modern world economy which evolved in the ‘long sixteenth 
century’ (1450–1640), has gradually spread from Europe to every corner of 
the world. In the last 500 years, the world has been divided into centres 
and peripheries, rich and poor nation-states, all serving the world economy 
and its homogeneous laws.9 Nationalism does have a role in this system, 
but to Wallerstein it remains one of the ideological methods of capitalism 
and a reflection of the functions of the deep structures of world economy. 
Nationalism is thus overly reduced to economism, and it no longer makes 
sense to analyse it on its own, separate from the economic development. 
This economic notion of nationalism is a follow-up of Marxist or socialist 
interpretations of nationalism, which assumes that nations will lose out 
as the basic units of the world economy. In the historical development, 
nationalism will necessarily transform into ‘internationalism’ and finally 
disappear altogether. To Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the era of the nation and 
its ‘ideology’ – nationalism – was an historical episode which would quickly be 
forgotten once the socialist societies took over. In the Marxist social analysis, 
the ‘nationality policies’ have almost without exception been overshadowed by 
the bigger picture of developmental theory. The idea was that while the study 
of nationalism might tell us something about the world, it would nevertheless 
do nothing to change it. 
Perhaps Marx was right in saying that the capital has no fatherland. He 
forgot, however, that the workers of the late nineteenth century already had 
a fatherland of their own. Lenin stayed loyal to the principles of Marx and 
8 Modernization theory is obviously very heterogeneous. Latin American cases are here quite interesting. 
The ‘Extreme West’ started to copy the European nation-state models for independent young Creole 
States already from the beginning of the nineteenth century – at the moment when most European 
powers – the creators of the nationalist recipe – were in a post-Napoleonic conservative and anti-
liberal stage. See, for example, Kay, Cristóbal (1990) Latin American Theories of Development and 
Underdevelopment. London: Routledge, 1990, 1–7; Cowen M.P. & Shenton R.W (1996) Doctrines 
of Development. London: Routledge, 63–75, 457–467; Blomström, Magnus & Hettne, Björn (1985) 
Development Theory in Transition. London Zed Books, 19–26.
9 Wallerstein, Immanuel (1979) The Capitalist World-Economy. London: Cambridge University 
Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1983) Historical Capitalism. London: Verso, 1983.
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Engels in his nationality policy. ‘Separating in order to unite’ was allowed as 
a strategic socialist tool. Rather than defining nationalism, which is part of a 
bourgeois ideology, Marxists and socialists have tended to define the nation 
as such and, for their tactical value, the nationality policies. Typically to a 
Marxist/socialist definition, Ernest Mandel argues that the nation is a product 
of a modern bourgeois class struggle. The bourgeoisie creates the nation in 
economic terms, because it has a need for common national markets. This 
is why they will eliminate all proto-capitalist, semi-feudal and corporative 
barriers of free trade. The bourgeoisie also creates a national unity in political 
and cultural terms in order to mobilise the masses against the previous ruling 
classes. By this Mandel clearly refers to the uses of nationalism as a tool of 
bourgeois ideological hegemony.10 
Stalin was the first to disregard Marx’s instructions and began to carry 
out nationalism in a socialist state and socialism in one country. After the 
turncoat Stalin, there has been no shortage of ‘nationalist’ leaders in the 
socialist countries11 – the most incredible continuum of this strange process 
is North Korea.
Tom Nairn has attempted to analyse the origin and global spread of 
nationalism with a Marxist model that bears some resemblance to Wallerstein’s 
world-system theory. Nairn argues that nationalism was able to spread because 
of the failure of the Enlightenment ideals of universal progress. To him, 
nationalism reflects the central contradiction in the capitalist world economy: 
capitalism progressed unevenly between and within the new political units, 
that is, the nations, and the riches were therefore also unevenly distributed. 
The capitalist logic operated both in the centres and peripheries of the world 
economy, forcing the political units into the same mould aggressively or as a 
defence mechanism. The shock that followed the spread of capitalism, says 
Nairn, caused the defensive reaction that we know as nationalism.12
It became abundantly clear especially in the peripheries of the world 
economy that the spread of capitalism did not equal increasing welfare. 
10 Here we do not have a possibility to analyze more in detail the controversial concept of socialist 
nationalism. See, for example, Mármora, Leopoldo (1986) El concepto socialista de nación. México D.F.: 
Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente 96, and La Segunda Internacional y el problema nacional y colonial, I 
(1978) (Eduard Bernstein, E. Belfort Bax, Karl Kautsky, Karl Renner) and II (1978) (Richard Calwer, Karl 
Kautsky, Otto Bauer, Josef Strasser, Anton Pannekoek). México D.F.: Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente 
73;74.
11 On Soviet patriotism and internationalism, see also, Törnudd, Klaus (1963) Soviet attitudes towards non-
military regional co-operation. Helsingfors: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, Commentationes Humanarum 
Litterarum XXVIII.1, 56–60.
12 Nairn 1981.
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According to Nairn, the elites in the peripheries sought political solutions that 
would have allowed their countries independent capitalist progress without 
the imperialist exploitation by the centres of the world economy. To make this 
capitalist utopia come true, the aim was to create a unified population also in the 
peripheries. The goal was one language and a homogeneous national culture. 
This process which invited the lower classes to join in the nation-building has 
been labelled as populist by Nairn. The people were mobilised in a fight for the 
fatherland through a sentimental and imagined national culture. Nationalism 
was the only cultural tool that could respond to the tremendous and unexpected 
changes brought about by capitalist ‘progress’. Nairn argues that in the end 
capitalism always equalled capitalism in one particular country, and that the 
relationship between nationalism and capitalism reflected the hidden networks 
that bind the societies together.13 It is here that Nairn crucially departs from 
Wallerstein’s world-system theory. Michel Billig’s later concept on ‘banal 
nationalism’ is recognizably related to Nairn’s framework of nationalism. 
In short, Nairn sees nationalism as an irrational and sentimental failure 
of the universal ideals of progress, reflecting the capitalist relations of 
production. Nairn’s view is also the opposite of the liberal tradition which 
sees nationalism as a triumph of Enlightenment values. Anthony D. Smith, 
for example, maintains that nationalism represents the eighteenth-century 
ideals that fought against the elitist view of the society through utilitarian 
values, secular education, individual thinking, commonly shared symbols and 
national memory. Nationalism emerged when the new elites, educated in the 
spirit of liberalism and progress, took upon themselves to educate the people 
in order to root out ‘feudal’ values, and when it was possible, to control the 
rapid changes that followed industrialisation. 
Despite their best attempts, liberalistic idealism, modernization and world-
system theories, traditional Marxist and neo-Marxist interpretations fail to 
answer several key questions – or at least the answers are too simplistic. 
Why has nationalism been so attractive globally? Why does it hold such a 
privileged and universal political value even today, with such a deep-rooted 
cultural legitimacy? What are the political or cultural circumstances that have 
given rise to the nationalist model? What are the conditions for the rise of 
nationalism – or different kinds of nationalisms, rather – in different social 
situations? Why and how does ‘nationalism’ work? The various structuralist 
views, based on the economy, do not explain why some nations correspond 
to their internal markets while others do not. In liberalism, nationalism roots 
13 Nairn 1981, 320.
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out the authoritarian state tradition or is regarded as a national spirit which 
makes political units into sovereign progressive entities, although it, too, fails 
to explain why some almost sovereign political units sometimes merge with 
bigger ones without any significant rise of collective national awareness.
For these reasons, many scholars of nationalism have come to the 
conclusion that it is impossible to find an ‘objective’ scientific definition for 
the phenomenon. This is why nationalism now attracts subjective rather than 
objective definitions. An ultimate circular definition of nation and nationalism 
can be found in Victor Alba, for example, who claims that even if many obvious 
elements change places in the various definitions of nationalism – including 
a united area, language, religion, culture etc. – they nevertheless contain one 
vital ingredient. People feel, believe or know themselves to be members of a 
nation. This means that the nation needs to be defined subjectively in the end, 
as if it were a common awareness of being part of a nation. To Alba, the nation 
therefore exists because this is what people think – and this is how they think 
because the nation exists. We will not get very far with a definition like this.14
Hans Kohn argues that nationalism is ‘a state of mind inspiring the large 
majority of a people’. To him, the nation state represents the ideal form of 
political organization, because this ‘nationalist state of mind’ is the source of 
cultural energy and economic welfare.15 For his part, Hugh Seton-Watson 
maintains that a nation exists when enough members in a community decide 
that they constitute a nation or act as if they did.16 Many anthropological 
definitions on ethnocentrism, too, bear a resemblance to subjective definitions 
of nationalism. For example, this is how Dominique Perrot and Roy Preiswerk 
define ethnocentrism:
ethnocentrism is a certain group’s attitude by which they aim to gain a 
leading position in relation to other groups, to appreciate their internal 
relations and particularism and to display an internally homogeneous 
reflection to those outside the group.17 
Subjective definitions of nation and nationalism appear at least as deficient as 
the above ‘objective’ attempts at definition. It seems that the most fruitful way 
14 Alba, Víctor (1968) Nationalists without nations. The oligarchy versus the people in Latin 
America. New York: Preager, 9.
15 Kohn 1944, 16.
16 Seton-Watson 1977, 5.
17 Perrot, Dominique & Preiswerk, Roy (1979) Etnocentrismo en historia. México D.F.: Editorial 
Nueva Imagen, 54.
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to understand nationalism is one which would combine the non-deterministic 
analysis of economic and political structures with cultural ideas and subjective 
concepts and collective mentalities – or with modern or postmodern ‘styles’. 
This would also introduce ‘objective’ criteria to the interpretation of largely 
subjective phenomena. As far as I can see, cultural and ideological phenomena 
cannot be analysed in isolation from the political and economic context. 
Tendencies such as these had perhaps too much emphasis in social sciences 
during the 1990s, and still have. 
Imagined political communities
We have to make certain choices in studying nationalism, because it has 
proved such a problematic concept. What follows is an attempt to define 
nationalism as the construction of the world and world-view that takes place 
in a modernization process. A nation, on the other hand, can be defined as a 
culturally and politically imagined community.18 
NATIONALISM AS ‘A CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD’
Nationalism has been interpreted theoretically in social sciences and 
anthropology, but these models have not in any fruitful way met the extensive 
tradition that has interpreted the phenomenon in a historical context. This 
has been a constant problem in the academic discourse on nationalism. It is 
partly for this reason that nationalist theory lacks a comparative historical 
background. An interesting challenge to both historians and social scientists 
is presented by Johann P. Arnason, an Australian sociologist. Briefly touching 
on the classics of nationalism, Arnason elaborates on the ideas of the 
modernization theory and globalization. Proponents of the modernization 
theory have seen nationalism as unifying and standardising the society and 
spreading – or force-fed – from the centre to the peripheries. Arnason prefers 
to look at nationalism as constructing the world rather than as an objective 
structure. The essence of a nation is a culturally determined totality. The 
underlying idea is of a modernization process, in which nationalism ‘constructs’ 
the world and world-view both politically and culturally.19 
18 Breuilly, John (1996) ‘Approaches to Nationalism’. In Baladkrishnan, Gopal (ed.) Mapping the Nation. 
London: Verso, 146–174.
19 Arnason, Johann P. (1990) ‘Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity’. In Featherstone, Mike 
(ed.) Global Culture, A Theory, Culture and Society special issue. London: Sage Publications.
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Anthropologists and theoreticians of the world-system theory have wielded 
a debate of the cultural and politico-economic nature of the processes that 
give rise to nationalism. Arnason’s challenge fits in with this argument. He 
also briefly introduces interpretations by Anthony Giddens, which underscore 
the psychological and mental dimensions of nationalism.20 
The relationship between culture and politics is crucially important in the 
analysis of nationalism. Modern nationalism can be understood as a way of the 
nation and state to uphold themselves through the citizens’ cultural autonomy 
and the ‘legitimate’ power wielded by societal institutions. Interpretations 
focusing on the political element of nationalism start from the notion that at 
the heart of a nation lies the preservation of political and statist autonomy. 
The nation is a political community defined by the dimension of power and 
authority.21 
In analysing the relationship between culture and political power, Arnason 
makes use of Ernest Gellner’s interpretation of nation and nationalism. Gellner 
begins from a political angle and sets the political units in a cultural framework 
by claiming that nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy. It controls 
the process whereby ethnic and political boundaries become one.22 Gellner 
maintains that the cultural and political merger (or the aim at such a fusion) 
is not inbuilt in the concept of the nation. It is nationalism – when combining 
the nation-building and different historical variations of national identity23 – 
that is the corner-stone of a genuine nation state. So, nationalism gives birth 
to nations, and not vice versa. It creates the collective identity that makes 
the nation. Nationalism is also an instrument and comes complete with a 
dimension of power. The nationalist construction of the world usually takes 
place from top down. It is the power elites which have normally transferred 
their nationalist world-view to the masses. A case in point was the new secular 
education systems adopted from the church by the state.
In Gellner’s definition, too, nationalism is a way of constructing and 
maintaining the world within a nation state. Arnason, however, criticises 
Gellner for not analysing closely enough the intimate relationship between 
cultural and power structures. This criticism is partly founded in Gellner’s way 
of seeing the emergence of nationalism purely as a result of the developing 
20 Giddens, Anthony (1985) The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity Press.
21 Tiryakin, Edward & Nevitte, Neil (1985) ‘Nationalism and Modernity’. In Tiryakin, Edward & 
Rogowski, Ronald (eds) New Nationalisms of the Developed West. London: Allen & Unwin, 57–86.
22 Gellner, Ernest (1988) Naciones y nacionalismo. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 14.
23 Identity – with ‘ethnic’ – is also quite complicated concept within the theory if nationalism. 
See, for example, Saukkonen, Pasi (2005). In Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen (eds).
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industrialised society. This society coupled with the need of division of labour 
and mobile work force necessitates a homogeneous culture within the state. 
Like the Marxist tradition and world-system theory, Gellner also focuses 
on the economy in explaining the development of nationalism. This is how 
nationalism only reflects a post-industrialist situation in again reverting to a 
‘second-generation’ phenomenon of a liberalist state. 
Arnason’s idea of nationalism as cultural globalization has interesting 
theoretical and methodological dimensions. To a historian, however, Arnason’s 
nationalism poses one overriding problem: his analysis of globalization 
remains at a quite general level in explaining nationalism, even if he sets 
out to criticise the fact that historians and theorists of nationalism within 
social sciences fail to meet. We could also find fault in Gellner’s generalism, 
reducing as he does nationalism to industrialism. If Arnason had investigated 
nationalism more in its historical context, he might have found his globalization 
analysis boosted by several simultaneous developments, including the change 
in the concept of time frames, which was in no small measure brought about 
by the nineteenth-century mass media (to consider, for instance, the growing 
national and global information of simultaneous events). His short but valuable 
essay also lacks some important interpretations of nationalism, which would 
have given more background to the model of world construction. By this I’m 
referring most of all to Benedict Anderson’s publications to Eric Hobsbawm 
on nationalism.24 
NATION AS ’A POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN ANONYMITY’
Benedict Anderson, an anthropologist examining the prerequisites of 
nationalism, follows Gellner and Arnason in giving ‘space’ for nationalism, 
i.e. away from the strictest concepts of ideology, structures or traditional 
politological approaches. Nationalism is quite problematic if it is defined 
as an ideology, because it is presented in all twentieth-century political 
ideologies and state models. Anderson sees nation as a sovereign imagined 
political community that is automatically bequeathed to the next generation. 
This ‘community’ is the result of the modern time-space concept, expanding 
mass media and the national education systems, once people have started 
to understand that there are thousands of people in the same region at the 
same time that they do not necessarily know. Nationalism to Anderson is 
24 Anderson, Benedict (1983; 1991) Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso; Hobsbawm (1990); Hobsbawm, Eric J. & Ranger, Terence (eds) (1983) 
The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge University Press.
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not a political liberalistic ideology, but should rather be discussed in terms 
of religion or kinship.
In the group of ‘classical modern’ theoreticians of nationalism, Anderson 
is also the one to throw most light on the origins of non-European political 
communities. It’s just a pity that his classic concept of the nation as ‘a politically 
imagined community’ is quoted in such shallow terms, still these days. We 
would probably do more justice to his ideas by using his term of the ‘community 
in anonymity.’ His imagined communities is better read as a hotbed of ideas. 
Anderson’s work may not perfectly explain the nature of nationalism, but he is 
able to excellently describe the prerequisites of nationalism and nation state. 
A key Andersonian idea is the change of pre-modern temporal concepts 
and the concomitant idea of the ‘plural worlds’, that people are aware of 
different but simultaneous social, cultural and political processes. This is a 
crucial difference of the nation-community in comparison with the networks 
keeping previous, or pre-modern, societies together. The world of the plurals 
was beginning to emerge in nineteenth-century literature, for example, in novel 
structures, or in the growing significance of the newspapers. It was therefore 
easier to understand contemporaneous events and to ‘know the unknowns’, 
that is, similar people who lived somewhere else but nearby at the same time. 
Our time frames have changed little since the nineteenth century, which 
is why collective elements boosting ‘imagined’ security have so far remained 
the same. We may think that today’s information networks and information 
society will change these time frames, but in fact the change serves only to 
strengthen the contemporaneous time frame and the idea of the plural worlds, 
which Anderson sees as one of the key prerequisites in the birth of nationalism. 
According to Anderson, the nation is ‘imagined because the members 
of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, 
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion’. The nation has been ‘imagined as limited because even 
the largest of them […does not imagine] itself coterminous with mankind’; 
‘imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which 
Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-
ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm’; and ‘imagined as a community, because, 
regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, 
the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’.25 
Anderson argues that cultures and peoples have met with the existential 
questions of life and death by constructing myths, identities and imagined 
25 Anderson 1991, 6–7.
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communities in order to face the scary world. Nationalism was an answer to 
this kind of question – that new nineteenth-century ideas such as bourgeois 
liberalism and Marxism were unable to respond to. Religions had previously 
served this function by at least trying to answer the mysteries of life, existence 
and death. Nationalism came and promised that you could die for your 
fatherland or that your own nation was sacred and eternal. The Andersonian 
nationalism is best condensed in the tombs or memorials of unknown soldiers. 
In western Europe, says Anderson, nationalist thoughts would fill the void 
left by secularisation. In a secular world, nationalism created a vital feeling 
of communal security. Following the European expansion and the liberalist 
nation state, nationalism became an ever more universal phenomenon.26
Historian Eric Hobsbawm claims that nationalism cannot be defined 
objectively ‘a priori’, and that subjective definitions of nationalism have led 
to suspicious and tautological ‘a posteriori’ interpretations. According to 
Hobsbawm, the concept of ideology fails to identify nationalism, as every single 
modern ideology of state – socialist, bourgeois, populist or fascist/dictatorial – 
has always had to justify itself and seek popular legitimacy one way or another. 
Almost without exception this has taken place through nationalist mass media 
and the construction of national myths. This patriotic information has often 
sought to turn people into ‘good citizens’ of the nation state, no matter what 
the legitimacy of the state. That is why nationalism has to be more than just a 
bourgeois ideology, because it appears more like a mobilising force in different 
state ideologies maintaining and strengthening the ‘legitimacy’ and stability 
of the nation state.27 How this process has succeeded or failed is one of the 
reasons behind why only reasonably homogeneous nation states or blocs that 
have created their own market areas have managed to ‘make it’ in capitalism. 
This is why stable nationalist projects have so far had a quite limited success 
outside Europe and the United States, with the possible exception of Japan.
The problem with Benedict Anderson’s macro-historical approach is 
that his analysis breaks off at the point where nationalism finally became 
universal as the model of world construction. At the same time ‘leftist’ or 
‘socialist’ nationalism emerged both in Europe and the previous European 
colonies. Anderson divides the history of nationalism into three phases: 1) 
Creole nationalism in the Americas; 2) nineteenth-century populist, linguistic 
nationalism in Europe; and 3) official conservative nationalism, which came 
26 See also Tønnesson, Stein & Antlöv, Hans (eds) (1996) Asian Forms of the Nation. Richmond: Curzon 
Press, 3–13.
27 Hobsbawm 1990.
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about as a response to populist nationalism shattering the power structures. 
There is also a ‘fourth nationalist phase’, which could be situated in the global 
triumph of the nationalist idea following 1918. Hobsbawm has maintained that 
the new ‘nationalist’ movement, which finally mobilised the masses within 
the nation states, was a social revolution rather than a principle of national 
sovereignty. Although this is true in Europe, in Latin America, for example, 
the social revolution and the principle of national sovereignty created an 
interesting blend of anti-imperialist nationalism – inside independent nation-
states – against growing US influence.28
This fourth phase of nationalism continued globally in anti-colonialist 
freedom fights in Asia and Africa, first in India in the 1940s and then in the 
African independence wars of the 1960s. This could be interpreted also as the 
fifth wave of nationalism. 
Anderson’s interpretation of the prerequisites of nationalism is rewarding 
to scholars of nationalism, most of all as a methodological tool. The intellectual 
historian can break away from the most complicated nets of the concept of 
ideology. We have to note, however, that Anderson is also a post-Marxist 
anthropologist and often interprets nationalism as a tool upholding and 
legitimizing power – and when we have a tool, we also have somebody to 
consciously use that tool. We therefore come close to the traditional Marxist 
terminology of ideology: nationalism amounts to ‘false consciousness’, 
which is used by the ruling class to send the citizens (proletariat) to wage 
war, for example, to defend the ‘national interests’. This is nevertheless not 
contradictory to understanding nationalism more broadly, as constructing and 
maintaining the world and world-view, which is present at all social levels. 
The sons of the rich have also fought their wars, and, during the national era, 
many times very closely together with the lower class soldiers.
It is also possible to look at Anderson’s thoughts – and to diversify our 
analysis of nationalism – by examining Antonio Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony. 
For Gramsci – synthesizing and simplifying his theory of cultural domination 
and the ruling class – hegemony is an ideological totality that defines the 
world view in capitalist (and socialist) ‘nation states’. According to Gramsci, 
every state is an ‘ethical’ or ‘cultural’ state that follows a plan, exhorts and 
28 In the second edition of Imagined Communities (1991), 47–65, 187–199, Anderson puts more emphasis 
on nationalisms of the ex-colonies but his analysis of the Latin American cases is based on very narrow 
literature (mainly Lynch & Masur) and remains quite imperfect. See, Pakkasvirta, Jussi (2005) ¿Un 
continente, una nación? Intelectuales latinoamericanos, comunidad política y las revistas culturales 
en Costa Rica y en el Perú (1919–1930). San José: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 44–45.
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encourages, makes demands and punishes.29 This is also the multidimensional 
and ‘nationalist’ basis how the dominant nation-state hegemony and national 
institutions control the power and exert over their citizens. Another tool for 
understanding the Andersonian ‘imagined communities’ is Michel Foucault’s 
interpretation of a ‘panoptic’ all-seeing society that watches and punishes its 
members, of a society that socialises its citizens by force.30 
Conclusions: mentality, feelings and nationalism’s style
Nationalism can be interpreted as a structure deeper than mere views or 
ideologies. Even if researchers such as Anderson, Arnason or Hobsbawm leave 
the term ‘mentality’ out of their analyses, their ideas are clearly similar to those 
in the so-called history of mentalities. My theoretical basis of nationalism as 
a construction of the world could therefore be understood as a ‘nationalist 
mentality’. Nationalism reflects long-term mental changes (values, norms, 
and the ‘psychology’ of the masses also on the individual level). It is obvious 
that other features, too, connected with the concept of mentality tie in with 
nationalism. In several countries the prevailing mentality at a certain time 
has been nationalism, or at least it has been a key ingredient of the ‘national 
mentality’. Seen like this, nationalism and mentality both amount to the way 
people react to external structures conditioning our actions. 
What is nationalism then? Religion’s kind of feeling, style of political 
community, imagined historical story of a group of people (decorated with 
local territories and historical frontiers), combination of hegemonic discourses 
of different local groups and elites, mentality – or memorials of popular heroes, 
maintained by their admirers and local fan clubs? My more mainstream 
conclusion is that nationalism is a human strategy and successful socio-cultural 
recipe of the construction of the surrounding world, affected by various political 
and cultural modernization processes. The nation is a political and cultural 
community, a result of a process where subjective and communal imagination 
meets social structures.
What is most important, though, is the fact that the approaches presented 
above help us to ‘read’ nationalism anew in historical sources. It is not always 
necessary to look at new archives, since a researcher can also rely on such 
familiar sources as press and media, architecture, statues, literature and other 
29 Gramsci, Antonio (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers, 247.
30 Foucault, Michel (1979) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books.
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quite traditional sources of historical research. We just need to re-interpret 
our sources, generation by generation, again and again.
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A nordic concePTUAl UniVerse
HENRIk StENIUS
What are the uses of conceptual history in the analysis of norden as a historical 
region? To even begin to answer this question requires an appreciation of a 
shared, exclusively Nordic, conceptual universe.
My argumentation is complicated by a couple of theoretical considerations 
and hurdles. What is a ‘conceptual universe’ and does it work as an analytical 
tool? And does ‘historical regions’ serve as a viable tool of analysis? What does 
it entail that norden should be a historical region? What could be considered 
as the formative elements that make norden Nordic; do these elements have 
a common formative period such as a common path to modernity, or should 
a Nordic sonderweg be traced back to prior or subsequent processes? 
The only premise that this article takes into consideration is that the path 
to modernity was a decisive formative period of a Nordic sonderweg. I will 
thus argue that the Nordic countries share a specific path to modernity. 
In analysing this Nordic path, I had best focus on the tension between what 
I will call a non-verbalised ‘web of belief’ (Marc Bevir) and a proper conceptual 
universe. The social institutions are in all societies grounded in underlying 
ideas, conceptions and visions. This is the ‘political imaginary’ that Cornélis 
Castoriadis talks about, providing the space in which political actions take 
place. In the Nordic pre-modern societies, the political imaginary included 
non-verbalised principles or a web of belief that constituted the political order.
In contrast, a conceptual universe is a collection of related key concepts 
and counter concepts which create a political imaginary imbued with these 
verbally expressed, discussed and contested key concepts. Modernisation in 
the Nordic countries introduced a modern conceptual universe by transferring 
concepts and discourses from the core of Europe to the Nordic countries. The 
new political imaginary was thus a culture of translations, where the actors 
digesting the European key concepts first had to think their thoughts in a 
European language before trying to articulate their thoughts in their national 
context, possibly but not necessarily in their vernacular language. 
Modern key concepts were European concepts. Adjusting the concept was 
a process of transfer. In the European core regions transfer involved reciprocal 
entanglement. Pre-modern Europe was a configuration of asymmetrical 
relations meaning among many other things that there was no real reciprocity 
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between the core regions and the realms of Northern Europa, Denmark 
and Sweden. The more sophisticated and elaborated the Nordic conceptual 
universe became, the more European the universe would grow while also 
preserving its own intellectual autonomy. In the end, a common European 
conceptual universe came to be a mixture of conceptual universes, a complex 
configuration of parallel regional and country-specific conceptual universes, 
existing side by side and overlapping at the same time.
* * *
But let us digress to be clearer about the point of creating a specific Nordic 
conceptual universe. Let us wander into the discourse of the graphs of 
modernity, or the question of how appropriate Koselleck’s metaphor of 
sattelzeit is for catching the gist of the formation of a modern conceptual 
universe. The pre-modern German-speaking world, which lived with a set a 
key concepts with a robust history and roots in Ancient Europe, was suddenly, 
in the mid-eighteenth century, launched into a phase a contestation and re-
conceptualisation. This phase only ended a hundred years later when the 
modern parameters of the key concepts of the German-speaking world were 
finally fixed. Although Koselleck himself never prioritised this metaphor, 
sattelzeit nevertheless became powerful and frequently used, and one can 
argue that within the German-speaking world the metaphor works fairly 
well. In this comparatively static pre-modern part of Europe, there was a rich 
European conceptual universe articulated mainly in non-German languages. 
And then this tranquil and equable culture got thrown into a phase of radical 
changes, social, cultural and political. During the German sattelzeit, which 
Koselleck unrigorously defines as the century from 1750 to 1850, the society 
based on privilege transformed itself into a capitalist society of classes and 
entrepreneurs. Such a transformation meant an ideologisation, politisation, 
democratisation and, most of all, a temporalisation of the political and social 
concepts. The idea with the sattelzeit metaphor is that this period established 
path dependencies which proved crucial for the way that the German society 
worked in later periods. 
However, this metaphor, or graph of modernity, has not been approved 
without resistance by scholars working on other historical regions.1 In the 
history of England, for instance, one cannot identify a similar sharp transition 
1 In discussions on the metaphor of Sattelzeit with conceptual colleagues in Finland, the main resistance 
to its use for Finnish purposes has been that the end of a suggested Sattelzeit in a Finnish context 
seems impossible to fix. 
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from pre-modern society into a period of modernisation. In the English case, 
the corresponding graph has to be rather like a string of pearls with clusters 
of concepts organised along the timeline. This illustrates that modern key 
concepts were introduced into a modern conceptual universe in different 
periods of time during the centuries from the Renaissance on. 
An appropriate graph for the formation of modern key concepts in the 
Nordic countries should acknowledge and communicate that modernisation 
did not entail that key concepts were modernised. Rather, they were imported. 
Instead of a sattelzeit, one could in the Nordic case talk about a Trichterzeit, 
a funnel period, which does more justice to the year zero state of pre-modern 
North in this regard, when all of a sudden a funnel appeared through which 
the European key concepts were pressed, distilled and poured out as a uniform 
set of concepts. The funnel functioned as a vehicle for Nordic eclecticism 
and allowed Nordic actors to choose and combine different elements from 
European discourses into a new uniform set of concepts. 
* * *
The funnel condition manifested itself in a political culture that pivoted 
around two basic principles that were more inborn and instinctively accepted 
than verbally acknowledged and theorised (and which can therefore hardly 
be regarded as concepts). According to the first principle, the gap between 
worldly and spiritual life should be bridged as much as possible (the Nordic 
syndrome of one-norm societies). According to the second, mechanisms of 
inclusion in different sections of society should be strengthened to a much 
higher degree than elsewhere in Europe. Together, these two tenets explain 
the making of norden as a historical region different from the rest of Europe, 
where the formation basically took place in the Post-Reformation centuries. 
More than in the rest of Western Europe, the Reformation in the two 
Nordic realms, Denmark and Sweden, brought the worldly (King) and spiritual 
(Church) power into an organic whole in which the worldly and spiritual 
officialdoms were two dimensions of one body of authority: no rivalry between 
the Guelfs and the Ghibellines; only one source of authority, legitimised, of 
course, by theological arguments, explicated by members of the ‘learned estate’, 
which in these two realms unambiguously meant the clergy – not, as in the 
other Lutheran countries, the clergy and the faculty of law, expressing two 
different sources of authority. 
Conformist, one-norm societies in the North provided a fruitful soil for 
modern, universal practices of the Nordic welfare states. Such narratives on 
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Nordic modernity usually trace Nordic conformism back to an alleged cultural, 
ethnic and religious homogeneity. However, what seem to be even more 
decisive for the formation of the Nordic sonderweg are the effective inclusion 
mechanisms in the Nordic realms of Denmark and Sweden. One should 
here look at the integration of the population into the process of production 
(alms should be given as little as possible; work instead of philanthropy); the 
pedagogical programme that efficiently rectified the ideological thinking of the 
subjects (Nordic ability to read in order to learn the basic article of faith, an 
ability which did not go hand in hand with the ability to write); the integration of 
the male population into local decision making (local democracy); the people’s 
army based on duty and coercion instead of a paid army; and opening up 
possibilities for as broad a populace as possible to take part in the production 
and distribution of useful knowledge about how to make the productive life 
more productive. The space in the margin for hospites, outside the regular 
organisations of the local community – much populated in countries south 
of the Baltic and North Seas – was almost non-existent. 
Whereas the principle of inclusion is difficult to analyse as a discourse 
about a key concept, the question of one-norm culture is slightly different: 
there are crucial historical documents marking out the linking between Church 
and Kind. We can therefore explore the second principle closer, that of the 
idea of a unified societal body where the Kingdom and the Church did not 
represent competing authorities. The Uppsala meeting in 1593 produced 
such documents, and these have later been considered a charter for the 
Swedish Kingdom and the Swedish Church. The meeting underlined the unity 
(‘samdräkt’) between the Kingdom and the Church, which the 1686 canon law 
also recognised. By analysing documents such as these one cannot, however, 
grasp in-depth the importance of this idea, or rather the related practices 
which made the Nordic countries Nordic.
The one-norm condition is a guiding light in the narrative of the Nordic 
sonderweg, The narration of the one-norm society got new chapters later. 
Secularisation broke the relative symmetry of the bi-polar tension between 
Church and Kingdom/State. But the idea and ideal of a one-norm society 
remained. 
* * *
One obvious digression for illustrating how particular the one-norm condition 
is in the North would be to contrast Zacharias Topelius’ roman à clef Tales of a 
barber-surgeon (Fältskärns berättelser,1856–67) with Alessandro Manzoni’s 
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The betrothed (i Promessi sposi, 1827), similarly a roman à clef and holder of 
a prominent position in the history of Risorgimento. Both books were written 
when the old society based on privilege was being challenged by new ideas of 
autonomous individuals with a liberty freely to sign contracts regarding their 
place in the production and re-production spheres (including the right to 
betroth the person you loved, which the novel shows was not easily achieved 
in pre-modern Italy). In order to picture a desirable horizon of expectation, 
both Topelius and Manzoni went back to the formative Post-Reformation 
period of the 1700s, which is a crucial phase in the European history of national 
comparisons. In this period they thought they could identify what was wrong 
with Italy and what was wrong with Finland, and thus point to a brighter future. 
Here is not the place for any extensive analysis of Manzoni’s splendid novel. 
What is important here is that even if the book is regarded as a cornerstone 
in the Risorgimento edifice, the book is not about ‘Italy’ but about modernity, 
about what sort of universalism accords with modernity.
Manzoni dissects the un-modern and thus unhappy Italian situation where 
a multitude of different kinds of authorities put their pressure on the individual 
citizen as well as on the public space as a whole. He analyses chapter by chapter 
the different agencies claiming their own specific type of power. The family 
is the institution that the rest of society relies upon, and should thus have a 
strong jurisdiction of its own. In this story, the parish priest is an unusually 
miserable character wielding his influence cowardly by abiding by what the 
bandits tell him to do. The local feudal lords are of a different quality, some 
corrupted, others not, but an inescapable category of authority all the same. 
The officials are likewise of different kinds. The administration of Milan, a city 
embroiled in crisis forged by the last big European plague, in the end take the 
responsibility for solving the crisis while wrongly identifying the hero of the 
book, Renzo, as a dangerous agitator. The bandits really behave like bandits, 
corrupting priests, officials and landlords. But they could be defeated, and 
even the worst of them could metamorphose into a repentant Lamb of God. 
The Cardinal of Milan represents all that is good in the Catholic Church: 
philanthropy, benevolence and acting as the primary defender of European 
cultural heritage. The monasteries as an institution are not to be trusted. And 
last, the law of nature and the law of economic intercourse one had better 
obey just because they are incontestable decrees. Describing this confusing 
pattern of competing authorities, Manzoni maintains that law and order is of 
course the key issue, although an obedient culture in Italy has to be adjusted 
to a system of multiple authorities. This is the message, even if the Italian 
readers of the book in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will obviously 
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draw slightly different conclusions, emphasising the importance of a legitimate 
regime for all the different parts of Italy. This was not, however, spelled out in 
the novel. Italy was not an issue, neither was Spain nor the Habsburg regime 
of which Milan was a part at the time.
In Tales of a barber-surgeon, Topelius, follows the Bertelsköld and 
Larsson families from 1631 (the battle of Breitenfelt) until 1772 (the coup 
d’état of Gustavus III), in the soldiery, among the political elite in Stockholm, 
in the academic and semi-academic environment (alchemistic circles), and as 
landowners in the Ostrobothnian countryside in Finland. Leading the reader 
through events and plots of the most dramatic kind, Topelius all the while 
demonstrates that there always is the virtuous alternative route to choose. 
Temptations to deviate from this road of conformity are manifold: vanity and 
pride; free-thinking, atheism and Catholicism; and intellectual hubris, which 
overestimates man’s capacity to master the world. In political terms, a virtuous 
life of this kind implies that man should stay away from sectarian companies 
of any sort and instead focus on the interests of national concord. The bad 
habit of focusing on one’s own interests Topelius finds first of all among the 
aristocracy, who more than others misuse enlightened thinking for personal 
materialistic purposes. In the political programme of Topelius, there is hardly 
any need for a mediating political class between the ruler and the people 
(whether the ruler was a Swedish King or a Russian Tsar was secondary). 
There should be no competing authorities, and the loyalty to the monarch 
should, accordingly, not conflict with religious piety and devotion. Topelius 
wanted to show that despite language and social differences, there was a set of 
common, patriotic norms indispensable for the nation, which it was possible 
to show in the framework of the old Swedish realm. The significance of loyalty 
was, however, as crucial in the nineteenth century within the framework of 
the Grand Duchy of Finland as part of the Russian empire. 
In these two novels, the question of modernity was not in the first place 
a question of an Italian or a Finnish nation as such, neither of Catholic nor 
Lutheran confession. What the problem of modernity in both these novel 
concerns is the principle of universalisms, the question of how to limit the space 
for the arbitrary and the depraved and how to cope with contradictory practices. 
Topelius exposes an inborn and instinctively accepted one-norm ideology, 
which becomes clear when we compare Topelius’ novel with Manzoni’s. For 
Manzoni, law and order, the fight against arbitrary rule, is crucial, but at the 
same time Manzoni demonstrates that modern man has to accept the existence 
of a parallel, sometimes even contradicting set of norms.
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In order to understand the importance of the one-norm ideal of the Nordic 
sonderweg, i Promessi sposi is the right book to study.
* * *
In the last part of this article, I will present a selection of key concepts in 
four different groups according to when they were introduced and adopted as 
modern key concepts in the Nordic countries. I will comment on the concepts 
only briefly, only catchword-wise in order to put to the test whether it is a 
fruitful exercise to look for a common Nordic conceptual universe. A positive 
response to this question would then imply a challenge to organise empirical 
research more systematically on the issue.
introduction of modern key concepts 1700–1800. The list of modern key 
concepts starts awkwardly with an unimportant concept at the time. This is 
the concept of opposition, which first appeared in a Finnish newspaper as 
late as 1867!2). In the Nordic one-norm societies, the idea of opposition did 
not resonate on the mental map of the pre-modern Nordic man. The religious 
dissensions were not of a harrowing kind. The Reformation was led from 
above rather than as protests from below. The Reformation was successful in 
the sense that it stopped the Nordic societies from splitting up in antagonistic 
subcultures, as was the case in Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Hungary 
and England. Neither did the ‘second Reformation’, the pietistic movement 
at the beginning of the eighteenth century polarise the society.3
Pietism and enlightenment were two political movements in eighteenth-
century Europe that more than any others polarised and mobilised the citizenry 
in different camps. These two concepts were not only neutralised in the Nordic 
countries, but they also worked according to another logic, which was quite 
different from the polarising and mobilising logic the concepts had southern 
of the Baltic and North Seas. In the northern realms, the concepts referred 
to features that every person had to a higher or a lower degree. By this logic, 
2 The article spelled the word both as ‘opposition’ and ‘oppostition’. Both spellings were used in the 
early history of the word. In Finnish print first time 1872. This word began to be used more frequently 
only from the 1880s onward; www.digi-lib.fi.
3 It is illuminating to turn to the situation in Swedish Pomerania, which followed German, not Swedish 
practices: Pomerania had several competing judicial authorities. Also, Pomerania was severely affected 
by a series of religious controversies, and in this part of the Swedish realm pietism had a decisive 
polarising effect. Contemporary observers, too, were aware of the differences between the Swedish 
Pomerania and the rest of the Swedish realm in this regard. Pomeranian commentators belittled the 
conforming religious climate in Sweden, claiming that there were no debates or original thinkers in 
Sweden; Önnerfors, Andreas (2003) Svenska Pommern: Kulturmöten och identification 1720–1815, Lund.
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the concepts acquired a pedagogical character pointing at a potential that 
each of us could be more devoted and enlightened instead of less devoted 
and enlightened. The concept could thus only with difficulty be used for 
distinguishing ‘us’ and ‘the other’.
The ethnic and religious differences were small compared to the situation 
in the far south of Europe. Here the concept of tolerance became a part of the 
modern conceptual universe as a mark for a particular strategy of how to deal 
with difference. In the Nordic realms, there was little need for such exercises. 
Instead, ‘tolerance’, like the concept of enlightenment, gained a moral and 
pedagogical aspect, which emphasised the importance of patience: little by 
little one would understand what was best for oneself.
The consensual culture in the one-norm-societies became manifested also 
in concepts such as knowledge and opinion, which in the Nordic countries 
came to be particularly closely connected. They were introduced as eighteenth-
century neologisms in the European languages in order to make a distinction 
between what is and what ought to be. This distinction became and remained 
blurred in the Nordic countries. One of Pauli Kettunen’s favourite quotation, 
from a late the nineteenth-century source, states that good ‘statistics’ 
substitutes for ‘politics’.4 
introduction of modern key concepts 1800–1860. The influence of the 
consensual culture is easily traceable also in the way key concepts were 
introduced and adopted in the period following the turbulent years of the 
French Revolution. While scouting out new, alternative or complementary 
ways for a legitimate political order and in substituting the supremacy of 
old dynastic principles, the political public in Europe focused on universal 
practices and universal concepts monitoring the new practices. In the two old 
countries, Denmark and Sweden, as well as the two new ones, Finland and 
Norway, the concepts of people and nation became focal concepts of political 
thinking, giving the regimes a new kind of legitimacy and in the end a new 
content of the concept of the state. Bernadotte’s appearance on the political 
scene in Sweden expressed a change in attitudes. It showed that the dynasty 
was neither the only nor the ultimate source of legitimacy. The concepts of 
people and nation were bendable and mouldable, accommodating a tension 
that marks the political culture of the Nordic countries. The holistic morale 
of the concepts was a demand for actions in accordance with the interests of 
the whole. This announced a political competition about who had the right to 
4 ‘Hyvä statistiikki korvaa politiikin’. Kettunen, Pauli (2008) Globalisaatio ja kansallinen me. Kansallisen 
katseen historiallinen kritiikki. Tampere: Vastapaino.
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define what was in accordance with the interest of the whole. But the concept 
could alternatively be loaded with a democratic moral: by referring to the 
will of the people, one could force the political public to interpret the moral 
demand to ask the people what they wanted. This second alternative signalled 
the possibility of loosening up the one-norm ideal.
The European concept of citizen became the paradigmatic case of new 
universalistic thinking, which abandoned the idea of feudal and other 
corporatist privileges. According to the modern European concept of citizen, 
every inhabitant of a national polity should have an equal relation to the state. 
In the Nordic countries, this democratic principle was launched together with 
a strong national moral. Citizenship consisted not only of rights. In the Nordic 
countries during the formative period of the nation state, the obligations were 
as important in terms of a positive freedom to take part in the building of 
the national edifice. Such a heroic task was accomplished by working hard 
in the spheres of production and reproduction. Particularly important was 
the partaking in the sittlichkeit project, a cultural and educational project 
in line with the Hegelian idea of the state as the ultimate objective of the 
citizenry. With such ethos, the education of the citizenry found a distinct 
German interpretation, which made the concept of bildung/sivistys/bildning 
a crucial political key concept as a component of the concept of citizen. bildung 
remained a political key concept not in every Nordic country, but certainly 
in Finland.
The Nordic conceptual universes in different Nordic countries were Nordic 
in different ways. The perceptions and the concepts of official and officialdom 
are one striking example that the nations were in the end consolidated 
differently in the different Nordic countries. Officials, whether government 
officials (ämbetsmän), civil servants (tjänstemän inom den offentliga sektorn), 
ministers of the Church, teachers or police officers not only personified the 
new state, but were also to a high degree responsible for the consolidation 
of the nation state. As such, they enjoyed a high social and political status, 
especially in Finland. What is interesting here are the differences, that the 
officials were not as beloved in West Norden (Denmark and Norway) as in 
East Norden (Sweden and Finland). In the West, it was socially acceptable 
to defraud and deceive an official, as was the tendency to realise one’s social, 
economic and cultural project in the sphere of voluntary engagement, in 
voluntary associations which kept the spere of officialdom at arm’s length.
introduction of modern key concepts1830–1900. The nation state became 
the only thinkable frame for political thinking and societal action as a result of 
a smooth, rather short but effective period of transition. In this transition, the 
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idea of inclusion and the objectives of the one-norm society were effectively 
dealt with by popular movements. In the Nordic countries, these had a massive, 
albeit mostly passive membership, who found the membership important as 
a mark of social and political participation. Members of these associations 
wanted to be represented through the association. Such representation was 
subordinated to national interest and thus adjusted to the one-norm ideal. 
The popular movements were not opposed to stately initiatives but emerged 
as a new type of corporative regime based on a division of labour between 
state, municipality, church and associational agencies.
Nor did the church play the role of antagonising the citizenry. The Church 
had only to a very limited degree been an alternative authority to the King and 
worldly power. Even the new revivalist movements of the nineteenth century 
were subordinate to the objectives of the nation to such an extent that they 
never left the national state church. The exception was Sweden, which could, 
like other old, well-consolidated states such as England, afford its citizenry 
the development of a dissenting culture of sects. 
Secularisation did not threaten the one-norm ideals, either. It did not 
produce an antagonistic citizenry of us and them: on the contrary, there was 
a convergence in the sense that all of us are to some extent secularised (modern) 
and sentimentally touched by the Lutheran traditions.
One can even argue that the elites in the Nordic countries, regardless of their 
holding very different positions in the different Nordic countries, could adjust 
themselves to the ideal of inclusion and the one-norm ideal. The aristocracy lost 
formal power, but continued to accumulate economic resources and political 
influence, not as a formal elite but as being part of a competent part of the 
citizenry. The cultural elite was particularly ‘inclusive’. The paintings they 
painted and the music they composed were not aimed for an inner circle 
of colleagues, but for the people. One should of course be careful with such 
romantic stands, but as a task for further empirical studies one could work 
with the hypothesis that the elite in the Nordic countries were more ‘inclusive’ 
than in other Western countries.
One particular expression of inclusion and the one-norm condition is 
the fact that the concepts of state and society became interchangeable. The 
counter concept of society was not the state but nature, which in the Nordic 
culture was equivalent to the sphere of authenticity. In order to construct a 
harmonious one-norm society, the individuals of the citizenry should regularly 
replenish authenticity by spending some time in the nature. While nature was 
a genuine alternative source of authority, it did not polarise citizens into us 
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and the other. It was rather a medicine we all are dependent on. We need it 
because we think it cures the alienation that comes with urban civilisation. 
introduction of modern key concepts after 1900. democracy and 
parliamentarianism have not destroyed one-norm ideals. Parliamentarianism, 
introduced smoothly in the Nordic political culture without its provoking 
any anti-parliamentarian mobilisation, did not contradict consensual one-
norm ideals. Not even Swedish bloc politics threatened the fundaments of 
the consensual culture. 
Social democracy benefitted from ‘conceptual history thinking’ and made 
the most of the potential of the strategy of a monopoly of definition. In the 
1930s, social democrats in Sweden in particular successfully launched and 
colonised the concept of nordic democracy as an anti-totalitarian movement. 
It was then that Sweden started to become a player in world politics by offering 
societal models for others. However, one is able to see much earlier already, 
since the radicalism of the Scandinavian movement in the mid-nineteenth 
century, that there was a tendency to substitute ideological othering for a 
physical-dynastic threat. Such an othering became more pronounced from 
the 1930s onward. It focused on forces in different parts of the world that 
contradicted values defined as Nordic. we was perceived as the modern 
progressives and opponents of the authoritarian and antidemocratic forces 
of the world.
The narration of Nordic modernity is arranged along an unbroken line that 
remained uncut even by the Western radicalism of the 1960s. The radicalism 
brought more participation and more emancipation, but what was specific in 
Nordic radicalism was that it was to a high extent – especially in Finland – a 
process of a prolonged enlightenment that effectively resisted post-modern, 
pluralistic challenges.
* * *
Pauli Kettunen has written that conceptual history aims to answer questions of 
how concepts are used and why they are used as they are. The why question can 
in the end be answered only by a reductionist argumentation, which identifies 
the causes in the social and political structures. Kettunen’s point is that there 
are even more important questions for conceptual historians, such as what an 
historical actor says, what sort of content (s)he puts into the concept. This is a 
search for the intentions that can be regarded as one of the crucial imperatives 
in the humanities. This imperative seeks to give full credit to individuals, but 
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it is rewarding also because it brings to light individuality, exceptions, losers, 
contestations, dissent and new openings.
The argumentation in this article does not follow this path. As a piece of 
radical reductionism, it is not in accordance with what conceptual historians 
usually do. It represents an awkward sort of conceptual history, because it 
starts with the structures and then asks what kinds of concepts accompany 
these structures.
On the other hand, one may think that such reductionism is an effort to 
contextualise a repetitive manner of writing and speaking. One can argue that 
as such, it is necessary for identifying the unique conceptual moves.
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social rights as a new paradigm by an accidental 
reform?
kLAUS PEtERSEN, NIELS FINN CHRIStIANSEN AND jøRN HENRIk PEtERSEN
The year 1933 was a dramatic year. The international economic crisis had 
reached new heights, the social and political effects were dramatic, and in 
Europe, the democratic constitutions were under pressure from totalitarian 
ideologies. In the United States, President Roosevelt launched his legendary 
New Deal programme to save the U.S. from collapse, and on the very same day 
that Hitler had taken over power in Germany, the Social Democratic Danish 
prime minister, Thorvald Stauning, could report that he (in his own words) 
had renounced a few principles but saved the country by entering into a major 
political compromise, the so-called Kanslergade Agreement. The agreement, 
named after Stauning’s home on Kanslergade (literally ‘Chancellor street’), 
was concluded between the Social Democratic Party, the Danish Social Liberal 
Party (det radikale Venstre) and the agrarian liberal (Venstre, lit. ‘Left’). The 
Kanslergade Agreement would become a milestone in Danish history. One 
part of the agreement was that the Social Democrats obtained the possibility 
to implement a major social reform that would not only bring together all 
major pieces of social legislation in four new laws, but also implement the 
principle of right based social provision and strengthen the role of the public 
authorities (state and municipalities). In this article, we examine the political 
process behind the reform more closely. It has often been viewed as part of 
the great Danish class compromise in 1933. In formal terms, this is correct. 
The events of 1933 created the possibility for the reform; but it had been long 
underway and was prepared long before the advent of the financial crisis. 
Here we will examine the intellectual history and origins of the social reform.
Taking our point of departure in a short presentation of the Danish social 
policy debate in the early 20th century, we discuss the social policy thinking of 
the Danish social democratic politician K.K. Steincke. In many ways, Steincke 
was a very atypical Danish social democrat. He was one of the very few who 
formulated fundamental ideas about the form and content of social policy. 
For Steincke, it was not just about higher or lower taxes or payment, but 
about the formation of a morally, socially and economically rational social 
political system. One of the sustaining ideas was the idea of social rights and the 
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Social Reform of 1933 has been praised as the breakthrough principle of legal 
based benefits (social rights) in Denmark.1 In the chapter we take a closer look 
on Steincke’s view on social rights (or the legal principle, retsprincippet, as 
Steincke labelled it). We then examine how Steincke and his social policy ideas, 
in a rather random way, became the social policies of the Social Democrats at 
the same moment when the Social Democrats took political power. However, 
the reform still had far to go. It encountered considerable resistance, and only 
after several failed attempts to promulgate reform proposals in parliament 
did the reform succeed, just barely, in becoming part of the major red-green 
class compromise in Kanslergade 1933. What is today viewed a natural 
building block in the history of the Danish welfare model was for a long time 
controversial and heretical and might not have happened at all.
Danish welfare history around 1900
From a welfare policy perspective, Denmark is a pioneer, with a wave of social 
reforms enacted around 1900. These include public old age pension (1891), a 
new poor law (1891), sickness insurance (1892), workers accident insurance 
(1898), the law on child welfare (1905), and unemployment insurance (1907).2 
The Danish model, as it emerged on this background, was based on a blend of 
social policy principles: insurance, philanthropy, tax-financed care and help 
to self-help. The common features here were the application of the discretion 
principle (means and needs testing based on local discretion) and the state’s 
beginning role; but there was great political disagreement about how the 
system should evolve in the future.
In the Conservative Party and among the dominant agrarian liberal party 
Venstre, there rapidly arose vocal skepticism about the social legislation. The 
critique especially concentrated on the growing role of the state vis-à-vis the 
market and families, growing public expenditure and taxes, and the weakening 
of the individual’s responsibility for his or her own life and fortune. Social 
1 Social rights is here seen as social legislation given the individual citizen claim rights and defining 
benefit level, conditions (for instance age) and other criteria (for instance income, family situation 
etc.). Cf. Walter Korpi, ‘Power, Politics and State Autonomy in the Development of Social Citizenship: 
Social Rights during sickness in eighteen OECD countries since 1930’, American Sociological Review, 
3 (1989), 314.
2 This legislation is described in Petersen, Jørn Henrik, Petersen, Klaus & Christiansen, Niels Finn (eds)
(2010) Frem mod socialhjælpsstaten. Dansk Velfærdshistorie. Bd. 1. Perioden 1536–1898, Odense; 
Petersen, Jørn Henrik, Petersen, Klaus & Christiansen, Niels Finn (eds)(2011) Mellem skøn og ret. 
Dansk velfærdshistorie. Bd. 2. Perioden 1898–1933, Odense.
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security might be a necessity for a modern society, but some restraint should 
be exercised. The right-wing rhetoric became significantly more acute when 
the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals not only took the lead but also the 
reins of government from 1929. It was especially the Conservatives who became 
articulate critics of ‘The Stauning-Munchian Regime’, especially including 
the expansion of the social sector.3 In the Conservative 1933 programme, 
in connection with praise the idea of help to self-help, it was added that the 
party at the same time wanted to eliminate the principle of right based social 
benefits: ‘Benefits without counter effort, being morally destructive for the 
nation’s youth, and which the country cannot sustain.’4
The Social Democrats, however, established themselves from the beginning 
of the century as the party of social reform. The party promoted several 
proposals in parliament on new initiatives and improvements to the existing 
system. In some areas, the Social Democrats succeeded in getting a theme 
placed on the political agenda; for example, school lunches and a pension 
benefit for widows with children but until the 1920s, the right-wing parties 
were veto-players in the legislative process and controlled the specific form 
of the law. The veto power was due to their control of the upper chamber. 
There are several examples of act of social policy being accepted in the lower 
chamber only to be ‘buried in the social mass grave of the upper chamber’ 
(as it was put by a contemporary observer). 
For the Social Democrats, the party’s socialist objectives appeared far 
into this period as the definitive solution to the social problems caused by 
capitalism and liberalism. In this perspective, social reforms were considered 
as a means of alleviating basic poverty, but also as a preparation for the desired 
socialist society. A key player in the development of a more consolidated social 
democratic reform agenda was K.K. Steincke.
K.K. Steincke and his agenda
K.K. Steincke’s major social policy work, ‘The Welfare System of the Future’ 
(Fremtidens Forsørgelsesvæsen, 1920) appeared as a result of Interior 
Minister Ove Rode and his Permanent Secretary Henrik Vedel having given 
Steincke paid leave in December 1918 from his position as department head in 
3 (Thorvald) Stauning was the leader of the Social Democratic Party and (Peter) Munck of the Social 
Liberal Party.
4 Det konservative Folkeparti, 1933-program.
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the local welfare agency in the municipality of Frederiksberg. The reason was 
that the Interior Ministry was ’considering moving toward a comprehensive 
revision of the Poor Law legislation’, and wanted Steincke to carry out the 
preparatory work.5 In the preceding years, the ministry had elaborated a major 
report on the Danish social legislation, which in 1918 had been published in 
three comprehensive volumes with Steincke as one of the authors.6
Steincke’s social policy views were not unknown to the government. In the 
preceding decade, he had presented his ideas in an impressive number of books, 
articles and debate essays. Especially the books entitled ‘Public Assistance’ 
(offentlig hjælp, 1910) and ’Charity or Rights’ (Almisse eller rettigheder, 1912) 
had given a clear indication of Steinke’s social policy thinking. What was path-
breaking about ’Charity and Rights’ was that Steincke had drawn the outlines 
of the principle of social rights, which were realized in the law about pensions 
for widowers with children (enkebørnspensionsloven) in 1913, in the ‘Little 
Social Reform’ in 1920s and carried forward with the social reform of 1933. 
The basic flaw in the system, argued Steincke, lay in the principle of charity, 
i.e., that the help was given according to the authority’s unfettered discretion 
of need in each individual case. If the help was allocated under such forms 
that the recipient first had to have his feelings of dignity crushed, it would 
dull the sense of being an independent, autonomous individual. The task of 
the state was not to exercise mercy,7 but to determine the citizens’ rights. For 
Steincke, the charity principle was a threat to the individual’s civil and political 
rights. If the individual’s sense of independence and of character were to be 
strengthened, it was necessary that the individual be accorded rights vis a vis 
the public sector, genuine legally based social rights, the execution of which 
rested solely on the pre-defined conditions and not on a random discretion. 
Social rights, the legal principle, protected the individual, but it also protected 
‘society’ and those who administered society’s payments.
If one is to be believe Steincke himself, it was far from coincidental that 
the ministry selected him.8 In a public lecture, the leading civil servant in the 
Interior Ministry Aage Schlichtkrull, had described the Danish social legislation 
as a labyrinth that would be difficult to unite into an organic whole, and he 
added that the man who had to carry out this major task was not yet born, 
much less found. Steincke’s self-confidence – viewed by others as his vanity 
5 See the preface to Steincke, K.K. (1920), Fremtidens Forsørgelsesvæsen, Copenhagen: Schultz, XIII–XIV. 
6 Ministry of the Interior 1918, Danmarks Sociallovgivning, Vol. I-IV, Copenhagen. Steincke was the author 
of the chapters on fatherless children and school lunch programmes (enkebørnsloven, skolebespisning).
7 Steincke, K.K. (1913), ‘Principiel eller opportunistisk Politik V’, Socialisten, 11: 5–6.
8 Steincke, K.K. (1946), Fra hele Valpladsen, Minder og Meninger, bind 2, Copenhagen: Fremad, 59–60. 
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or arrogance -- led him to address Permanent Secretary Henrik Vedel in the 
Interior Ministry and inform him that this man had indeed been born 38 years 
ago. In December 1918, it led to the Ministry requesting that Frederiksberg 
Municipality freed Steincke from his official duties as head of department so 
that he could carry out the preparatory work for a thorough revision of the 
poor laws. Steincke’s fellow party member, Minister (without portfolio in the 
war time coalition government) Thorvald Stauning, apparently played no direct 
role in the selection of Steincke as a one-man commission.9
Steincke showed himself up to the task. When, a year after the publication, 
he presented his work to the delegates meeting of the National Association of 
Municipalities (Købstadsforeningen), he courageously described his task as 
‘giving an overview of the last 2–3 pounds of printed matter, with which, by 
the ministry’s good will, I have been able to bless upon society’, and whose aim 
was to create system, determination, clarity and order.10 Steincke chose not, 
as the Interior Ministry had requested of him, to limit himself to examining 
only the poor laws. He took up the entire welfare legislation. ‘The Welfare 
System of the Future’ was both a critical review of the existing social laws and a 
proposal for a systematic reform based on Steincke’s ideas about social rights.
In the book’s introduction, Steincke presented his theoretical point of 
departure in Marxism, which he preferred to call ‘the economic view of 
history.’ According to this view, the capitalist society consisted of a constant 
and undeviating tendency toward proletarisation of still larger population 
groups, and with the proletarisation came not only economic-social but also a 
moral weakness of the proletariat. However, Steincke concluded in a somewhat 
optimistic tone:
The social development described here through the last century is … of 
such a kind that it would have entailed even far more dangerous results, 
especially in cultural and moral respects, if efforts had not been made to 
ameliorate its effects through the increasing organization of the working 
class with its special ethics, built upon the feeling of solidarity, willing-
9 Sode Madsen, Hans (1975), ‘Indenrigsministeriets socialdepartment’, Arkiv, 5. bind, no. 5, 166–188; 
Grelle, Henning (2008) Thorvald Stauning. Demokrati eller kaos. En biografi, Copenhagen: Fremad, 
224–229. A short time earlier, Stauning had taken over responsibility for precisely the labour and 
social legislation from the exhausted interior minister, Ove Rode, but Stauning focused only on the 
labour law as such.
10 Købstadsforeningens Tidsskrift, 32, 1921, 43–50.
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ness to sacrifice and subordination to the common economic and political 
goals, an ethic which, however, also wavers under the dissolving and 
confusing influence of the revolutions.11
In Steincke’s thinking, philanthropy was not among the instruments for 
improvement of the lower classes and those in need. Steincke was close to 
placing philanthropy on the dustbin of history because it represented
sentimentality, generally false charity or nonsensical populist beggary… 
which only panders to the thoughtless part of the upper classes’ narrow-
est egotism and Phariceeism, this harshness, this contempt for human-
ism, which can seem both arrogant and manly, but which for the serious, 
socially interested person is but proof of the person’s ignorance of the 
poorest situated population’s living conditions and hopelessness, and of 
his lack of more profound culture.12
Steincke’s point of departure was that there was no longer any disagreement 
about the necessity of social legislation between the major political parties. 
The conflicts were about its specific form (benefit level, recipients, conditions, 
financing etc.). It was Steincke’s pragmatic viewpoint that if one is to construct a 
social law according to defensible principles, one needed to look at the historical 
development of the Danish legislation. The continuity could only be broken 
if there was necessary and adequate justification.13 An existing arrangement 
could not be changed unless there was certainty about the negative effects and 
that the shortcomings could not be corrected, just as it should be demonstrated 
that there was an alternative that was better than the status quo, assessed on 
the basis of the purpose of the existing arrangement.14 
Steincke praised the psychological consequences of the voluntary insurance 
plan, which increased people’s sense of independence and awareness of their 
own worth, but in light of his demands for a change worthy of recommendation 
he rejected the idea of compulsory insurance (which was quite popular among 
the right-wing parties) because
• it did not have ethical advantages
• it was just as financially onerous on the public sector as was the existing 
arrangement,
11 Steincke 1920, 9.
12 Ibid., 10–11.
13 Ibid., 13.
14 Ibid., 32.
111
THE DANisH sOCiAl REFORM OF 1933
• present and future generations had to carry proportionally larger 
burdens,
• the premium would be experienced as unjust poll tax
• the ability to pay was not present
• it created a complicated, incomprehensible, circumstantial and 
expensive administration,
• as a large group were not able to pay the premiums it was nevertheless 
necessary that the arrangement contained an essential component of 
public welfare care
• it violated the historically given conditions.15
In Steincke’s view, it was not a positive alternative to the once trodden path 
and instead focus should be on correcting the existing social security system. 
He therefore returned to his earlier critique of the charity principle16 and 
found the necessary alternative in the principle of legally based social rights.17 
In this connection, he emphasized the importance of social rights on an equal 
footing with the civil and political rights.18 This further meant that individuals 
had to organize their daily life so that they could manage with the legally 
determined benefits, which would promote both the will to work and thrift. 
It was essentially a liberal perspective, because it assumed that the individual 
had to make their own contribution if they wanted to achieve a given standard 
of living:
with the recognition of the legal principle, everyone obtains their right 
for a basic existence, but as this is a right, the public sector does not in-
terfere in how much or how little money the individual himself has saved 
up, and the relationship becomes one that the individual who receives 
an old age pension as a right has the same interest in saving up for his 
old age do as other citizens; because he is exactly so much better off, 
financially speaking, than those who are wasteful and uncaring, as his 
frugality or energy has been transformed into saved assets. The growing 
expenditures that the implementation of the legal principle entails in the 
short run are gradually compensated by the principle’s indirect effects, 
in that the desire to earn and save as much as possible does not become 
15 Ibid., 33.
16 Ibid., 172–175.
17 Ibid., 271.
18 Ibid., 272–73. Steincke thereby anticipated the argumentation found a few decades later in the work 
of British sociologist T.H. Marshall. 
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weakened, and thereby follows a changed view of the individual’s posi-
tion vis a vis the public sector.19
At the time, this was a very modern viewpoint, as it argued that a public 
investment can in itself promote economic growth.
In the ongoing debate about discretion versus legal based entitlements in the 
allocation of welfare payments, Steincke went against his fellow party members 
in the Social Democratic Party who desired to retain the discretion principle 
in order to make it possible for social democratic municipalities to pursue 
more ambitious social political strategies. The legally founded social rights 
with strictly defined benefit levels would not only guarantee the minimum 
level but also limit the possibilities for raising levels locally as had happened 
in cities like Copenhagen, Århus and Esbjerg.20 According to Steincke:
in the long run, the political struggle over the increasing humanization 
cannot be conducted by the individual municipality against their col-
leagues, nor does it belong here. it must be conducted in the parliament, 
where the viewpoints of the different parties and their influence will 
determine the course to be followed and the rules that should operate ac-
cording to the legal principle.21
Steincke was far from being an ordinary social democrat. His view of society 
rested upon a combination of English Christian socialism and Marxism, and 
his analyses and proposals were always permeated by ethical considerations. 
He was a biting polemicist, generally never in doubt about the correctness of 
his views. Where possible, he sought out support for his views and proposals 
in the social science literature of the time. Hence, his book contains a chapter 
describing the benefits and disadvantages of eugenics laws, and it was with 
Steincke as minister of justice that Denmark implemented the first national 
law on forced sterilization.22 However, Steincke was also a reform politician 
who wanted to see results. In his view, economic-political power relationships 
posed an obstacle to radical breaks with the existing social order. From this 
point of departure, Steincke formulated his social political project in a balance 
between the socially-ethically desirable and the political-economically feasible.
19 Ibid., 274.
20 Kolstrup, Søren (1996) Velfærdsstatens rødder. Fra kommunesocialisme til folkepension, Copenhagen: 
Selskabet til forskning i arbejderbevægelsens historie.
21 Ibid., 271, 281.
22 Koch, Lene (1996) Racehygiejne I Danmark, Copenhagen: Gyldendal.
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Beyond the discussion of the fundamental system properties, ‘The Welfare 
System of the Future’ contained a total reform proposal which would later 
become the basis for the great codification of social legislation, the father of 
which was Steincke, and which became the social reform of 1933. One after the 
other, the individual areas of social policy were thoroughly analyzed, criticized 
and an in the second part of the work, an effort was made to improve each area.
Steincke’s work and reform proposals aroused attention, primarily in 
specialist circles. While everyone recognized the contribution of his work, 
its purpose and Steincke’s insights into the Danish social legislation, there 
remained a degree of hesitation among others regarding the implementation 
of social rights. Several observers were skeptical about replacing the subjective 
discretion principle with the legal principle of social rights.23
‘The Welfare System of the Future’ and the political reality
The Ministry of the Interior published Steincke’s work in 1920. It was a 
politically dramatic year, when Denmark, because of a coup attempt (the so-
called ‘Easter Crisis’) saw three changes of government in March, April and 
May.24 When the smoke had cleared, the Social Liberals had lost power, and 
Ove Rode was no longer interior minister. Under Niels Neegaard’s two liberal-
agrarian governments in 1920–1924, the post of minister of the interior was 
taken by Sigurd Berg, followed by Oluf Krag after Berg’s death in the summer 
of 1921. However, even though both these ministers were well versed in the 
social legislation, they did not have the mind set to continue the reform efforts.25 
Steincke’s comprehensive reform plans were therefore put into mothballs for 
better times. It should be mentioned, however, that the Neergaard government 
implemented the law on invalid pensions in 1921 – formally speaking, an 
insurance scheme – and the law on old age pensions in 1922, which was a de 
facto implementation of the legal principle in its calculation of the allowances.26
23 Nielsen, N.P. (1920) ‘K.K. Steincke: Fremtidens Forsørgelsesvæsen’, Social Forsorg, 16, 91–104 and 17, 
1921: 31–41.
24 Kaarsted, Tage (1968) Påskekrisen 1920, Århus: Jysk Selskab for historie
25 According to Hans Sode Madsen 1975, 182–83, Neergaard would have maintained the idea of a genuine 
Ministry for Social Affairs, but the idea ran aground due to practical problems of occupying the various 
ministerial posts.
26 Petersen, Jørn Henrik (2006) Den danske lovgivning om alderdomsforsørgelse II. Fra skøn til ret. Odense: 
University of Southern Denmark Press, 305–339.
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The better times apparently arrived in April 1924, when the Social 
Democrats, headed by Thorvald Stauning, formed the first Social Democratic 
government. However, it was Frederik Borgbjerg and not Steincke who 
took over the portfolio of Minister for Social Affairs in the new government 
(previously social affairs had been part of the Ministry for the Interior). Steincke 
became Minister of Justice. It was therefore initially Borgbjerg who had to 
carry out the reform work.
During the debate on the national budget in the parliament, on 29 
October 1924, Borgbjerg presented several fundamental social policy ideas. 
The conclusion was that much had been achieved ‘in the last era’, but ‘at the 
same time, I believe that the time is fast approaching when the social policy 
legislation of the last era should be taken up to a thorough, comprehensive 
and deep-going review, to have plan, systematic and coherent, also in the 
administration of this legislation, and in this respect the new ministry of social 
affairs can make an important contribution.’27
On this background, at a government meeting in August 1925, Borgbjerg 
proposed that a commission be formed that would draft a proposal for a 
‘codification of the social legislation’.28 The former permanent secretary 
Henrik Vedel became chairman and among the members were the permanent 
secretaries from the Social Affairs and Interior ministries and a representative 
from each of the parties represented in the two chambers of parliament.
Ove Rode, who had helped get Steincke started in his work, was not 
satisfied with the dynamics of the work that Borgbjerg had initiated. During 
the Folketing’s discussion of the budget in October 1926, Rode complained 
that the commission had held only ‘ one single preparatory meeting, although 
it already had a long life behind it.’29 Borgbjerg could not totally deny that 
this was the situation, but he emphasized that it was nevertheless ‘a two-day 
preparatory meeting’, that the commission had initiated a major survey of 
the views of municipalities and public agencies on the matter, and this were 
complicated issues which demanded a long run-up.
It is difficult to say why the committee had not gotten any further with 
its work. One possible explanation is that Borgbjerg was perhaps not the 
right man at the right place. The exchange with Ove Rode could imply a 
27 Rigsdagstidende 1924–25, Folketingets Forhandlinger, 882.
28 Olsen, Karen Marie & Madsen, Hans Sode (eds)(1976) Kristen Bording. Dagbog over Danmarks første 
socialdemokratiske regering 1924–26, Århus: Universitetsforlaget Århus, 89–90. The commission was 
finally approved at a cabinet meeting on 28 October 1925.
29 Rigsdagstidende 1926–27, Folketingets Forhandlinger, 252–53 (Ove Rode) and 1009–10 (Borgbjerg’s 
reply).
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certain disagreement between the two parties who was meant to carry the 
reform through the parliament. Another explanation can be that the Social 
Democrats had not accustomed themselves to their role in power and state 
administration, at the same time as the government was preoccupied with 
foreign exchange problems, the struggle for disarmament and disturbances 
on the labour market.30
A third explanation might lie in the work which the commission in fact had 
carried out. As Borgbjerg explained, it had distributed a survey questionnaire 
in January 1926 to institutions such as the Sickness Fund Committee 
(sygekassenævnet) and the Labour Directorate (Arbejdsdirektoratet) and 
to the counties, municipal executive boards and other local institutions. The 
12 questions sought to evaluate in what way the existing system did not work 
adequately. Were there situations, for example, where assistance should be 
given without the effect of poor allowance (loss of civil right), but where the 
rules prevented it? Were there problems in cooperation between the different 
administrations and institutions? 
The survey was meant to document (and legitimate) the need for 
simplification and systematization. The problem was that the answers gave no 
foundation for this. The state institutions and major municipalities (especially 
Copenhagen and Aarhus) responded as expected with serious reviews of the 
social welfare regulations and proposals for simplifications and improvements, 
but the parish councils in the small municipalities in the rural areas resisted. 
These municipalities were most often dominated by the agrarian liberal party. 
The ministry’s summary of the survey, first published in 1930, describes a very 
low response rate from the municipalities, explaining that surprisingly many 
of the small (and Liberal-led) municipalities simply answered a laconic ’No’ to 
the question of whether there were problems or needs for more coordination.31 
Even worse was that many municipalities had utilized the survey to answer 
questions that had not been asked. The ministry’s summary mentions ‘about 
140 statements that the social legislation to a greater degree than had been the 
case should set the insurance principle in place of the maintenance principle’ 
(the latter being the tax based social benefits).
If the commission’s work proceeded sluggishly during the Social Democratic 
government, it did not fare much better following the change of government 
in December 1926. The Liberal government under Madsen-Mygdal did not 
30 Grelle 2008, 280–311.
31 A summary of the survey was published as an appendix to the law on public welfare in 1930 – see 
Rigsdagstidende 1930–31, Tillæg A, 3584–3670.
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provide fertile ground for continued social policy expansion and reform. 
Madsen-Mygdal abolished the Ministry for Social Affairs (established in 1921), 
which to a great degree had become a symbol of Social Democratic reform 
initiative, transferring control of the public welfare system to Interior Minister 
Oluf Krag and Minister of Health Victor Rubow. The Liberal government’s 
social policy project focused on controlling social expenditures.
Steincke as Minister of social affairs
In 1929, Madsen-Mygdal lost power to a Social Democrat-Social Liberal 
coalition government under Thorvald Stauning, who proved to be a long-term 
presence in Danish politics as Prime Minister until his death in 1942. Despite 
Stauning’s skepticism toward the self-assured and intransigent Steincke, he 
tapped Steincke to be the new minister of social affairs (re-establishing the 
ministry abolished in 1926), much to Steincke’s own surprise. According to 
Steincke’s memoirs, it was because Stauning saw in him the man who could 
carry through the long debated social reform.32 The social reform was part of 
the new government agenda, and the government’s plan was to finance the 
reform by means of budget cuts in the military. The social reform, according 
to Stauning, should function as a corrective to Madsen-Mygdal’s retrenchment 
policies, create administrative simplification, move resources to the most needy 
persons and ensure everyone except for the most work-averse the right to 
assistance without loss of any civil rights.33
When Steincke took over as minister of social affairs, matters came to 
a head. Borgbjerg’s Social Commission, which was formally still operating, 
was on the agenda at government meetings in the spring of 1929.34 Steincke 
closed down the commission and instead established a smaller, more 
effective working group headed by the ministry’s own people: Rudolf Lassen, 
O. Fenger and H. de Jonquiéres as head. This organisation of work meant 
that Steincke and the ministry had complete control over the reform work. 
He delegated work to a number of specialized committees dealing with 
specific policy areas. One example was the committee which worked with 
the children’s protection services that included a number of experts such as 
32 Steincke, K.K. (1946) Fra hele Valpladsen. Ogsaa en Tilværelse II (1918–1929), Copenhagen: Fremad, 
258; Grelle 2008, 322. 
33 Grelle 2008, 324.
34 Kaarsted, Tage (ed.)(1981) Ministermødeprotokol 1929–1933. Ministeriet Stauning-Munch, bd. 1, Aarhus: 
Jysk Selskab for Historie, 4, 12.
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the chief inspector for the child welfare Oluf J. Skjerbæk and the Christian 
philanthropist Gerda Mundt. Both were politically active (and would later 
become members of parliament) for the Conservative Party. They combined 
expert knowledge with the possibility to anchor the reform ideas among 
the most receptive representatives for the right-wing parties. In addition, a 
cross-cutting committee was established: ‘the advisory social committee’, with 
representatives from especially the local administrations. On the committee 
was also the Copenhagen mayor Viggo Christensen; chairman of parliament 
and of the National Association of Municipalities H.P. Hansen; the chairman 
of the Federation of Parish Council Associations, Gerud Jensen; and the Sorø 
county chief administrator (amtmand) Vilhelp Topsø. The committee had a 
legitimating function, but also contributed with practical advice for revisions 
of the refund arrangements and the problem of which municipality was to 
care for individuals moving from one place to another.35
The effective work in an almost corporative tradition involving major 
interest groups with an ambitious minister at its helm meant that Steincke, 
in June 1929, two months after taking up his position, could present his 
reform to the government at a cabinet meeting. Such a comprehensive reform 
naturally provoked reservations and critical remarks also from his government 
colleagues. Several, including Stauning, had reservations regarding whether 
the elected local politicians could implement Steincke’s idea to make the 
municipal boards into the center of the social administration. But Steincke 
obtained a green light to go forward and elaborate a genuine draft law (based 
on the ideas in his ‘Welfare System of the Future’).36
The reform proposal consisted of four main laws which collected, coordinated 
and reformed 55 existing laws. It was a comprehensive administrative reform, 
which in several areas also entailed changes in the legislation. In the first round 
of parliamentary debate in November 1929, Steincke presented in parliament 
the three laws on accident insurance, unemployment insurance and People’s 
insurance (covering benefits in case of sickness, invalidity and old age), while 
the proposal on a new law on social assistance (the old poor law) would not 
come until December 1930. The proposal obtained the expected reception. The 
two government parties were positive, of course, while the right-wing parties 
35 See appendix to the proposal on the law on public welfare (lov om offentlig Forsørgelse), 
Rigsdagstidende 1930–31, Tillæg A, 3151–3174, 3183–3186. The discussion on which municipality had 
to provide help – the place of birth or place of resident was extremely complicated and led to a high 
number of controversies and even law suits between municipalities. 
36 Cf. Christensen, Jacob (1995) ‘Socialreformen 1933’, Historie, no. 2: 202. He uses notes and meeting 
minutes from Steincke’s personal papers. See also Kaarsted 1981, 46; Steincke, K.K. (1947) Det trækker 
op. Ogsaa en Tilværelse III (1929–1935), Copenhagen: Fremad, 9.
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were much more reserved. They feared increasing public expenditures, were 
afraid of the advance of the legal based social rights and had several more 
specific objections. The strongest political critique, however, came from the 
Communists. The Communist Party of Demark (DKP) was strongly critical 
to the Social Democratic government’s response to the financial crisis. This 
critique reflected the Communists’ ideological course, in which Stalin, in 1928, 
had dictated a struggle against the social democratic ‘social fascism’, and the 
two parties’ were in direct competition for working class voters. The DKP 
sought to exploit the crisis to mobilize and organize the unemployed, and 
they arranged several demonstrations and protests. A dramatic high point 
occurred when Charles Nielsen, from the communist-led, ‘Organisation of the 
Unemployed’, on 10 December 1930, fired his revolver from the parliament’s 
spectator gallery, while Steincke, then Minister of Social Affairs, was speaking 
during the debate on the Law on Public Assistance.37
Outside the political system, Steincke’s plans met a degree of resistance 
among the philanthropic organisations. As early as 1930, the leader of The 
Federation of Danish Parish Charities, Alfred Th. Jørgensen, pointed out 
that an enactment of the welfare bill would place the parish charities in a 
completely new situation, because nursing services, child welfare centers and 
the setting up of nursing homes and homes for the chronically ill would be 
taken over by the public authorities. Jørgensen agreed with the fundamental 
principles underlying the reform, but pointed to the importance of ensuring the 
possibility for cooperation between the public authorities and the volunteer-
based institutions. Together with High Court Judge V. Krarup, Jørgensen tried 
to pressure Steincke to alter the content of the bill.38 Krarup used his legal 
skills to formulate an alternative proposal, which the two of them presented 
to Steincke at a personal meeting in 1931. In his memoires, Jørgensen notes 
that Steincke seemed to be opposed to the idea, but after having considered 
the matter for some time, he said that he was willing to take the federation’s 
suggestion into account, and he eventually had Krarup’s proposal written 
into the bill, thus enabling the municipal social committee to conclude an 
agreement with the voluntary associations and institutions about cooperating 
to help the needy.
Up through the early 1930s, the critique became harsher and more extensive, 
as the national-conservative magazine ‘The Taxpayer’ (skatteborgeren) led 
37 Christensen, Jacob (1998) K.K. Steincke. Mennesket og politikeren. En biografi, Copenhagen: Christian 
Ejlers Forlag, 226.
38 Jørgensen, Alfred Th. (1949) Filantrop og Skribent. Brogede Minder fra et begivenhedsrigt Liv i Indland 
og Udland, Copenhagen: Gad, 165–166.
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the struggle against Steincke’s social reform.39 There were several detailed 
and especially critical reviews of the four main pillars of Steincke’s reform 
proposal and an equally sharp attack on the right-wing parties for not 
sufficiently distancing themselves from the proposals. The critical points 
were the increased expenditures, the increased state intervention element 
and especially, what ‘The Taxpayer’ magazine labeled ‘the great revolution’: 
that poor law became municipal social assistance (kommunehjælp). This 
meant that for the large group of recipients of help under the poor law, the 
legal ramifications (e.g., loss of voting rights) would disappear and ‘From the 
shameful ashes of the impoverished there rises into the sky a new phoenix 
which does not know the conservative sense of shame.’
And this was not good. For it was precisely this notion of shame which 
ensured that people did everything they could not to be placed into the poor 
law category. Steincke and the principle of social right threatened the entire 
conservative social order:
The new system is based on making the needy person’s access to help into 
an allodial right (odelsret) and civil right for him, a right which he can 
exercise without hesitation and any kind of diminishing of his sense of 
self and his reputation. but that one can thus renounce one’s economic 
independence with the same indifference as one throws off one’s coat 
stands in stark contrast to the very foundation of the bourgeois social 
order.
There was no immediate progress for Steinckes ideas due to the right wing 
parties’ ability to veto the process. In 1929, 1930, 1931 and 1932, Steincke 
had to promulgate again and again his proposals. There were at times very 
long and heated debates in the parliament, after which they were pushed into 
committee for further discussion.40 The disagreements meant that the project 
became deadlocked. The two government parties certainly had a majority in 
the lower chamber (Folketinget), but they desired a broad compromise which 
ensured political legitimacy and especially that the reform could get through 
39 See for example ‘Hr. Steinckes ‘Folkeforsikring’’, Skatteborgeren, no. 58, januar 1930, 878–880; ‘De 
Steincke’ske Forsørgelseslove’, Skatteborgeren, no. 67, October 1930, 1021–1024; Frantz Pio, ‘De sociale 
Love’, Skatteborgeren, no. 69, December 1930, 1054–1059; ‘Hr. Steinckes ’Socialreform’’, Skatteborgeren, 
no. 70, January 1931, 1069–1072; Harald Nielsen, ‘Socialreform og Kriseforlig’, Skatteborgeren, no. 80, 
november 1931, 1228–1230; ‘Det danske socialdemokratiske system’, Skatteborgeren, no. 90, 1385–1398; 
‘Socialreformen’, Skatteborgeren, no. 96, March 1933, 1489–1491; ‘Socialreformen’, Skatteborgeren, no. 
100, July 1933, 1541–1544; ‘Socialreformen II’, Skatteborgeren, no. 101, August 1933, 1553–1555.
40 For a detailed analysis of the debates, see Petersen, Petersen & Christiansen 2011, esp. Chapter 5.
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the upper house of parliament (landstinget), where the right-wing parties 
still had a majority. The law on unemployment insurance was implemented 
as a part of a crisis agreement with the Conservatives in June 1932, while the 
situation looked darker for the three other proposals.
What finally broke the deadlock was the crisis agreement concluded in 
Stauning’s apartment on Kanslergade in January 1933. The crisis negotiations 
between the government, Venstre (the agrarian liberal party) and the 
Conservatives took place from the 12th to the 30th of January 1933. The talks 
were aimed primarily at resolving a dramatic situation on the labour market 
with strikes and lockouts and the economic problems facing agriculture. 
Steincke, who participated in the social democratic negotiating committee, 
relates in his memoires that the social reform was one of eight points that the 
government wanted to include into the negotiations. 
Steincke was leading a sub-committee in the negotiations to examine the 
social reform and the public expenditures. There are no indications, however, 
that these negotiations were successful. Steincke does not mention it in his 
memoires, and the question of foreign exchange policy and the conflicts 
on the labour market generally came to dominate the discussions on crisis 
policies. By the end of the month, things became more and more pressured, 
and Stauning therefore took the initiative to conduct informal negotiations 
between the government and the agrian-liberal Venstre in his own apartment 
on Kanslergade. Here, on the night from the 29th and 30th January, they 
finally reached agreement for a major compromise which gave something 
to the farmers and to the workers. This meant that in principle, the Venstre 
promised not veto the implementation of the social reform, and the reform was 
included into a draft compromise that was presented to the Social Democratic 
parliamentary group on the morning after the Kanslergade Agreement.41 In 
the weeks that followed, negotiations took place regarding the content of the 
reform, and the final agreement on the content of the social reform was only 
reached in March 1933.42
Milestone and reform by accident?
41 Møller, Iver Hornemann (1994) Velfærdsstatens udbygning. Den anden socialreform 1933, Copenhagen: 
Samfundslitteratur, 144. Reference is made to minutes of the Social Democratic parliamentary group 
meeting of 30 January 1933. 
42 Christensen 1998, 211. 
121
THE DANisH sOCiAl REFORM OF 1933
It has since been discussed what the social reform actually implied. Was it 
an administrative reform, or was it the final victory of the principle of social 
rights? Was there anything qualitatively new, or was it just the old system with 
some new legal paragraphs added? It is difficult to answer these questions in 
an unambiguous way.
The process behind the reform, as we have seen, was marked by an active 
K.K. Steincke, a social democracy on the offensive, strong resistance toward 
a comprehensive social reform and a window of opportunity which opened 
with the international financial crisis in 1933. The social reform was realized 
because it became part of a major crisis compromise. Had this not occurred, 
the history of Danish welfare would undoubtedly have been different. Elements 
of the reform would certainly have been implemented anyway in the long run, 
as there was a need for better coordination and administration, but it would 
have occurred with another kind of timing, and it could easily have been a less 
statist version without the state’s partly takeover of social expenditures from 
the municipalities and the idea of social rights being so prominent.
The social reform of 1933 meant greater changes in some areas than in 
others. In areas such as unemployment insurance, old-age pensions and 
medical insurance, there were no major changes. The most important change 
was in the area of social assistance, where it was decisive for Steincke to 
distinguish between the great majority of the deserving poor, who were simply 
the victims of fate and hard times, and the group of socially ‘substandard’ 
citizens (Undermaalere). While the first group was relieved from the moral 
grip of the discretion principle and was allocated social rights, the latter group 
was subjected to the stricter right hand of the state. Beyond reforming and 
coordination in the individual areas – collecting 55 laws into four main laws 
– the social reform brought with it general administrative changes:
• Municipalities became the center for the local social administration 
(in terms of responsibility, administration and control).
• A simplification of the very complicated refund regulations and a 
collective redistribution from the rural municipalities to the large 
urban municipalities.
• In total, the state took over a larger share of the social expenditures 
from the municipalities.
Over the somewhat longer term, the social welfare reform in 1933 marked the 
start of the development of a public sector governed by rules and the space for 
local discretion became increasingly restricted. There continued to be room 
for the non-governmental institutions (e.g., the sickness and unemployment 
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funds) and philanthropic actors, which in some areas had been a sustaining 
elements in the old system, but they were now subject to more public regulation 
and control. It was a step toward the post-war welfare state.
In a broader historical perspective one can also see the social reform as a 
kind of democratization of social policy and defense of a democratic society. 
The ideas of a uniquely Danish and Nordic democracy combing democracy 
and social security made its impact later in the 1930s, illustrated by the ‘Days 
of Nordic Democracy’ in Copenhagen in 1935 or the Nordic ‘Protection and 
Welfare’ exhibition in Copenhagen from 1939.43 The idea was also clearly 
coined in the monumental work by Hartvig Frisch, ‘Plague over Europe’ (Pest 
over europa, 1933):
now is the time for us to show that there are bones and marrow in the 
nordic democracy. it was the farmers in the north who led parliamen-
tarism to victory and created the political democracy, to them belongs 
the honor. it is the workers’ movement which has built further on this 
foundation and laid the foundations of social democracy. The building 
has not been constructed yet, and it is enough hard work for the coming 
generation, but the foundations have been laid, and every nordic worker 
and farmer, craftsmen and functionary, professional and artist, has rea-
son to protect and defend the effort which has been done, against every 
attempt to introduce dictatorship and methods of violence, no matter 
whether they come from east or from south.44
Frisch proved to be correct in many ways. The Danish (and the Nordic) 
democracy survived both the totalitarian plague and the great war. After 
the war, the construction of the welfare state continued, with the 1933 social 
reform as the basic pillar, until the start of the 1960s. Today most accounts 
of the history of the Danish welfare state model include the Social Reform in 
1933 as one of the important building stones illustrating the Danish tradition 
for consensus politics. However, as we have shown in this contribution, the 
reform was just as much a result of a window of opportunity created by the 
international crisis as it was the result of Danish corporatism and consensus 
culture. As Steincke himself noted in his ‘Political Testament’ from February 
43 See the contributions in Kurunmäki, Jussi & Strang, Johan (eds)( 2011) Nordic Democracy: The Rhetoric 
of Shared Values in a World of Tensions, Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society; Christiansen, Niels Finn 
& Petersen, Klaus (2003) ‘Norden som folkehjem’. In Benum, Edgeir et al. (eds) Den mangfoldige 
velferden. Festskrift til Anne-Lise Seip, Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 13–16. 
44 Frisch, Hartvig (1933) Pest over Europa. Bolschevisme-Fascisme-Nazisme, Copenhagen: Fremad, 9.
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1962, the social reform he implemented ‘was just as much recognized abroad 
– from Norway to Uruguay -- as it was criticized here at home.’45
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The PriMAcy oF welFAre PoliTics
notes on the language of the swedish social 
democrats and their adversaries in the 1930s
NILS EDLINg
The 1930s are usually highlighted as the formative moment in modern Swedish 
history; weak governments, high unemployment rates and many industrial 
conflicts prior to that decisive decade – strong governments, welfare reforms 
and harmonious relations between capital and labour after it.1 On 27 May 
1933, the Social Democrats (sveriges socialdemokratiska Arbetarparti) 
and the Farmers’ Party (bondeförbundet) signed the crisis agreement, and it 
was followed five years later by the second step, the Saltsjöbaden-agreement 
between employers and unions concerning the rules that were to govern labour 
market relations. These are the two formative events, the foundation of the 
Swedish historical class compromise, to use Walter Korpi’s well-known label.2 
The decade also saw the rise of corporatism and, of course, the beginning 
of a new era in Swedish politics with the Social Democrats in power from 
1932 to 1976, almost without interruption but not always in majority.3 These 
changes turned out to have an epochal character; the 1930s saw the birth of 
modern Sweden, of the virtuous circle with its long-lived societal compromises 
connecting economic growth, politics and ethics.4 Notwithstanding Sweden’s 
1 This text is an early report from the research project ‘The Struggle over the Welfare State: A History 
of the Welfare Concepts in Sweden 1850–2010’ funded by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, the Bank of 
Sweden Tercentenary Foundation (grant P12-0269:1). I would like to thank my colleagues Nikolas 
Glover, Urban Lundberg and Klas Åmark for comments, discussions and suggestions. See also note 9. 
2 Korpi, Walter (1978) The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism. Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 80–86.
3 For a highly readable account of the 1930s, Hirdman, Yvonne, Lundberg, Urban & Björkman, Jenny 
(2012) Sveriges historia 1920–1965. Stockholm: Norstedts, 178–301, for kohandeln see 196–199. For a 
short overview in English, Sejersted, Francis (2011) The Age of Social Democracy. Norway and Sweden 
in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 166–172.
4 My thinking about welfare state history owes a lot to numerous conversations with Pauli Kettunen over 
the last decade and a half. Of course, I have also benefited greatly from reading Pauli’s English and 
Swedish texts. The Myrdalian ringing ‘Virtuous Circle’ is just one of Pauli’s illuminating ideas, receptively 
picked up, reworked and tried out in different texts, e.g. Kettunen, Pauli (1997) ‘The Society of Virtuous 
Circles’. In Kettunen, Pauli & Eskola, Hanna (eds) Models, Modernity and the Myrdals. Helsinki: Renvall 
Institute, 153–173; Kettunen, Pauli (2011) ‘The Transnational Construction of National Challenges. The 
Ambiguous Nordic Model of Welfare and Competitiveness’. In Kettunen, Pauli & Petersen, Klaus (eds) 
Beyond Welfare State Models. Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 26–31. 
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speedy recovery from the depression and the immediate international 
attention it attracted, the long-term consequences were of course unknown 
to contemporaries.
The crisis agreement from 1933 secured parliamentary support for an 
expansionist economic policy with an under-balanced budget in order to 
combat unemployment through public investments and for special regulations 
to secure production prices and incomes in agriculture. This vitally important 
political compromise between two former adversaries was immediately and 
disparagingly labelled the horse-trade, kohandeln (literary translated the 
cow-trade). This name followed that of the Danish crisis agreement, from 
January the same year, which critical Danes named the ox-trade, studehandel. 
The agreement’s importance for parliamentary democracy and the general 
political climate must be underlined. However, the Social Democratic 
minority government under Per Albin Hansson’s leadership failed to make 
the unemployment insurance part of the package in 1933, and the voluntary 
insurance legislation was passed through the riksdag the following year with 
support from the Liberals – a dozen liberal MPs had in fact deserted the 
party line and supported the crisis agreement. In 1934, the farmers joined the 
Conservative opposition and said no to unemployment provision, and the new 
economic and social reforms were subjected to heavy fire from conservative 
and liberal camps.
The present study deals with the central concepts in Swedish political 
discourse in the 1930s, particularly with the language of economic and social 
reform.5 It has an overtly polemical thrust and sets out to challenge and correct 
the now widespread and well-established interpretation which says that ‘the 
people’s home’, folkhemmet, is the key concept in modern Swedish history. 
My contention is that it actually had a rather limited immediate significance 
compared to the contested, but forgotten, key concept of the 1930s: welfare 
politics, välfärdspolitik.6 ‘The people’s home’s’ elevated status as the core 
concept is to a large extent a presentist construction with relatively weak 
historical foundations. That is the strong challenge put forward in this text.
5 My approach can be labelled pragmatic nominalism, which means that my searchlight is set on the 
terms that were used. Which were those terms? How were they used and what did they mean? And 
who used them? Such questions guide my search. In other words, this is not a text about welfare 
ideas and ideologies in general. For the sake of simplicity, I will in this text use term and concept 
interchangeably when referring to folkhemmet, ‘the people’s home’, and välfärdspolitik, welfare politics.
6 Like other Nordic and Continental languages, Swedish has a single word, politik, for both politics 
and policy, cf. Heidenheimer. Arnold J. (1986) ‘Politics, Policy and Policey as Concepts in English and 
Continental Languages: An Attempt to Explain Divergences’. The Review of Politics, Vol. 48, Issue 1, 
3–30. 
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The limited significance of folkhemmet
It is customarily argued that the new policies forwarded by the Social 
Democrats in the 1930s were centred on the concept of folkhem (definite 
form: folkhemmet], home for the people/the people’s home. Consequently, 
runs the argument, this must be the key concept in modern Swedish politics. 
The weak claim that the term folkhem was used relatively frequently from 
the 1930s and on is certainly correct, but probably not in the sense intended 
by those who reproduce it. A stronger and more interesting assertion states 
that it was a key concept for the Social Democrats and that it guided Swedish 
politics in general. Unfortunately, that claim has been repeated so often over 
the last decades that it is now taken for granted despite the lack of systematic 
studies, and it is symptomatic that the ambitious oxford handbook of the 
welfare state reiterates the historically incorrect claim that ‘welfare state’ and 
‘folkhem’ are interchangeable terms.7 In a similar way, German studies have 
set up folkhemmet as the organising principle of Swedish welfare society, the 
ordnungsmodell of the last century.8 The Swedish examples are too many to 
list, folkhemmet is to be found everywhere and its popularity seems to be rising.
Nevertheless I contend, well aware that I am fighting an uphill battle, it 
is actually the case that the popularity of folkhemmet is of recent origin.9 A 
simple search in the national research library catalogue indicates this quiet 
clearly: up to 1980 folkhem appeared 67 times in total in the titles of Swedish 
publications. From the 1980s onwards, we see a continuous growth with more 
7 Castles, Francis G. et al (2010) ‘Introduction’. In Castles, Francis G et al (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1. The only texts I know of where the Swedish Social 
Democrats/the Swedish Social Democrats (and their Nordic colleagues) in government make active 
use ‘the people’s home’ and use it as a synonym to comprehensive welfare politics were intended 
for an international audience. They used ‘people’s home’ with the purpose to show that Swedish/
Nordic social reforms could not be labelled welfare state or socialist, see Nelson, Georg et al (1953). 
Freedom and Welfare. Social Patterns in the Northern Countries of Europe, Copenhagen: Ministries of 
Social Affairs in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, 518–521; Severin, Frans (1956) The 
Ideological Development of Swedish Social Democracy. Stockholm: The Swedish Social Democratic 
Labour Party, 55–56.
8 Henze, Valeska (1998) Das schwedische Volksheim. Zur Struktur und Funktion eines politischen 
Ordnungsmodells. Berlin & Florence: Humboldt Universität & European University Institute. Henze’s 
text is mainly about Ellen Key and Rudolf Kjellén as ideological ‘step-parents’ to the social democratic 
welfare state which she has labelled folkhem. For a similar use, Etzemüller, Thomas (2010) Die Romantik 
der Rationalität. Alva & Gunnar Myrdal – Social Engineering in Schweden. Bielefeld: Transcript, pt. VI. 
9 For a more extensive discussion of the term’s history in the 20th century with examples of the changing 
meanings attached to it, see Edling, Nils & Lundberg, Urban (forthcoming) ‘Folkhemsmyten i svensk 
historisk forskning’.
128
Nils EDliNG
than 500 hits up to date.10 This growth coincides with the fiscal crisis of the 
welfare state, the murder of Olof Palme and neo-liberal calls for a ‘system 
change’ (systemskifte) in the 1980s. In this era, the concept of folkhemmet 
was recovered and consciously deployed by Social Democrats to describe the 
good society which they were defending against all the hostile attackers. The 
Social Democrats did not, this must be underlined, use the concept actively 
in any systematic way before the 1980s; it was at that time rescued from 
history and reintroduced in books like Folkhemsmodellen from 1984, an 
explanation of the virtues and achievements of the Social Democrats’ labour 
market and social policies, and pamphlets contrasting the present welfare 
state, now baptised folkhemmet, with the dangerous neo-liberal alternatives.11 
It was in this context folkhemmet became popular as a metaphor for the Social 
Democratic welfare state, a metaphor impregnated with nostalgia looking back 
at the lost Golden Age of Welfare.12 Tellingly, the Swedish Social Democrats 
themselves made programmatic use of the concept for the first time ever 
in 1990 in the background which described the labour movement’s historic 
mission and the need to defend the inclusive and general welfare reforms 
against neo-liberals at home or bureaucrats in Brussels.13
Nowadays, folkhemmet is used indiscriminately in all kinds of popular 
and scholarly discourses. It is a fuzzy concept with multiple connotations and 
it can be easily stamped on anything and everything. In my view historians 
and social scientists are largely responsible for this through their persistent 
and uncritical promotion of the concept. In other words, folkhemmet has 
been established as a key concept through collective efforts from the 1980s 
onwards; it moved quite swiftly from politics into academia where it was 
10 This search in Libris, http://libris.kb.se/, includes books, articles and posters and doesn’t take multiple 
editions into account. Consequently, the total number of unique hits might be slightly lower. However, 
the search omits all the numerous folkhem-compunds, such as folkhemssverige, folkhemspolitik or 
folkhemsmodell etc. The online catalogue was accessed 4 October 2012.
11 Hedborg, Anna & Meidner, Rudolf (1984) Folkhemsmodellen. Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren; Haste, 
Hans & Persson, John-Olof (1984) Förnyelse i folkhemmet. Stockholm: Tiden; Haste, Hans & Persson, 
John-Olof (1985) Folkhem eller systemskifte. Stockholm: Tiden; Grassman, Sven (1985) Det plundrade 
folkhemmet. Från samförstånd till klasskamp. Stockholm: Årstiderna; Aspling, Sven (1989) 100 år i 
Sverige. Vägen till folkhemmet. Stockholm: Tiden.
12 On this nostalgia, Andersson, Jenny (2009) ‘Nordic Nostalgia and Nordic Light. The Swedish Model 
as Utopia 1930–2007’. Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 34, Issue 3, 229–245.
13 Swedish Social Democrats’ party programme 1990, 6–7. This and many other Swedish party programmes 
and election platforms are available online, see Svenska partiprogram och valmanifest 1887–2010, 
Svensk Nationell Datatjänst, http://snd.gu.se/sv/vivill (accessed 11 October 2012).
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warmly welcomed.14 Apart from the overtly political use of folkhemmet as 
a nostalgic reference to a lost golden age and the perceived need to guard 
previous achievements in a politically more hostile environment, the new 
scholarly interest in discourses and concepts and their historical significance 
propelled the study of that strange term, the compound noun of people (folk) 
and home (hem). This interest in language as an object of historical inquiry 
in itself and the apparent urge to give a fitting name to an important period 
in modern Swedish history – yet chronologically speaking a very flexible one 
since the concept has been set to cover anything from a few decades to the 
entire century – help explain the proliferation of folkhem-studies. Most of 
them just make use of ‘the people’s home’ as an unspecified yet familiar frame 
of reference, a few put forward arguments about the concept’s fundamental 
significance and these studies are of course of primary interest here. It is 
possible to discern three overlapping claims in these studies: a) folkhemmet is 
a vitally important concept in modern Swedish history; b) the Social Democrats 
had to fight to take control of this contested concept; c) the concept rapidly 
became very popular in the social democratic version.
Beginning with the last claim, any argument about the concept’s instant 
popularity takes as the given starting point the parliamentary debate in early 
1928 when acting Social Democratic party leader Per Albin Hansson, in passing 
but not by accident, tried out the metaphor folkhemmet. In this speech, one 
of the most quoted in modern Swedish history, Hansson made it clear that 
the good home, characterized by community and inclusion as well as equality, 
consideration, co-operation and helpfulness, could not accept any privileged 
or neglected members. The Swedish society of his day was a brutal negation 
of those ideals: 
Applied to the great people’s and citizens’ home this would mean the 
breaking down of all the social and economic barriers that now sepa-
rate citizens into the privileged and the neglected, into the rulers and the 
dependents, into the rich and the poor, the propertied and the impover-
ished, the plunderers and the plundered. swedish society is not yet the 
14 Yes, I contributed too; with the closing remark in my first book I wanted to underline that the use of 
the home (hemmet) as a metaphor for the good society and national integration was well established 
in Swedish political discourse before the 1930s, Edling, Nils (1996) Det fosterländska hemmet. 
Egnahemspolitik, småbruk och hemideologi kring sekelskiftet 1900. Stockholm: Carlsson, 383–385.
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people’s home. There is formal equality, equality of political rights, but 
from a social perspective, the class society remains and from an econom-
ic perspective the dictatorship of the few prevails.15
According to many researchers, Hansson’s people’s home-speech captures 
the essence of Social Democratic reformism and that might be a valid 
interpretation. Generally speaking, these studies focus on the ideas and policies 
and make use of ‘the people’s home model’ to catch certain characteristics of 
Swedish social democratic reformism.16 However, it must be remembered that 
the Social Democrats themselves hardly ever used folkhemmet to describe and 
promote their objectives. Although it can be seen as a welfare concept of a kind, 
it was not synonymous with ‘the welfare state’, and certainly not contested 
in that way. For Hansson folkhemmet was clearly a future-oriented welfare 
concept but not the most important tool in his rhetorical repertoire; he used 
‘the people’s and citizen’s home’ (folk- och medborgarhemmet) or simply ‘the 
citizen’s home’ (medborgarhemmet) more often.17 Furthermore, Hansson was 
the only leading party representative who talked about ‘the people’s home’; 
his prominent colleagues Ernst Wigforss, Minister of Finance 1932–1936 
and 1936–1949, and Gustav Möller, Minister of Social Affairs 1924–1926, 
1932–1936, 1936–1938 and 1939–1951, never spoke about folkhemmet, and 
later party leaders Tage Erlander and Olof Palme only mentioned it when 
referring to Hansson’s times or to Sweden in general. In Tiden, the party’s 
15 This translation is from Tilton, Tim (1990) The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy. Through 
the Welfare State to Socialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 126–127.
16 E.g., Tilton 1990, ch. 6; Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1992) ‘The Making of the Social Democratic State’. 
In Misgeld, Klaus, Molin, Karl & Åmark, Klas (eds) Creating Social Democracy. A Century of the Social 
Democratic Labor Party in Sweden. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 42–47; 
Berman, Sheri 1998 The Social Democratic Moment. Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 156–160; Berman, Sheri (2006) The Primacy of Politics. 
Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, ch. 7. There are numerous Swedish studies, e.g. Jonsson, Tomas (2000) ‘Att anpassa sig efter 
det möjliga’. Utsugningsbegreppet och SAP:s ideologiska förändringar 1911–1944. Göteborg: Arachne, 
Göteborgs universitet, ch. 6–8; Karlsson, Sten O. (2001) Det intelligenta samhället. En omtolkning av 
socialdemokratins idéhistoria. Stockholm: Carlsson, 459–490. Jonsson’s book is in my opinion the best 
study of the Social Democrat’s ideological development up to the 1940s. More interested in ideas and 
ideology than concepts he uses folkhemmet to cover the emerging reformism in general. 
17 For details, Edling & Lundberg 2013. Björck, Henrik (2011) ‘Det politiska folkhemsbegreppet. Tillkomstens 
kontexter’, in Andrén, Mats et al (eds) Språket i historien – historien i språket. En vänbok till Bo Lindberg, 
Göteborg: Arachne, Göteborgs universitet, 380, also notes this. Berman 1998, 171, contends that Hansson 
used ‘the people’s home’ a lot in 1932. That is hardly correct. She refers to Landgren, Karl-Gustaf (1960) 
Den ‘nya ekonomien’ i Sverige. J.M. Keynes, E. Wigforss, B. Ohlin och utvecklingen 1927–39. Göteborg: 
Göteborgs universitet, 89–90. Those pages deal with parliamentary debate about the crisis agreement 
and the economic arguments forwarded by leading Social Democrats. Landgren says nothing about 
folkhemmet.
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journal for political and cultural debate, folkhemmet appeared a meagre seven 
times 1928–1940, this in the years when, according to modern interpretations, 
it permeated and directed Social Democratic ideology and practice.18 The two 
volume study of the ideological development of the Social Democrats from 1941 
by Professor Herbert Tingsten, a prominent political scientist and at that time 
an active party member, confirms this picture: Tingsten, a truly well-informed 
insider, devoted only a couple of lines out of 900 pages to the concept of 
folkhemmet.19 Three years later, the party congress devoted several days and 
600 pages to the new principal programme and the reform agenda for the 
coming years and folkhem popped up only twice in these lengthy and detailed 
discussions.20 As noted, the concept made its debut in the party programme as 
late as in 1990 and it cannot be found in a single Social Democratic national 
programme, election platform or poster before that year.21 This discrepancy 
between the historical actors’ lack of interest in the concept and the current 
fascination is rather surprising – Hansson obviously lacked a spin doctor with 
a feeling for what today’s scholars and politicians appreciate. My conclusion 
is that any argument stating that folkhemmet was a central slogan or core 
concept for the Social Democrats over time must be taken with a pinch of salt 
or two, and it is, I believe, necessary to make a clearer distinction between the 
use of ‘people’s home’ as an analytical concept introduced post festum and the 
claim that folkhem held a central position in the sources and processes studied. 
As for claims a) and b), the assertion that ‘the people’s home’ became 
popular early in the 1930s remains unsubstantiated. The logic of reasoning 
seems to go something like this: folkhemmet was central to the Social 
Democrats, their party won popular support in the elections and was in 
18 Arvidson, Stellan (1930) ‘Brantings tal och skrifter’. Tiden, Vol. 22, 607; Johansson, Axel (1931) 
’Från läsarna. Socialdemokratien och nykterhetsfrågan’. Tiden, Vol. 23, 384; Andersson, Nils (1935) 
’Riksdagens 500-års jubileum’. Tiden, Vol. 27, 235; Vanner, Al (1935) ‘Per Albin’. Tiden, Vol. 27, 520; 
Nilsson, Anders (1935) ’Partiet och dess ledare’. Tiden, Vol. 27, 588; Johnsson, Melker (1939) ’D. H. 
Lawrence, kriget och samhället’. Tiden, Vol. 31, 562; Gårdlund, Torsten (1940) ’Den nationella väckelsen’. 
Tiden, Vol. 32, Issue 4, 197; Tingsten, Herbert (1940) ’Svensk demokrati i samling’. Tiden. Vol. 32, Issue 
5, 258. Tiden is available online in full text, http://runeberg.org/tiden/.
19 Tingsten, Herbert (1941) Den svenska socialdemokratins idéutveckling 2 Vols. Stockholm: Tiden, Vol. 
1, 325. Unfortunately, I have not had access to the English translation from 1973.
20 Protokoll Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetarepartis 17:e kongress i Konserthusets stora sal. Stockholm, 
den 18–24 maj 1944, Stockholm: Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetarparti, 11 (P. A. Hansson), 71 (G. 
Branting). Just to avoid any misunderstanding: folkhemmet was used four times at the congress in 1928 
(two of these were in Hansson’s welcome speech); not a single time, it seems, at the congresses in 
1932 and 1936; two times at the congress in 1940. This conclusion is based on the copies I have made 
for my research project of the relevant parts of the volumes. Of course, there might be references to 
folkhem in the parts that I have excluded, but I doubt it.
21 This conclusion is based on a search in the online database Svenska partiprogram och valmanifest 
1887–2010 at Svensk Nationell Datatjänst, http://snd.gu.se/sv/vivill (accessed 11 October 2012).
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government, and consequently, the concept must be both important and 
widespread in Sweden. As indicated here, the first premise lacks firm empirical 
anchorage and this of course damages the argument in general. Yes, there 
are several good studies of the meandering prehistory of the concept from 
the last decades of the nineteenth century to the 1930s; the term was first 
used for settlement houses (cf. German Volksheim) and became politicised 
after the break-up of the union with Norway in 1905 – the infrequently used 
metaphor folkhemmet symbolised the nation and national unity.22 But these 
works are all based on the questionable premise that ‘the people’s home’ 
became the key concept in Swedish politics from the 1930s onwards. That is 
the main problem, in my view. The antidote whenever claims are made that 
folkhemmet was ‘the central organizing slogan of the Social Democrats’ or 
that ‘the struggle over the concept “folkhemmet” became synonymous with 
the struggle over governmental power’ is to check the references provided 
– if you can find any – and then ask for an explanation of exactly how the 
metaphor was transformed into a political programme.23 Numerous texts feed 
the message that ‘the people’s home’ became a popular slogan, the Social 
Democrats’ ‘mantra’ (Witoszek), a widely spread metaphor popularised by 
the social democrats (Stråth), a metaphor that Hansson introduced and made 
common in Swedish political discourse (Henze) or, even worse, the metaphor 
22 E.g., Götz, Norbert (2001) Ungleiche Geschwister. Die Konstruktion von nationalsozialistischer 
Volksgemeinschaft und schwedischen Volksheim. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft; Hallberg, 
Mikael & Jonsson, Tomas (1993) ‘Allmänanda och självtukt’. Per Albin Hanssons ideologiska förändring 
och folkhemsretorikens framväxt. Uppsala: Litteraturvetenskapliga institutionen, Uppsala universitet; 
Dahlqvist, Hans (2002) ‘Folkhemsbegreppet. Rudolf Kjellén vs Per Albin Hansson’, Historisk tidskrift, 
Vol. 122, Issue 3, 445–465; Björck, Henrik (2008) ‘Till frågan om folkhemmets rötter’. In Björck, Henrik 
Folkhemsbyggare. Stockholm: Atlantis, 13–52; Björck 2011, 377–393.
23 Lars Trägårdh has repeated this argument several times but his empirical evidence is in this respect 
rather sketchy, Trägårdh, Lars (1990) ‘Varieties of Volkish Ideologies. Sweden and Germany 1848–1933. 
Language and the Construction of Class Identities’. In Stråth, Bo (ed.) Language and the Construction 
of Class Identities. The Struggle for Discursive Power in Social Organisation. Scandinavia and Germany 
after 1800. Report from the DISCO II Conference on Continuity and Discontinuity in the Scandinavian 
Democratisation Process in Kungälv 7–9 September 1989. Göteborg: Gothenburg University, 48–49; 
Trägårdh, Lars (2002a) ‘Sweden and the EU. Welfare State Nationalism and the Spectre of ‘Europe’’. 
In Hansen, Lene & Wæver, Ole (eds) European Integration and National Identity. The Challenge of 
the Nordic States. London: Routledge, 130–148; Trägårdh, Lars (2002b) ‘Crisis and the Politics of 
National Community. Germany and Sweden 1933/1994’. In Trägårdh, Lars & Witoszek, Nina (eds) Culture 
and Crisis. The Case of Germany and Sweden. New York: Berghahn, 76–85. Quoted from Trägårdh 
(2002b), 77 (‘organizing slogan’) and Ljunggren, Stig-Björn (1992) Folkhemskapitalismen. Högerns 
programutveckling under efterkrigstiden, Stockholm: Tiden, 58 (’Kampen om folkhemsbegreppet blev 
därför också liktydigt med kampen om den svenska regeringsmakten’). For similar statements, Stråth, 
Bo (1992) Folkhemmet mot Europa. Ett historiskt perspektiv på 1990-talet. Stockholm: Tiden, 205–
208; Stråth, Bo (2005) ‘The Normative Foundations of the Scandinavian Welfare States in Historical 
Perspectives’. In Nanna Kildal & Stein Kuhnle (eds) Normative Foundations of the Welfare State. The 
Nordic Experience, London: Routledge, 34–36. Stråth largely follows Trädgårdh.
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transposed into some kind of blueprint: ‘Following Hansson’s speech, the 
idea of the “folkhem” became the main organizing principle of the Swedish 
welfare state’ (Schall).24 These claims confuse centrality and popularity. If 
the Swedish welfare state is the direct realization of Hansson’s metaphor 
about community and belonging, as the centrality-argument runs, then this 
process, the transformation of the metaphor into a full-scale reform agenda 
– which used other concepts – needs to be explained, instead of being taken 
for granted. As a matter of fact, neither the Social Democrats, apart from 
Hansson, nor the non-socialist opposition were particularly keen on talking 
about folkhemmet. So it seems, at least judging from the speeches made by 
the party leaders and from the election pamphlets and handbooks issued by 
the competing parties. In my view, this is important and affects the strongest 
claims made in the literature about the continued contestation surrounding 
the concept. Lars Trägårdh, the historian who has most ardently promoted 
the idea of folkhem as the contested key concept to the international public, 
confuses the mixed historical roots of the concept with contestation; that more 
or less prominent liberal, and conservative writers and politicians had made 
use of the term before 1914 and even in the 1920s does not in itself support 
the claim that P. A. Hansson had to fight in order to appropriate the concept.25 
The simple truth is that the Social Democrats two main adversaries in the 
1930s, the Conservative (högern) and the Liberal (Folkpartiet) parties lacked 
any greater interest in folkhemmet; they occasionally made fun of Hansson’s 
new metaphor but refrained from any attempts to conquer it. Admiral 
Lindman, the Conservative leader, made sarcastic remarks and his successor 
Professor Gösta Bagge in a similar way repeated that the ideas of a national 
community and togetherness were attractive if one could trust the socialists. 
But that was of course completely out of the question as the Social Democrats 
favoured a planned economy and social reforms that undermined individual 
responsibility: ‘If the Social Democrats are allowed to stay in power, it is much 
to be feared that Mr Per Albin Hansson’s “folkhem” becomes the institution 
24 Witoszek, Nina (2002) ‘Moral Community and the Crisis of Enlightenment’. In Trägårdh, Lars & Witoszek, 
Nina (eds) Culture and Crisis. The Case of Germany and Sweden. New York: Berghahn, 56; Stråth 1992, 
206; Henze 1998, 80; Schall, Carly Elizabeth (2012) ‘(Social) Democracy in the Blood? Civic and Ethnic 
Idioms of Nation and the Consolidation of Swedish Social Democratic Power, 1928–1932’. Journal of 
Historical Sociology, Vol. 25, Issue 3, 467. 
25 Trägårdh 2002a, 146; Trägårdh 2002b, 84–85. He makes the same claim in both texts stating that the 
Conservatives made unsuccessful attempts ‘to establish a right-wing reading of the folkhem slogan’ 
in the 1920s and 1930s. However, the footnote refers to the critique P. A. Hansson received from a 
fellow Social Democrat. Much can be said about Arthur Engberg, one of Hansson’s adversaries within 
the party, but he was not a right-wing propagandist. Consequently, ‘the attempts’ remain unknown.
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of all institutions.’ According to Bagge, his socialist opponent subscribed to 
‘the ideals of medieval times and stagnation’.26 The Liberals were even less 
interested, it seems.27 As Norbert Götz indicates in the best researched study, 
folkhemmet was not very widely used in political debates in the 1930s and 
only the small parties on opposing flanks, the Communists and the different 
right wing groups, got really excited and launched harsh critiques.28 The major 
parties had other priorities and more pressing issues to deal with and their 
lack of interest lead to a rapid de-politicization of Hansson’s metaphor. This 
de-politicised and non-contested concept of folkhemmet became quite popular 
already in the 1930s and it appeared in commercials, illustrated weeklies and 
cartoons as the non-controversial metaphor for Sweden or Swedish society 
in general, ‘the people’s home which belongs to us all’.29 It became a broad 
national ‘flagging’ metaphor, and had little, if any, import on the social reforms 
of the 1930s and 1940s. As the leading literary critic Ivar Harrie stated in 
April 1940: ‘The term “folkhemmet” is nowadays used mostly with a rallying 
tone – a discarded term from propaganda which is used as a boomerang.’ 
According to him, it was a dead term without any real connotations and he 
wanted to revive it in order to defend the democratic ideals, the rule of law 
26 Bagge, Gösta (1936) Politiska tal år 1936. Stockholm: Egnellska boktryckeriet, 100. See also, Bagge, 
Gösta (1937) Politiska tal 1937. Stockholm: Egnellska boktryckeriet, 75, 135, 162. For Lindman, e.g. 
Lindman, Arvid (1928) Samverkan för produktiva uppgifter. Tal i valrörelsen 1928. Stockholm: Allmänna 
valmansförbundet, 128; Lindman (1934a) Vår svenska väg. Urval av tal i 1934 års valrörelse. Stockholm: 
Allmänna valmansförbundet, 83; Lindman (1935) Frihet eller förtryck. Tvenne föredrag av Arvid Lindman 
den 14. och 16. mars 1935 i Stockholm. Stockholm: Allmänna valmansförbundet, 7; Lindman (1936) 
Trygghetskrav i orostider. Föredrag i 1936 års valrörelse. Stockholm: Allmänna valmansförbundet, 44. 
All of these examples are simple references without any argument about the meaning and content of 
the concept. The Conservatives usually marked their distance by putting folkhemmet within quotations 
marks.
27 Österström, Ivar (1936) Folkpartiets arv, insats och uppgift i svensk politik. Stockholm: Folkpartiet, 30. 
The central liberal text from the 1930s did not mention folkhem at all, Ohlin, Bertil (1936) Fri eller 
dirigerad ekonomi? Stockholm: Folkpartiets Ungdomsförbund.
28 Götz 2001, 245–252; also Björck 2011, 390–393. It is possible that further studies of the newspapers 
might alter my conclusion as far as the press is concerned.
29 Håstad, Elis (1956) ‘Arbetarrörelsen och Högern’, in Arbetets söner. Text och bilder ur den svenska 
arbetarrörelsens saga, Vol. 4: Nydaningens tid. Stockholm: Steinsviks Bokförlag, 653. Håstad was a 
Conservative MP and Professor in political science. Salomon, Kim (2007) En femtiotalsberättelse. 
Populärkulturens kalla krig i folkhemssverige, Stockholm: Atlantis, 240–242, has examples from weeklies 
in the 1950s. However, a problem with Salomon’s book is in my view the indiscriminate and simultaneous 
use of folkhemmet as an analytical tool and an empirical finding.
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and the Swedish nation in dark times.30 His aspirations were not fulfilled, it 
seems. Despite the surge of nationalist sentiments during the war years, ‘the 
people’s home’ did not became the preferred way to describe the Swedish way 
of life and its central democratic values.31
The importance of folk
The many studies of the concept of folkhem have successfully highlighted 
folk, the people, as a key concept in Swedish politics. Without a doubt, 
Tomas Jonsson, Trägårdh and others have made important contributions by 
uncovering the different historical meanings attached to folket.32 Focus has 
been on the Social Democrats and their ideological change where the entire 
national community (the people, folket) replaced the working-class as the 
focal group for social reforms. This new national orientation was clearly a 
fundamental change in socialist reformist ideology and political practice, and 
vitally important for the subsequent and repeated electoral successes, that 
well-known trademark of the Swedish Social Democrats from the 1930s to the 
1970s. Party leader Hansson was instrumental in orchestrating and directing 
this transformation from class to nation – ‘he explicitly embraced the notion 
that the party must project itself as a party of the people, so as not to be trapped 
within the exclusionary and adversarial language of class and class-struggle.’33 
This was Hansson’s strategy from the early 1920s and he regularly referred to 
30 Harrie, Ivar (1944) In i fyrtiotalet. Stockholm: Gebers, 26–27, 242–249 (written 1940 and 1941), quotation 
from 26, a text dated 10 April 1940, the day after the Nazi invasion of Denmark and Norway. Other 
examples from literary criticism in the 1930s and 1940s show how folkhemmet lacked an explicit political 
content and was used as a metaphor for contemporary Swedish society in general, cf. Blomberg, 
Erik (1940) Mosaik. Litteratur, teater, konst etc. 1930–1940. Stockholm: Tiden, 149; Strindberg, Axel 
(1941) Människor mellan krig. Några kapitel i mellankrigslitteraturen. Stockholm: Kooperativa förbundets 
bokförlag, 369–429.
31 This is largely an educated guess on my part and the topic is well worth further inquiry. A single 
reference to folkhemmet can be found in the collection of essays in Svenska folkets väsenskärna (The 
Essence of the Swedish Nation) from 1940 and it is missing in the classic piece of propaganda from 
1942–1943, the correspondence course Den svenska livsformen (The Swedish Way of Life). Folkhemmet 
is also completely absent in the edited volumes Socialismen och friheten. En orienterande debatt from 
1942 and from Bonow et al, Svensk ordning and nyordning (Swedish Order and New Order) from 1943, 
where a handful leading Social Democrats contributed. Moreover, folkhemmet is not a theme in a 
contemporary study of the political commentary in Swedish literature, Mjöberg, Jöran (1944) Dikt 
och diktatur. Svenskt kulturförsvar 1933–1943. Stockholm: Natur & Kultur.
32 Jonsson 2000; Trägårdh 1990, Trägårdh 2002a and 2002b, Stråth 2005. See also Götz 2001; Schall 
2012; Tängerstad, Erik (2012) 'Varianter av folkbildning. Kampen om den tidiga folkhögskolan'. In 
Burman, Anders & Sundgren, Per (eds) Svenska bildningstraditioner. Göteborg: Daidalos, 47–75.
33 Trägårdh 2002b, 82–83.
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his party’s patriotism and the national message became even more important 
after the electoral defeat in 1928, the event that propelled the reformation in the 
coming years. The changes from 1928–1932 meant that the party finally took 
control over the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (landsorganisationen) 
and made the exclusion and isolation of the communists a central objective 
for the unified reformist labour movement.34 Anti-Communism and watered 
down demands for socialist changes combined with the new emphasis on 
national community – folket understood as both ethnos and demos in changing 
and complex ways – set the tone of the new Social Democrats and their political 
reform programme. Hansson’s democratic nationalist socialism and the ways 
in which he linked democracy, national community and welfare reforms to each 
other provide the background, an explanation of a kind, for the present fixation 
on folkhemmet as the unifying and nation building key concept in the history 
of the Swedish welfare state. The analyses of Hansson’s brand of socialist 
reformism, with its stress on national co-operation and inclusive reforms, make 
several good points.35 Their problematic aspect is the exaggerated explanatory 
power invested in that single metaphor. 
The one-sidedness in the folk-interpretation is also slightly problematic 
as it paves the way for simplifications. Bo Stråth, mainly following Trägårdh, 
argues that the Social Democrats conquered the concept of folk from the 
Conservatives after a protracted discursive struggle and he also indicates that 
the reunited liberals – the two Liberal parties joined forces in 1934 – decided 
on a new name, Folkpartiet, the People’s Party – as a consequence of the 
Social Democratic success.36 Both claims can be questioned. In my view, it 
is hard to argue that the Conservatives actually owned the concept of the 
people, folket, in the beginning of the twentieth century. The concept of the 
people, understood either as the entire population, the classes of lesser means 
(as opposed to the elite) or as the electorate, was open for contestation and 
appropriation from the late nineteenth century onwards and all parties did 
their best to claim ownership. It was the nation, the fatherland, fosterlandet, 
that the Conservatives claimed exclusive ownership to. The general point 
is of course that the Social Democrats’ folkish-national turn disarmed the 
standing critique from primarily the Conservative camp that the labour 
movement was anti-national and represented a mere class interest whereas 
34 This makes up the central theme in Schüllerqvist, Bengt (1992). Från kosackval till kohandel. SAP:s väg 
till makten (1928–33). Stockholm: Tiden. 
35 Cf. note 16.
36 Stråth 2005, 34–36.
137
THE PRiMACY OF WElFARE POliTiCs
the Conservatives looked after the national interest, all of the people.37 In the 
1930s, the Conservatives continued to hammer out the message that the Social 
Democrats concealed their true identity, that of a socialist working-class party, 
behind new rhetorical adornments. The new Conservative programme of 1934 
set up a strong state, true to Swedish historical traditions and independent of 
class-interests, as a fundamental political objective and the attacks on ‘class 
egoism’, ‘class idolatry’ and ‘red class domination’ continued. Following the 
Conservatives, the socialists were abusing the languages of nation (fosterland) 
and popular sovereignty (folkstyre), the preferred conservative synonym to 
democracy.38
In addition, it must be made clear that folk was a politically significant 
concept for all parties, independently of what the social democrats said or did. 
The general suffrage, introduced in 1921, provided the institutional setting 
which forced all parties to compete for votes, to reach out to the people in 
order to maximize support in the new parliamentary democracy. All parties in 
1920s were folkish in this basic sense and they made use of the folk-concept 
in various ways.39 One of the liberal parties, de frisinnade, called itself the 
People’s Liberal Party, Frisinnade folkpartiet or de folkfrisinnade, in the 
elections 1924–1932, and the others followed suit down the folkish road: the 
Farmers’ Party (bondeförbundet) of the 1930s was the rural areas’ people’s 
party (landsbygdens folkparti), the Conservatives (högerpartiet) described 
themselves as a national people’s party (nationellt folkparti).40 By selecting 
Folkpartiet – the People’s Party – the liberals reclaimed the name used by 
one of the liberal parties already in the 1890s and emphasised the old liberal 
claim to be the true representatives of the people.41 The Social Democrats 
37 Nilsson, Torbjörn (2004) Mellan arv och utopi. Moderata vägval under 100 år, 1904–2004. Stockholm: 
Santérus, 169–170.
38 For the Conservative programme from 1934, Svenska partiprogram och valmanifest 1887–2010, Svensk 
Nationell Datatjänst, http://snd.gu.se/sv/vivill (accessed 13 November 2012). For Conservative attacks, 
Lindman 1934; Lindman 1935; Bagge 1936. Trägårdh 2002a and 2002b and Stråth 2005 are well 
aware of this and stress the new ways in which the Social Democrats made use of Swedish history 
and traditional national symbols. The weakness rests their binary interpretation of folket as either a 
Conservative or a Social Democratic concept. Another issue is the exaggerated importance they assign 
to the political scientist and Conservative politician Rudolf Kjellén.
39 Hallberg, Mikael & Jonsson, Tomas (1996) ‘Per Albin Hansson och folkhemsretorikens framväxt’. In 
Åsard, Erik (ed.) Makten, medierna och myterna. Socialdemokratiska ledare från Branting till Carlsson. 
Stockholm: Carlsson, 133–141.
40 See Svenska partiprogram och valmanifest 1887–2010, Svensk Nationell Datatjänst, http://snd.gu.se/
sv/vivill (accessed 13 November 2012).
41 Edling 1996, chs. 4–5, 9, 12; Lundberg, Victor (2007) Folket, yxan och orättvisans rot. Betydelsebildning 
kring demokrati i den svenska rösträttsrörelsens diskursgemenskap, 1887–1902. Umeå: h:ström - Text 
& kultur, passim.
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were definitely successful in appropriating folket, but they were not alone and 
active competitors can be found in all political camps. Their success had little 
to do with the concept folkhemmet or any privileged access to ‘the people’. It 
owned a lot to their welfare politics, välfärdspolitik, and the successful ways 
in which they managed to mobilize popular support.
The primacy of welfare politics
During the election campaign of 1936, the Social Democrats issued a lavishly 
illustrated single-issue weekly named ‘The Government that Left Office’, 
regeringen som gick, a title which referred to their tactical resignation 
from office right before the summer holidays. That journal, without a single 
sentence about folkhemmet, was all about the economic and social progress 
produced by Social Democratic welfare politics. Black and white photos and 
figures illustrated the swift recovery from the depression under the Socialist 
government and the message laid out in pictures, numbers and words must 
have been difficult to misunderstand: the new unemployment policies, 
above all the productive investments in housing and construction, and the 
agricultural support had saved the country and improved the living conditions 
for all citizens. The slogan, repeating the central demand from the May Day 
demonstration that year, in large bold letters read: ‘The welfare politics must 
continue’.42 Välfärdspolitik, welfare politics, stood at the absolute centre of 
Swedish politics in the 1930s. This was the vitally important concept launched 
and exploited by the Social Democrats.
There is no doubt that the term ‘welfare’ has a long history in Swedish 
political discourses, yet it remained a second rank concept for centuries. 
That changed in the 1930s when it was politicised and temporalized; it 
gained momentum and its importance increased dramatically as different 
actors incorporated it into their competing programmes.43 Consequently, it 
became highly contested: ‘welfare’ and ‘welfare politics’ were the concepts 
that the parties competed to control. As far as is known, the Social Democrats 
started to use ‘social welfare politics’ (social välfärdspolitik) in 1932 as an 
umbrella for the different measures needed to combat the current economic 
crisis and ‘welfare’ climbed to the top in spring the following year when the 
42 Regeringen som gick (1936) Stockholm: Tiden, 29–31. 
43 For this Koselleckian idea, Palonen, Kari (2005) ‘Political Times and the Temporalisation of Concepts. 
A New Agenda for Conceptual History’. In Landgrén, Lars-Folke & Hautamäki, Pirkko (eds) People, 
Citizen, Nation. Festschrift for Henrik Stenius. Helsinki: Renvall Institute, 50–66.
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riksdag’s ‘welfare committee’ tried to come to a decision on the government’s 
innovative ‘proto-keynesian’ economic policies. ‘The welfare committee’ – 
välfärdsutskottet – was the popular name for the committee where the cow-
trade bargaining took place in 1933.44 This linked welfare directly to the crisis 
agreement and provided both an institutional basis and a relatively precise 
definition of the new concept ‘welfare politics’. The new political dictionary 
from 1937 stated this quite clearly:
welfare politics, the term for the common course, which the social demo-
crats and the Farmers’ Party agreed upon in the riksdag in 1933 [--- Fol-
lowing the elections 1936] the Farmers’ Party and the social democrats 
formed a coalition government, and this cooperation can be seen as a 
direct continuation of the welfare politics. The government’s programme 
includes that the social democrats abstain from any nationalisation 
plans and together with the Farmers’ Party continue the reform pro-
gramme.45
The package of expansive labour market, social reforms and agricultural 
support constituted the Social Democrats ‘welfare politics’, a future-oriented 
programme for reform. The comprehensive programme, helping both 
unemployed workers and indebted farmers, securing both democratic rule 
and economic progress, had other names too. Prime Minister Hansson 
sometimes talked about ‘positive popular employment policies’ (positiv 
folkförsörjningspolitik) and folkpolitik, politics for the people, whereas 
Minister of Social Affairs Möller wrote about the government’s ‘anti-crisis-
politics’.46 But ‘welfare politics’ remained the common term used to cover all 
their different reforms and it appeared in the May Day resolutions, election 
44 This is very preliminary and I am sure that further studies will uncover the history of ‘welfare politics’ – 
my own project sets out to do that. For details on the complex negotiations, where the parliamentary 
committee gradually was sidestepped through the intervention of the government and its direct talks 
with leading party representatives, see Nyman, Olle (1947) Svensk parlamentarism 1932–1936. Från 
minoritetsparlamentarism till majoritetskoalition. Uppsala & Stockholm: Statsvetenskapliga föreningen 
and Almqvist & Wiksell, 89–164.
45 Dahlberg, Gunnar & Tingsten, Herbert (1937) Svensk politisk uppslagsbok. Stockholm: A-B Svensk 
Litteratur, 389–390. It is probably not necessary to point out that their 400 page book contains no 
entry called ‘folkhemmet’. Both authors were Social Democrats.
46 Hansson, Per Albin (1934) Demokratisk samverkan eller nationell splittring? Stockholm: Tiden; Hansson 
(1936), Varför vi gick. En redogörelse för regeringskrisen. Stockholm: Tiden, 5–7, 27–32. See also the 
collection of speeches in his Demokrati from 1935; Möller, Gustav (1936) Kampen mot arbetslösheten. 
Hur den förts och hur den lyckats. Stockholm: Tiden; Möller, Gustav (1938) Regeringens anti-krispolitik. 
Stockholm: Tiden.
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manifestos and posters. It was the overarching concept used to describe what 
they had accomplished and what they set up as the coming goals, and this 
makes ‘politics’ instead of ‘policies’ the correct translation of välfärdspolitik. 
The May Day resolution from 1936 started with a direct appeal: Make this 
demonstration a ‘general call (generalmönstring) for continued democratic 
welfare politics’.47 A few months later, the election manifesto repeated the 
credo:
The spirit of mutual understanding, created around the crisis policies, 
has furthered the general reform work in different areas. [---] The work-
ers’ Party calls on the citizens to unite behind continued energetic welfare 
politics.48
The Social Democrats managed to take full credit for Sweden’s rapid comeback 
from the depression. The welfare programme became a valuable political asset 
and they took full advantage of this. The election campaign of 1936 focused 
on Per Albin – the only Swedish politician ever who, like royalty, was referred 
to only by his first name. The message was that Hansson’s government had 
saved the country and ‘Per Albin’ alone could guarantee social progress and 
peace. ‘At no earlier point in [Swedish history] had a party so systematically 
grounded its electoral propaganda...on what had already been accomplished 
and on [an argument] that the politics of the future should go further on [the 
same] path’.49 This ‘we conquered the crisis-strategy’ paid off handsomely: 
The Social Democrats increased their support from 41.7 per cent of the votes 
in 1932 to over 50 per cent six years later.
‘The surest sign that a society has entered into possession of a new concept 
is that a new vocabulary will be developed, in terms of which the concept can 
then be publicly articulated and discussed’, concludes Quentin Skinner, and 
‘welfare politics’ in the 1930s was certainly such a concept.50 Contestation 
started immediately and the temperature rose for several years; the new 
coalition in 1936 with the Farmers’ Party and the Social Democrats in a majority 
government came as a real let-down for the Liberals and Conservatives and the 
47 Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsens berättelse för år 1936. Stockholm: Socialdemokratiska partiet, 7.
48 Election manifesto 1936, Svenska partiprogram och valmanifest 1887–2010, Svensk Nationell Datatjänst, 
http://snd.gu.se/sv/vivill (accessed 13 November 2012).
49 Tingsten 1941 Vol. 1, 377 quoted from Berman 2006, 175. On the elections in the 1930s, Esaiasson, 
Peter (1990) Svenska valkampanjer 1866–1988. Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 152–161.
50 Skinner, Quentin (1978), The Foundations of Modern Political Thought Vol. 2 quoted from Farr, James 
(2004) ‘Social Capital. A Conceptual History’. Political Theory, Vol. 32, Issue 1, 10.
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temperature fell in the latter half of the decade. In general, non-socialist critique 
of the new labour market policies and social reforms regularly focused on the 
need for fiscal moderation, the dangers of producing ‘artificial jobs’ through 
state intervention and on the grave threats to the free economy caused by the 
socialists’ planned economy.51 The battle-cry ‘system change’, systemskifte 
(a concept familiar from the Swedish politics in the 1980s) was the direct 
answer to the crisis agreement and the new economic policies. Folkhemmet 
was not a target, while välfärdspolitiken constituted the prime trophy. The 
Conservative critique followed three well-known lines from Hirschman’s 
typology: 1) it argued that the reforms were costly and dangerous experiments 
– ‘welfare policies that undermine welfare’, warned party leader Gösta Bagge, 
2) the Social Democratic reforms would have adverse effects and produce a 
welfare-mentality, a dependency on the state, 3) the reforms were of minor 
significance compared to the general economic recovery which would have 
taken place without any costly social reforms.52 Variations of these three themes 
can be found in numerous attacks on the Social Democrats in the 1930s, 
texts where wealth-producing reforms were contrasted to Socialist planning 
and wastefulness. The welfare-mentality-critique (understödstagarandan) 
accompanied the crisis agreement from the start; the Conservatives contrasted 
their productive social policy, securing economic growth, with the Social 
Democrats’ generous alms-giving producing collectivism. 
‘The Social Democrats have launched a slogan and they want to base their 
entire election campaign on this slogan welfare politics’, noted party leader 
Bagge in 1936 well aware of the stakes involved. He attacked the socialist 
welfare myth and warned about the long-term dangers involved: that of a 
socialist planned economy. But the imminent threat was equally grave because 
the social Social Democrats were about to conquer ‘welfare’ and they did this 
by portraying themselves as the only positive force in the history of Swedish 
social policy.53 The welfare of the nation was the common objective of all 
parties, declared the Conservative chairman and introduced what would 
become the Conservative answer, an attempt to take back ‘welfare’ from the 
Social Democrats: we also contributed to the now popular social and economic 
51 For overviews, Lewin, Leif (1970) Planhushållningsdebatten. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell (2nd ed.), 
ch. 2; Carlson, Benny (1994) The State as a Monster. Gustav Cassel and Eli Heckscher on the Role and 
Growth of the State. Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of America, chs 8, 12.
52 Bagge 1937, 78; Hirschman, Albert O. (1911) The Rhetoric of Reaction. Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. For earlier attacks, Lindman, Arvid (1934b) Med högern för 
systemskifte. Tal av Arvid Lindman vid det nationella medborgartåget i Stockholm söndagen den 27 
maj 1934. Stockholm: Allmänna Valmansförbundet; Lindman 1935 and 1936.
53 Bagge 1936, 60–63, 71–73, 91–94, 98–112, quote 98. 
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reforms.54 The Liberals argued along similar lines and questioned the Social 
Democrats’ monopoly on welfare: the main aspects of ‘the so-called welfare 
politics’ had support from Liberals, Farmers and Social Democrats. No party, 
argued party leader Andersson, owned the welfare reforms – to distance 
himself he put ‘welfare politics’ within quotation marks – and no party could 
claim sole responsibility for the economic recovery.55 Like the Conservatives, 
the Liberals also wanted a share of the welfare reforms, and this agenda, the 
fight to reclaim ‘the welfare politics’ of the 1930s and correct the hegemonic 
Social Democratic interpretation remained a topic in later Liberal election 
handbooks, and the struggle to include the Liberals into the recent political 
history continued in the party leaders’ memoirs.56
The coming of the welfare state
The Liberals and Conservatives largely failed to make ‘welfare politics’ 
common political property. Indirectly, the on-going critique from the non-
socialist parties confirmed the political success of the Social Democrats and 
their control of the key concept; the Social Democrats managed to spread 
the message that the government had saved the country and that only one 
party was the true provider of välfärdspolitik. To paraphrase Pauli Kettunen, 
the Social Democrats could claim ownership to the language and ideology of 
the virtuous circle of welfare politics, or to quote Esping-Andersen: ‘The net 
effect, be it warranted or not, was the emergence of a synonymity between 
the Social Democratic movement, political democracy, economic prosperity, 
and social welfare’.57 Economists and economic historians nowadays stress the 
general economic changes and reduce the impact of the crisis programme.58 
The Social Democrats promoted the opposite interpretation and did quite 
54 Politisk valhandbok 1938. Stockholm, 20, 64; Politisk valhandbok 1940. Stockholm, 140–141; Politisk 
valhandbok 1942. Stockholm, 134–137. All were published by Högerns riksorganisation.
55 Andersson i Rasjön, Gustaf & Ohlin, Bertil (1936) Välfärdspolitiken, valet och framtiden. Stockholm: 
Folkpartiet (Politikens dagsfrågor 8), see Folkpartiets valhandbok, Vol. 2. Riksdagsmannavalet 
1936. Stockholm: Folkpartiet (Politikens dagsfrågor 7), 5–6, 12–15. Ohlin 1936 completely avoided 
välfärdspolitik and used ’welfare arrangments’ (välfärdsanordningar) and ’social policy’ (socialpolitik).
56 Folkpartiets valhandbok, Vol. 6. Kommunalvalen 1950. Stockholm: Folkpartiet, 54–55; Folkpartiets 
valhandbok, Vol. 7. Andrakammarvalen 1952. Stockholm: Folkpartiet, 114–116. Andersson i Rasjön, 
Gustaf (1955) Från bondetåget till samlingsregeringen. Stockholm: Tiden, 123–129; Ohlin, Bertil (1972), 
Memoarer, Vol. 1. Ung man blir politiker. Stockholm: Bonniers, ch. 16.
57 Esping-Andersen 1992, 44.
58 For a recent overview, Schön, Lennart (2010) Sweden’s Road to Modernity. An Economic History. 
Stockholm: SNS, 281–307.
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well at establishing that message as the political and popular explanation. 
This caused frustration in the non-socialist quarters and we find sarcastic 
comments on the fantastic performance of the Social Democratic government:
The whole nation should by now know that Mr Per Albin hansson has 
created the welfare state in sweden, that Mr Gustav Möller saved us 
from the crisis, that Mr ernst wigforss is the best Treasurer of the realm 
[rikshushållare] of all time [---] All these truths are clear and evident 
from the social democratic election preaching from ystad to haparan-
da. [---] The members of the latest socialist government are already 
omniscient and omnibenevolent. now, the only task that remains is to 
get the voters to make them omnipotent too.59
In the latter half of the 1930s, when liberals and conservatives complained 
about their lack of influence and attacked ‘the myth about the importance of 
“the welfare politics”’, the country of the Middle Way with its celebrated ‘new 
deal’ was becoming a minor international success.60 Foreign guests marvelled 
over the wonders of the economic recovery and the seemingly harmonious 
labour market relations. The Swedish stocks were rising and the praise abroad 
attracted attention back home; Social Democratic propaganda repeated these 
statements, and these positive reports reinforced Social Democratic self-
understanding.61 As Gustav Möller explained in 1940, when summing up the 
achievements of the past decade brought to a halt by the war, ‘We were on our 
way to rebuild old Sweden into a social welfare state. It was not an exaggeration 
to claim that we in Sweden had advanced further than any other country, 
maybe with the exception of New Zealand.’ The war had brought an end to 
partisan competition and strife, so Möller did not give the credit to solely his 
own party. Instead, he used the inclusive ‘we’ and a great portion of national 
pride to describe the triumph: ‘We were, to repeat, right in the middle of a 
construction project that was about to transform Sweden to a “social state” 
59 The liberal daily Dagens Nyheter 8 September 1936, quoted from Torbacke, Jarl (1972) Dagens Nyheter 
och demokratins kris, Vol. 1. 1922–1936, Friheten är vår lösen. Stockholm: Bonniers, 301.
60 Heckscher, Gunnar (1936) ’ Högerns valnederlag’ Svensk tidskrift, Vol. 23, 626.
61 See e.g. ’Ljuset från Norden. Välfärdspolitikens eko i utländsk press’ and ’Sverge åter blickpunkt för 
Europa’, SAP-Information. Utgiven av Socialdemokratiska Partistyrelsens Informationsavdelning, 1936 
Vol. 1, Issues 18–19, 304–307, 317–322. On Sweden’s rise as a model society, Musial, Kazimierz (2002) 
Roots of the Scandinavian Model. Images of Progress in the Era of Modernisation. Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 80–94 and ch. 4. See also, Alm, Martin (2002) Americanitis. Amerika som sjukdom 
eller läkemedel. Svenska berättelser om USA åren 1900–1939. Lund: Lunds universitet, 162–165; Marklund, 
Carl (2009) ’The Social Laboratory, the Middle Way and the Swedish Model. Three Frames for the 
Image of Sweden’. Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 34, Issue 3, 264–285.
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[socialstat] of the highest order.’62 He was definitely proud – Sweden was the 
most advanced country in the world in social matters – but not content since 
deprivation and poverty were still a part of Swedish society, and he finished 
his speech by reminding his fellow citizens, the people, that the reconstruction 
project would continue after the war. The primacy of welfare politics would 
continue to form Social-Sweden. ‘Social-Sweden’, Möller’s concept, would 
guide the Social Democrats’ welfare politics of the early post-war era.
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so MAny roAds And nowhere To Go 
how the swedish social democrats are losing the 
battle about the nordic model.
URBAN LUNDBERg AND kLAS ÅMARk
For decades Social Democratic pilgrims from around the world travelled 
to the Scandinavian countries for comfort and support. Even if they were 
struggling at home they could always find relief in the unceasing successes 
of their brother parties in northern Europe. The accomplishment was indeed 
remarkable. In Sweden, our focus in this chapter, the Social Democratic party 
was unique in the unparalleled length of time in government for any party 
in the democratic and industrialized part of the world. In many ways the 
Swedish case tells its own story, but also in Denmark and Norway, Social 
Democracy eventually developed into a hegemonic social order, that in the 
words of Norwegian historian Francis Sejerstedt ‘left its stamp on every sector 
of society, the economy, welfare, culture, education, and family.’1 
Today, of course, the situation is different. Social Democratic parties are 
still competitive; from time to time even able to form a government, but the 
grand metaphors and sense of historical mission which used to frame their 
political endeavour have vanished. Instead, they are involved in a losing battle 
against shrinking membership figures and disappointing election results. Even 
if the pilgrimage has not ended, it is nowadays caught up with a malicious 
interest in the problems tormenting the modern day Social Democrat: political 
infighting, reduced policy impact, unstable identities, and a growing discontent 
in the relationship between the parties and the trade unions. Even the welfare 
state, once a ‘Social Democratic road to power’ to speak with Gøsta Esping 
Andersen, has become a source of distress. In both Sweden and Denmark, 
conservative parties have accomplished an extreme makeover in recent years; 
they are now appearing as socially responsible, ecologically sensitive stewards 
of a welfare state in need of perpetual restructuring and reform.2
1 Sejersted, Francis (2011) The age of social democracy: Norway and Sweden in the twentieth century. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
2 Lundberg, Urban & Petersen, Klaus (2012) ‘Wanted: A Good Cleavage! Body Snatchers, Desperadoes 
and the Real McCoy’, paper presented at the conference ‘Cleavage 2.1: Revolutions and Conflicts in 
the 21st Century’, in Paris, March 8–9, 2012. 
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To explain this dull predicament most researchers return to external 
circumstances, such as the diminishing industrial working class, the emergence 
of the service economy, ageing populations, the return of mass-unemployment, 
increasing levels of immigration, the impact of neoliberal thinking, the 
Europeanization of politics, and the workings of the global economy, and so 
forth.3 These factors are of course important, or essential, for anyone interested 
in understanding the decline of Scandinavian Social Democracy, as well as 
the deterioration of Social Democratic parties in any other European country. 
The world has changed and with it the preconditions for Social Democratic 
success or failure.4
Our interest in this chapter, however, is somewhat different. After all, 
one of the main characteristics about Scandinavian social democrats was 
their ability to transform gloomy prospects into strategic opportunities and 
continued political influence.5 This happened in the early 1930s − in the midst 
of the Great Depression − when they formed an alliance with the farmers 
movement which allowed them to tackle mass unemployment with Keynesian 
demand policies.6 It happened in the late 1930s with the so-called ‘historical 
compromise’ between labour and capital, one of the key stones in the notion 
of a Scandinavian or Nordic model.7 It happened during the post-war period 
when the public social insurance system was designed in order to secure middle 
class support for the ongoing welfare project.8 In this sense, Scandinavian 
Social Democracy has been a notorious shape-shifter with a manifest ability 
to alter the social and political dynamics to its own advantage.9
3 Ryner, Magnus J. (2002) Capitalist restructuring, globalisation and the third way: Lessons from the 
Swedish model. London: Routledge; Pierson, Christopher (1995) Socialism after Communism. The New 
Market Socialism. Pensylvania UP 1995; Andersson, Jenny (2010) The library and the workshop: Social 
democracy and capitalism in the knowledge age. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
4 Schumacher, Gijs (2011) Modernize or die’. Social Democrats, Welfare State Retrenchment and the 
Choice between Office and Policy. University of Amsterdam.
5 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1985) Politics against markets: The social democratic road to power. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press.
6 Bergström, Villy (1993) ‘Party programs and economic policy: the Social Democrats in government’. 
In Misgeld, Klaus, Molin, Karl & Åmark, Klas (eds) Creating Social Democracy. A Century of the Social 
Democratic Labor Party in Sweden. Penn State Press.
7 Korpi , Walter (1978) The working class in welfare capitalism: Work, unions and politics in Sweden. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
8 Svensson, Torsten (1994) Socialdemokratins dominans: En studie av den svenska socialdemokratins 
partistrategi. Uppsala: Uppsala universitet; Berman, Sheri (2006) The primacy of politics: Social 
democracy and the making of Europe’s twentieth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9 Moschonas, Gerassimos (2002) In the name of social democracy: the great transformation, 1945 to the 
present. London: Verso.
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However, somewhere along the line Scandinavian social democrats 
apparently lost the magic touch. For almost forty years they have been largely 
incapable of developing a future oriented project of any lasting impact. The 
closest they get is probably their contribution to the austerity plans and 
economic recovery of the 1990s and early 2000s, loosely tied to Anthony 
Giddens much debated vision of the ‘Third Way’. But one can very well argue 
that their attachment to this realignment process in fact paved the way for 
the current conservative revival.10 Rather, as we will highlight in this chapter, 
the contemporary history of social democracy in Scandinavia is a history of 
misguided efforts to recall the strategic and political capacities which once 
upon a time gave them a taste of perpetual political influence. 
The weakening of Scandinavian Social Democracy is closely intertwined 
with the structural factors and external processes enumerated above. No 
serious explanatory attempt could do without them. Though, by conducting 
an archaeological excavation into the growing pile of already forgotten policy 
initiatives, we will demonstrate that part of the responsibility must fall on the 
Social Democrats themselves and their inability to dissolve the dilemmas which 
are placed before them. In the following our empirical examples cover the 
Swedish case, which we believe is especially informative, but we are confident 
that a similar line of reasoning could be applied on the Norwegian, Danish, 
even Finnish, examples as well. 
Programme for the 90s
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the Swedish social democrats were facing 
problems which are similar to many of the problems they are confronting today. 
The party noted severe losses in the opinion polls, and had serious difficulties 
in the three largest cities in Sweden, Stockholm, Malmo and Gothenburg. 
Its long-term power base was disrupted, among other things by economic 
internationalization and the growth of a new strong middle class.11 The party 
was also tormented by an internal debate over economic policy and public 
sector reform − the so called ‘war of the roses’. The ‘right-wing’ alternative in 
10 Lundberg, Urban & Petersen, Klaus (2006) ’Välfärdsstatens seger – politikens död? Spelet om 
välfärdsstaten i Sverige och Danmark’. In Lundqvist, Torbjörn (eds) Den kreativa staten: Framtidspolitiska 
tendenser. Stockholm: Institutet för framtidsstudier; Giddens, Anthony (1998) The third way: The renewal 
of social democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
11 Åmark, Klas (1993) ‘Afterword: Swedish Social Democracy on a historical threshold’. In Misgeld, Klaus, 
Molin, Karl & Åmark, Klas (eds) Creating Social Democracy. A Century of the Social Democratic Labor 
Party in Sweden. Penn State Press.
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this debate was represented by influential policy makers in the Department of 
Finance while the ‘left wing’ alternative drew support from the top echelons 
of the Trade Union Federation, the LO.12
table 1 Social Democratic election results (%) in the Swedish parliamentary elections, 1964–2010
1964 47,3
1968 50,1
1970 45,3
1973 43,6
1976 42,7
1979 43,2
1982 45,6
1985 44,7
1988 43,2
1991 37,6
1994 45,3
1998 36,4
2002 39,9
2006 35,0
2010 30,7
After the election in 1988, Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, successor to Olof 
Palme, managed to stay in office after a minor setback (election results, see 
Table 1). But the leadership recognized that the labour movement was in 
deep trouble, and decided to appoint a commission with representatives for 
the party and the LO with the task to write a programme for the coming 
decades.13 The working group did not become very successful. Its effects on the 
12 Already in 1982 Prime Minister Olof Palme appointed Bo Holmberg as Minister of Public Administration 
with the two-sided task of democratizing the public sector and to make it more cost effective. Holmberg, 
however, turned out to be a failure. Thinking along traditional tracks he was unable to gain support 
for his vision of a decentralized public sector infused with local self-government and cooperative 
initiatives. Fokus nr 2, 2010, Mellbourn, Anders (1986) Bortom det starka samhället: socialdemokratisk 
förvaltningspolitik 1982–1985. Stockholm: Carlsson; Åmark1993; Östberg, Kjell (2009) När vinden vände: 
Olof Palme 1969–1986. Stockholm: Leopard, 297−300.
13 90-talsrprogrammet, 5 f.
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members’ individual carriers can also be discussed. In just a few years, almost 
all of them had lost their influence in the party leadership Anna-Greta Leijon 
had been Minister of Labour and then Minister of Justice, but was forced to 
leave her office after a scandal in the reconnaissance after the murder of Olof 
Palme. In 1988, she returned to Parliament and was appointed chair of the 
Parliamentary committee on finance. But she had to leave that post too in 
the spring of 1990.14
Kjell Olof Feldt was one of the most prominent members of the Social 
Democratic leadership in the 1980’s. But he claimed that he did not get the 
influence over economic policy he wanted and resigned from his post as 
Minister of Finance in the spring 1990.15 This step undermined the authority 
of his close associate Klas Eklund, secretary in the commission. Eklund later 
went on to become an economist in the bank sector and writer of economic 
textbooks. Bo Toresson was installed as Party Secretary in 1982 but had to 
leave his post in 1993. Stig Malm, chairperson of the LO, was forced to step 
down after a conflict with the party leadership in 1993.16 Rune Molin, vice 
chairperson in the LO, was appointed Minister of Industry in 1990, but left 
his assignment after the defeat in the election in 1991.
The Program for the 90’s was remarkable from several aspects. Not only 
was it written by a group of soon to be losers in the Labour movement. It 
was intended to be a programme in between the party programme and a 
more concrete action programme. There was a famous forerunner, the labour 
Movement’s Post-war Program, published in 1944. That programme was 
also produced by a joint working-group consisting of members from the party 
and the LO, and played an important role in the renewal of Social Democratic 
policy in the aftermath of the Second World War. In comparison, Program for 
the 90s was written in a novel style. Party programmes are usually composed 
in a very concise manner, with short sentences and few words. Program for 
the 90’s on the other hand is written with many words, but with few concrete 
suggestions. 
It was also – typical for Swedish Social Democrats – created for a political 
movement in power. The programme contains no overview of the party political 
landscape in Sweden at the time; there is no discussion about the prospects 
for the party to stay in government; and there is no mentioning about possible 
14 Leijon, Anna-Greta (1991) Alla rosor ska inte tuktas! Stockholm: Tiden.
15 Feldt, Kjell-Olof (1991) Alla dessa dagar-: i regeringen 1982–1990. Stockholm: Norstedt. See also the 
memoirs of Ingvar Carlsson for an alternative take on the fall of Kjell-Olof Feldt. Carlsson, Ingvar 
(2003) Så tänkte jag. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg. 
16 Malm, Stig (1994) 13 år, Stockholm: Brevskolan.
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allies or coalition partners.17 When the Social Democrats lost the election in the 
fall of 1991, and had to leave Government, the circumstances for the party’s 
strategy changed dramatically which made much of the programme’s content 
obsolete. 
It also lacks an analysis of the international arena. Only six months after 
that the programme was finished, the Berlin Wall fell, an event which was 
followed by the disintegration of the former Socialist bloc, and eventually the 
emergence of a completely new political situation in Europe. As one of many 
consequences of this rapid development, the Social Democratic party changed 
its position on the European Union and embarked on a process which ended 
with a Swedish membership in 1995. This change in the overall preconditions 
for Swedish politics was not foreseen or commented on in Program for the 
90’s.18
When the Social Democratic party celebrated its 100th anniversary in 1989, 
a group of Swedish and international historians and social scientists published 
an anthology about the party’s history since the founding one hundred years 
earlier. The sociologist Göran Therborn contributed with a chapter on the 
party’s road to power, with the title: ‘Nation and class, luck and competence 
– roads to continual (?) power’.19 From Therborns perspective, a programme 
authored by failures and obsolete before the ink has dried on the paper is not 
very interesting. 
From our perspective, however, it is the other way around. Here, we are 
looking for signs of disappointment and defeat. Program for the 90’s then 
become an interesting example of how the Social Democratic movement at 
a critical juncture failed to formulate a future oriented vision. We are going 
to look closer on two chapters of the programme, the one about the public 
sector and the one about environmental policy – two policy fields where the 
Social Democrats have had major problems in developing convincing and 
lasting strategies.
17 For the reception of the programme, see Arbetarhistoria nr 1–2, 1990.33–53. 
18 See for example the memoirs of Ingvar Carlsson (Så tänkte jag. Politik & dramatik, Hjalmarson & 
Högberg, Stockholm, 2003).
19 Misgeld, Klaus, Molin, Karl & Klas, Åmark (eds)(1989) Socialdemokratins samhälle: SAP och Sverige 
under 100 år. Stockholm: Tiden. – In the English translation of this book, published in 1993, Therborn 
had adjusted his title to a less prophetic and more historical one: ‘A unique chapter in the history of 
democracy: the Social Democrats in Sweden’, Misgeld, Molin and Åmark 1993.
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Reforming the public sector
The section on the future of the public sector in the Program for the 90s 
begins with an important precondition, or even dilemma. The citizens’ needs 
of public service are still growing, the programme states, but then it adds that 
further, major contributions are inconceivable. Two arguments were offered 
to support this crucial statement. The first was that there was a shortage 
of available labour. Twenty years earlier, the public sector could expand by 
employing women, but now there was no labour reserve to obtain. The second 
argument was that it no longer was possible to raise the taxes.20 This was a 
particularly dramatic analysis for a Social Democratic party. For many decades, 
the Swedish Social Democrats had solved upcoming political problems by 
expanding the public sector and raising the taxes to pay for the expansion.21 
When this strategy was declared obsolete, they ended up in a political situation, 
which they still haven’t found any credible solution to.
So, what could be done instead of expansion? With many words Program 
for the 90s explains that there actually existed new possibilities. The number 
one priority was to decentralize the public sector and to make things run 
more effective. As a consequence politicians had to redefine their role as 
public servants. Instead of collecting and handing out money they had to 
establish well-defined goals for the services and then evaluate the results. 
They were also advised not to make decisions about details, but to leave this 
task to the employees and public officials directly responsible for the service 
in question.22 Another proposal was to move the financial and administrative 
responsibility for sickness and other caring services for older persons from 
the regional authorities to local governments.23 Only in this way could Social 
Democratic policy be adjusted to the needs and wishes of the individual citizen: 
‘Facing the 90s, the labour movement shall more distinctly put the individual’s 
development as the starting point for its policy’, the programme declares.24 
Concerning the future organization of the public sector, this meant that 
individuals’ should be able to choose more freely between different service 
producers – but only between public alternatives. The programme committee 
did not recommend private or market based solutions, since they would only 
20 90-talsprogrammet, 174.
21 90-talsprogrammet, 180.
22 90-talsprogrammet, 171–230.
23 90-talsprogrammet, 214–219.
24 90-talsprogrammet, 55.
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increase segregation. It should be possible for parents to choose schools with 
an alternative educational programme, such as Montessori and Waldorff 
schools – there were a few of each kind in Sweden at the time, so this did not 
mean any serious challenge to the existing school system. But the programme 
opened up for cooperative solutions, such as nursery schools administered 
by parents or personnel. Taken together, the programme’s vision of a public 
sector, with elements of cooperative ventures, that offered a wide range 
alternatives for the individual to choose between, were said to open up a ‘third 
way’ between bureaucratic stiffness on the one hand and commercialization 
on the other hand.25 
Although related to what later became known as New Public Management 
strategies, Program of the 90s did not anticipate the dynamic that would 
characterise public sector restructuring in Sweden and other countries over 
the following decades.26 Privatization was not part of the agenda, and the 
idea of freedom of choice was narrowly defined in terms of self-organizing, 
rather than as an absolute individual predicament. Consequently, when the 
non-socialist parties gained power in 1991, the whole discussion tilted in an 
unforeseen direction. Their intention was to privatise as much of the welfare 
services as possible. In doing this they were stressing the freedom of choice for 
the individual, and the rationalisation they expected to take place as a result 
of market competition. In this sense, Program for the 90’s was looking in the 
rear-view mirror rather than forward, into the future. 
During the second half of the 1990’s, the Social Democrats made new 
attempts to renew its position on public sector reform, but now it was 
democracy itself which was placed on top of the political agenda. Prime Minister 
Göran Persson appointed a special parliamentary committee to investigate 
the quality of Swedish democracy. The committee was chaired by the former 
minister of Culture and Education, Bengt Göransson, and with representatives 
from all political parties represented in Parliament. The committee chose to 
develop a general perspective on the current condition of democracy, using a 
number of social scientists as experts. The result was disseminated in the form 
of 32 small publications and 13 research volumes, which were distributed to 
all public libraries and all school libraries in the country.27 
25 90-talsprogrammet, 224.
26 On New Public Management strategies, see George, Vic & Taylor-Gooby, Peter (eds)(1996) European 
welfare policy: Squaring the welfare circle. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
27 SOU 2000:1, Demokratiutredningen, En uthållig demokrati!:politik för folkstyrelse på 2000-tale. 
Demokratiutredningens betänkande, Stockholm.
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The final report was a contribution to the general debate about democracy 
and its fundamental values rather than a platform for concrete reforms. In 
this sense, the report could be described as a tribute to the form of popular, 
representative democracy which is typical for popular movements in Sweden. 
The report was more worried over voter passivity and diminishing election 
turnout than over the functioning of the existing political parties. It was the 
voters who were the problem, not the parties, the representatives for the 
parties declared. Yet a number of reforms, aiming at vitalising local democracy 
were suggested. But all in all these proposals were more oriented toward 
strengthening the kind of democracy which was already in crisis than trying 
to create new forms of popular involvement.28
After the election in 1998, Prime Minister Göran Persson chose to appoint 
a special Minister for Democracy, the young Britta Leijon. She was the 
daughter of Anna Greta Leijon and had experience from a trade union for 
state employed white collar workers. Leijon was not able to influence the big 
committee on democracy headed by the old-timer Göransson. Instead, she 
appointed a committee of her own, with the task to investigate democracy 
in the municipalities. Finally, after more than three years in office, Leijon 
could present a government bill on local democracy. She suggested that local 
governments should give every citizen the right to make suggestions to the 
municipal councils. This proposal can be seen as a critique of the political 
parties’ incapacity to engage citizens on the local level.29 
When Leijon introduced her bill to the Social Democratic parliamentary 
group, the reaction was strong and critical. After much debate, Prime Minister 
Göran Persson allowed her to present the bill to Parliament, but the public 
reaction was most unfavourable. Leading political scientists criticised the bill 
for being one-sided and much to narrow. In preparing the bill, Leijon had 
forgotten to evaluate the role of the political parties and their democratic 
responsibility, they argued. And the major Social Democratic paper Aftonbladet 
declared that Leijon even had forgotten the electorate.30 In the parliament, 
party loyalty turned out to be strong, so the parliament endorsed the bill in spite 
of the criticism against it.31 After five years, 194 of the 290 local governments 
28 SOU 2000:1. 
29 The Governments proposition 2001/2002:80.
30 Peter Kadhammar in Aftonbladet 4.11.2002, Lena Mellin in Aftonbladet 22.1.2002, DN Debatt, 22.1.2002, 
article by Olof Petersson, Sören Holmberg, Leif Lewin, Hanne Marthe Narud.
31 Parliamentary minutes 2001/02: KU 14 Demokrati för det nya seklet.
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and nine of the twenty regional governments, permitted citizen’s suggestions 
but the effects on the working of Swedish democracy seem to be minimal.32
Half a year later, after the election in the fall 2002, Göran Persson sacked 
his Minister of Democracy without appointing any successor and after the 
electoral setback in 2006 the party had to leave the Government. But by 
then, the Party had already since long removed the whole idea of reforming 
the public sector through citizen engagement and a revitalization of popular 
democracy from its agenda.
The Green People’s Home
Swedish Social Democracy has always been a party which promotes 
industrialisation, urbanisation, development and modern technology. Nature 
originally represented the resources needed to improve living conditions for 
the majority of the people. Therefore, the environment has been far from a 
prioritized policy issue.33
Environmental policy basically meant steps to prevent major accidents 
with spills from the big industries, etc. In the 1970’s, the Centre party, former 
the Agrarian party, successfully re-launched itself as a party with a green 
profile, including a negative attitude towards nuclear energy. After a historic 
victory in the 1976 election, the head of the party Torbjörn Fälldin could 
form the first non-socialist government in 44 years. After the accident in the 
American nuclear power station Three Miles Island, a referendum on the future 
of nuclear energy in Sweden was held in 1980. The referendum resulted in a 
narrow victory for the alternative advocated by the Social Democrats and the 
Liberal Party, which implied that Sweden should dismantle its dependence 
on nuclear energy, but in a ‘responsible manner’ and without endangering 
the competitiveness of Swedish industry and the goal of full employment.34
In 1987, the former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundlandt 
published a UN report on Environment and Development.35 It became a much 
32 Faktablad. Projekt medborgardialog, 3 medborgarförslag, Sveriges kommuner ocn landsting April 
2007.
33 Lundqvist, Torbjörn & Carlsson, Märta (2004) Framtidspolitiken: visionen om ett hållbart samhälle i 
svensk politik. Stockholm: Institutet för framtidsstudier; Nyberg, Sven (2012) 1LO, jobben och miljön’, 
Arbetarhistoria 2012:3, 24–28.
34 Anshelm, Jonas (2000) Mellan frälsning och domedag: Om kärnkraftens politiska idéhistoria i Sverige 
1945–1999. Eslöv: B. Östlings bokförl. Symposion.
35 Report of World Commission on Environment and Development, Our common future, Nairobi, 1987.
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observed and discussed report. It showed to Swedish Social Democrats that 
even the labour movement could be aware of environmental problems and 
formulate a policy truthful to its historical ideals. Shortly after the publication 
of this report, Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson appointed the first Minister of 
Environment and Energy ever in a Social Democratic government, Birgitta 
Dahl. In the general election in the fall 1988, the Green party entered Parliament 
for the first time. 
The steering committee for the Program of the 90’s identified the 
environment as one of four policy fields crucial for the party’s future. 
Nevertheless the section on environment is predominantly written to 
convince traditional Social Democrats, especially industrial workers, that these 
issues are not only significant but also solvable within a traditional Social 
Democratic approach. Reforms should be made, but incrementally, almost 
invisible, and in close relation to the development in other policy areas: ‘The 
governing tools of environmental policy will be overlooked and tightened’; ‘ 
The legislation has to be tougher’, are typical formulations.36 Symptomatically, 
also in this policy field, the programme argued for a Third Way, this time 
between conservatives who wanted as little done as possible on one hand, and 
bureaucratic control and central planning, on the other. Another recurring 
theme was the optimistic attitude towards science and modern technology, 
which eventually would provide new solutions. Environmental policy of the 
pragmatic Social Democratic kind, it was stated, was not incompatible with 
economic growth and industrial development.37 
All in all, the working group really tried to integrate environmental 
concern in the traditional framework of Social Democracy, but it was not 
really successful in this attempt. The measures which were proposed were 
overwhelmingly technical; much of the discussion was devoted to narrow 
details, for example what can be done with chemical hazards, transports, 
agriculture etc., and a broader more compelling appeal was never developed. 
In the end, citizens with a serious concern for the environmental were left 
with a document that remained within the long-established confines of the 
labour movement itself. 
In 1996, Göran Persson was surprisingly chosen as the successor to Ingvar 
Carlsson. Only the sixth chairperson for a party founded already in 1889, and 
succeeding well-known figures such as Hjalmar Branting, Per Albin Hansson, 
Tage Erlander, and Olof Palme, Persson was well aware of his place in the 
36 90-talsprogrammet, 66.
37 90-talsprogrammet, 61–111.
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Party’s history. In order to continue this impressive legacy, he needed a profile 
and an ideological vision of his own. Already from the beginning of his ten 
year long period as party leader, he chose to emphasize the environment 
as a fundamental challenge for the party. In his first major speech as party 
chairperson, at the congress in 1996, he presented his dream of creating 
a ‘Green People’s Home’, a vision which recalled the party’s glorious past. 
Perssons speech attracted much attention. However, in later speeches he 
typically opted for the more neutral phrase, sustainable development − a key 
concept in the Brundtland report which was never cited in the Program for 
the 90’s.38 
Persson also recruited a policy adviser of his own, the author and educated 
biologist, and fellow Christian, Stefan Edman. The objective was to establish 
the labour movement as a frontrunner in the public debate on a wide range of 
environmental issues. In his capacity as policy advisor, Edman was provided 
with a secretariat of his own and exclusive access to the Prime Minister’s office. 
The arrangement, however, created a rather awkward situation for the newly 
appointed Minister of Environment, the party’s rising star, Anna Lindh.39 
In his memoirs Persson claims that he made a lot to advance environmental 
concern in Sweden during his ten years as Prime Minister. He also tried to 
establish a close cooperation with the Green party on changes in the tax system 
which would incite environmental concern. But in spite of these efforts, when 
Perssons tenure ended, the Social Democratic party was still far away from 
assuming the green profile that he had hoped for.40 Instead he was caught up 
in the typical dilemmas of the labour movement. How can a positive attitude 
to big industry be combined with a more demanding stance on environmental 
policy? For example, both the engineering industry and the paper and paper 
pulp industry, so important for Swedish economy, required a lot of cheap 
electricity, while the typical green activist was negative to the nuclear power 
industry which was providing about half of the electricity in Sweden.
Another problem was that the issue became too ambiguous. In the 
programmatic documents produced by the Social Democratic party between 
1996 and 2006, the concept ‘sustainable society’ gained importance. But also 
this approach to the environmental complex changed dramatically over the 
years, from a narrow ecologist interpretation close to the Brundland Report 
38 Fichtelius, Erik (2007) Aldrig ensam, alltid ensam: samtalen med Göran Persson 1996–2006. Stockholm: 
Norstedt, 29–48, Lundquist & Carlsson 2004.
39 Franchell, Eva (2009) Väninnan: rapport från Rosenbad. Stockholm: Bonnier.
40 Fichtelius, 47 f.
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in the early years of Göran Perssons term as Party Leader, to a wider appeal, 
encompassing almost all aspects of the modern welfare state. By the mid-2000s 
almost every political problem could be solved by referring to sustainable 
development; it would produce economic growth, new technical solutions, 
social security, a more healthy population, improved integration between 
Swedes and immigrants, and so on.41
Simultaneously, a bundle of new environmental challenges entered public 
debate, not least the prospect of climate change. However, the policy solutions 
developed in Stefan Edman writings on sustainable development did not focus 
on the climate, so again the Social Democrats were left in a position from which 
they had a hard time to develop a reliable alternative. All this came to an end 
with Göran Perssons defeat in the general election in 2006 which resulted in 
his resignation as Party Leader in 2007. By consequence Stefan Edman lost 
his role as an influential advisor to the Social Democratic leadership. The 
new leadership took a different stance. Instead of building on the work of 
Persson and Edman, it decided to redefine its concern for the environment 
altogether. Today neither the vision of a Green People’s home nor the hope 
for Sustainable Development is used in the Party’s rhetoric.42
Profit and welfare
The Program for the 90’s was written as a programme for a party in power. 
Two years after it was published, the Social Democrats lost the election in 1991, 
and Carl Bildt, the Party Leader for conservative Moderata Samlingspartiet, 
became Prime Minister. After three years, in 1994, things went back to normal. 
The Social Democrats won the election and Ingvar Carlsson could return as 
Prime Minister. The first years of the new government was dedicated to the 
task of cleaning up the economy and public finances after the deep economic 
crisis that hit Sweden in the early 1990’s. During these circumstances there 
was not much time for discussions on either environmental issues or public 
sector reform. 
In the election 2006, the Social Democrats lost the election again and had 
to leave government.43 A couple of years earlier, the non-socialist parties had 
41 Lundqvist & Carlsson 2004, Lundqvist 2006.
42 The present- day formulation is ’a ecologically longterm sustainable society’, (ekologiskt långsiktigt 
hållbart samhälle), see for example Socialdemokraterna, Framtidspartiet i svensk politik, 12.11.2012.
43 See for example Göran Perssons memoirs, Min väg, mina val, Stockholm, Bonnier 2007, and his published 
interviews with the journalist Erik Fichtelius, Fichtelius 2007. 
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formed a close Alliance in order to win the election and regain government 
power. The alliance was headed by Fredrik Reinfeldt, the Party Leader for 
what was now labelled the new Moderates, and it was built on the premise 
that it is impossible to win consecutive elections in Sweden without addressing 
the problems of the welfare state in a constructive way. This meant that the 
ideological gap to the Social Democrats on matters of social policy had to be 
reduced. In a number of policy documents, the non-socialist parties declared 
that they no longer were against the welfare state as such. Rather they were 
concerned about its future financing, and its declining capability to deliver on 
its promises. To create cost-effective and flexible welfare services, they argued, 
it would not be enough to simply reform the public sector. The way forward 
went through market solutions, privatization and competition. Another benefit 
of this slightly disguised neoliberal turn, of course, would be the way in which 
it strengthened the position of the individual in relation to established state 
and municipal welfare bureaucracies.44 
The new catch-word was freedom of choice, not as in the Program for the 
90s, between public solutions and isolated small scale cooperative initiatives, 
but rather between the old public sector and the alternatives produced on a 
fully developed market of private providers. 
Without doubt, the rapid privatization enacted by the alliance changed the 
structure of welfare services in Sweden. New actors successfully established 
themselves as producers of publically funded welfare services such as schools, 
child day-care, old age care, etc. Some firms were big and financed by venture 
capitalists that demanded low risks and high returns. Others were small and 
headed by former employees who were encouraged to buy off their old working 
places for low amounts from local authorities controlled by non-socialist 
majorities. Successfully managed for a couple of years, it then became possible 
to sell these enterprises with high profits. Soon, the question of private profits 
in the tax financed welfare sector became a crucial topic in the opposition 
against the Alliance government. One scandal after the other was revealed in 
the media; a recurring story was de-humanizing standards and mistreatment 
in elderly homes operated by big firms with remarkably high profits.45 
However, for the Social Democrats the changing landscape of the welfare 
state meant new problems and a growing degree of political infighting. Was it 
reasonable that tax payers’ money ended up in tax paradises such as Guernsey? 
It turned out that there were different opinions within the labour movement 
44 Lundberg & Petersen (2006). 
45 About the profits, se the SCB report Finansiärer och utförare inom vård, skola och omsorg 2010, 2012.
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on profits in the welfare sector. The Party congress in 2009 was arguing, 
although a bit vaguely, against market solutions and open competition in the 
welfare sector, but it also emphasized the importance of securing the freedom 
of choice for the individual: ‘It is the freedom for the individuals’ to choose 
welfare services which shall increase, not the freedom for the providers to 
choose where the activities shall be situated and whom who will have access to 
what.’46 The intra party debate on profits was not terminated by the decision 
on the Party Congress, and the debate has continued since then. 
Especially the LO has embraced a critical view, arguing that only non-profit 
organisations should be allowed in the publically funded welfare sector. If this 
becomes the reigning principle, laid down as a law, it would definitely imply 
dramatic changes in the legacy created by the non-socialist alliance. 
The LO is supported by many ordinary party members and by the chair 
of the Social Democratic Women’s Association, Lena Sommestad.47 But the 
new party leader, elected in the spring 2012, the former head of the Industrial 
workers Union, Stefan Löfven, does not seem to promote an unconditional 
ban on profits. Instead he advocates limitations on profits, stricter control, 
and more rigidly applied criteria’s from the local communities as buyers of 
services. The Party Board has recently made a decision about ‘National quality 
laws – for order and clarity in the welfare’. Turning a blind eye to rigid non-
profit principle, this document is arguing for a more regulated market with 
reduced profitability, and for the importance of safeguarding diversity and 
the citizen’s freedom of choice.48 
The decision from the Party Board was subjected to heavy criticism from 
various corners of the labour movement. In an editorial, the Social Democratic 
daily, Folkbladet asked if the Social Democratic party in fact lost the next 
election, due in 2014, when the Party board unanimously supported the new 
guideline for the welfare sector. The editor was apparently dissatisfied with 
both the vagueness of the guidelines and the willingness to accept profits and 
added that the party board actually was not united behind the guideline.49
Conclusions
46 Partikongressens beslut 2009, 4.1. Högre kvalitet i välfärden. 
47 SvD 20.6.2012, Article by the new LO chairperson Karl Petter Torvaldsson and the vice chair Tobias 
Baudin. The LO has appointed a special Welfare Committee to investigate the question, but it has not 
yet published its report. Blog by Lena Sommestad 27.5.2012, supporting the LO argument. 
48 Socialdemokraterna: nationella kvalitetslagar – för ordning och reda i välfärden, 26.10.2012.
49 Folkbladet 29.10.2012.
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Over the last few decades Scandinavian Social Democrats have made repeated 
attempts at reinventing themselves in face of new dilemmas and constraints. 
There is no shortage of prominent speeches, conceptual advances and political 
reasoning, but unlike the achievements of the past, these efforts have been 
largely ineffective and soon forgotten. Rather they are indicative of an extended 
policy crises stretching back to the late 1970s and early 1980s, which should 
be part of any attempt at explaining the current state of the once so victorious 
Social Democratic labour movement in Sweden. 
This crisis is not unique for the Swedish or even the Scandinavian social 
democrats. Most Social Democratic parties in Europe have experienced 
declining election results since the 1950’s.50 But as stated in the introduction, 
Social Democracy was always uniquely well positioned in Scandinavia, which 
makes the decline in these countries especially conspicuous. 
One way of understanding this reversal of circumstances is by pointing to 
the different kinds of dilemmas confronting the social democrats of today. On 
the one hand we have quandaries regarding the classical interplay between 
economic growth and social welfare, the idea of a society, or ‘virtuous circle’ 
to speak with Pauli Kettunen, in which the objectives of social equality 
and security and of economic efficiency, competitiveness and growth are 
cumulatively supporting each other.51 The Scandinavian countries are still 
doing well by European standards, so in this sense the circle is still moving, 
but most economists, including those who are leaning to the left, indicate 
that the tax burden and the size of the government has since long reached 
its maximum. This constraint, acknowledged in the Swedish Program for the 
90s, becomes an obvious obstacle to the Social Democrats, forcing them to 
divert their quest for renewal to the bundle of social services provided by the 
modern welfare state. 
Part of the problem is that the history of social democracy is less glamorous 
in this dimension. It is in the service sector you find the policy scandals of the 
past, the paternalistic tendencies of local politics, the dictatorial municipal 
party bosses, the bureaucracies of the health care sector, the de-humanizing 
aspects of modern social engineering, as well as the underpaid and part-
time working women of the public sector. Furthermore, the service sector is 
50 Moschonas, Gerassimos (2011) ‘Historical Decline or Change of Scale? The Electoral Dynamics of 
European Social Democratic Parties, 1950–2009’. In Cronin, James, Ross, George & Shoch, James (eds) 
What’s left of the Left? Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times London: Duke University 
Press.
51 Kettunen, Pauli (1997) ‘The Society of Virtuous Circles’. In Kettunen, Pauli & Eskola, Hanna (eds) 
Models, modernity and the Myrdals, Univ., Helsinki.
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nowadays fragmented into a number of crucial policy choices concerning its 
future organization: whether cash is preferable to care, whether individual 
choice is preferable to collective decisions, whether public services are more 
reliable than private providers, etc. 
In dealing with these questions neither the Party’s ideology nor its history 
offers any undisputable course of action. Instead policy development is to 
large extent influenced by the shifting ideals of policy experts as well as the 
norms and prejudices of civil society. And the situation is indeed especially 
severe in Sweden. Faced with a rapidly growing market for privatized welfare, 
Swedish Social Democrats have remained reluctant, seemingly unable to unite 
the Party around a guiding principle which offers a distinct alternative to the 
policies fashioned by the Alliance and the new Moderates. The situation is 
similar when it comes to environmental policy and climate change. Despite 
numerous attempts, the social democrats have been incapable of developing 
a credible and lasting policy. 
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A MAnAGer And his ProFessionAls 
Planning and constructing the modern firm in 
Finland, 1920s–1940s
SUSANNA FELLMAN
Introduction
One significant consequence of industrial development and the emergence of 
large-scale corporations was the professionalisation of management. In addition 
to the separation of ownership and management, the professionalisation of 
management meant increasing skill requirements, transforming career paths 
and adopting a new approach to the managerial task.1 Professionalisation has 
also been seen as one of the prerequisites for the modernisation of management. 
Although ‘modern management’ is a somewhat vague term, it is evident that 
the professionalisation process led to a new attitude and to new approaches 
towards the managerial task, including, as Alfred D. Chandler pointed out, the 
systematisation of management. By the 1950s, Mable Newcomer had already 
observed a new ‘professional attitude’ among business executives in large US 
firms, including that managers had become more absorbed in their work and 
more committed to the company. 
The professionalisation of management occurred in close connection with 
the general professionalisation of society, but there is agreement that managers 
could not be seen as forming a professional group, nor could one educational 
group monopolise the managerial task.2 Moreover, the professionalisation of 
management did not mean that the owner/manager was ‘unprofessional’ or 
that the owner/manager disappeared. On the contrary, many owners were 
both well-educated and extremely competent in carrying out their tasks and 
family firms still exist today.
1 Chandler, Alfred D (1977) The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambridge 
MA: Belknap; Newcomer, Mabel (1955) ‘The Professionalization of Management.’ Business History 
Review Vol. 22, No. 1, 54–63.
2 For a further discussion, see Fellman, Susanna (2001) ‘The Professionalisation of Management in 
Finland – The Case of the Manufacturing Sector, 1900–1975.’ Scandinavian Economic History Review 
Vol. 49, No. 3, 5–27.
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The professionalisation of management can be seen as an important 
part of the modernisation process and its effects extended to all aspects of 
management, i.e. to the production process, to sales and marketing and to 
financial management, as well as to how management related to workers and 
how the owner and managers saw their roles in the local community and in 
society at large. 
The professionalisation process was also observed in a growing cadre of 
middle managers and experts – ‘professionals’ – at all levels of the company.3 
As a result of the growth in firm size and increasing technological and 
organisational complexity, owners and top managers had to delegate power and 
tasks and they became more dependent on the skills of specific professionals. 
One important expression of the new professional attitude, both among a new 
generation of more professional managers and among professional experts, 
was to create a modern, efficient and productive company. Professionalisation 
was thus a key factor behind the modernisation of companies.4
As new opportunities for competent professionals to advance up the 
corporate hierarchy emerged, the corporation also became a battleground 
for competition not only between competing individuals but also between 
competing professions, where various educational groups claimed they were 
the most competent to create a modern and efficient company. Although these 
contests for control were occasionally detrimental to the company, they also 
had positive consequences: by working hard to show their competence and 
by advancing their own interests, skilled experts at the same time developed 
the company.
The goal of the chapter
This chapter deals primarily with the role of, on one hand, top managers and, 
on the other, professionals and experts in the construction of the modern 
firm from the 1920s to the 1940s. I especially study the ‘division of labour’ 
between the manager and the professional experts in their daily routines and in 
particular the planning and carrying out of some modernisation projects. Thus, 
one aim of the article is to achieve a better understanding of the significance 
3 Chandler 1977.
4 Fellman, Susanna (2007) ‘Aesthetics in Modern Management’ – The Professionalisation of Management 
and the Creation of the Modern, Efficient Firm in Finland, 1920s–1940s.’ In Kervanto Nevanlinna, Anja 
(ed) Industry and Modernism – Companies, Architecture and Identities During the High-Industrial Period. 
Helsinki: SKS.
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of various professionals on firm development by investigating these groups 
and their roles in various projects.
Moreover, I address the problem facing the owner-manager of how to 
maintain power and control while he became increasingly dependent on the 
professional employees and as there was an increasing need for delegation. 
During this period, the employee–employer relation between top professionals 
and owners also started to change.5 
This is carried out empirically by investigating the tasks and duties of 
these groups of employees in three construction projects in one Finnish paper 
industry firm, G.A. Serlachius Ab (GAS), in the inter-war period when one of 
its legendary managers, Gösta Serlachius, managed the company. I focus on 
the construction projects within the growing company and especially study the 
divergent roles and tasks of the various professional employees and manager 
and how the work was carried out in practice. The guiding question is what 
these employees actually did and how did they influenced the development 
of the company. In spite of their crucial role in corporate development, these 
employees have formed an almost invisible personnel group in historical 
research.6 One reason for this is that they were for long a fairly small employee 
group and as a result considered to be of marginal interest. Moreover, they 
have commonly been seen as part of ‘management’, which in research has often 
been personified by the entrepreneur or top manager. The significance of the 
(other) professionals in strategic, technological and organisational planning 
and in the development of the company has been overlooked. 
This chapter is based on a study of only one company and manager, 
which obviously makes it limited in scope. It is evident that the impact and 
significance of the owners and professionals varied from case to case. Some 
managers took a very active role in all aspects of running the company, while 
others delegated the questions of technical solutions and organisational issues 
to the professionals and experts, instead concentrating on one specific aspect 
of management or on other issues e.g. taking care of external contacts. 
5 See Fellman Susanna (2010) ‘Enforcing and Re-Enforcing Trust – Employers and Upper-White-Collar 
Employees in Finnish Manufacturing Companies, 1920s–1980s.’ Business History Vol. 52 No 5, 779–911.
6 There are, of course some notable exceptions, like the work by Jürgen Kocka (White Collar Workers in 
America, 1890–1940. A Social-Political history in international perspective. New York: Sage, 1980) and 
Toni Pierenkemper (‘Pre-1900 Industrial White Collar Employees at the Krupp Steel Casting Works: 
A New Occupational Category in Germany.’ Business History Review, Vol. 58, No 3 (autumn 1984), 
384–408.)
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GAS and Gösta Serlachius
GAS was founded in 1868 when Gustaf Adolf Serlachius built a mechanical 
wood pulp mill in Mänttä, a small community about 90 kilometres from 
Tampere. In 1880, the first paper machine was installed. During the era 
of Gustaf Adolf Serlachius, which ended with his death in 1901, the firm 
remained small and was on several occasions on the verge of bankruptcy. 
Rapid expansion started when Gösta Serlachius, who was both nephew and 
son-in-law of Gustaf Adolf, took over management in 1913. Production capacity 
was increased by enlarging existing mills and by investing in new machines, 
but also through the acquisition of other paper mills. During the years 1915–
1918, Gösta Serlachius acquired several paper mills, the most important being 
Kangas Pappersbruks Ab and Tammerfors Takfiltsfabrik Aktiebolag (Oy 
Tako Ab) as well as the Kolho sawmill. New brands of paper, for example 
greaseproof and tissue paper, were introduced. Both were brands for which 
GAS later became well known. During his period, GAS grew into one of the 
30 largest industrial companies in Finland.7
Gösta Serlachius (1876–1942) was not only an able manager, he was also 
engaged in numerous activities outside GAS. He played a key role in the 
foundation of large Finnish forest industry export cartels and was active in 
the Confederation of Employers (suomen Työnantajien Keskusliitto STK). 
He also had close relations with the highest political elite, which gave him 
important assignments within the newly independent state first during the 
Civil War (1918) and later in the development of Finnish trade relations with 
other countries. Gösta Serlachius had a great interest in fine art and succeeded 
in building up a sizeable art collection. He was also interested in architecture 
and took an active interest in all construction projects in the firm, from both a 
technical and an architectural point of view. In addition to a genuine interest 
in fine art, his interest in beautifying the community played a significant part 
in the creation of an image of a benevolent and good employer in the local 
mill community and in society at large.
Serlachius was in many respects a ‘typical’ manager of the time: he was the 
main owner and he had studied both at home and abroad, but he had never 
completed a formal professional education. In Finland during this period, 
most owners and top managers were still actively engaged in running the 
company – this was an era of ‘personal capitalism’ in the words of Alfred D. 
7 Fellman Susanna (2005) ’Hur leds ett skogsföretag? – G.A. Serlachius Ab på 1920- och 30-talet.’ 
Historisk Tidskrift för Finland Vol. 90 No 2, 241–269.; for a recent biography of Gösta Serlachius, see 
Silvennoinen, Oula (2012) Paperisydän. Gösta Serlachiuksen elämä. Helsinki: Siltala.
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Chandler. On the shopfloor, Serlachius maintained a paternalistic attitude 
towards his workers and took an active part in daily management. However, he 
can also be seen as a very modern manager of his generation, with an unusually 
‘professional’ approach. He compensated for his lack of formal education with 
an active and studious mind and he was interested in both commercial and 
technical questions. He understood the importance of employing the best 
available expertise. He travelled abroad frequently and followed professional 
journals in order to absorb new ideas, which he actively presented to his 
engineers and other professional employees. He was one of the earliest 
Finnish managers to visit the US and, in addition to the technological and 
organisational novelties he observed there, he was inspired by Taylorism and 
the ‘Safety First’ movement.8 Moreover, he took an active interest in the social 
welfarism applied in both American and European companies.9
One of the key notions about Serlachius’ ability as a manager was his talent 
to recognise and employ skilled and competent professionals.10 Owing to the 
rapid expansion of the company, but also to his extensive engagements outside 
the firm, he was forced to trust his subordinates and delegate responsibilities 
and tasks. Nevertheless, he also wanted to retain power over the companies 
from a distance. This was not an easy balancing act. Moreover, he had a 
difficult temperament and tended to run into conflicts with people. Some of 
these conflicts led to lifelong break-ups. Interestingly, however, some of the key 
employees in GAS stayed long in the company, in spite of repeated conflicts.
The inter-war period: Industrial progress and modernisation
The period of investigation is from the 1920s to the late 1940s. The inter-war 
period was a period of rapid industrial progress in Finland; ‘a breakthrough 
phase’11, but also one of pronounced modernisation ideologies and nation 
building. Although the Finnish industrialisation process was still in its prime, 
8 Kettunen, Pauli (1994) Suojelu, suoritus, subjekti. Työsuojelu teollistuvan Suomen yhteiskunnallisissa 
ajattelu- ja toimintatavoissa. Historiallisia Tutkimuksia 189. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura.
9 Fellman Susanna (2012) ‘French influences in a Finnish company in an era of industrial break-through 
and modernisation: Société Michelin’s welfare program and G.A. Serlachius AB in the 1920s and 30s.’ In 
Godelier, E., M. Le Roux, E. Briot, G. Garel, A. (eds.) Managerial Thoughts and Practice in France 19th to 
21st Centuries. Assesment and Future Prospects. Online at <http://mtpf.mlab-innovation.net/en/>.
10 Fellman 2005.
11 Krantz, Olle (2001) ’Industrialisation in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. A Comparative View.’ In 
Kryger Larsen, H. (ed.) Economic Convergence? Industrialisation in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. 
Commentationes Scientarum Socialum. Helsingfors: Finnish Society of Science and Letters.
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the idea of the large-scale production unit, mechanisation and mass production 
as the road to economic development and modernisation took root. Obviously, 
such modernisation ideologies were part of an international phenomenon (see 
below), but became perhaps particularly prominent in the newly independent 
country. As Finnish state formation, political and social modernisation and 
industrial breakthrough occurred more or less simultaneously, modernisation 
and economic progress became in some respects considered to be identical 
to nation building. This feature persisted throughout the 20th century and 
strongly influenced economic and political thinking in the post-war period.
This period has also been considered to be the period when professional 
society emerged, having been made possible after the introduction of 
unicameral parliament and universal suffrage in 1906: recruitment based 
on merit and qualification, instead of by birth, gained ground. At the 
same time, professional education developed, while professional interest 
formulation among certain educational groups, most notably engineers, 
became pronounced.12 These processes were also reflected in top management, 
where a first ‘professionalisation wave’, marked by a rapid increase both in 
the number of salaried managers in top management and in the educational 
level of top managers, occurred in the 1920s.13
This period of rapid industrial transformation was reflected in manufacturing 
companies in their swift growth in size, in increasing productivity and in the 
introduction of new technology. For instance, GAS grew fast both by expanding 
production in existing mills and through mergers and acquisitions. The period 
was also a turning point for the old, patriarchal, owner-led firm. Family firms 
– in the sense that the majority of the shares were controlled by the family 
and that top management consisted of family members – still continued to 
dominate, but rapid industrialisation and growth in company size inevitably 
brought with it changes both in ownership and in management. New skills were 
required, while owner/managers received to a growing extent a professional 
education. Even though the paternalist model of management persisted, 
Taylorism and rationalisation ideologies changed managerial practices on the 
shopfloor. Thus, modernisation and professionalisation went hand-in-hand. 
12 See Karl-Erik Michelsen (Viides sääty. Insinöörit suomalaisessa yhteiskunnassa. Helsinki: Suomen 
Historiallinen Seura & Tekniikan Akateemisten Liitto 1999) for the engineering profession and 
modernisation in the early 20th century.
13 Fellman, Susanna (2000) Uppkomsten av en direktörsprofession – Industriledarnas utbildning och 
karriär i Finland 1900–1975. Bidrag till kännedom av Finlands natur och folk nr. 155. Helsingfors: Finska 
Vetenskaps–Societeten.
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Planning the modern firm: A professional battlefield in the inter-war 
period
As mentioned earlier, professionals’ impact in the development of companies 
has tended to be somewhat neglected in historical writing, although increasing 
technological and organisational complexities called for new skills. Many 
company managers were also well aware of the need for professional expertise 
and a scientific and rational approach in order to modernise firms. As part 
of professional motivations, professionals began to claim they were the most 
competent for this task.
The concepts ‘modern’, ‘modernism’ and ‘modernity’ are somewhat 
difficult: what is seen as ‘modern ‘is something that changes over time and 
the forms and expressions of both ‘modernism’ and ‘modernity’ in a company 
varied between countries according to local economic, institutional and cultural 
circumstances.14 Nevertheless, the ideology or style of ‘modernism’ is often 
dated to the first decades of the 20th century, i.e. the period during which the 
idea of the ‘modern company and ‘modern management’ also emerged. The 
concept of the ‘modern company’ is also connected to modernistic ideals: the 
new, the rational and the efficient.
According to the Danish historian Ole Markussen, modernism at the 
company level was characterised by rapid technological development, by a 
strong belief in scientific approaches to both technical and organisational 
problems and by the introduction of rationalisation, standardisation and 
mass production. New labour relations and the more systematic selection 
and recruitment of workers also evolved.15 Lindy Biggs stressed that on the 
factory floor, modernity meant primarily the introduction of rationalisation 
ideologies and the methods propagated by Taylor and Ford. The interest 
in factory planning grew and so-called model factories were constructed.16 
Moreover, the ideology of the modern firm also included a striving for improved 
working conditions, with a safe and hygienic work environment, and where 
good lighting, fresh air and a tolerable temperature was seen as particularly 
important.17 In addition to a product of genuine concern for the company’s 
14 For various expressions of modernity at the company level in a comparative perspective, see Kervanto 
Nevanlinna (ed.) 2007, esp. the article by Anders Houltz.
15 Markussen, Ole (1988) ‘Danish Industry, 1920–1939: Technology, Rationalisation and Modernization.’ 
Scandinavian Journal of History Vol. 13, No. 2–3, 233–293.
16 Biggs, Lindy (1996) The Rational Factory: Architecture, Technology and Work in America in the Era of 
Mass Production. Studies in Industry and Society 11. John Hopkins University Press, 2.
17 Biggs 1996, 75.
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workers, welfarism and good working conditions it also created a positive 
image of the employer. Efficient, well-planned and attractive factories had 
a civilising and uplifting influence in the community and eradicated labour 
problems.18
Production was to be efficient, but the significance of clarity and simplicity 
in solutions was also stressed. The latter goals were obviously in accordance 
with the efficiency requirement, but clarity and simplicity were valuable 
in themselves. The idea of the efficient, rational company had not only an 
instrumental economic value, but also an intrinsic – even ‘aesthetic’ – value: 
as a rational and efficient solution was good for the company and for progress 
in general, it was also beautiful.19 To achieve these goals, there was a need for 
planning at all levels, both at the company level and in society at large, for 
the application of scientific methods and for increasing professionalism. New 
professionals – in particular engineers and architects, but also other emerging 
professionals such as psychologists and health experts – were the ‘carriers’ 
of these ideas and ideologies, while also the business owners and company 
managers saw themselves as contributors to modern society.
In the first decades of the 20th century in Finland, engineers and architects 
began to show an interest in the construction of the new and rational factory. 
As the manufacturing industry grew in importance, architects realised the 
potential of planning industrial plants, a task previously often sneered at, 
and the increasingly positive image of the new model factories made factory 
construction work a respectable field.20 In the new ‘machine age’, the factories 
became carriers of progress and prosperity. 
This led occasionally to tensions between the professions. Architects 
considered themselves to be experts on the totality of the plant, while engineers, 
by contrast, proclaimed their skill in planning factory buildings and areas as a 
consequence of their knowledge of technology, the production process and the 
product. The argument about who was best qualified to plan the modern factory 
actually became a tool in their professional rivalry. The Swedish historian Lisa 
Brunnström spoke of a heated debate in Sweden about the role of the engineer 
and the architect in the construction of industrial plants. However, there was 
in general a shared interest in constructing modern, rational factories.21 
18 Loader, Robert & Skinner, Joan (1991) ‘Management, Construction and the Architecture: The 
Development of the Model Factory.’ Construction History Vol. 7, No 2, 83–103.
19 On this, see Fellman 2007.
20 Loader & Skinner 1991; Brunnström, Lisa (1990) Den rationella fabriken. Om funktionalismens rötter. 
Dokuma.
21 Brunnström 1990, 203.
179
A MANAGER AND His PROFEssiONAls
Such professional tensions were also observed in Finland. The struggle 
between engineers and architects to claim industrial planning as their 
professional territory was particularly heated in Finland in the 1920s, perhaps 
due to the rapid modernisation of Finnish society. Engineers’ ambitions 
extended to managing industrial companies and taking a leading role in 
modern industrial society generally. As the owner of Pargas Kalkbruk Ab, 
Emil Sarlin, who was also an engineer, stated in a famous article about the 
manufacturing sector that engineers were actually needed at every level and for 
every task in the industrial company.22 He was accompanied by a professional 
colleague A. E. Norrmén, who stated that their role in industry was not only 
as technical experts, but also as organisers, planners and leaders.23
By contrast, representatives of architects argued that they were most 
capable of taking charge of planning factories and industrial estates. For 
example, Carolus Lindberg objected to entrusting engineers with the design 
of factory buildings. Engineers were good at planning the production process, 
but architects were needed in order to achieve a factory building that combined 
both aesthetic values and functionality into ‘one concept’.24 To this, engineers 
answered by claiming that they were also able to consider, for example, the 
selection of the right environment, the general outline of the building and the 
planning of light, heating and ventilation. Engineers would be particularly 
proficient in this due to their knowledge of the production process and the 
flow of resources.25
These debates and tensions were occasionally also visible in individual 
companies. For example, Gösta Serlachius greatly valued some architects and 
their vision and work, and thus he established long-lasting relations with 
some ‘house architects’. However, often much of the planning was given to his 
‘own’ engineers, which annoyed the architects. The engineers employed in the 
company were consigned tasks which the architects considered their domain, 
for example, the planning of the breadth and width of the factory buildings or 
the calculating of the space between pillars depending on the products to be 
stored, the size of the planned machinery or the ‘flow’ of the whole production 
22 Sarlin, Emil, ‘Teknikern och industrin’. Särtryck ur Tekniska Föreningens i Finland Förhandlingar 1926.
23 Norrmén, A.E., ‘Ingeniörskåren och dess betydelse för samhället’. Tekniska Föreningens i Finland 
Förhandlingar no 1, 1922. 
24 Lindberg, Carolus, ‘Sananen arkkitehtuurista’. Teknillinen Aikakuskirja 1920.
25 Mäkinen, E., ‘Teollisuuslaitoksen suunnittelussa huomioitavia näkökohtia’. Teknillinen Aikakauskirja no. 
2 1938.
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process.26 Occasionally, Serlachius himself interfered in the architects’ plans 
of new buildings, which was not always well received.
A construction engineer Louis Nyrop, who worked as an independent 
consultant that specialised in planning and building industrial sites and who 
was often engaged in planning construction projects in GAS, reflected on 
several occasions in his correspondence with Gösta Serlachius on the task of 
the construction engineer in building the most practical and efficient factories. 
Nyrop felt that his expertise was not fully appreciated by most factory owners 
and he complained that he was having difficulty in getting new commissions, 
as owners of industrial plants ‘only contacted him when they needed some 
specific calculations made, while they claimed they managed to do the general 
planning work by themselves’.27 Similar complaints were often put forward 
by the architects: they were only called in to give some details or ornaments. 
According to Nyrop, this was shortsighted, as these ‘amateurs’ could not 
grasp the totality as he could. On the other hand, Nyrop did not always give 
full credit to the architects. While the architects complained they were only 
asked to come and give the final details, Nyrop did not consider the question 
of façades or aesthetic issues a problem in the planning of new factories, as, 
according to him, it ‘is always possible to arrange the façade in a satisfactory 
way, independent of the width of the building’.28
Both engineers and architects sought, however, to contribute to the 
development of the ‘modern firm’, although the focus differed in some respects. 
For modernists, the aesthetic, the efficient and the functional went hand-in-
hand. Or as Nyrop concluded on one occasion: ‘In factory buildings, the correct 
outline and design is generally also the most architectonically beautiful’.29
The manager and his professionals in three modernisation projects
As stressed earlier, modern management penetrated all aspects of the managerial 
function, but here I focus on how this process affected the division of labour 
between the top manager and key professionals and their interrelations through 
the lens of three concrete construction projects of particular importance for 
26 Protokoll vid möte på huvudkontoret i Mänttä. B. Vitzthums arkiv. Privat, pappersbruket. 4499 GAS 
archive, ELKA.
27 Nyrop till Gösta Serlachius 19 juli 1933. Gösta Serlachius korrespondens. GS Art museum.
28 ’PM angående utvidgning och ombyggnad av pappersbruket 1.mars 1938, av L. Nyrop.’ GAS archive, 
ELKA.
29 ‘Brev från Nyrop till Gösta Serlachius, 2 mars 1932.’ Gösta Serlachius’ korrespondens. GS Art museum.
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the modernisation of GAS. These were: 1) an extension to the Mänttä paper 
mill, which started in the late 1930s and continued throughout the 1940s, 2) 
the modernisation of Kangas between 1934 and 1937 and 3) the construction 
of a new head office in Mänttä, which also was called the ‘White House’ (it 
even had an oval hall), which is today a museum of the history of GAS. 
 Reorganisation and new investment were ongoing processes in a firm 
of the size of GAS. Many projects, ranging from small adjustments to 
existing machinery to building completely new factory buildings, occurred 
simultaneously. Planning work could go on for years and projects often 
changed shape over the course of this process. Several memoranda, plans and 
drafts were often drawn up before the final solutions were discovered. Thus it 
is occasionally difficult to say when a project started and when it ended. On 
the other hand, by looking at this process, the crucial role of the key experts 
in the projects becomes visible.
It is, however, evident from the sources that Gösta Serlachius was the 
driving force behind every project and that he initiated and controlled all 
details. He was, after all, the owner of the company and involved in managing 
it on a daily basis. However, he also had an active and industrious mind and 
was always looking out for novelties and improvements. Both Gösta and his 
son R. Erik Serlachius sent notes about interesting articles and magazines to 
the company’s employees and suggestions for models to copy or to be inspired 
by. The construction of the head office was a project of great symbolic value 
for the company, and, thus, both Serlachius himself and the chief engineer in 
GAS, Warner Silfversparre were very active in planning the new building.30 
An open architect competition was announced in 1929, but the requirement 
was that the visions of Serlachius and Silfversparre were to be integrated into 
the plans suggested by architects.31 
Although Serlachius initiated the goals and main points of the project and 
often wrote the first memorandum himself, the concrete drafting and planning 
work was conducted by the professionals. After the initial orientations and 
discussions, Serlachius commissioned some of his employees to carry out a 
feasibility study of the project at hand.32 In the Kangas modernization, for 
example, the role of the chief engineer Oskar Burgman was very strong in the 
30 ’Johtokunnan pöytäkirja 5.9.1924.’ Kangas. GAS archive, ELKA.
31 ‘Nytt huvudkontor. Af W. Silfversparre 13.11.1929 1ª utkast.’ Kotelo 8 Pääkonttori. GAS Museum; ’Kontrakt.’ 
GAS Hallinto. Kotelo 8. Pääkonttori. GAS Archive. GAS Museum.
32 ‘P. M. betr. Koncernens byggnadsverksamhet 1938. ‘B. Vitzthum, diverse 4500. GAS archive, ELKA.
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concrete planning process.33 The so called engineering meetings kept at regular 
intervals at the head office in Mänttä also seem to have been important in all 
the renewal projects. As the number of engineers were still low, these was an 
important meeting place for developing the company.
Moreover, outside experts were often engaged at some stage in the process. 
For example, some of the planning of the extensions and reorganisations of 
Mänttä and Kangas was entrusted to Louis Nyrop, who drew up general plans 
and presented alternative solutions. Interstingly, Nyrop commonly aimed 
for larger extensions than the engineers had. According to him, provisional 
solutions or too small buildings would perhaps save money first, but they 
would ultimately be uneconomical. Instead, Nyrop underlined the importance 
of anticipating future extensions and new investments. He emphasised the 
importance of being far-sighted, but it also seems that he often wanted 
‘grander’ solutions than the engineers in the company did. Nevertheless, as 
an independent professional expert, he had only to consider the best solutions 
and not think about the costs.
Keeping control in the growing company
However, although the professionals were key persons in developing and 
modernising the company, Serlachius intended to keep himself informed at 
every stage of the process. He expected the engineers and technicians to report 
to him on a regular basis about progress in the various projects. When the 
company grew and he was to an increasing extent away from the company 
due to his other engagements and weakening health, the need to delegate 
responsibilities became urgent. He was, thus, confronted with the dilemma 
on how to delegate tasks without losing power and control.
One solution was centralisation. During this era, most manufacturing 
companies applied an organisational model that Per Schybergson called the 
‘historical-geographical model’.34 In simple terms, the firm consisted of one 
head office and separate independent local mills. The head office was often 
situated in the main mill community, but sometimes in Helsinki or another 
large city. Firms were strictly functionally organised and production in the local 
mill was diversified into several unrelated branches. The model was primarily 
33 ‘Beträffande Kangas modernisering 26 okt. 1934.’ Ing. Burgman Allmänna 1926–37. 4715GAS archive, 
ELKA.
34 Schybergson, Per (1988) ’Tätort kring ett företag.’ Historisk Tidskrift för Finland Vol. 73 No 1, 40–57.
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a result of the Finnish industrialisation pattern based on geographically remote 
mill communities, which had to be self-sufficient in a period of inadequate 
communication possibilities. GAS was indeed organised along the lines of 
this ‘historical-geographical model’ at this time. Individual plants were 
geographically scattered and the Kangas, Kolho and Tako plants acquired in 
the 1910s were merged to the mother company only in the 1930s. 
The fact that the plants were not officially merged with the mother company 
until the 1930s was, however, only a formality and in reality the local plants 
were not independently run. Plant managers could take care of the daily duties 
and had a certain position in the local mill community, but the power in GAS 
was firmly kept in Mänttä and with Serlachius himself. The mills had their own 
boards of directors, but these boards consisted of members of the Serlachius 
family and loyal employees from the Mänttä mill. The plant managers and 
professionals in the various mills reported on a weekly, sometimes even daily, 
basis to Gösta and R. Erik and they travelled regularly to the head office for 
meetings and consultations. Cooperation between the plants was extensive and 
it was, for instance, common that orders were switched between the separate 
plants.35 
Another way of centralising power to Mänttä was by creating an efficient 
network of close and loyal personnel in certain key positions. This was achieved 
by an ingenious system of the circulation of personnel between individual 
plants. By circulating key personnel between the plants, they became closely 
tied to each other and to the mother company. Cooperation in engineering and 
board meetings became efficient and the key persons knew most of the plants 
well. Moreover, this ongoing circulation made sure that no plant manager 
could become too independent with respect to the central office and Serlachius 
himself.36
Another key issue to keep control in his hands was to secure a continuous 
flow of information between the individual plants and the head office. 
Serlachius received weekly reports with figures about sales and production 
from the plants, he was informed about all correspondence that had arrived 
and some letters were forwarded to him. Whenever he was not informed about 
everything, the employees were immediately reprimanded. For example, he 
stressed in a circular letter to all white-collar employees and managers in 
1935 that he was to know everything. No issue was too insignificant to be 
brought to him. Moreover, it was not the task of the individual employee to 
35 Fellman 2005.
36 Ibid.
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decide whether an issue was to be brought forward to him or not.37 The lesson 
was apparently learned: later the same year, the plant manager and technical 
leader in Kangas sent a letter to Serlachius with detailed reports about the 
sales figures and incoming orders. The letter begun with a notion that
[w]e take for granted that bergsrådet [i.e. Gösta serlachius] also during 
this stay abroad wishes to receive the customary weekly reports from 
Kangas, although we have not received any formal request to do so.38
It is an often repeated notion about Serlachius that he had a difficult personality 
and that he could be both ruthless and hard, which often drove him to conflicts 
with people around him. In companies that he directly or indirectly received 
control of, he as a rule drifted very quickly into open conflicts with the local 
management. Thus, the local management was regularly replaced shortly after 
a takeover.39
In his own company, however, he was apparently more able to cooperate 
and succeeded in building long-lasting working relationship with his key 
employees. Many of them, such as Vitzthum, Silfversparre and Gunnar 
Stadius, stayed at GAS for their entire careers. For example Silfversparre had a 
particularly strong position as both expert and a confidant of Gösta Serlachius. 
As mentioned earlier, one of Serlachius’ qualities as a manager seems to have 
been his ability to recruit able professionals and there is ample evidence that 
he was meticulous in his recruitment. He employed personnel he or some of 
his close relatives knew well. Vitzthum was a friend of R. Erik, while Rafael 
Jaatinen, plant manager in Mänttä during 1920–1929, had been a young 
correspondent clerk in Kymmene Aktiebolag when Gösta Serlachius managed 
the company for a few years in early 1910s. Nyrop, who Serlachius regularly 
commissioned for construction works, was a former employee in Mänttä. 
Serlachius was also continuously on the lookout for potential candidates and, 
if he did not know the candidates personally, he kept himself informed about 
them and asked his colleagues about their skills and reputations.40
His relationship with these key employees was, however, also occasionally 
complicated. As he wanted to keep all decisions in his own hand and required 
37 ‘Brev till disponenter och avdelningsföreståndare den 7 jan. 1935.’ Tiedotuksia Isännöitsijälle 192930. 
Huolto-osasto. 5181. GAS archive ELKA.
38 ’Brev från Kangas pappersbruks disponent till G. Serlachius 19 augusti 1935.’ Korrespondens Kangas 
KA22 1935. GAS archive ELKA.
39 See, for instance, Silvennoinen 2012, 444–447.
40 See Fellman 2010, 202 footnote 86.
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information about every small detail, conflicts could not be avoided. He tolerated 
little – or no – opposition. Clashes between him and certain professionals, 
thus, occasionally occurred, especially with Nyrop and Silfversparre.41 For 
example, there was extended and harsh correspondence concerning some 
turbines that Silfversparre had ordered without Serlachius’ formal consent.42 
His cooperation with the architects was also occasionally strained. But it 
was apparently not only Serlachius that was difficult: Silfversparre actually 
answered to Serlachius’ allegations in a not altogether polite tone.
i tried for several days to get in touch with my superiors, but in vain. 
And i did not even think about asking for the opinion of the employees 
in Kangas, especially as i had got the impression that i had received 
bergsrådets’ [i.e. Gösta serlachius] consent to the order. Moreover, the 
Kangas ‘crew’ lacks the ability to give positive support in this issue.43
Silfversparre also emphasised that it was his duty as a professional employee to 
carry out this task, as it was urgent to complete the project. As a professional, 
he felt he had a loyalty to do the best he could, and not only take orders from 
his employers.
In spite of these controversies, no final break between Serlachius and these 
trusted employees came about. Being close confidants, as well as skilled and 
innovative, Silfversparre and Nyrop were probably among the few who could 
take certain liberties without facing more serious consequences than a sharp 
reprimand from Serlachius – or in the case of Nyrop difficulties in receiving 
payment for his work. In spite of protracted disputes, Nyrop and many of the 
trusted architects kept receiving new commissions in GAS. 
Discussion 
Even though Gösta Serlachius was both interested in and actively took part 
in all aspects of the planning and building processes, and even though he was 
in many ways a skilled and knowledgeable manager, both the competencies 
and the input of these professional experts were crucial in planning new lines 
41 Intense correspondence between Nyrop and Serlachius concerning these matters took place in the 
early 1930s.
42 ‘Meddelande till Ingeniör Silfversparre. Gösta Serlachius korr. 1937. Werner Silfversparre’ Si 48.
43 Turbin-konkurrens/Kangas 1937. Brev Silfversparre – Serlachius 7 August 1937. 
186
sUsANNA FEllMAN
of production and new buildings, introducing technical and organisational 
innovations and carrying out and completing projects. 
Moreover, the creation of a good ‘team’ was also crucial in the rapidly 
expanding company, particularly as Serlachius himself was tied up – sometimes 
for months – in extensive engagements outside the firm, and it seems that he 
was good at creating such teams of experts. He was, as mentioned, always on 
the lookout for good employees and recruited personnel of high competence, 
while his system of tying the individual mills close to the mother company and 
circulating personnel between them supported building such teams.
Many engineers in the company also worked for him for long. Long-
term employment was common among white-collar employees and skilled 
professionals during this time period, but it seems that the key employees 
in Serlachius’ company stayed at GAS for particularly long periods, many of 
them for their entire careers. Actually, the idea of lifelong employment among 
highly skilled professionals and top white-collar employees during this time 
period can be considered something of a myth. Skilled engineers, lawyers 
and business graduates, who intended to pursue a career in business, moved 
– or had to move – between companies in order to reach top positions later 
in their careers.44 Thus, the loyalty of Silfversparre, for instance, seems to be 
remarkable.
In principle, Serlachius demanded complete loyalty from his employees. 
He kept control and power firmly in his own hands and was by no means an 
easy employer, but instead both dominant and despotic. However, he also 
had another side. He was probably both an inspiring and an encouraging 
employer when he was pleased with his subordinates, and although he was 
demanding, he seems to have trusted his subordinates’ capabilities. Moreover, 
his tireless efforts to modernise and expand the company and introduce new 
products required a lot of planning and research. Thus, it was perhaps also 
professionally rewarding to work for him, which could partly explain the long 
employment contracts among some key employees.
From this exercise it becomes evident that these projects were important 
for skill formation in the company. The planning and realisation of them 
required extensive reading, massive calculations, drafts and redrafts as well 
as long study trips abroad and the engaging of consultants and other outside 
experts. For example, the power questions required of Silfversparre continuous 
examinations of professional magazines, calculations and discussions with 
professional experts in other companies and with consultants, while the 
44 Fellman 2000, 173–176.
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expansion of tissue paper production in Mänttä required several study trips 
by the engineers and R. Erik Serlachius. Thus, expanding the study of these 
types of processes can enable a deeper understanding of skill formation at the 
company level. This is, however, a task for the future.
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PriVATe enTrePreneUrshiP  
And The sTATe
discursive power struggles during the regulated 
economy 1939–1949
kARI tERäS
The environment of economical activity changed rapidly and dramatically in 
Finland after the Second World War broke out. The war affected the whole of 
society and the economical role of the state grew to new proportions during the 
war time. At the beginning of September, 1939, the construction of a state-led 
regulated economy began in Finland with great haste. It was supposed to secure 
the supply of necessities to the civilian population and secure the maintenance 
for the quickly growing army. In Finland, economic control was not proactive 
and based on overall planning; rather it was reactive, and matters were dealt 
with out of compulsion, at the last minute and often randomly. However, the 
state started to practise a more planned economic and financial policy than 
before and started to create the institutional structures for it. 
A quick transition to a state-led economy meant a radical state of insecurity 
in the sectors of the economy. The predictability of business was lower, and 
from the point of view of private enterprise, there was uncertainty under the 
continuously strengthening pressure of the state, even though in Finland the 
aim was to regulate the economy in co-operation with the organisations which 
represented the business sector. The representatives of the private business 
sector started to actively defend their own position in public and to define their 
attitude towards the state-led economy: it was a discursive power struggle 
about the nature of the war economy and the regulated economy and the 
ways it was actualised.
This article does not study how the regulated economy functioned in practice 
and to what extent the government interfered in the economic operating 
structures. Instead, it studies, first and foremost, the kind of meanings that 
the representatives of the business sector gave to private enterprise, to the 
mechanisms of the free-enterprise economy and to the economic control of 
the state in Finland in the years 1939–1949.1 The use of language connected to 
1 This article is partly based on my earlier article ’Kilpailu, yhteistyö ja luottamus elinkeinoelämän 
puhunnassa säännöstelytalouden aikana 1939–1949’ (Teräs 2008).
190
kARi TERÄs
the economy is observed as a social activity and at the centre of the research 
lies the modes of speaking, discourses, with which the private business sector 
aimed to construct the economy of the exceptional times into a desirable form 
and define their relationship to the quickly changing economic institutions. 
At the same time, attention is given to how the representations of private 
enterprise changed in the exceptional circumstances during and after the war. 
The basis of the article is that discourses are means to use power, are organised 
on social grounds and have social power.2 
The research material of this article consists of the volumes of the 
newspapers and magazines Kauppalehti, Talouselämä, yksityisyrittäjä 
and Talous ja Koti from the time period of 1939–1949 when the Ministry 
of National Supply was still functioning and when the regulated economy of 
Finland can be dealt with as a system; the regulations continued even after this 
in several sectors of the economy. The two first mentioned were leading organs 
of business life and the latter two mentioned reflected especially the views and 
values of small business entrepreneurs and private merchants. Although the 
newspapers and magazines had their own target audiences and missions in 
the publicity of the business sector, as a whole they can be seen to have vastly 
represented the sentiment of private enterprise in terms of how it wanted to 
be portrayed publically. 
Entrepreneurship discourse
Since 1931, the Week of Private Enterprise was celebrated annually in Finland, 
during which the general public received information about entrepreneurship 
in general, and several different functions related to private entrepreneurship 
especially. The week received wide-ranging publicity, especially in the right-
wing press where the themes of private entrepreneurship were frequently 
discussed. In the beginning, the Week of Private Enterprise was organised 
by Taloudellinen Valistuskeskus (Economic Education Centre) which was 
founded by merchant organisations in 1929, and starting from the year 1934 
the week was organised by yksityisyrittäjien liitto (Private Entrepreneurs’ 
2 See Fairclough, Norman (1992) Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press, 3–5, 62–
66; Fairclough, Norman (2003) Analyzing Discourse. Textual analysis for social research. London: 
Routledge, 3–4, 123–133; Jokinen, Arja, Juhila, Kirsi & Suoninen, Eero (2004) ’Diskursiivinen maailma. 
Teoreettiset lähtökohdat ja analyyttiset käsitteet’. In Jokinen, Arja, Juhila, Kirsi & Suoninen, Eero (eds) 
Diskurssianalyysin aakkoset. Third Edition. Tampere: Vastapaino, 24–29; Johnstone, Barbara (2008) 
Discourse Analysis. Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2–5; Pietikäinen, Sari & Mäntynen, 
Anne (2009) Kurssi kohti diskurssia. Tampere: Vastapaino, 52–63.
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Union) which represented primarily private shops in different lines of business. 
The way the private entrepreneurs wanted to present their significance to the 
society was condensed to the motto of the week:3 
1931: Private enterprise – the basis of the country’s economy.
1932–1934: Private enterprise – the road to a brighter future
1935–1939: With own action – with own power – towards a brighter future 
1940: Powerful individuals build this country 
1941: Private enterprise has been and is the strength of this country
1942–1943: Private enterprise is the strength of this country
1944: Now if ever we must be enterprising
1945: Entrepreneur takes the society forward
1946: Enterprising individual – enterprising nation – reviving country 
1947: Free entrepreneur, free nation
1948: Healthy economy – secured future
1949: Private enterprise is the fly wheel of all development
First and foremost the mottoes portrayed continuity: the basic message was 
always the same. The central matter was to present entrepreneurship as a 
supportive pillar of the whole society and as something that ensures the bright 
future of the country and is the source of its inexhaustible strength. In the 
mottoes, private entrepreneurship was strongly connected to individuality, 
freedom and the destinies of the whole nation; the seeking of personal gain 
connected to entrepreneurship was left to the background in them. One 
purpose of entrepreneurship propaganda was to clear the quite bad reputation 
private enterprise had among the general public. The reputation had taken big 
blows especially during the First World War when some of the entrepreneurs 
had succumbed to speculation and concentrated on war-time profiteering. 
The entrepreneurship discourse which defended the private business sector 
on a general level was built upon three basic starting points. Firstly – as the 
mottoes show – the core idea of it was to demonstrate that the market economy 
is a universal system and that private enterprise is its foundation. According to 
the president of the Private Entrepreneurs’ Union, the councillor of commerce 
Walter Rydman, private enterprise has always been ‘the impelling force of 
the business sector and even life itself’ with which the Finnish nation has 
been able to move forward and overcome difficulties. Private enterprise was 
portrayed metaphorically as the engine of the economy, as its most important 
3 Terho, Viljo E. (1983) Yrittäjän työ on näyttänyt arvonsa. SYKL 50. Suomen Yrittäjäin Keskusliitto ry 
1933–1983. Helsinki: Suomen Yrittäjäin Keskusliitto ry, 132.
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impelling force: ‘the spirit of entrepreneurship is the same to commercial life as 
electric power and steam power are to industry’.4 According to the discourse, 
without private enterprise, economic development would sooner or later stop. 
Therefore it should be protected under all circumstances. The general positive 
significance of entrepreneurship was set above all scepticism and discussion; 
i.e. it was presented as being a self-evident matter.5 
Secondly, private entrepreneurship was portrayed as an inseparable part 
of human nature. In fact, the spirit of entrepreneurship was defined as ‘an 
impelling force of the human spirit’ which in itself encouraged people to create 
new things and to have higher aspirations. Moreover, entrepreneurship was 
presented as being normal human behaviour , even as instinctive activity based 
on ‘nature’s unyielding laws’.6 The competition related to entrepreneurship 
was customarily presented as a trait of the individual and at the same time as 
the guarantee of individualism. All aspirations to detach the ‘urge to compete’ 
and the ‘spirit of entrepreneurship’ from the human nature were doomed, even 
though the state-run economic systems pursued to repress competition ‘by 
their nature’. The central rhetorical method of the entrepreneurship discourse 
was to ‘humanise’ economic activity, which was shown, in addition to the 
above-mentioned, in such abundantly used terms as ‘entrepreneur instinct’, 
‘entrepreneur persistence’, ‘entrepreneur will’, ‘entrepreneur perseverance’, 
‘entrepreneur vigour’, ‘entrepreneur calling’ and ’entrepreneur mindset’. The 
thought of entrepreneurship as a characteristic of human nature was often 
taken to the very end: ‘The entrepreneur instinct is just as persistent in humans 
as the self-preservation instinct in which it is after all based on.’7
Thirdly, private entrepreneurship was presented as an integral part of the 
Finnish national character and the nature of the whole nation, as the ‘basic 
condition of the nation’s existence’, in which case protecting it was portrayed as 
the common mission of the whole nation.8 According to the entrepreneurship 
discourse, the economic achievements of Finland had at all times been 
based on competition and private enterprise: ‘While private entrepreneurs 
have been the supporting force of the country’s economy, Finland has been 
4 Yksityisyrittäjä 9/1943, ’Yrittäjähenki’, 40–41.
5 See Lehtonen, Mikko (1998) Merkitysten maailma. Kulttuurisen tekstintutkimuksen lähtökohtia. Tampere: 
Vastapaino, 23-25; Vehkaperä, Meri (2003) Yrityksen yhteiskuntavastuu – vastuuta voittojen vuoksi? 
Taloustieteiden tiedekunnan julkaisuja N:o 135/2003. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto, 35.
6 Yksityisyrittäjä 10–11/1941, Yksityisyritteliäisyys, 5; Yksityisyrittäjä 16/1944, Nyt jos koskaan on yritettävä, 
2–5; Kauppalehti 28.11.1941, Ihmisolemuksen liikkeellepaneva voima on yksilöllinen yrittäjähenki.
7 Talous ja Koti 6/1941, J.R., Kuka on yksityisyrittäjä?
8 Talous ja Koti 13/1948, ’Yritteliäisyys kansan olemassaolon edellytys’.
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able to enjoy a magnificent economic development.’9 The economic upbeat 
preceding the wars was declared as a merit of private enterprise — and the 
economic difficulties of war time could easily be included in the long list of 
sins of the state-led controlled economy. The political conclusion of this was 
clear: if private enterprise was touched, the core of economic activity would 
be interfered with and the country’s economic capacity of production would 
be put in severe danger.
According to the entrepreneurship discourse, private enterprise could 
only work in conditions of competition and freedom. The basic idea was that 
competition based on freedom supported in itself the democratic political 
system. Economic competition was defined rather like a part of democracy in 
which case limiting it was an offence to democratic character and interfering 
with political democracy consequently put free competition in danger. 
The member of parliament Usko Koski who had the confidence of private 
entrepreneurs expressed this interdependency as an absolute truth: ‘An inch 
lost on the freedom of the economy has definitely meant a similar loss on the 
citizen’s basic freedoms.’10 
The defence of free competition and private initiative was built upon a 
generalising take and the polysemy of words was utilised effectively.11 For 
example, the definitions created for private entrepreneurship were an important 
part of the discursive power struggle during the regulated economy. Moreover, 
the entrepreneurship discourse emphasized that ‘private enterprise is not a 
private matter of any group’ and therefore it was not only the entrepreneurs 
themselves that should cherish the entrepreneurial spirit.12 In the most 
extensive sense, all citizens or at least the large majority of the nation was 
considered to be a private entrepreneur because ‘every working individual 
is a private entrepreneur from their social status’: he sells his labour to the 
highest bidder and gets the supplies he needs from the most profitable place.13 
In a strongly agricultural country, it was especially important to include the 
peasants as private entrepreneurs.14 From this point of view the actions of the 
state that limited private enterprise unnecessarily were directed against the 
large majority of the nation and were therefore generally harmful. 
9 Yksityisyrittäjä 6/1940, Uusi tie, 1.
10 Talous ja Koti 6/1948, Tuuma taloudesta – tuuma kansalaisvapaudesta.
11 Jokinen – Juhila – Suoninen 2004, 30; Fairclough 1992, 187.
12 Yksityisyrittäjä 21/1944, Yksityisyritteliäisyyden Viikko marraskuun 19–26 pnä.
13 Talous ja Koti 6/1941, J.R., Kuka on yksityisyrittäjä?
14 Talous ja Koti 10–11/1943, Suomen talonpoika on ollut ja tulee olemaan yksityisyrittäjä.
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Guardianship discourse 
In Finland, the representatives of the private business sector accepted almost 
without objections the state’s economic regulation and its aspiration towards 
a more planned economic and financial policy during the war. However, the 
economic control of the state was portrayed at the same time as a necessity 
and as a threat. The representatives of the business sector acknowledged the 
limitations of the market economy in exceptional circumstances: with free 
competition alone, it was impossible to ensure that the resources which were 
scarcer because of the war would be directed in a socially fair way, or to 
prevent speculation and profiteering.15 Centred state-led economic regulation 
and planning was needed in order to direct the resources of the nation first 
to war endeavours and then to the reconstruction of the country. However, 
the entrepreneurs did not want to give the state unlimited power to control. 
The representatives of the private business sector actively took part in 
the definition struggle about the war economy and the regulated economy. 
The matters at hand concerned the kind of meanings the state-led economy 
was given, how extensive it was defined to be and what its relationship to 
private enterprise comprised. The attitude of the business sector to the state-
led economy was dual: in practice, the ‘interference’ of the state was tolerated 
while at the same time it was harshly criticised in public. It can be said that the 
business sector did not miss any chances to criticise or redefine. The discourse 
of the business sector was dominated by the guardianship discourse where 
the negative imagery was in a controlling position.
The regulation critique of the private entrepreneurs clearly had two levels: 
the ideological and the political. The ideological discourse was about pointing 
out the weaknesses of the state-led economy in comparison to the free market 
economy. In this context, the discourse was easily elevated to the level of 
economic systems and economic and political power. Governmental control 
was equated straightforwardly with different forms of ‘collective economy’ 
or at least the vagueness of the line between them was pointed out: ‘forced 
economy’, ‘command economy’, ‘planned economy’ and even ‘socialism’ would 
15 Talouselämä 7–8/1940, Sotatalouden kulmakiviä, 67–68; Talouselämä 7–8/1940, von Fieandt, R., 
’Business as usual’; Talouselämä 21–22/1942, Valtion puuttuminen talouselämään…; Kauppalehti 13.1. 
1940, Taloudellinen rintama; see Pihkala, Erkki (1982) ’Sotatalous 1939–1944’. In Ahvenainen, Jorma, 
Pihkala, Erkki & Rasila, Viljo (eds): Suomen taloushistoria 2. Teollistuva Suomi. Kustannusosakeyhtiö 
Tammi: Helsinki; Teräs, Kari (2005) ’Luottamus ”valtiojohtoisessa markkinataloudessa” toisen 
maailmansodan aikana’. In Vihanto, Martti (ed.) Instituutiotaloustieteen nykyisiä suuntia. Turku: Turun 
korkeakoulujen yhteiskunnallis-taloudellinen tutkimusyhdistys r.y. Åbohögskolornas förening för social 
och ekonimisk forskning r.f, 143–144.
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be easily at hand if the state interfered too much in the economy. As a rhetorical 
effect of ideological critique, strong dichotomies were made, differences were 
exacerbated and the extremes were taken as far away from each other as 
possible. The market economy and free competition were always indisputable 
winners in the comparison of the two systems. 
The political critique of the state-led economy dealt with the content 
of the regulation decisions and first and foremost the extent of the control 
authorisations they gave to the authorities. The central issue was how much 
the control deviated from the customary business activity and to what extent 
the authorities could interfere with the operation of the markets. The discourse 
took up eagerly any discovered excesses in controlling: ‘the freedom of the 
entrepreneur is constrained too much’ was the most usual comment on almost 
every regulation decision.16 It was also customary to pronounce new control 
authorisations given to the Ministry of National Supply systematically as 
‘guardianship’, ‘meddling’ and ‘interference’ with which the freedom of private 
entrepreneurs was unnecessarily limited. From this it was a short transition 
to a discussion about the opposing economic systems: the transition from the 
political discussion to the ideological field happened in a moment whenever 
necessary. Individual control decisions were quickly interpreted as a long step 
towards a permanent state-led economic system.17 
The guardianship discourse looked for the conditions with which the private 
business life could feel confidence in the practises of the regulated economy. 
Confidence is about having trust in matters, institutions and organisations; 
people have the tendency to have confidence in, for example, the law, the 
police and the state, which were all formed over a long period of time as a 
result of human action and in which people have little direct influence on.18 
In the guardianship discourse, two main conditions for confidence came up. 
According to the first one, the control of the state should be extremely weak 
and it should not touch upon the deep structures of the economy. The leading 
16 Talous ja Koti 21–22/1941, ’Yrittäjän vapautta kahlitaan liiaksi’.
17 Kauppalehti 24.8.1940, Kehittyvä uusi organisaatio; Kauppalehti 26.5.1942, Liikemieskunnan 
suhtautuminen valtiojohtoisuuteen; Kauppalehti 27.11.1942, Valtion tehtävänä talouselämässä on olla 
ainoastaan ohjaavana osapuolena Kauppalehti 27.11.1942, Lauri Helenius: Valtion ohjaus on tarpeellinen; 
Kauppalehti 11.12.1942, Yrittäjien pakollisen järjestäytymisen ajatus).
18 See Luhmann, Niklas (1979) Trust and Power. New York: Wiley; Luhmann, Niklas (1988) ‘Familiarity, 
Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives’. In Gambetta, Diego (ed.) Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Seligman, Adam (2000) The Problem of Trust. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press; Nooteboom, Bart (2002): Trust. Forms, Foundations, Functions, Failures 
and Figures. Edward Elgar: Cheltenhamn; Nooteboom, Bart (2003) ‘Trust Process’. In Nooteboom, 
Bart – Frédérique Six (eds) The Trust Process in Organizations. Empirical Studies of the Determinants 
and the Process of Trust Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
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principle had to be that business should continue as much as possible in the 
same way as before even in exceptional circumstances: ‘Business as usual’.19 
The state with its own actions was not allowed to change the relations between 
competitors, and it had to be absolutely impartial towards all the businesses 
working in the same field.20 As a second condition for confidence, the demand 
of the regulated system being only temporary was presented repeatedly. The 
business life had to be able to have confidence that the control would stop as 
soon as the circumstances allowed it. If this was not a certainty, the fears about 
the destiny of private enterprise under the strain of the state’s guardianship 
would grow.21 These conditions connected in such a way that it was believed 
that it would be easy and quick to get rid of the limited control. 
The essential achievement of the discursive definition struggle was the 
concept of the ‘state-led market economy’ launched in 1942 by a production 
committee set up by the government. The business life could build their 
defences upon the concept. The definition united two concepts in a way 
where the market economy was primary and the state’s part was limited to 
a directional role. According to the production committee which had done 
economical planning for the coming years, the state-led market economy was 
based on the peasant economy, co-operative operations, private enterprise 
and the state’s own business activities and economic policy.22 The state-led 
market economy was interpreted in the guardianship discourse to exclude 
the actual planned economy, not to mention the other forms of collective 
economy. Nevertheless, the interference of the state should be more planned 
and centred than before.23 The content of both parts of the concepts and their 
interrelation was actively discussed in public. The representatives of the private 
economy had an absolute and uncompromising opinion about the order of 
19 Talouselämä 7–8/1940, von Fieandt, Rainer, ’Business as usual’; Talouselämä 41/1940, Valtiojohtoinen 
talouselämä, 443–444.
20 Lehtinen, Artturi (1945) ’Sodanaikaisen ulkomaankaupan säännöstely, kaupan kehitys, rahoitus ja 
merikuljetukset’. In Untamo Utrio (ed.) Viisi vuotta kansanhuoltoa. Helsinki: Kansanhuoltoministeriö, 
178–179; Lehtinen, Artturi (1967) ’Sotatalous 1939–1945’. In Itsenäisen Suomen taloushistoriaa 1919–
1950. Historian Aitta XVII. Porvoo: WSOY, 214; Teräs 2005, 155–156.
21 Kauppalehti 19.6.1942, Keskustelua talousjärjestelmästä.
22 Kom. 1942: Mon. 5: II, 10–14; Talouselämä 17–18/1943, Bruno Suviranta, Sodanjälkeisen talouspolitiikan 
suuntaviivoja meillä ja muualla, 303–310; Teräs 2005,143–148; Teräs, Kari (2008) ’Kilpailu, yhteistyö ja 
luottamus elinkeinoelämän puhunnassa sota- ja säännöstelytalouden aikana 1939–1949’. In Keskinen, 
Jarkko & Teräs, Kari (eds) Luottamus, sosiaalinen pääoma ja historia. Historia mirabilis 5. Turku: Turun 
Historiallisen Yhdistyksen referee-sarja, 271–272; Teräs, Kari (2009) Yritys ja yhteiskunta. Heikki 
Huhtamäen verkosto- ja sidosryhmäsuhteet. Historiallisia Tutkimuksia 246. Helsinki: Suomalaisen 
Kirjallisuuden Seura, 159–161.
23 Kauppalehti 14.8.1942, Valtiojohtoinen markkinatalous.
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importance of the concepts: ‘Whenever the possible options are freedom and 
regulation, the aforementioned should be preferred.’24 However, the line the 
production committee took for the market economy and its strict critique 
on the regulation system seemed to have reinforced the confidence private 
enterprise had in the future.25 
In the guardianship discourse of the private business sector, the economic 
control of the state and bureaucracy were continuously presented almost as 
synonyms. In this, they supported the wide lack of confidence and discontent 
citizens had towards national rationing.26 Free competition was described in the 
guardianship discourse as automatic by nature, and therefore it did not need to 
be burdened by expensive and heavy administrative machinery, instead it could 
direct economical resources efficiently by itself. This was used as an argument 
supporting the view that the more competition was limited and repressed in 
the controlled circumstances, the stronger the bureaucracy’s tendency was to 
gain ground. These two enemies were portrayed to be constantly struggling 
for living space as with the rules of the zero-sum game. 
The flexibility of private enterprise was methodically presented as the 
opposite of the rigid bureaucracy of the state; the definition struggle went on 
through strong dichotomies. The state-led economy was clear ‘paper economy’, 
‘bureau economy’ or ’paper command’ which was painfully rigid, inflexible 
and slow: matters which required quick decisions spent impermissibly long 
times in different administrative offices.27 The nature of the bureaucratic 
‘command economy’ was to repress ‘healthy economical development’ because 
in practise it paralysed and impeded business activities. Bureaucracy hindered 
creativity and initiative and could not take the entrepreneurs wishes into 
consideration.28 Private entrepreneurs portrayed the public administration 
as a parasitic structure which took great costs to maintain while remaining 
24 Kauppalehti 4.4.1940, Monopoli-ilmiöt kansantaloudessa.
25 Kauppalehti 14.8.1942, Valtiojohtoinen markkinatalous; Kauppalehti 18.8.1942, Maamme vastaisen 
kauppapolitiikan suuntaviivoja; Kauppalehti 31.8.1942, Kansantalouden ’rationalisoiminen’; Kauppalehti 
4.9.1942, Valtionjohtoisuus iskusanana; Teräs 2005, 147–148.
26 Toivonen, Onni (1950) Kymmenen vuotta kansanhuoltajana. Muistelmia. Turku: WSOY, 204–205, 225–
241; Salonen, Seppo Heikki (2005) Puotipuksusta suureksi toveriksi. Onni Toivosen elämä. Helsinki: 
Edita, 134–142; Seppinen, Ilkka (1996) Ahdinkoajan varalle. Taloudellinen puolustusneuvosto ja 
puolustustaloudellinen suunnittelukunta huoltovarmuuden kehittäjänä 1929–1955–1995. Helsinki: Oy 
Edita Ab; Rantatupa, Heikki (2004) ’Kansanhuolto toisen maailmansodan aikana 1939–1949’. In 
Peltonen, Matti (ed.): Suomen maatalouden historia II. Kasvun ja kriisien aika 1870-luvulta 1950-luvulle. 
Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura.
27 Yksityisyrittäjä 1/1942, Liikemaailman kokemukset viranomaisista, 1; Yksityisyrittäjä 3/1943, Mitä on 
virastokankeus?, 16; Kauppalehti 8.6.1946, Arvi Raikkala, Milloin päästään säännöstelyn rysästä?
28 Kauppalehti 11.12.1942, Yrittäjien pakollisen järjestäytymisen ajatus.
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inefficient. Economic bureaucracy was described as an unnatural and 
artificial structure. The authorities were characterised as arrogant and the 
administrative procedures ‘with perpetual meetings’ were stigmatised as a 
completely unnecessary waste of time.29
In the critique directed at bureaucracy, it was emphasised that the officials 
were ‘theoretical’, book-learners, impractical and had a lack of expertise in the 
field of business. The extensive control authorisations that were granted for the 
supply authorities included, therefore, noteworthy risks since ’the government’s 
expertise often completely lacks expertise’.30 The representatives of the private 
entrepreneurs thought that the regulations drawn up by ‘masters unfamiliar 
with the issues’ were foreign to real life.31 As an opposite, the guardianship 
discourse took up ‘practical men’ who had long-term experience and knowledge 
about the operational mechanisms of the economy and knew the everyday 
realism of business. If they were leaned on, the economy would work efficiently 
and smoothly without any unnecessary administrative complications. 
The impartiality of the government was disputed time after time in the 
guardianship discourse of the private entrepreneurs by referring especially 
to the favourable treatment of the co-operative movement in taxation in 
comparison to other forms of enterprise: ‘The truth is – I am sorry to say – 
that the relationship of trust between the state and the economy that naturally 
should be the beginning and the end of everything has been severely shaken 
by partial actions.’32 The authorities had to earn the trust of private enterprise 
with actions that would remove the special privileges so that all forms of 
enterprise would be placed on the same level. If the government gave up on the 
principle of equality, it caused conflicts between different forms of enterprise 
and deteriorated the operational capacity of the whole nation. 
29 Kauppalehti 4.1.1945, ’Hän on neuvottelussa…’ .
30 Talous ja Koti 21–22/1941,’Yrittäjän vapautta kahlitaan liiaksi’ ; Kauppalehti 22.7.1942, Talouselämän 
byrokratisoiminen (pk); Yksityisyrittäjä 8/1946, Valtiovallan asiantuntemus usein täydellistä 
asiantuntemattomuutta, 4.
31 Talous ja Koti 21–22/1941, ’Yrittäjän vapautta kahlitaan liiaksi’.
32 Yksityisyrittäjä 6/1940, Uusi tie, 1; Henttinen, Annastiina (1999): Kolmannen tien etsijät. Kuisma, Markku, 
Henttinen, Annastiina, Karhu, Sami & Pohls, Maritta: Kansantalous. Pellervo ja yhteisen yrittämisen idea 
1899–1999. Pellervo-Seura ry. Kirjayhtymä Oy: Helsinki, 151–156.
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Co-operation discourse 
The notions and practical demands of the state-led economy made it necessary 
to emphasise the co-operation of entrepreneurs alongside competition – and 
partially at the expense of it. In the discourse of the business sector a clear 
transformation happened especially through the emphasis on co-operation: in 
the exceptional circumstances it was not enough only to emphasise the values 
and institutions of the market economy.33 The co-operation discourse which 
had achieved quite a dominant role during the war time brought new tones to 
the discussion of both the market-driven economy and the state-led economy. 
According to the co-operation discourse, the co-operation with the 
government would not go smoothly if the businesses could not agree on 
common rules within their lines of business, trust each other and present 
themselves in a united manner to the government. Consequently, it would 
be impossible for the state to direct the business sector if it did not have on 
its side the powerful organisations of the business sector that would take 
responsibility for their own lines of business.34 Without the confidence and co-
operation between these parties, it was believed that the whole control system 
would be driven into a dead end. It was thought to be self-evident that ‘the 
government needs the support and backing of the business organisations’ to 
direct business and make it more efficient.35 The representatives of the private 
business sector often presented harsh critique on how the government did 
not lean enough on the support and expertise of the business organisations 
when making economic decisions. 
In the co-operation discourse, strong appeals were made for economic 
organising because co-operation with the authorities could only be efficient 
through organisations: ‘Without a strong organisational activity, free business 
and with it our whole economy would be like a ship adrift in a storm.’36 
Individuals or individual businesses were not credible actors in the regulated 
economy, the wheels of which were bureaucratic even out of necessity. When 
the authorities were in contact with the business organisations, the lack of trust 
between competitors could be reduced. The growth of ‘the political markets’, 
33 Fairclough 1992, 35–36; Jokinen, Arja – Juhila, Kirsi (2004) ’Valtasuhteiden analysoiminen’. In Jokinen, 
Arja & Juhila, Kirsi & Suoninen, Eero Diskurssianalyysin aakkoset. Third Edition. Tampere: Vastapaino, 
101–105.
34 Kauppalehti 23.10.1940, Järjestöpakko; Yksityisyrittäjä 6/1940, Kansanhuoltoministeriö ja liike-elämä. 
Ministeri V.A. Kotilaisen esitelmä, 4–6, 20; Yksityisyrittäjä 6/1940, Järjestöpakko saa kannatusta, 14–15.
35 Yksityisyrittäjä 8/1943, Paavo Aarnio, Näkökohtia elinkeinoelämän järjestötoiminnasta, 21–25.
36 Yksityisyrittäjä 5/1946, Talouselämä nuorallatanssijaksiko…?, 2.
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which were characteristic for the controlled economy, raised suspicion on the 
impartial treatment of businesses. There were exceptionally good chances 
to improve the trust of the competitors, which in general was low, during 
the controlled period since the government restricted competition and 
determinedly removed hindrances of co-operation.37 
The organisational activity was pronounced as ‘the symbol of our time’ 
and as the duty of the private entrepreneurs who traditionally emphasised 
individuality. During the war time, it was felt to be important to point out that 
‘private enterprise is by no means the enemy of co-operation, rather it actually 
requires just that and finds right and suitable forms for all co-operation’.38 
The democratic state system and ‘the social balance’ were seen to necessitate 
the proper organisation of all interest groups.39 According to the co-operation 
discourse, the economic organisations were first and foremost actors of the 
national economy that also taught their members to ‘adjust to the interests of 
the whole society, following the rule that common interest has to always be 
placed before the interest of the individual’.40 Because businessmen needed 
both the protection of the law and the limitations it set in their businesses, ‘the 
state and the society have to always have the right to trust the impeccability of 
the business community’. The ones who betrayed the trust deserved a severe 
moral judgement. According to the co-operation discourse, a central mission 
of ‘the organisations of the business community’ was to promote and oversee 
that good business moral was followed.41 
In individual speeches, they were not timid to admit that some ‘ruthless, 
immoral predators’ had gained a hold in the business community and the 
organised businessmen should clearly separate themselves from these people.42 
According to the co-operation discourse, the future of business life depended 
on ‘how the moral of the business community could bear the hardships in the 
time of crisis’. If the business life lost the trust of the rest of the society during 
exceptional times, it would be difficult to gain it back. It was perceived to be 
37 Compare, Casson, Mark (1997) Information and Organization. A New Perspective on the Theory of the 
Firm. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Nooteboom 2002, 76–77.
38 Talous ja Koti 3/1944, Yksityisyritteliäisyydestä sanottua 10 vuoden ajalta.
39 Talous ja Koti 16/1943, Keskiluokka, valtio ja järjestäytyminen.
40 Talouselämä 7–8/1942, Askel ’suunnitelmataloutta’ kohden, 81–82. 
41 Kauppalehti 12.9.1940, Liikemoraali; Kauppalehti 4.9.1940, Taloudelliset järjestöt; Kauppalehti 28.11.1941, 
Yksityisen yrittäjätoiminnan tulevaisuus.
42 Yksityisyrittäjä 9/1943, Nimensä häpäisijät, 1.
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a problem that opportunistic behaviour, ‘self-interest seeking’43, in relation to 
the official and unofficial rules of the exceptional times, could spread quickly 
through example, in which case it would develop from individual cases to a 
social problem:
Precisely that danger of spreading should already be paid attention to. 
it is so that if an industrial establishment or a shop breaks or works 
around the law and in that way can temporarily earn more than its 
competitor, this competitor is tempted to succumb to the same kind of 
dishonesty which means that an individual case starts to form into a 
common habit which breaks the whole foundation of business. 
  (Kauppalehti 6.2.1941, Säännöstelymääräysten rikkomukset.)
During the war time, serving the society and promoting the common good 
became a guiding star of business according to the co-operation discourse, 
although it was not considered to be in complete conflict with seeking 
personal gain. Charity which expanded during the war time, especially the 
great donations from the industrialists for public utilities which gained a lot 
of attention publically, and the expansion of welfare work of factories was 
interpreted as an indication that private businesses could fulfil their social 
responsibilities. They were considered to prove ‘how wrong the argument was 
of private enterprise being selfish and unsocial’. At the same time they were 
interpreted in the co-operation discourse as a proof that private entrepreneurs 
had taken on ‘solidarity’ and their businesses were invigorated by ‘a social 
mind’.44
The co-operative nature of the Finnish business sector, which was 
interpreted as ‘natural’, was given a clear and topical substance: the better 
the co-operation inside the business sector worked, the bigger role the trade 
associations could get in executing the control and the better they could defend 
the mechanisms of the free market economy. The central message of the co-
operation discourse was that the organisations should have self-regulation on 
an area of ‘economic autonomy’ as wide as possible, and on this the directional 
activity of the government could build upon.45 The business sector wanted 
to manage as much of the tasks of the regulated economy as possible among 
43 Williamson, Oliver E. (1989): Transaction costs economics. In R.L. Schmalensee & R.D. Willing (eds): 
Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume I. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 139.
44 Kauppalehti 28.11.1941, Yksityisen yrittäjätoiminnan tulevaisuus; Talous ja Koti 2/1944, Sosiaalinen mieli 
ja yksityisyritteliäisyys; Teräs 2009, 245–248, 286–301.
45 Talouselämä 33–34/1940, Tuonnin ja sen valvonnan keskittäminen, 353–354.
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themselves without interference from the government. The aim was to present 
the autonomy as an arrangement supporting the control, not unsettling it. 
It was difficult for the business organisations to claim an authoritative 
position in the regulated economy if they could not achieve ‘discipline’ in their 
own field. When the voluntary means to enhance organising did not seem to 
produce good enough results, mandatory organisations became an option 
worthy of consideration.46 Discussion about mandatory organisations can be 
taken as a held out hand towards the government: its purpose was to inspire 
confidence in the authorities regarding the desire and ability of the economic 
organisations to operate in the conditions of the controlled economy and to 
support its goals. Mandatory organisations were considered to elevate the 
social significance of economic organisations and to put an end to the doubts 
about their ability to represent their own fields of business. In multiple texts, 
there were approving references to the German model where the mandatory 
business organisation and the wholesome effect of ‘private initiative’ had been 
able to unite in a successful manner.47
Mandatory organisations were much discussed during the war time and it 
had a lot of support from the economic organisations out of principle. At the 
end of the year, 1941, Walter Rydman announced that he supported the idea 
because it would reinforce the ‘social way of thinking’ among entrepreneurs. 
Also, the free rider problem came up in the arguments. The professional 
organisations had obtained such benefits to all businesses that also the 
businesses which were not a part of an organisation could enjoy them.48 In 
the public discussion, there were many opinions, according to which it was 
only through mandatory organising the trade associations that co-operation 
partners, challengers or even substitutes could become worthy of consideration 
for the control machinery of the state. A complete organisation would enhance 
the ability of the organisations to act as ‘an economic executive organ’ which 
could also be granted official authorisations. A mandatory organisation would 
46 Kauppalehti 23.10.1940, Järjestöpakko.
47 Talouselämä 41/1940, O.W. Louhivuori, Valtiojohtoisuus Italian ja Saksan taloudessa, 445–452; 
Kauppalehti 14.12.1940, Terve kilpailu sälytettävä; Kauppalehti 7.1.1942, Onko riippumattomalla yrittäjällä 
tulevaisuutta?; Kauppalehti 10.2.1942, Siirtyminen sotatalouteen tapahtui hankauksitta Saksassa; see 
Faber, Jasper (2000) ‘Trade Associations in Dutch Fruit-processing Industry 1910–1970’. In Kuijlaars, 
Anne-Marie, Prudon, Kim & Visser, Joop (eds) Entrepreuners, Politics and Networks in a Historical 
Perspective. Proceedings of the Third European Business History Association (EBHA) Conference 
‘Business and Society’, September 24–26, 1999, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Rotterdam : Centre of 
Business History, 317–318.
48 Kauppalehti 28.11.1941, Elinkeinoelämän järjestöjen merkitys kasvanut poikkeuksellisissa oloissa; 
Kauppalehti 4.9.1940, Taloudelliset järjestöt; Kauppalehti 18.2.1943, Järjestöpakko. Teräs 2005, 158–
159; Teräs 2008, 282–283.
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guarantee such an airtight organisational discipline that all the entrepreneurs 
would have to follow the control commands and operate in a way which is 
predictable and inspires trust.49 
However, the mandatory nature of organisations badly suited the private 
business sector which defended freedom fiercely. Mandatory organisations 
also raised the question of a state representation in the governing bodies of 
the trade associations.50 The possible loss of the ‘autonomy’ which might occur 
through representatives of the state was in the end too much for the private 
business sector, and at the same time there were fears that through mandatory 
organising, the organisations would allow certain undesirable people to join 
them with a ‘spirit which opposed’ their intentions.51 In the end, Finland did 
not take the path of mandatory organisations, although attempts were made 
to solve the problem on a voluntary basis. Although complete organisation 
remained a fantasy, the business organisations of many fields strengthened 
considerably during the years of war.52
The entrepreneurs had to be able to unite the demands set by ‘social 
solidarity’ and ‘private initiative’ as a harmonic unity in their businesses. New 
concepts were also created in the co-operation discourse with which these two 
starting points were attempted to meet, and with which the entrepreneurs 
wanted to prove that their contemplation had changed to become more 
responsible than before. Alongside individual freedom, it was discussed that 
the entrepreneurs could only keep their freedom in exceptional circumstances 
in the form of the ‘group freedom’ and ‘collective freedom’ provided by the 
organisations. In the organisations, private entrepreneurs were safe because 
the organisations could unite their interest to the common interest of the society 
and actualise the aspirations of the controlled economy. In the organisations, 
the hope was that the entrepreneurs would learn to think about economic 
issues as a more extensive phenomenon than just business economics.53 
49 Yksityisyrittäjä 2/1943, R. Teerisuo, Järjestötoiminnan uudistaminen, 2–5; Kauppalehti 11.12.1942 
Yrittäjien pakollisen järjestäytymisen ajatus.
50 Yksityisyrittäjä 8/1943, Paavo Aarnio, Näkökohtia elinkeinoelämän järjestötoiminnasta, 21–25; sama, 
Usko Koski, Järjestöpakkokysymyksestä, 25–28.
51 Yksityisyrittäjä 6/1943, Järjestötutkimus, 2–6.
52 Teräs 2008, 282–283; Teräs 2009, 218–244.
53 Kauppalehti 17.4.1942, Ammatillinen järjestäytyminen nykyoloissa; Yksityisyrittäjä 11/1942, 
Yksityisyritteliäisyyden viikko, 2–10; Toivonen 1950, 86.
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Deregulation discourse
The economy also had to be controlled in Finland after the war had ended. 
Even then it could not be precisely predicted how long and how extensive the 
controls would continue. However, the regulations were curtailed little by little 
as the economic and productive conditions were met. This need for control by 
the state was kept up especially due to the difficulties of getting enough raw 
materials, modern technology and consumables that the citizens badly needed 
in the country because of the currency shortage. Rebuilding the country, 
settling the Karelian people and war reparations were enormous national 
projects which demanded the public direction of economical resources.54 
The organs of the business sector emphasised that making production more 
effective and improving the citizen’s standard of living could only succeed 
through private enterprise. Entrepreneurs were described as servants of 
the whole country and securing the requirements of entrepreneurship was 
defined as a mission of the whole nation. As an issue of utmost importance 
it was questioned how freely and unrestrainedly private enterprise was 
allowed to carry out this national mission. Consequently, it demanded that 
the bureaucracy and the control of the state which hindered business should 
be drastically reduced.55
The discussion about economic regulation had new tones after the peace 
had been established and the justifications for the mandatory nature of the 
system were no longer as strong as in the war time. It was considered to 
have lost some of its legitimacy and its ‘psychological foundation’ in the 
new situation. This can be seen in a deregulation discourse, in which it was 
demanded that the economic regulation would be abandoned as completely as 
possible, started to dominate the texts of the private business sector after the 
wars. The core content of the deregulation discourse was to create justifications 
for the radical decreasing of the economic control of the state and to clear the 
path for the return to the peacetime economy. The discussion was about the 
kind of role private enterprise and a free market economy would have in the 
time after economic control. 
54 See Karonen, Petri (2006) ’Johdanto – Kun rauha tuo omat ongelmansa’. In Petri, Karonen & Kerttu 
Tarjamo (eds) Kun sota on ohi. Sodasta selviytymisen ongelmia ja niiden ratkaisumalleja 1900-luvulla. 
Historiallinen Arkisto 124. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 9–20.
55 Kauppalehti 29.6.1946, Yrittämisen vapauden puolesta; Kauppalehti 16.11.1946, Yrittäjät maan 
palvelijoina; Kauppalehti 23.11.1946, Usko Koski, Tuotannon tehostaminen ja elintason kohottaminen 
onnistuu vain vapaan yritteliäisyyden avulla.
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Deregulation was one of the most central discussion topics of the time. 
The representatives of the business sector demanded quick action on the 
one hand and serious consideration in executing the deregulation on the 
other. According to the deregulation discourse, the economic control could 
not, in practice, be abandoned at once but it had to be done ‘carefully and 
systematically’ in order to be able to ensure economic stability.56 In the texts 
of the business sector, it was continuously emphasised that the deregulation 
should be executed methodically, logically, gradually and at the right time 
instead of making random decisions.57 
The deregulation discourse built upon strong threats after the war. The 
private business sector still perceived the future as unsure and full of risks. 
This can be seen in the fact that socialism and the ‘socialisation’ of economic 
life rose strongly to the public debate after the political change following the 
war. The representatives of the private business sector continually warned 
that the left aspired to leave the economic control as a ‘permanent system’.58 
It was a rhetorical tool of the representatives of the business sector to connect 
unpopular rationing and socialism systematically together. Although they were 
not actually claimed to be the same, the kinship of these ‘systems’ was brought 
up straightforwardly. The socialised command society was described with 
pleasure with the terms of the regulated economy and the threat of it was 
portrayed to be acute.59 The slow pace of deregulation was interpreted as 
compelling evidence of the fact that the left was actually preparing for socialism 
and attempted to use the control system as a stepping stone. 
The private sector of the economy was even more worried about the freedom 
of the Finnish society when the country’s government set up in February 1946 
a so-called socialising committee which was assigned to study and plan ‘the 
possibility of the society taking possession’ of suitable fields of business or 
‘to increase the social influence on the economy’ in some other form. The 
general goal of the committee was to find the means to make the economy 
more methodical. The composition of the committee mainly followed the 
parliamentary power relations and there was a noticeable representation of the 
private business sector in its right-wing members. The work of the committee, 
56 Kauppalehti 17.11.1947, Säännöstelyn purkaminen.
57 Kauppalehti 25.1.1946, Kauppias, Vahingoksi osoittautunut säännöstely; Kauppalehti 30.6.1947, 
Säännöstelyn purkaminen; Talouselämä 47/1947, Säännöstelyn kriisi, 821–822; Talouselämä 17/1947, 
Enemmän johdonmukaisuutta, 281–282.
58 Kauppalehti 10.1.1946, Keskitettyyn suunnitelmatalouteenko?; Talous ja Koti 4A/1947, Yrittäjävapauden 
puolesta ja säännöstelyn purkamisen toivossa.
59 Yksityisyrittäjä 14/1946, Mihin suuntaan?, 2
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which made extensive reports and research, was quarrelsome and proceeded 
slowly.60 In the organs of the business sector, the ‘socialisation pursuits’ of the 
committee were perceived to be evidence that ‘our left’ aims for dictatorship 
and to set a monopoly of the state instead of competition.61 The work of the 
committee dried up in the late 1940s because of the change in the political 
power relations, and its practical results were weak, mainly remaining at the 
level of research and suggestions. The fact that the committee’s work came 
to an end with no results was described in the business sector as ‘the end of 
a farce’ which proved that private enterprise had taken down the collective 
forms of the economy.62
The earlier started critique of ‘bureaucratic pursuits’ was continued in the 
deregulation discourse and it was pronounced that the ‘Finnish nation has had 
enough of trivial bureaucracy’. Deregulation was metaphorically presented as 
a removal of ‘a malignant tumour’ which sucks ‘our nation’s life force’ after 
which the economy would recover quickly and the ‘circulation of the economy’ 
would start to work again.63 The necessity of the deregulation was further 
underlined by speaking openly about the degeneracy of the rationing system: 
its expensiveness, inefficiency and corrupted practices.64 During the war time, 
these crisis phenomena were left more or less to the background in the spirit 
of national consensus and apparently also in the fear of censorship.65 
After the peace was reinstated, free competition started to present 
itself as a topical option which should quickly take over from ‘the system 
of administrative authority’. The superiority of competition was explained 
basically with the same ideological arguments as before but the interest of 
the consumers were emphasised more strongly after the wars: ‘The whole 
purpose of free competition is to meet the different needs of consumers and 
60 See Paavonen, Tapani (1987) Talouspolitiikka ja työmarkkinakehitys Suomessa toisen maailmansodan 
jälkeisellä jälleenrakennuskaudella vuosina 1944–1950. Turun yliopiston julkaisuja/Annales Universitatis 
Turkuensis. Sarja C – osa 64. Turku: Turun yliopisto, 209–269; Paavonen, Tapani (2006) ’Taloudellinen 
kehitys ja talouspolitiikka hyvinvointivaltion kaudella’. In Paavonen, Tapani & Kangas, Olli, Eduskunta 
hyvinvointivaltion rakentajana. Suomen eduskunta 100 vuotta, Vol. 8. Helsinki: Edita, 36–37; Teräs 
2009, 383–386.
61 Kauppalehti 8.2.1946, Sosialisoimiskomitea; Kauppalehti 18.2.1946, Sosialisoimiskomitea; Kauppalehti 
31.8.1946, Vapaa talousjärjestelmä vai sosialismi?; Kauppalehti 16.9.1946, Sosialisoimishankkeet ja 
julkisuus; Kauppalehti 8.5.1947 Sosialisoimispuuhat.
62 Kauppalehti 19.12.1949, Erään farssin loppu. 
63 Kauppalehti 2.5.1949, Byrokratia; Kauppalehti 22.11.1947, Turhasta säännöstelystä päästävä kiireimmiten.
64 Talouselämä 47/1947, Säännöstelyn kriisi; Talouselämä 37/1947, Olavi Salas, Säännöstelyn kustannukset, 
604–605,; Talouselämä 38/1947, Olavi Salas, Säännöstelyjärjestelmämme epäkohtia, 625–626.
65 See Vilkuna, Kustaa (1962) Sanan valvontaa. Sensuuri 1939–44. Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 
102–104.
207
PRiVATE ENTREPRENEURsHiP AND THE sTATE
therefore the freedom and power of the consumer is most complete when 
free enterprise prevails’.66 Because the regulated system had failed to satisfy 
the needs of the consumers, there was some pent-up pressure to consume.67 
The competition was described to be a kind of barrel of consumers’ hopes 
which would remove the deficiency and misery that was distinctive to the 
regulated economy. 
The deregulation discourse aimed to create a comprehensive option for the 
control of the state: ‘We have to expedite the development which leads us back 
to the competitive economy.’68 With the concept of the competitive economy, 
the impression of the systemic change needed to be emphasised, which is why 
it was not enough to dismantle the control partially. Through a competitive 
economy, themes which had been left to the background during the supply 
control came up in discussions; themes such as advertising, marketing and 
selling which described the revived competition of customers. New American 
teachings of business management were taken on quickly in the economic press 
at the end of the 1940s.69 The Finnish business sector had to prepare itself for 
a challenge of an even larger scale: the freedom of international competition. 
For that, the domestic production costs had to be methodically reduced.70 
As the status of competition strengthened as the foundation of the 
economy, the problems related to it started to gain some attention again.71 
In the deregulation discourse, the significance of ‘healthy competition’ was 
emphasised. The definition referred to both fair and socially responsible 
business: 
The mission of competition is to keep business vivacious and reasonable 
of its costs in order for it to serve the society as efficiently as possible. For 
the same reason, competition has to follow healthy methods. 
(Kauppalehti 24.11.1949, Kilpailun tehtävä)
66 Talous ja Koti 11/1946, Yrittäjävapaus –kuluttajan vapaus; Talous ja Koti 7A/1947, Vapaa kilpailu on 
myös kuluttajan vapauden perusta ja pohja; Talouselämä 47/1947 Säännöstelyn kriisi, 821–822.
67 Talous ja Koti 6/1947, Täyttyvätkö kuluttajain toiveet viimeinkin?; Yksityisyrittäjä 14/1946, Vapaa 
kilpailu takaa hyvän asiakaspalvelun, 30; Yksityisyrittäjä 16/1946, Kilpailuko tarpeeton rasitus 
talouselämälle?, 25; Kauppalehti 25.1.1946, Kauppias, Vahingoksi osoittautunut säännöstely.
68 Kauppalehti 10.1.1946, Keskitettyyn suunnitelmatalouteenko?
69 Teräs 2008, 288–289; Teräs 2009, 348.
70 Kauppalehti 18.6.1948, Säännöstelyn purkaminen; Kauppalehti 24.8.1948, Kilpailutalouteen!.
71 Kallioinen, Mika (2010) ’Kilpailun kieli – Suomalaiset kartellit sotien välisenä aikana. In Ojala, Jari, 
Eloranta, Jari & Roiko-Jokela, Heikki (eds) Monelta kantilta. Ilkka Nummelalle omistettu juhlakirja. 
Jyväskylän yliopisto. Jyväskylä: Historian ja etnologian laitos, 73–76, 79–82.
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Even competition between business companies could be stigmatised as 
unhealthy and harmful in the spirit of the regulated economy. The business 
sector was ready to admit that even the economic sector itself was often guilty 
of reducing competition by ‘creating different organisations and endorsing 
various agreements that control business’ and that there were deceitful 
competition methods. At the same time it was repeatedly reminded that this 
type of unhealthy phenomena spring up most often when the public authorities 
oversee the economy.72 
With competition they needed to also get rid of ‘the false sense of security’ 
that the uneconomic methods typical to the economic control had produced 
and that were emotionally very difficult to give up: the love of comfort often 
gained victory over business creativity and initiative.73 The entrepreneurs 
themselves had to shake off the bureaucratic methods from their businesses 
and replace them with a spirit of service and competition. 
The deregulation discourse started to produce a reality of its kind in the 
late 1940s. The economic control was reduced gradually and eventually the 
Ministry of Supply could be buried in 1949. The economic control of the state 
continued in many sectors of the economy, especially in foreign trade but the 
competitive economy had overcome its biggest threats. After a long period of 
co-operation, it was time to start to get used to the tough laws of competition 
which had been so beautifully and highly praised for about ten years. During 
the regulated economy, the extended and deepened co-operation had created a 
strong trust both inside the business sector and in the communication between 
it and the authorities – this tradition was aspired to remain as a resource of 
the Finnish economy also in the conditions of the competitive economy.
Conclusion
During the war economy and regulated economy, there was a strong discursive 
power struggle about the status of private enterprise in the state-led economy. 
The representatives of the business sector actively took part in this definition 
struggle: they had plenty of publicity and quite extensive support for their 
message, especially during the Weeks of Private Enterprise. The texts of the 
representatives of the private business sector were stigmatised by a clear 
duality: on the one hand they supported the exceptional arrangements out 
72 Kauppalehti 18.6.1948, Säännöstelyn purkaminen; Kauppalehti 8.2.1949, Talouspoliittinen komitea.
73 Kauppalehti 16.10.1947, Säännöstelyn purkaminen.
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of compulsion, and on the other hand they presented a harsh critique of the 
governmental intervention which had been taken too far. Although in the 
discourse of the business sector there was a clear juxtaposition between the 
government and ‘the free economy’, it has to be remembered that Finland’s 
economic and financial policy was formed by unyielding supporters of 
economic liberalism.74 
In this article, four tightly connected discourses, which were in continuous 
motion, have been distinguished from the texts of the private business sector. 
In the institutional entrepreneurship discourse, the general significance of 
private enterprise and the free market economy in the society was defined 
and described. The mechanisms of the market economy were presented 
in the entrepreneurship discourse of the business sector in a hegemonic 
way: they were natural, universal, self-evident and without option.75 In the 
discourse, private enterprise was described both as a natural characteristic 
of an individual and as a crucial part of the Finnish national character. Other 
modes of speaking were built upon entrepreneurship discourse, which were 
supported and modified according to the requirements of the topical social 
context.
The guardianship discourse was, by its nature, defensive and openly 
challenging, and it presented the ideological and political critique of a state-
led economy with strong and emotional metaphors. The discourse strongly 
built upon the unpopularity of the rationing system among the citizens. The 
business sector created strong dichotomies in publicity between the rigid and 
slow ‘bureau economy’ and the flexible and creative market economy. The 
guardianship discourse created and reinforced the fears that the economic 
control of the state would inevitably lead to ‘a command economy’ if it 
goes too far or if it limits too much the private initiative or the freedom of 
entrepreneurship. According to it, the economic control of the state should be 
as limited and temporary as possible, if anything as light as a feather. 
The context of the war economy and regulated economy also caused changes 
and variations in the discourse of the business sector: pure economic liberalism 
badly suited the sentiment of the time. Intense co-operation was needed both 
between the entrepreneurs and the government and between competing 
entrepreneurs themselves. The central message of the co-operation discourse 
which strengthened during the war was that the business organisations should 
have self-regulation on an area of ‘economical autonomy’ as wide as possible. 
74 See Teräs 2005, 143–148.
75 Jokinen & Juhila 2004, 80–82, 89–90 
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In the co-operation discourse, it was argued that the organised entrepreneurs 
were ready to serve the society and work in a morally sustainable way instead 
of purely seeking self-interest. According to the co-operation discourse, the 
economic organisations benefited both the entrepreneurs and the whole of 
society.
The discussion after the war was controlled by the deregulation discourse 
which was also built upon strong threat scenarios, the central content of 
which was to create the justifications for the intensive economic reduction of 
state regulations. According to this discourse, it was necessary to remove the 
economic control as soon as possible, albeit in a planned manner in order to 
not weaken the competitiveness of the Finnish business sector and to allow 
the country’s economy to stand on a solid base. In the deregulation discourse, 
the concept of a ‘competitive economy’ was portrayed to be an option for the 
regulated economy: the free market economy had to be liberated from all 
its constraints and free competition should get back the directing role that 
belongs to it. 
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KnowledGe And sKills As  
nATionAl cAPiTAl
industrial modernization, nationalism and  
the failure of Asea-strömberg 1962–641
jUHANA AUNESLUOMA
An onslaught on independence
In December 1962, Finnish newspapers were flooded with reports of 
outrageous assault on the country’s independence. Unlike in days past, the 
threat did not originate from the east. This time it came from the west. An 
object of national pride, as well as industrial and technological prowess, Oy 
Strömberg Ab was about to be plundered by the Swedes.
‘On our day of independence it is justified to pay attention to a danger 
that according to the information received in the past few days threatens 
the independence of the Finnish electrical industry’, ran the opening lines 
of an editorial in Uusi Suomi, a conservative daily newspaper, on Finland’s 
independence day, 6 December 1962.2 Martti Paavola, a professor in electro-
technology at the Helsinki University of Technology, was even more dramatic: 
‘Strömberg is a great achievement created in 70 years by our electrical engineers 
together with workers, a national symbol that one now wants to lead into 
foreign hands’. This industrial and technological treasure was about to fall 
under ‘dangerous foreign influence’, which was a ‘reckless and unpatriotic deed 
resulting in a national disaster’. The company’s shareholders had no right to 
sell what Paavola saw as ‘these professional men’s intellectual capital’.3 Should 
this happen, seconded another eminence in the Finnish industry, it would be 
1 The author wishes to thank Mr John Welsh for his assistance in checking the language of the article.
2 Uusi Suomi 6.12.1962.
3 Professor Paavola’s comments were reported in Uusi Kuvalehti on 14.12.1962 by the well-known political 
zealot and a latter day Fennoman Ilmari Turja, but also in other media and in the Swedish ambassador 
Gösta Engzell’s letter to Utrikesdepartementet (UD) in Stockholm on 15.12.1962. Utrikesdepartementets 
Arkiv (UDA), Stockholm, H 114 Af, Diplomatiska framställningar, underhandlingar och avtal rörande 
handel och sjöfart, Finland maj 1962 – december 1964, Vol 11.
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comparable to the treacherous surrender of the naval fortress Sveaborg to the 
Russians without firing a shot in 1808.4
Judging by the outcry, something was not quite going to plan in the Nordic 
world of business and finance. A couple of days earlier news had been leaked 
to the press that Asea Ab5, one of Sweden’s largest corporations and a leading 
manufacturer of electro-technical goods, harboured far reaching plans towards 
its smaller, but dynamic competitor on the other side of the Gulf of Bothnia.6 
Asea’s management had approached Strömberg’s owners7 and made them 
an offer for a stock-ownership swap, according to which Asea, a significantly 
larger company, would exchange 1.89 per cent of its stocks for 28 per cent of 
Strömberg’s share capital. The Finnish owners had found the offer tempting, 
but not because of the percentages of Asea, in itself not an inconsiderable 
position in a company of that size. Their motivation lay elsewhere. A cross-
ownership of this kind would have cemented the companies into a permanent 
strategic partnership. It would have been a major step towards developing 
a competitive cross-border corporate alliance at a time when the world 
trading and financial system was entering a period of rapid transformation, 
liberalisation and expansion.
The rationale behind the creation of the Asea-Strömberg alliance lay in 
the coordinated potential of their research and development sectors. Both 
companies operated in a field characterised by paradigmatic technological 
change. The production, transmission and the uses of electric power expanded 
and entered into new areas. Automatization changed the face of industrial 
production. New technologies and applications emerged at the interface of 
mechanical engineering and electronics. Computers and digital technology 
were arriving on the scene. In the 1960s Asea achieved one of the true 
4 The eminence in question was the managing director of the state-owned mining company Outokumpu 
Petri Bryk, whose statement was made in a press conference on 11.12.1962 and reported in Engzell to 
UD, 15.12.1962, UDA.
5 Allmänna Svenska Elektriska Aktiebolaget, established in 1883. Oy Strömberg Ab had been established 
in 1889.
6 The first news appeared on 2.12.1962, when the social democratic party organ reported on Asea’s ‘far 
reaching plans to acquire shares in a large Finnish industrial company in order to merge it into its 
extensive family of international subsidiaries’. Suomen Sosialidemokraatti 2.12.1962.
7 The majority of Strömberg was owned by other Finnish companies. The largest were Tampella (35 % 
of shares), Kymin (31 %), Valmet (10 %), Wärtsilä (7 %) and Ahlström (6 %). These represented the 
main branches of Finnish heavy industry from forestry products to engineering, machinery, shipbuilding 
and textiles. With the exception of state-owned Valmet, one would have felt more comfortable in their 
board rooms if one spoke Swedish rather than Finnish. In addition to Finnish owners, the Swiss group 
Brown Boveri & Cie owned 5 % of Strömberg’s shares, a position it had held since the 1930s. 
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technological feats of the time: the know-how and capacity to design and 
build nuclear power reactors and plants.8
In Finland, Strömberg had not progressed quite as far, but in some products 
its know-how and innovation capacity matched that of Asea.9 While its exports 
were still comparatively modest, it had become the domestic investment 
goods arsenal of Finland’s industrial and societal modernization. It designed 
and delivered the electro-technical equipment and machinery requisite for 
industrial investments and the improvement of the national infrastructure. 
Electricity had become the power that kept the lights of modern society on, 
and Asea and Strömberg were the agents delivering the tools that kept that 
power flowing and glowing.
Unusually for Finnish companies at the time, Strömberg housed a large 
research and development facility. However, the race for new innovations 
was intensifying, and only companies with the willingness and the ability to 
invest more were likely to survive. While expensive to maintain, Strömberg’s 
knowledge base increased the company’s value and made it an attractive 
partner, or target for others in the sector. The temptation for joining forces 
with Asea stemmed from the benefits a comprehensive coordination of their 
research and development activities would bring to both companies. From 
sharing their knowledge, and secrets, in product development and research, 
their collaboration subsequently might extend into manufacturing and 
marketing operations, all aspiring to make them together a stronger bulwark 
against toughening international competition. 
The talks had been going on for some months in autumn 1962 in utmost 
secrecy between Asea’s and Strömberg’s management and owners. However, 
before all the details of the deal were cleared up, the employees of Strömberg’s 
plants in Helsinki and Vaasa got a whiff that something unusual was in the 
air. Their reaction was quick and fierce. Strömberg was not to capitulate to 
the Swedes. Without access to the minutiae of the talks, the mere thought 
that Strömberg’s management was colluding with their Swedish counterparts 
made the staff furious. 
The strong reaction of Strömberg’s staff could be explained by the fact 
that Asea had for long been suspected of expansionistic tendencies and for 
8 On the history of Asea, Glete, Jan (1983) ASEA under hundra år: 1883–1983: en studie i ett storföretags 
organisatoriska, tekniska och ekonomiska utveckling. Stockholm: EHF.
9 On the history of Strömberg, Hoffman, Kai (1989) Sähkötekniikan taitaja. Strömberg 1889–1988. Vaasa: 
Strömberg Oy. 
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its habit of swallowing up other companies.10 According to popular stories 
circulating inside the firm, Strömberg had almost been gobbled by its stronger 
and bigger competitor in the interwar years, when Asea had managed to acquire 
a majority of its shares in 1928. In the end a modus vivendi between Asea and 
its competitors was agreed, when a company even larger than it, the formidable 
Swiss Brown Boveri & Cie (BBC) had bought half of Asea’s stock in Strömberg 
leaving each holding a one third stake in the company. 
In the 1930s a fine if somewhat trying balance existed between Strömberg’s 
Finnish, Swiss and Swedish owners. Their agreement covered not only the 
ownership of Strömberg, but also, typically for the time, a cartelised division 
of the local markets which Strömberg’s professionals later saw as an attempt 
‘to keep their company down’.11 However, already before the outbreak of world 
war, their understanding over how to split the Finnish markets between them 
broke down. The final blow to the three-way balance came during the war, 
when wartime legislation limited Asea’s and BBC’s ownership to 14 percentages 
each. After the war, BBC decided to keep its stock whereas Asea, frustrated 
and disappointed, sold its own. But insiders knew to watch for Asea’s return 
one day.
The 1940s and 1950s were decades of austerity and shortages for most 
Finns, but the hardships were fought with hard work, and that meant good 
times for large, domestically strong companies like Strömberg. The post-war 
reconstruction efforts and nation-wide investments gave it a strong growth 
impulse and elevated it onto a faster catch-up trajectory from where to 
challenge its bigger rivals. However, if Strömberg was developing favourably 
in the 1950s, so was Asea, which was also at the forefront of modern corporate 
management, rationalisation and organisation development. Curt Nicolin, its 
youngish and dynamic managing director, a ‘planning engineer’ by training, 
had earned his credentials in a heavy-handed restructuring of the airliner 
Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) in the 1950s. But as was stressed by Strömberg’s 
staff, even worse than this representative of the new technocratic breed of 
professional corporate managers, was the dark past of Asea itself, which by 
coincidence also touched upon one of the low points of 20th century Swedish-
Finnish relations. Strömberg’s staff could not and probably did not want 
to forget how one of Nicolin’s predecessors at the helm of Asea had been 
responsible, as the vice-chairman of the International Olympic Committee, for 
10 Uusi Suomi, among others, pointed out this aspect Asea’s expansion strategy in its editorial on 6.12.1962. 
See also Maakansa 13.12.1962.
11 Interview with Nils Björklund 17.5.2000; interviews with Aimo Puromäki 30.9.2002 and 22.10.2002. 
Interview notes in the possession of the author.
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its decision in 1931 to disqualify the legendary Finnish runner Paavo Nurmi 
from attending the 1932 Los Angeles Olympic games.12
With the memories of the capitulation of Sveaborg and the Paavo Nurmi 
debacle evoked in this way, it was obvious that the prospect of joining forces 
with Asea roused deep sensitivities. As a response to the news received of 
the talks, practically all engineers and other technically trained personnel of 
the company, totalling more than 500 professionals in various positions of 
responsibility, signed a petition addressed to the company’s management, 
where they voiced their concern and outright opposition to the proposed 
alignment with Asea. Even if the world was changing around them, they 
had the full confidence of succeeding in it by their own means. Before the 
management was able to respond, the employee’s stormy reaction against 
the proposed deal became national news. 
For weeks and months the ‘storm around Strömberg’13 became the political 
cause célèbre of public life in Finland. From being a dispute between the 
company’s staff and its managers, or a discussion of an ordinary business 
transaction between two privately owned companies, it escalated into a debate 
about Finland’s economic and technological future, its place on the map of an 
integrating Europe, relations with its neighbours, the inroads of international 
capital, and into searching explorations on the nature, meaning and the bounds 
of the Finnish nation and national identity in the modern industrial era. A 
whole range of characterisations and attributes were associated with both 
companies, their collaboration or competition, the immaterial or even spiritual 
capital they contained, who had created and who owned them, who had the 
right to do what with them, the companies’ Swedish or Finnish identities, and 
also the sinister forces that were suspected of pulling strings behind the scenes. 
When the storm finally passed, almost one and half years later in the 
spring of 1964, when Asea, overpowered, reluctantly gave up its plans and 
withdrew its proposition, it could be witnessed how the Finns had been 
agitated and also somewhat shaken by their first integration - or globalisation 
- debate, as it would now be termed. During the debate the levels, positions 
and relationships of the individual, the collective, the corporation, the nation 
12 Engzell to UD 9.1.1963, UDA. The ambassador reported how a Strömberg staff member had spoken how 
Asea’s long time managing director, Sigfrid Edström, had been the culprit behind Nurmi’s disqualification 
in 1931. His role indeed had been central in the protest against Nurmi’s amateur status as the vice-
chairman of the IOC and the chairman of Swedish Sports Confederation, making him for a while 
one of the most hated Swedes in Finland. Edström famously crossed swords with his counterpart in 
Finland, the sports leader and agrarian politician Urho Kekkonen, who in turn in 1962 was the reigning 
president of the republic.
13 A headline of an editorial in Nya Pressen 10.12.1962.
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and the international had been explored and juxtaposed and contrasted using 
old terms and conceptual understandings, but in a new context. This in turn 
gave rise to novel associations between the notions of work, knowledge, skills, 
technologies and capital in the modernising nation facing an internationalising 
world. The global awoke and defined the national, but in modes yet unseen.
The return of the language strife
One of the reasons why the debate over Asea-Strömberg was so fierce, lasted 
so long and animated so many, arose from the simple fact that Asea was 
from Sweden and Strömberg was from Finland. Strömberg’s already existing 
connexion with the Swiss-based multinational BBC activated hardly any 
emotions other than those that conducting an ordinary business transaction 
would do. With Asea, things were different, but not just because of traditional 
national rivalry between two neighbouring countries, or elements of envy, 
jealousness and even ill will especially on the Finnish side. What made 
the nationality question in the companies’ identities so acute was how two 
economic elite groups in Finland, one that mostly spoke Swedish, and the 
other one Finnish, clashed in an ongoing struggle for power and position in 
the nation’s industrial and societal modernisation.
Right from the very first news and issued statements made in public 
it became apparent that the indignation caused by the Asea-Strömberg 
collusion was not the sole property of the staff and engineers of Strömberg. 
It is conceivable that the company’s technical experts were not as concerned 
about the mother tongue of the owners and managers of their companies as 
they were about the future ownership and the autonomous prospects of their 
research and development efforts. Be that as it may, the language question still 
was not irrelevant, as further afield and deeper down in Finnish society and 
business life, language still played a role. What was interesting was how the 
prospect of internationalisation and integration, in the form represented by 
Asea’s approach to Strömberg, reawoke the language strife that for the most 
part had been buried in the sands of soldier’s graves in churchyards around 
the country in 1939–1945.14 
The heart of the matter was in the ways in which financial and industrial 
power and property had clustered in Finland since the speeding up of 
14 A contemporary analysis that saw the affair as a reversion to the older strife between the two language 
groups was an article by Aulis Pöyhönen in the January 1963 issue of Turun Ylioppilaslehti. The Swedish 
embassy in Helsinki adopted the same broad interpretation of the affair in its reporting to Stockholm.
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industrialisation from the late 19th century. While it would be a crude 
simplification to say that all capital in Finland had coalesced into two camps 
signified by language, with their characteristic companies, banks and personal-
familial networks, one Finnish and the other Finnish–Swedish, this pattern was 
very much present in Strömberg’s pattern of shareholdings and stakeholdings. 
The former, the owners, spoke mostly Swedish, whereas the latter, the clients, 
customers and most staff, used Finnish as their mother tongue.
What was relevant for Strömberg’s engineers also was how the technical 
and civil engineering profession had for a long time, particularly in the first 
decades following Finland’s industrialisation, been dominated by the use of 
Swedish language. With the Fennoman movement challenging this state of 
affairs in the last decades of the 19th century, the language strife had divided 
the profession into two camps with their separate associations, clubs, student 
organisations and language based group identities.15 However, broader socio-
economic and demographic change gradually defused the situation as the 
numbers of Finnish speaking engineers overtook the Swedish speakers. By the 
interwar years the balance had shifted decisively in their favour. This meant 
that at the same time when the language strife had heated up in Finnish 
society and politics in the interwar years, the engineers’ internal dissension 
had become less acute. 
This trend had been heightened during and after the Second World War. 
The surge of post-war Nordism, at least in part motivated by Finland’s position 
in the Soviet sphere of influence, and the related and renewed emphasis of 
Finland’s historical connections with Sweden and Scandinavia, were felt in 
the engineering and other professional organisations as well. Old bones of 
contention were buried, but not entirely forgotten. Certain quarters of Finnish 
industry and commerce such as the all mighty forestry sector, were still after the 
war characterised by relatively higher numbers of Swedish speaking business 
and technology professionals. By contrast with the older forestry firms, newer 
industries and especially the state-owned companies had the appearance of 
being more favourably disposed to Finnish speaking engineers and other 
professionals. Also the fact that some leading figures in the state-owned 
companies and public utilities openly propagated for better career prospects 
for Finnish-speaking engineers after the war, kept the language issue on the 
agenda, albeit in a less confrontational form than it had been in times past.16
15 Aunesluoma, Juhana (2004) Nykyaikaa rakentamassa. Tekniikan Akateemisten Liitto TEK edeltäjineen 
1896–1996. Helsinki: Tekniikan Akateemisten Liitto TEK, 15–48.
16 One of them was Uolevi Raade, a pro-Finnish engineer activist and the charismatic managing director 
of the state-owned oil company Neste Oy. Interviews with Aimo Puromäki 30.9.2002 and 22.10.2002.
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The judgements over how particular companies’ profiles may or may not 
have been influenced by the dominant languages of their corporate cultures, 
and whether there existed any preferences or prejudices based on these types 
of identities, were inevitably subjective, but of consequence.17 What was less 
subjective was who yielded power in Strömberg. The two largest owners of 
Strömberg were the forestry company Kymin Oy – Kymmene Ab and Tampella 
Oy, a wood processing, heavy engineering and textiles conglomerate. Both were 
managed by and closely connected to the Swedish speaking business elite. The 
chairman of Strömberg’s board, C. J. Ehnrooth was also Kymin’s chairman, a 
powerful figure whose influence reached beyond the immediate financial and 
industrial realm controlled by him and other members of his family, such as 
his brother Göran Ehrnrooth, the director of the Pohjoismaiden Yhdyspankki 
– Nordisk Föreningsbank. In control of Tampella was another central figure 
in the Swedish speaking industrial elite, Åke Kihlman. 
These men and their associates were together a good match for the figure 
with whom they discussed the Asea-Strömberg scheme on the Swedish side. 
While Asea’s managing director Curt Nicolin did most of the footwork, the 
real mover and shaker behind the plan was Marcus Wallenberg, representing 
the family behind Asea, and many other Swedish companies. The Wallenberg 
family was famous for its banking and manufacturing empire that by the 1960s 
had cast its net far and wide, but also known for their longstanding interest 
in Finnish markets and their close relations with the country’s political and 
economic leaders.18
The prospect of seeing the Wallenberg’s and Finland’s Swedish speaking 
financial interests joining forces in Strömberg was a prospect that did not find 
opponents wanting on the Finnish side. On the same day in December 1962 
that Nicolin sought to dispel the misgivings aroused by the Asea-Strömberg 
talks in a crowded and heated meeting in Helsinki, a group of managing 
directors of five large state-owned companies organized a press conference 
where they took a strong stand against the plan.19 Other Finnish business 
leaders were also outspoken in their criticism, such as the personification of 
Finnish forestry industry captains, Juuso Walden of Yhtyneet Paperitehtaat, 
17 As Professor Ilmari Hustich, who himself opposed the plan, pointed out in an article in Hufvudstadsbladet 
on 22.4.1963 the ‘national feeling that exist – and are of great vitality in Finland – have to be considered 
as an economic and political reality’. 
18 Marcus Wallenberg was particularly close to president Urho Kekkonen. Olsson, Ulf (2001) Att förvalta 
sitt pund. Marcus Wallenberg 1899–1982. Stockholm: Ekerlids förlag, 428–429.
19 The companies were Valmet, Enso-Gutzeit, Outokumpu, Imatran Voima and Neste, all important 
customers of Strömberg and in the case of Valmet, a minority shareholder.
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who would not miss an opportunity to snipe at his domestic competitors and 
particularly the Swedish speaking Ehrnrooths.20
The opposition did not end there. While the Finnish industrialists avoided 
explicit references to the language question in their criticism of the deal, the 
press was instantly excited by the prospect of having the behind-the-scenes 
wrangling of different groupings in the small world of Finnish business out 
in the open and in the public eye. Newspapers such as the conservative Uusi 
suomi, the agrarians’ Maakansa and the communists’ mouthpiece Kansan 
Uutiset found themselves in a unified front – a rare sight in itself – opposing 
the selling of Finland’s crown jewels to foreign ownership.21 And if the issue of 
language was involved, even better, although perhaps paradoxically if not for 
the first or last time, the first to notice that the affair touched upon language was 
the Finnish Swedish language media, which lamented the regression back to 
the discourse and mood of the 1930s. Editorials and columnists in the Swedish 
press around the country hoped the debate would instead focus on Finland’s 
industrial and internationalizing future, and the material means of how to 
get there, instead of reverting to debating points already settled a long ago.22 
Nevertheless, once out, the language issue could not be avoided. One of 
the forums where this reversion towards the mood of the pre-war years took 
place was the organization where Fennoman civil engineers had assembled in 
the first place to fight the dominance of the Swedish language in the 1890s.23 
Besides a cunning use of the news-hungry press and the trade and professional 
organisations of Strömberg’s staff24, the opponents of the Asea-Strömberg deal 
could utilise the profession’s national and the most prestigious organisation, 
the Finnish Association of Engineering Professionals (STS) as a high profile 
platform from where to launch their attack on the plan.
20 An observation made by the Swedish ambassador Gösta Engzell in his letter to UD 18.3.1963, UDA.
21 Maakansa 13.12.1962. Uusi Suomi was at first very critical of the plan, but subsequently in 1963 modified 
its views and took a neutral position similar to that of Helsingin Sanomat, a leading daily. Social 
democratic newspapers were also opposed to the plan, as was the communists’ Kansan Uutiset, which 
also held its critical views all the way until Asea buried its plans. For later views see Kansan Uutiset 
30.4.1964, 7.5.1964 and 12.5.1964.
22 Nya Pressen 10, 12.1962; Hufvudstadsbladet 12.12.1962, 18.12.1962, 11.3.1963 and 31.5.1964 in a postmortem 
of the whole affair. 
23 Aunesluoma 2004, 15–48. The Finnish name of the organisation was Suomen Teknillinen Seura, but its 
first name when it was established in 1896 had been Suomenkielisten Teknikkojen Seura (subsequently 
Suomalaisten Teknikkojen Seura), denoting the Finnish language based group identity of the members 
and later also their Finnishness in a broader sense.
24 The Association of Electric Engineers (Sähköinsinööriliitto), where a substantial number of Strömberg’s 
technical experts were members, was active in opposing Asea’s plans.
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By coincidence, STS had scheduled its biannual general meeting for 
December 1962. Not surprisingly, the agenda was dominated by the Asea-
Strömberg case. The Association’s board had, remarkably enough, already 
spoken against the proposed deal, but the general meeting went one step 
further. It approved a motion condemning ‘the transfer of domestic industry 
into foreign ownership’: 
we do not believe that a solution, that ties an entire company or an 
industrial sector with a foreign company in a way that terminates 
that company’s independent development path, is a happy one for the 
country’s industry and technology. … we think that it is in the interests 
of the country that advanced and advancing companies may commit 
themselves to their independent development work on the long run. The 
contribution of the Finnish engineer in this work is best utilised only if 
he at the same time feels that he is, without reservations, advancing the 
cause of his own country and its industrial development.25
Economic policy-makers, government ministers and industrial leaders followed 
closely the discussion. To gauge the mood simmering among the professionals, 
the director general of the Bank of Finland, Klaus Waris, telephoned during 
the association’s debate one of its more luminous participants, Nils Björklund, 
for his opinion. Björklund, a high flying business executive and a conservative 
who was otherwise known for his liberal pro-market views, confessed that he, 
too, was against the plan: ‘I think the Swedes are up to what they were already 
doing in the 1930s. We should turn down the deal’, Björklund told Waris, who 
in turn would be one of the key advisors to the Finnish government, when 
and if Asea would approach it for its permission to conclude the share swap.26 
As Asea would be increasing its ownership in Strömberg above 20 per cent, 
Finnish law stipulated it must seek the government’s approval.
That the government had the ultimate say in the matter ensured that 
the affair would sooner or later come onto the national political agenda, 
and that happened sooner rather than later. Echoes of the professionals’ 
concerns were felt practically in real time in the national parliament, albeit 
guised in a somewhat different ideological outlook. While the engineers and 
Strömberg’s staff were drafting their statements, the parliament was passing 
25 Aunesluoma 2004, 130–131; Archives of Academic Engineers and Architects in Finland (TEK), Helsinki. 
official record of STS’s meeting 2/1962, 14.12.1962, annex 11. For a fuller account of the STS response 
to the Asea-Strömberg plan see also Aunesluoma 2004, 126–131.
26 Aunesluoma 2004, 130, based on an interview with Nils Björklund 17.5.2000.
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the laws required for the government budget for the coming fiscal year 1963. 
During this procedure a member from the centrist Agrarian League, Atte 
Pakkanen, with a direct reference to Asea, proposed a resolution condemning 
the ‘subjugation of Finnish industry to the influence of international cartels’. 
While it was acknowledged that international capital was needed in Finland, 
the resolution urged the government to follow the situation carefully, and 
if need be, to ‘take such measures by which it can prevent Finnish industry 
from falling under the influence of international cartels’.27 The resolution was 
passed with a demonstratively strong majority, with supporters mainly from 
the political centre to the left wing parties. While the Swedish language press 
deplored the character of the discussion in the professional organisations and 
in the parliament, both debates showed how explosive and politically sensitive 
the deal between Asea and Strömberg had become.
Technology as a national project
Given that personalities like Nils Björklund, a Swedish speaking member 
of the business elite, and Atte Pakkanen, a representative of the Agrarian 
League, both took such a clear stand against the Asea-Strömberg-plan, it was 
apparent that the hullabaloo was hardly only about language-based identities 
or language-based nationalism. Also the wordings of the resolution passed in 
the parliament and the STS’s motion suggested that larger issues were at stake. 
Sticking to the issue of language seemed increasingly anachronistic, and at 
best a thin veil for a very material contest over power and position between 
competing camps of Finnish industry and business. A more likely banner 
under which to rally the troops, and where the Finnish speaking engineers 
and their associations joined forces with their Swedish-speaking colleagues, 
was the cause of Finnish technology. It is hard to see that the debate over 
Asea-Strömberg would have been quite so intense without the concept of 
national technology. 
At first, the very idea that technology should have a particular nationality, 
may sound somewhat strange for anyone accustomed to the technologically 
infused, interconnected and interdependent world of the 2000s. Technologies 
are developed and accumulated, shared and owned, like capital, but they bear 
no passports and have no national colours on them. For a very long time it 
indeed seemed to be so, that technology would not have a nationality, at least 
27 As reported in Engzell to UD 18.3.1963, UDA.
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a Finnish one.28 This view, however, was challenged after the Second World 
War, when a number of technological innovations appeared, first in small 
scale, bearing the hall-mark ‘made in Finland’. Small innovations in existing 
technologies or an adept application of them were conjoined by the fruits of the 
innovation and development work that was conducted in the relatively small, 
but expanding laboratories and research departments of Finnish companies 
and in publicly financed institutes and research centres. 
National technology became synonymous with the idea of national 
innovation competence, and the skills and knowledge required for spontaneous 
and self-directed technological development and change. Only with this kind 
of competence would a nation, its people and its industry and business be able 
to survive in the global marketplace of the future.29 As has been extensively 
researched by Petri Paju, this project of developing ‘Ilmarinen’s Finland’ was 
a large scale effort to build up Finland’s own scientific and technological base, 
which among other things was directed into computer construction.30 In all, 
‘Ilmarinen’s Finland’, a direct reference made by professor Erkki Laurila in 
1954 to the national epic Kalevala and its magical artefact Sampo, was one of 
the big post-war national projects which connected actors from the public to 
the private sectors and created an institutional frame, from where subsequent 
steps were taken to create ‘Technology Finland’.31
Strömberg was one of the companies that were producing these innovations 
and a carrier of the national project. In the eyes of young engineers seeking 
employment in a cutting edge firm, Strömberg came second only to the other 
flag bearer of Finnish technology, the electronics division of the Finnish Cable 
Works, today known as Nokia. However, these small but growing national 
champions were important not only to recently trained experts, but also to a 
bigger group of stakeholders who were interested in the autonomous capacity 
of these Finnish technology companies to develop and provide the highly 
specialized and advanced goods needed in their various investments projects.
28 On the short and thin historical roots of technology development in Finland see Michelsen, Karl- Erik 
(1999) Viides sääty. Insinöörit suomalaisessa yhteiskunnassa. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura & 
Tekniikan Akateemiset. 
29 It is useful to notice that the term ’competitiveness’ was explicitly and frequently used in the Asea-
Strömberg discussion as well as the yet novel term ‘European integration’, but characteristically on 
the side of the proponents of the deal.
30 Paju, Petri (2008) ”Ilmarisen Suomi” ja sen tekijät. Matematiikkakomitea ja tietokoneen rakentaminen 
kansallisena kysymyksenä 1950-luvulla. Turku: Turun yliopisto; Paju, Petri (2010) ’Building ”Ilmarinen’s 
Finland”: Computer Construction as a National Project in the 1950s”, Tekniikan Waiheita, Vol 28, Issue 
2, 56–65.
31 Paju 2008, Paju 2010, passim.
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The electrification of Finland had been one of the investment projects 
where Strömberg had been an important provider of goods for the electric 
power providers, which in Finland’s case were utilities mostly owned by the 
municipalities and cities. Soon after the big state-owned companies had entered 
the debate on the opposition’s side, the electric utilities did the same. With the 
managing director of the biggest of them, Unto Rytkönen from the Helsinki 
electric works as their ringleader, the electric utilities voiced their concern 
over the consequences of the Asea-Strömberg deal for Finland’s technological 
development.32 The public appearance of Rytkönen and other Finnish business 
leaders as opponents of the plan made the Swedish Ambassador Gösta Engzell 
burst in frustration: ‘It is outright incredible how these directors of the state-
owned companies are allowed to sabotage the proposed cooperation. Their 
various emotional outlooks should not be so determining. Most of them are 
sensible and intelligent, but some of these directors are almost fanatic in their 
struggle against Swedish industry in Finland’, Engzell wrote in a report to 
Stockholm in March 1963.33 
It bears witness to how remarkably strong and embedded the ‘Ilmarinen’s 
Finland’ -project had become, that so many saw the threat to Strömberg’s 
independence also as a threat to the prospects of Finland’s future as a 
technologically advanced nation. As Uusi suomi wrote in December 1962, the 
willingness of Strömberg’s owners to throw in their lot with Asea showed that:
we have not quite yet given up worshipping ‘foreign pictures’. The belief 
in our own possibilities has not been that strong. yet our Finnish electri-
cal industry is acknowledged to have achieved a high level of develop-
ment and our engineering skills do not pale in international comparison. 
now when international trade is increasingly liberalized, we need to 
have more of a sense of self-rule. it is about time to give up the colonial 
mentality.34
The idea that Finland would need to have its own national technological and 
scientific achievements and capacities as the means with which to master its 
modernisation, came very close to contemporary discussions elsewhere in 
Europe. Just as with larger European countries from France to the United 
Kingdom, it was as if Finland’s nationhood suddenly came to be defined by 
32 Hufvudstadsbladet 18.12.1962.
33 Engzell to UD 18.3.1963, UDA.
34 Uusi Suomi 6.12.1962.
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its technological and industrial capacity. The concept of Finnish technology, 
skills, knowledge and industry became the focus for matters of language, the 
Finnish nation and its capability of mastering its own societal and economic 
transformation towards the modern era and where they became fused into a 
political programme, with its first mission to save one company from being 
sucked into the whirlwind of European integration and internationalisation. 
This was the mixture that eventually derailed the Asea-Strömberg project 
irrespective of what the Wallenbergs or Strömberg’s owners would have 
wanted to do with their property, and whether or not their plans were sound 
for their businesses or even for their nations’ technological futures.
Integration, globalisation and the national Us
By the beginning of 1963, it was clear where the battle lines were drawn in the 
Asea-Strömberg case, and what the arguments were either for or against the 
deal. A broad and diverse front had emerged opposing the plan. It comprised 
of engineers and other professionals, business leaders especially from the 
state-owned companies and companies not belonging to the inner circle of 
Finland’s Swedish speaking financial and business community, publicly owned 
utilities, university professors and other commentators, politicians from the 
agrarian centre to the left wing parties and finally of newspapers around the 
country. For all their different motivations and interests, they found a unifying 
tune in the advocacy of Finnish technology and the autonomous prospects of 
its further development.
In retrospect, we can see that as soon as the public debate of the Asea-
Strömberg alliance had begun, the plan had little chance of success. The 
opposition was able to set the parameters of the debate around the concepts 
of Finland’s self-determination and its future as a modern, industrial and 
technologically advanced nation. After the first salvoes were shot, the debate 
was no longer so much about Strömberg; it was about Finland and the meaning 
of Finnishness in the modern era. For some observers and commentators, the 
types of ‘demonstrations of national pride’ the whole affair brought into light, 
were unsettling. Kauppalehti, a business daily, wrote how Asea’s approach 
had done a disservice to the important need to attract more international 
capital and investments to Finland. ‘In a spirit of “blind nationalism” one was 
throwing “the baby out with the bathwater”.’35
35 Kauppalehti 10.12.1962.
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Marcus Wallenberg’s and Curt Nicolin’s frequent visits to Finland in the 
months following the disclosure of the talks, and discussions with key decision-
makers and the wider public, were to no avail. Asea needed the government’s 
approval for the deal, and as the then Agrarian minority government made it 
clear from the beginning, it had neither the political strength nor the internal 
willpower to give its consent to the deal. The public uproar was just too massive, 
too broadly based, and it had already reached the parliament. In private, 
ministers were positive, and practically all their advisors from the powerful 
central bank chief Klaus Waris down to individual civil servants, approved 
the deal and thought it an important step for Strömberg to survive amidst 
the toughening international competition. 
Neither would the fact that even the all-powerful president of the republic, 
Urho Kekkonen, supported the plan could save it. In his regular discussions 
with his friend ‘Dodde’, Marcus Wallenberg, a close and trusted talking 
companion, the president wished that the opposition would somehow be won 
over. But on the other hand, if Asea persisted with its plans, the government 
might have to say no. That would be good neither for Asea nor for Finland’s 
international image, and ought to be avoided. However, in the event that the 
government said yes, it would risk a vote of no confidence in the parliament. 
In the end, and after having explored all the avenues, Asea backed down 
in the spring 1964 and withdrew its application to receive the government’s 
blessing to increase its ownership in Strömberg above the 20 per cent limit. 
As it happened, the plan was buried, but not forever. Strömberg’s engineers 
had known in the 1940s to wait for Asea’s return one day. And so it did, 
and in 1986 the deal was closed, preceding an even larger corporate merger 
between the newly founded Asea-Strömberg and the Swiss BBC, creating in 
1987 what today is known as ABB.36 Many other cross-border mergers followed 
the failed attempt in 1962–64, and the Wallenbergs and their trusted Finnish 
counterparts were key players in them. In 1968 a Finnish family business, Kone 
Oy, successfully merged its elevator-business with that of Asea with the help 
and midwifery of Urho Kekkonen himself. From the success of that transaction 
and also the later and happier mergers crossing the Gulf of Bothnia, it appeared 
that a lesson had been learned from what had taken place in the early 1960s.
What should have been an ordinary business transaction between two 
privately owned companies, had all of a sudden become an issue of national 
proportions. The forces that the Wallenbergs, Strömberg’s owners and other 
36 Barham, Kevin & Heimer, Claudia (1998) ABB. The Dancing Giant. Creating the Globally Connected 
Corporation. London: Financial Times Pitman Publishing.
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Finnish proponents of the plan encountered were powerful and able to mobilise 
and excite political activism across a broad, deep and heterogeneous front. 
What they encountered was the paradox of globalisation that Pauli Kettunen 
has identified in his work on the relationship of globalisation with nationalism.
As Pauli Kettunen has pointed out in his elaboration of the paradoxes of 
globalisation, the encounter of national polities with the globalisation process 
leads to the formation and the articulation of new types and discourses of 
nationalism. When the international or the global are perceived as a challenge 
to local entities, it results in a need to conceptualise national institutions, 
identities and the society’s dynamics in a new way. Instead of removing 
nationalism or the framing of society’s functions with nationalistic concepts 
from the agenda, the global reconstructs it.37
That is what happened in December 1962. Finnish society defined and 
understood the transfer of capital and skills across national borders in terms 
typical of later integration and globalisation debates. The argumentation 
in the Asea-Strömberg affair was carried out in distinctly nationalist terms 
and vocabulary. Strömberg, previously just another company among many, 
was portrayed as a national champion, the seedbed of Finnish engineering 
excellence, Finnish work and the maker of Finland’s technological future. 
Finnish technology and engineering skills were considered not only the 
property of the company, but a part and parcel of the Finnish nation. 
Technological development and industrial modernization were a national 
project, which found its mirror image in the competing, more advanced and 
potentially threatening Swedish modernization project.
The fate and the debate about Asea-Strömberg in 1962–64 showed how 
nationalist vocabulary transcended the accustomed traditional sphere and its 
bounds, and how it entered the modern era. The concepts Finnish technological 
skills and Finnish industrial prowess were crucial: the challenges of economic 
internationalization and globalization awoke a strong feeling of Finnishness 
not only in terms of identity, but in industrially manufactured artefacts, in the 
Finnishness of technological skills, and by and large in the material means of 
modernization. The stage and parameters were set for several other rounds of 
similar debates, in different historical circumstances and with quite different 
outcomes, but in contexts that bore a remarkable similarity to the early 1960s.
37 Kettunen, Pauli (2008) Globalisaatio ja kansallinen me. Kansallisen katseen historiallinen kritiikki. 
Tampere: Vastapaino.
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A comparison of swedish and british shipbuilding 
industry in the context of economic downturn
StEVEN gASCOIgNE AND NOEL WHItESIDE
Introduction 
During the final decades of the twentieth century, western European countries 
found their industries increasingly challenged by developing economies, 
notably in the Far East. This competition forced a process of change. This 
chapter will examine policies and strategies of industrial restructuring within 
the shipbuilding sectors of Sweden and Britain. Both countries faced global 
competition which proved ultimately insurmountable; however, prior to 
total collapse new initiatives aimed at efficiency gains had sought to reassert 
national competitiveness. Shipbuilding was a well-established industry in both 
countries and in both cases governments took an active interest in securing its 
future viability. Although neither was ultimately successful, the comparison 
illustrates the different strategies developed in each case, which reflect very 
different traditions of management, industrial relations and the state’s role 
in promoting economic development.
According to Esping Andersen1, Britain and Sweden belong to different 
welfare ‘regimes’, the social rights of ‘de-commodified’ citizens being a key 
factor determining classification. Britain’s liberal inheritance discouraged 
state intervention in market activities: welfare support remained confined to 
rescuing labour market casualties. In contrast, the Swedish welfare system 
has been praised for the support it offers to all citizens, whether labour 
market active (‘commodified’) or not. The case studies presented here throw 
this distinction into question: they demonstrate how initiatives developed 
both in Gothenburg and on the Clyde sought to avoid mass labour market 
exit by sidestepping established welfare institutions, to ensure continuing 
employment for as many potentially redundant workers as possible. Hence, 
this study argues that both examples promoted continuing commodification, 
1 Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
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reinforcing the norm of waged work as proper for both Swedish and British 
adult male citizens. 
In 1968 a research team from the Glasgow shipbuilding consortium Upper 
Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) visited a number of Swedish yards with the aim of 
applying what they hoped to learn about industrial relations at some of the 
world’s most productive shipyards2 to the ailing Clyde shipyards3. A decade 
later Swedish shipbuilding was in terminal decline and a novel project was 
forged to manage uncertainty using those same good industrial relations. 
Remarkably, had the UCS team looked back just three years they would have 
seen a similar project created under similar conditions of uncertainty on the 
Clyde that focused upon promoting and sustaining good industrial relations. 
Separated by a decade and a half, Fairfields Shipyard on the Clyde in 
Glasgow and Götaverken Shipyard on the Göta in Göteborg were both sites of 
radical experiments that sought to reinforce waged work norms by removing 
uncertainty and by avoiding redundancies and unemployment. The state 
played a central role in both experiments; however official influence was limited 
by local autonomy coupled to and extended by workers’ participation. Crucially, 
rapid decline within the shipbuilding sector did not harden attitudes; in fact, 
compromises on the part of all concerned characterised both experiments. 
Although each project was quite distinct and there’s no evidence that either 
learned from the other, there are similarities between the two - not least the 
state’s central role in both creating and aborting the projects and the way in 
which success was presaged on a revival in market demand. 
Managing redundancy as shipbuilding faces decline
By the mid-1960s shipbuilding on the Clyde was in terminal decline, eight 
yards closed on the Upper Clyde between June 1961 and January 1965, 
shedding more than 8000 workers on the south bank alone and on the 
15th October, 1965, Fairfields Shipyard announced it also faced bankruptcy. 
The announcement was surprising as the yard had an order book worth 
£32 million and was in the middle of a £5 million modernisation scheme. 
Indeed, Fairfields was considered to be the most modern and efficient 
yard on the Clyde. A campaign to keep the yard open began immediately, 
2 Hedin, G. (1995) Svenska Varv: Världsledande. Tre Böcker Förlag AB, Göteborg.
3 Upper clyde shipbuilders (1968) Visit of Joint Management/Shop Steward Party to Swedish Shipyards, 
John Cossar, Glasgow.
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organised by shop stewards. Lobbying of local Members of Parliament and 
government ministers was coupled with the generation of local support among 
industrialists, influential notables and in the media. The Minister for Economic 
Affairs, George Brown, would only commit the Labour government to a £1 
million guarantee to secure continued operations until the Geddes committee, 
which was created in 1966 to consider how British shipbuilding could be made 
more competitive, reported the following year.4 A general sense of optimism 
prevailed regarding this report, especially as forecasts of rising demand would 
advantage a rationalised industry. However, £1 million was not enough to 
continue operations beyond six weeks and the Labour government, conscious 
of its precarious parliamentary position, was not able to nationalise the yard. 
The intervention of a local businessman, Iain Stewart, transformed what 
critics had called ‘creeping nationalisation’ into a radical project to transform 
working practices in the shipbuilding industry. Stewart had worked with 
the Glasgow Corporation to create jobs for workers made redundant at the 
nearby Stephens Yard. His vision entailed every worker having two trades so 
that, during slack times, all could be redeployed elsewhere. When demand 
picked up, a skilled workforce would be available to meet requirements. As, 
when a ship was completed, unemployment no longer threatened, the yard 
could become more productive as workers would no longer have a financial 
interest in prolonging the time it took to build a ship. Fairfields gave Stewart 
an opportunity to put this vision into practice. He outlined this idea in a letter 
to George Brown:
in my view the situation presents a heaven sent opportunity to expose 
the deep problems of the industry and grasp the nettle of overmanning, 
demarcation and management problems. […] if the government would 
be prepared to back an experimental project […] i would undertake to 
produce a profit on the Fairfields balance sheet, certainly within five 
years and probably within three.5
Stewart set about raising money to buy Fairfields, reciting the mantra of 
industrial change. Local business leaders were persuaded to invest money in 
a project that promised to redefine relations between management and labour. 
Stewart also convinced trade unions to invest in the yard using money from 
4 The findings indicated that British ships were uncompetitive; the industry was inefficient and prone 
to industrial action, and ships took longer to produce than those made by overseas competitors. 
5 Cited in Paulden, S. & Hawkins, B. (1969) Whatever Happened at Fairfields? London: Gower Press, 
18–19.
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their accumulated funds, a unique achievement. In total five trade unions6 
invested in Fairfields and in doing so they agreed to (and recommended that 
their members also agree to) new employment conditions. Firstly Fairfields 
would be ‘isolated’ from all other firms insofar as industrial conflict was 
concerned, strikes would be eliminated as would go-slows, overtime bans 
and working to rule. Furthermore, job demarcation must be abolished: 
there must be free movement between jobs irrespective of skill. In return, 
Stewart promised retraining to remove the threat of unemployment, union 
representation on the Board of Directors and regular, direct communication. 
At a mass meeting held on 27th December, 1965, the workers agreed to these 
conditions.7 
Ten years later in Göteborg, the Swedish shipbuilding industry faced a 
similar, possibly faster, decline. In 1969, Götaverken was saved from bankruptcy 
by government. In 1975, the nearby Eriksberg Yard faced bankruptcy and in 
1976 it was the turn of Götaverken again. The government intervened in both 
instances, Eriksberg was merged with Götaverken and by 1979 Eriksberg was 
closed. New orders had stopped arriving in 1974 and the backlog of existing 
orders was completed in 1977. The new Bourgeois government which had 
defeated the Social Democrats in the 1976 election decided to nationalise the 
Swedish shipbuilding industry and created the umbrella group ‘Svenska Varv’. 
As part of the scheme, the government announced a round of redundancies 
including 5,500 in Göteborg. 
On the 18th October, 1978, the Bourgeois coalition government headed by 
Thorbjörn Fälldin resigned over the nuclear energy question and was replaced 
by a Liberal minority administration headed by Ola Ullsten. With this change 
of government came a change of industry minister and a change of policy 
towards the shipbuilding crisis. A new bill8 presented in the autumn of 1978 
by Erik Huss would follow the ‘cheese cutter’ or ‘salami’ principle: that is, equal 
sacrifices at all the nationalised yards within Svenska Varv. The bill was heavily 
criticised by the opposition Social Democrats who presented an alternative in 
6 The Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, the Clerical and 
Administrative Workers’ Union, the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, and finally the 
Electrical Trades Union had a debenture holding. 
7 Paulden & Hawkins 1969 
8 Riksdag (1978/1979:49) Prop. 1978/79:49. Riksdag, Stockholm. p.49
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the form of a motion9 that “aim[ed] at evolution instead of liquidation”10. The 
key part of this motion was a two year employment guarantee:
it is thus our understanding that the very large employment problem in 
the affected areas can only be avoided if the labour surplus within the 
shipyards is gradually minimised over a longer period. we feel therefore 
that all those present within the shipyards at the four large shipbuilding 
areas shall be guaranteed employment until the end of 1980. This respite 
must be utilised for strong measures.11 
With the support of some Liberal politicians the Social Democrats were able 
to modify Huss’ proposition12 to include the employment guarantee and also 
the creation of a special company to employ the pool of redundant workers:
According to our opinion a special organisation, separate from current 
production should be formed at the shipyards. This organisation should 
absorb the personnel that become redundant through capacity reduction 
and the rationalisation process.13
The two year employment guarantee and the special organisation to pool 
the workers formed the core of the Social Democrats’ motion that aimed to 
“accomplish the proposed adjustments in socially acceptable forms”14. The 
decision by Svenska Varv to appoint Leif Molinder15 to the directorship of 
this new organisation was crucial to its formation. Molinder had worked on 
the regeneration of another Göteborg shipyard and the idea of extending the 
principles learned there into a general model for future industrial management 
9 Riksdag (1978/1979:141) Motion 1978/1979:141 av Olof Palme m.fl. med anledning av propositionen 
1978/1979:49 om vissa varvsfrågor. Riksdag, Stockholm. p.141
10 Ibid., 3.
11 Ibid., 3–4.
12 Cited in Stråth, B. (1987) The Politics of De-industrialisation: the contraction of the West European 
shipbuilding industry. London: Croom Helm, 87.
13 Riksdag Mot. 1978/1979: 4 
14 Ibid., 3.
15 Molinder had worked as personnel director for Götaverken (1963–1967), production director for 
Lindholmen Yard (1967–1970), personnel director for Eriksberg (1970–1978) including Project 
Lindholmen and then P80 (Molinder, 1989:7). He later gained a reputation for closing down yards 
effectively; after P80 was wound up he successfully closed down the Landskrona yard with only 1% 
of the workforce experiencing long-term difficulties and later oversaw the closure of the Uddevalla 
yard and Kockums in Malmö (Lawrence, P / Spybey, T (1986) Management And Society In Sweden. 
Routledge & Keegan Paul, London., p.38).
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had been discussed internally for some time. With the advent of this project, 
the ground appeared fertile for the seeds of that work to take root. Here, then, 
was an opportunity to apply those principles: collaborative research, training 
and production within the two year employment guarantee.16 The terms had 
been set out by Svenska Varv:
capacity reduction must happen in such a way that the yards, when the 
adjustment process is accomplished, have a personnel structure that 
renders an effective enterprise within all the divisions. so as to reach this 
requirement the shipyards and the unions will agree on such forms of 
personnel reduction that the new situation demands.17 
The criteria for selection aimed to remove the least efficient members of 
the workforce. The three main factors for being selected for transferral to 
Project 80were old age, short employment service and high absenteeism.18 
These criteria abandoned the last-in, first-out principle as it would clash with 
the Riksdag demands for an effective and efficient enterprise. The nature of 
shipbuilding in Göteborg placed a premium on certain trades (welding and 
plating). As these workers were in high demand, they would often change 
firms to secure better pay or working conditions. In consequence, the most 
sought after workers were those with the shortest service history and therefore 
liable to be the first in line for redundancy. The last-in, first-out principle 
thus contravened the demand for efficiency. Its application would have 
removed so many platers and welders that the shipyards would not have 
been able to function.19 Selection was followed by an invitation to join the 
special organisation; there was no compulsion to do so, yet out of a total 1814 
workers only 26 declined.20 Whereas at Fairfields a show of hands had secured 
the workers’ cooperation, here a personal invitation achieved the same result 
and the workers transferred in the summer of 1979. 
16 Molinder, L. (22/05/1979) Letter to Zetterström, R & Kadefors, R. [Gothenburg Regional Archive: 
Lindholmen Utveckling AB, Projekt 80 AB, F6AII].
17 Sjölin, M. (1991) Och Efter De Goda Åren... Göteborg: Götaverkens Verkstadsklubb, 87.
18 Posner, L. (1982) Frånvaro Bland de Arbetare som Uttagits till Projekt 80. Psykologiska Inst, Göteborgs 
Universitet.
19 Interview with former Social Democrat Politician (10/12/08) 
20 Projekt 80 AB (1982) Slutrapport. [Gothenburg Regional Archive: Lindholmen Utveckling AB, Projekt 
80 AB, F6AII].
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Implementing new strategies
Once Fairfields was under new management and the workers and unions had 
agreed to full cooperation, the task of reconstruction started. Crucial here was 
improving communication both top-down and bottom-up, thereby removing 
the ‘grapevine’ process by which workers came to learn of developments via 
local shopkeepers who had served the wives of management or by reading 
of developments in the evening newspaper. This process also worked in 
reverse: managers heard of worker discontent from newspaper reporters, 
tipped off by local shopkeepers that workers were massing outside the 
gates.21 This was replaced by an in-house magazine, Fairfield News, priced 
very cheaply and read by 70 per cent of the workforce. Furthermore, unions 
were given seats on the board of directors and a joint central council for 
union-management communication. A number of mass meetings were held 
at a local cinema where management would communicate important news 
and then take part in question and answer sessions. The novelty here was 
not so much the mass meeting but the fact that management took questions 
from workers and answered them. External communication was greatly 
improved and professionalised with the appointment of a full time press officer. 
One unexpected outcome of this was that press accounts of the Fairfields 
Experiment were mostly positive and this raised morale among the workers 
who now saw themselves as involved in a unique experiment that interested 
the national media.22 Improved communication was designed to reduce, even 
eliminate, uncertainty. The new management reasoned that the uncertain 
nature of work produced practices such as defence of trade demarcation. 
If unemployment was the consequence of finishing work on a ship, then 
prolonging that work was a reasonable reaction. 
Perhaps the most important mechanism for reducing uncertainty was 
training. Fairfields, like many other shipyards on the Clyde, suffered from 
overcapacity estimated at 40–50 per cent.23 The issue of redundancy was thus 
bound up with training and its promotion; Iain Stewart hoped to highlight 
the ‘positive aspects’ of redundancy:
“[T]he Fairfields experiment will establish an indisputable argument 
for the Government to establish national facilities for re-training and 
21 Paulden & Hawkins 1969.
22 Blanford, O. (1969) The Fairfields Experiment. London: The Industrial Society.
23 Alexander, K.J.W. & Jenkins, C.L. (1970) Fairfields: A Study of Industrial Change. London: Cox & Wyman. 
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planned re-employment, which of course is, and has always been as far 
as I am concerned, the main object in setting up the Fairfields platform.24 
Workers would be retrained in order to gain two skills, as reasoned by a senior 
Fairfields official:
when there’s no work left for the sheet metal worker, we want to be able 
to train him as a plater or as a welder where there is a shortage of men. 
why can’t a man have two trades, so that he can be a steelworker when 
he’s building a ship and then a painter when it needs finishing, instead of 
two lots of men doing a leap-frog through their lives of work, unemploy-
ment, work, unemployment? Then we could have twice as many men 
building the ship and twice as many painting it, finishing it in half the 
time with no one unemployed.25
Prior to the experiment, Fairfields had no training facilities. A new training 
centre was constructed and twelve supervisors were recruited from within the 
yard and trained as instructors. The apprentice system was modernised; in 
their first year apprentices would have general craft training before specialising 
in their chosen trade, this would then give them a base from which to be 
retrained in the future. Smaller training facilities were located throughout 
the yard for shorter practical courses, typically lasting five days. These were 
welcomed with enthusiasm by the workers who recognised the value in not 
only furthering their knowledge of their own trade but also in learning a new 
trade. Thus the joint reforms of communication and training both worked 
towards removing uncertainty, they aimed toward re-casting redundancy in 
a positive light and ultimately they encouraged higher productivity. 
At Götaverken the aim of higher productivity involved removing a section 
of the workforce and it was then this ‘less efficient’ element that formed the 
experiment’s cohort. Once transferred out of the workforce the experiment 
aimed to provide personal solutions for each worker based around education 
and intensive job search activities and facilitated by multiple state agencies.26 
This was achieved systematically by following procedures that recognised four 
24 Ibid., 175–176.
25 Cited in Paulden & Hawkins, 1969, 122.
26 Projekt 80 AB (1979a) The Purposes of Projekt 80 AB. [Gothenburg Regional Archive: Lindholmen 
Utveckling AB, Projekt 80 AB, F6AII].
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alternatives, all of which ultimately aimed at the individual finding work on the 
open market and differed according to the individual’s labour market aptitudes. 
An established, fully-equipped training centre, originally designed to train 
platers and welders for the ship-repair industry, was utilised by the project. 
The centre had the capacity to train 250 personnel, there were 30 instructors 
and 4000 square meters of space at its disposal, again reflecting its ship repair 
focus. An additional 64 places at local colleges had been hired for extramural 
courses. Apart from education, workers took part in production activities; the 
aim here was to occupy workers with ‘meaningful’ work until they found new, 
permanent employment. Initially the maximum capacity was for 40 people 
per week, but this increased over the life of the project to a maximum number 
of around 600. The department had the redundant Eriksberg shipyard at its 
disposal with designated areas for both blue collar and white collar employees. 
This relatively modern shipyard could be adapted to a variety of different 
production activities designed to improve skills. 
The local employment agency organised job search and dedicated officials 
worked full time within the project interviewing workers and exploring 
future options. This aspect was fully integrated into education, training and 
production activities to create a tailor-made package for each worker to secure 
labour market re-integration. The focus on individual solutions was achieved 
systematically by following procedures that allowed for four alternatives, all 
of which ultimately aimed at the individual finding work on the open market. 
A special procedure was also drawn up for more intensive actions should a 
worker prove to be especially difficult to place. Essentially the procedures 
codified various possibilities within the framework of the project with the 
four options, ranked by order of preference. 
Under option one, the most desirable outcome, the individual found work 
on the open market immediately after a planning interview. The desirability 
of this option lay in the speed with which the individual found a new job, 
thus minimising both expenditure and resources; this was possible when a 
vacancy could be found that was compatible with the individual’s skills and 
desires. Under option two the individual was transferred to the production 
department after the first planning interview, either to update rusty skills, 
or because no job vacancy fitted that person’s capabilities and therefore the 
applicant was to be kept busy until a suitable job was available. option three 
took the worker directly to the education department after the initial planning 
meeting because that person’s skills and knowledge were incompatible with 
the current labour market and the planning meeting decided to retrain within 
an expanding industrial sector. 
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Option four was the least desirable and was reserved for those hard to 
place. The special procedure drawn up for problematic workers involved an 
‘intensified labour exchange service’27, using local experts, who aimed to find 
the individual permanent work. Failing this, the individual would take training 
courses or temporary work within the project after which the labour exchange 
service expanded its search nationwide. Those remaining were offered early 
retirement, a pension, rehabilitation, vocational training and what became 
known as ‘the other solution’. This was based on the argument that ‘continued 
occupation is a better alternative to an early retirement pension for the persons 
concerned as well as for the community’ as ‘continued work gives self-esteem, 
chances of being together with friends at the work place and opportunities for 
medical care’28. The idea was to occupy the individual with work that achieved, 
as far as possible, maximum results for the costs involved. 
Comparisons and conclusions
Participation was central to success in both Glasgow and Gothenburg. At 
Fairfields participation took four forms: first, the mass meetings included 
question and answer sessions, allowing management to ‘take the pulse’29 of the 
workforce by speaking directly to individual workers. Second, briefing groups 
were set up to communicate policy decisions downwards and then feedback 
reactions upwards, typically within the space of a few hours. Third, advisory 
committees were set up for each executive manager; unions joined management 
on these committees. Finally, union shop stewards were represented at the 
executive management meetings and participated in policy discussions. One 
negative outcome of this enhanced role for trade unions was a diminished role 
for foremen, who had previously seen themselves as intermediaries between 
workers and management and whose morale subsequently slumped.30
Participation at Götaverken was channelled solely through the trade 
unions; this benefitted some groups more than others. Elderly workers, as 
long term union members, were well represented and won key concessions 
from management over early retirement. Conversely, those with alcohol abuse 
27 Projekt 80 AB (1979b) Model for intense handling of problems arising for personnel being discharged. 
[Gothenburg Regional Archive: Lindholmen Utveckling AB, Projekt 80 AB, F6AII].
28 Ibid. 
29 Alexander, K.J.W. (1973) ‘Shipbuilding’. In Balfour, C. (ed.) Participation in Industry. London: Croom 
Helm.
30 Alexander & Jenkins 1970.
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issues were less well regarded and management offered no special concessions 
to this group. Other vulnerable workers were similarly neglected; their specific 
needs marginalised them as they needed special workshops to accommodate 
them or they spent periods of time in hospitals or clinics. As their needs varied 
they could not articulate common demands and did not have the same access 
to the union representatives as other workers.
In both these projects, time ultimately secured their demise. At Fairfields 
the project lasted twenty-seven months, at which point the shipyard was 
incorporated within the new consortium of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. 
Following the recommendations of the Geddes Report, national policy 
determined that individual yards should be merged into ‘super-groupings’. 
With the merger of Fairfields into UCS the dynamic management team 
disappeared and, although aspects of the design were incorporated into UCS31, 
all studies agree that the project was effectively dead.32 At Götaverken the 
project had never been destined to last more than two years; however as 
time ran out and management realised a large group of residual workers 
had not found work, policy became increasingly coercive. The outcome was 
either pressure, under threat of benefit reductions, to find work or officials 
arbitrarily found jobs for those who were left. In both cases, the job search 
process ceased to involve participation between agency and client as market 
forces exerted their familiar role in determining outcomes.
At Fairfields the experiment had attempted to rationalise workers into 
the shipyard whereas at Götaverken the project had rationalised workers out 
of the yard. Both yards had suffered from chronic overcapacity. Götaverken 
solved this by cutting labour. Prior to market collapse, productivity there had 
been the highest in the world. It was hoped that by shedding labour that 
position could be restored. Fairfields on the other hand rationalised labour 
management in order to increase productivity. In both projects, whether men 
were being rationalised in or out, the goal was the elimination of uncertainty 
and continued engagement of all within the labour market. Uncertainty over 
the future prompted trade unions in both yards to develop practices designed 
to avoid labour market exit. In this sense compromises by interested parties 
are all the more remarkable: the voluntary abandoning of the strike weapon 
and job demarcation at Fairfields and the voluntary abandoning of the last-in, 
first-out principle at Götaverken. 
31 Blanford 1969.
32 Alexander & Jenkins 1970, Paulden & Hawkins 1969.
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The true novelty at Fairfields was union funding which complemented 
funds from the state and individual entrepreneurs. Traditionally British unions 
had been hesitant to involve themselves in any corporatist arrangements, yet 
here involvement meant not only a seat on the board of directors but also 
a financial commitment. This actively encouraged more private investment 
from those previously sceptical that any reform could happen in an industry 
characterised by labour conflict. Organised labour had made significant 
compromises and the fact that more private individuals then invested shows 
that these concessions were taken seriously. There is no comparative novelty 
at Götaverken where corporatist solutions were the norm. Indeed, Götaverken 
was seen as a model yard in terms of industrial relations 33 and it is significant 
that, after the collapse of the Fairfields project, an investigative team from UCS 
visited Götaverken to observe such industrial relations in action
The role of the state in both these projects should be noted. These were 
both local projects featuring local compromises from local actors where state 
policy played two very different roles. In the example of Götaverken, state 
institutions actively encouraged labour market participation, the project itself 
– the product of parliamentary legislation - facilitated this process whilst 
guaranteeing security between one job and the next. Esping-Andersen’s34 oft 
cited concept of ‘decommodifaction’ is missing here; rather the object was 
to sustain worker commodification as the project bridged the gap between 
labour market exit and subsequent re-entry.35 In the case of Fairfields we 
can also observe a process of continual commodification, although here state 
institutions were missing. The shipyard itself sought to remove insecurity 
by promoting a training policy to give every worker two trades. The project 
rested on liberal, voluntarist foundations. In both Fairfields and Götaverken, 
waged work was strengthened through a process which sought to rationalise 
labour market entry and exit: however, in the UK a liberal state offered no 
legislative support for the Fairfields initiative – whereas in Götaverken, the 
project was backed by backed by government and run by public officials. 
Hence, the objectives of both initiatives retain similarity - as, Pauli Kettunen’s 
analysis demonstrates (in reference to Nordic experience):
social and labour market policies, while creating non-market support-
ive institutions for preserving labour power when it is not traded in the 
33 Stråth 1987. 
34 Esping-Andersen 1990. 
35 Or total exit in the case of early retirement .
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labour market, were a liberating life course from the necessities of selling 
labour power at any conditions and, thus, making labour more like a 
real commodity.36 
Yet the role played by official institutions in each case was quite different 
and illustrates the real difference between a liberal and a social democratic 
polity. While both strengthened labour as a commodity by removing market 
uncertainty, in the Swedish case public officials supervised operations while 
at Fairfields joint bargaining between unions and management were charged 
with putting the experiment into practice. 
In both cases, however, guarantees of security were limited and in both 
cases time dictated the end of the experiment. At Götaverken the project was 
only ever endowed with a two year lifespan at the end of which it had to be 
wound up. At Fairfields the project was allowed to continue until the outcome 
of the Geddes Report which absorbed the initiative into the UCS consortium, 
which effectively ended the experiment. A market solution was the long term 
goal in both cases: at Götaverken work on the open market was the ideal 
solution for workers and at Fairfields the goal of having two trades aimed 
at a seamless exit-entry process during a period of contraction. The removal 
of uncertainty, then, with the central goal of continuing commodification, 
side stepped traditional support institutions to strengthen the worker as a 
commodity who ultimately fell victim to market forces over the long run. 
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The 1890–1910 crisis oF AUsTrAliAn 
cAPiTAlisM And The sociAl 
deMocrATic resPonse 
was the Australian model a pioneering regime of 
social democratic welfare capitalist regulation?
CHRIStOPHER LLOyD
State experiments in Australia:  
the historic compromise of the early 20th century
In 1890–94 Australia was convulsed by a crisis of historic proportions that 
marked a watershed in the development of the economy, society, culture, 
and polity. The preceding 40 years had been ones of great prosperity, wealth 
advancement, and democratization, sparked in 1851 by the great and long-
lasting gold rush. By the late 1880s Australia was believed by boosters to be 
a ‘working man’s paradise’ and a triumphant vindication of the egalitarian 
and democratic rejection of British social class and privilege. This successful 
settler capitalist country had ridden the great Victorian commodities boom and 
succeeded in overcoming the legacy of its prison foundation and the ‘tyranny of 
distance’ to become the richest society in the world. The capitalist model that 
had developed, however, was far from the laissez faire of British theory and 
policy, combining instead industrial protection in most parts of the country 
with a significant degree of state ownership of economic enterprises. What 
was later called ‘colonial socialism’1 was the more or less unquestioned model 
of a rudimentary developmental state that rested on the great wealth flowing 
from raw material exports and the distribution of rents for working-class 
urban expansion. Indeed, economic development and employment generation 
had been the chief preoccupation of colonial governments since the 1830s. 
In this context, the bursting of the long boom in 1890 and collapse into 
the first (and very severe) depression in half a century was a transformative 
1 Butlin, N. G. (1959) ‘Colonial Socialism in Australia: 1860–1900’. In Aitken, H. G. J. (ed.) The State and 
Economic Growth. New York: Social Science Research Council.
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event. The consequences of the crisis years, lasting for most of a decade, were 
profound. The main response by the political process, however, was not on 
the whole to question the centrality of the state in Australian capitalism but 
to reinforce it in new, ideologically-based as well as class-based, ways. Social 
democratic developments emerged that had long-lasting consequences, 
detectable even unto the 21st century. A ‘historic compromise’ of labourist-
protectionism2 and other social measures was constructed and reinforced over 
the following decades that remained central to Australia’s political economy 
until the 1980s. 
Looking back from 1902 at the 1890s crisis era, William Pember Reeves, a 
New Zealand socialistically-minded liberal journalist, lawyer, and government 
minister, (and later a leading Fabian in Britain and Director of the London 
School of Economics) wrote in his magnum opus on state experiments in 
Australia and new Zealand (1902) that the radical movements in Australasia 
were ‘deeply tinged with socialism’. This was not borrowed from German or 
French socialist thinking, he said, but was cautious and tentative, drawn from 
English thinking.
but though there is no social democratic party, there is a good deal 
of democratic socialism. it is none the less real because it is ‘a sort of’ 
socialism, finds expression in acts, and eschews short cuts to a ‘new earth 
which will make the old heaven unnecessary’. … if it be state socialism, it 
is democratic and not bureaucratic. [pp 68–69] 
Governmental as he is, the labour politician is at heart more of a trade 
unionist than a conscious socialist, and the middle-class Progressive is 
still half a liberal. Ask either of them whether he aims at socialising land 
and capital, and the odds are that he will reply that he does not trouble 
his head about such a goal. he certainly does not dream of achieving it 
by revolution in his own time. he accepts the wages system, rent and 
interest, private ownership, private enterprise. his business is to obtain 
tolerable conditions for the masses, and to stand by the small man 
wherever the small man is not a petty, cutting employer. … M Métin has 
cleverly summed up the colonial Progressive movement as le socialisme 
sans doctrines. … when democrats in the colonies repudiate the title of 
2 Lloyd, C. (2002) ‘Regime Change in Australian Capitalism: Towards a Historical Political Economy of 
Regulation’, Australian Economic History Review, 42, 3, 238–266
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socialists, it may mean merely that they do not know what experimen-
tal socialism is; but it may also mean that they are not revolutionary 
socialists, and truly they are not. [pp 70–71]3 
Reeves was in a very good to position to know and write about democratic state 
socialism in Australasia at the end of the 19th century for he had been a radical 
minister in New Zealand governments and was responsible for, among other 
measures, legislating in 1893 for a state-established and regulated centralized 
industrial dispute settlement system. This was a system that was demanded 
by radical liberals and working class politicians throughout Australia and 
New Zealand from the early 1890s as a response to the severe economic 
and social crisis. The preceding booming economic conditions had enabled 
considerable working class militancy to flourish. Legal formation of trade 
unions and membership recruitment in strategic industries – especially mining, 
pastoralism, land and sea transport – had been very successful and unions had 
been emboldened in their labourist ideology in the era of high employment 
and economic development. In addition, industrial protectionism, especially in 
Victoria, the most industrialized part of the country, encouraged the growth of 
trade unionism. The onset of the 1890s depression, however, radically altered 
the labour market and the balance of ideological and political forces. The 
alliance of state and capital, combined with the desperation of many working 
people for employment, defeated the unionist demands for maintenance of 
closed shops, high wages, and reduced working hours. The main lesson drawn 
by the unionists was electoralism. Universal malehood suffrage had existed 
throughout Australia since the 1860s and secret ballots since the late 1850s 
but no working class political movement existed to harness this electoral 
possibility. Class formation lagged behind the de jure liberalization, which 
had come about through liberal reformers acting in the spirit of Chartism, 
influenced by nativist egalitarian culture and the lack of aristocratic privilege, 
and in response to events such as the Eureka rebellion of 1854.4 
3 Reeves, William Pember (1902) State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand, 2 Vols, London: Grant 
Richards. 
4 Constitutionally and formally, Australasia consisted of a set of British ‘colonies’ [New South Wales, 
Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, Western Australia, New Zealand]. But de facto they were 
independent countries because the various British Acts granting full self-government from 1850 
removed all British prerogatives and granted full constitutional autonomy except in the area of foreign 
policy. These ‘colonies’ then moved towards unification from the late 1880s and achieved a federation, 
which New Zealand declined to join, on 1 January 1901. The Australian Constitution Act of the British 
Parliament in 1900 in effect granted full de jure independence. 
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Working class consciousness and organization developed rapidly in the 
1890s and by the 1910s the Australian Labor Party (ALP) had affected an 
historic alliance of workers, liberals, manufacturers, and farmers that had 
legislated an accommodation between society and market, mediated by a 
non-doctrinaire politics of a democratic, socialist, protectionist, and welfarist, 
nature. Australia thus seems to have produced an early version of what 
became in the post-1945 decades in northern Europe a more mature and 
comprehensive state-centred regime of capitalist stabilization, regulation, and 
development. Can this Australian model be understood as a pioneering version 
of Social Democratic Welfare Capitalism?5 
The chief (but not only) instigator of this model, the ALP, was not, as Reeves 
pointed out, an avowedly socialist party although it contained many avowed 
socialists, as well as labourists, nationalists, farmers, catholics, unprincipled 
careerists, and even capitalists. As V Gordon Childe pointed out in 19236, 
this was a rich mixture, and one, moreover, that successfully appealed to a 
majority of the electorate.7 Early ALP governments strove with varying degrees 
of principled conviction to redistribute the wealth of the developing capitalist 
5 The term ‘Social Democratic Welfare Capitalism’ (SDWC) was coined by various thinkers in the past 
decade or two, see Lloyd, C. (2011) ‘The History and Future of Social Democratic Welfare Capitalism: 
From Modernization to the Spectres of Ultramodernity’. In Kettunen, P. & Petersen, K. (eds) Beyond 
Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
199–217. Karl Polanyi used similar terminology in The Great Transformation (1944), Boston: Beacon 
Press, and more recently also Hicks, Alexander (1999) Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. Wolfgang Streeck has referred to ‘Democratic Capitalism’ in his powerful 
sociological analysis of the evolving interconnection of society and economy: Streeck, W. (2011) 
‘The Crises of Democratic Capitalism’, New left Review, 71, Sept-Oct, 5–29, Streeck, W. (2012) ‘How 
to Study Capitalism’, European Journal of Sociology, 53, 1, 1–28. One advantage of the term SDWC is 
that it avoids confusion with an American concept of democratic capitalism that usually refers to a 
liberal/market form of capitalist ideology in which markets are free of state interference but subject 
to democratic influence via citizen pressure.
6 Childe, V. Gordon (1923) How Labour Governs: A Study of Workers’ Representation in Australia, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Childe (born 1892) was a radical anti-war activist during the 
Great War, from within the Labor Party, and highly critical of the ALP’s lack of socialist thinking and 
its compromises with capital. His book is an insightful and sober analysis of the Party and still very 
relevant. Being denied academic and political employment he left Australia and Australian socialist 
activism in 1922 for an academic career in Britain (having previously studied at Oxford) and became 
by the 1930s the world’s most influential archaeologist, located for most of his career in the University 
of Edinburgh.
7 The Westminister-style, two-party system, which results from single-member constituencies and was 
reinforced by the Australian preferential voting system, requires political parties to have majoritarian 
electoral appeal. In such electoral systems, coalitions are formed before the election and not after it. 
The ALP implicitly recognised this from an early stage and the corresponding basic tension between 
party discipline over programme, ideology, and parliamentary voting and the need to appeal to many 
interests, so well understood by Childe in his insightful 1923 book, was overcome by having a quasi-
official place for factions. But this did not prevent three major splits over doctrine and policy in 1916, 
1932, and 1955.
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economy essentially by trying to guarantee full employment with high wages 
combined with progressive income taxation from 1915, some welfare measures, 
and market interventions. But the profitability and management of capital 
were never threatened and many erstwhile Labor politicians found lucrative 
capitalist employment and/or became themselves significant capitalists.8 
Indeed, certain branches of capital, especially manufacturing and arable 
agriculture, were actively supported by Labor governments.
There is a problem, then, of how to characterize and locate within a wider 
world of social democracy the significance of this early Australian model. 
Details of the Australian case seem to be little understood and researched in 
the comparative social democracy/welfare state field. While Australia (along 
with New Zealand) is included in research on welfare states it is sometimes 
included in a misconstrued ‘Anglo-Saxon’ category that somewhat bizarrely 
includes Australia with UK and USA when their economic, political, and 
social histories are quite different. The Varieties of capitalism literature 
(vide Hall and Soskice9) has labelled Australia as a Liberal Market Economy 
and lumped it in with other Anglos such as USA and Canada. This is a very 
contestable categorization that takes little account of the history and details 
8 In recent times former Labor Prime Ministers Hawke and Keating have developed substantial business 
interests, as have many former Labor state premiers. One of the most interesting examples is that of 
‘Red Ted’ Theodore (b 1884), who in some ways represents an archetypical Labor politician of his era. 
Son of very poor immigrants (Romanian and Irish), lacking formal education beyond the age of 12, he 
became a Queensland miner and then militant union organiser and rose to become a Labor member 
of the Queensland state parliament in 1909, deputy state premier in 1915, and premier in 1919 at age 
34. His premiership was marked by substantial increases in government investment in and ownership 
of productive sectors (‘colonial socialism’ extended), and extension of labourist-protectionism at the 
state level. At the same time he vehemently opposed socialists and communists in the Party and tried 
to have them banned. In 1927 he moved to federal parliament and became a prominent member of 
the Labor opposition and then deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer after the election of October 1929, 
a fateful moment to enter government. He was already privately wealthy through investments and 
close connections with certain businessmen and had a substantial home in an expensive suburb on the 
shores of Sydney Harbour. As Treasurer he was far-seeing and tried to implement a quasi-Keynesian 
reflation that was blocked in the Senate and he was forced out for a period over a financial scandal. 
The consensus is that he was an outstanding financial thinker but a bitter electoral defeat in 1932 
(engineered by an opposing Labor Party faction) saw him abandon politics altogether despite the 
likelihood that he would have become Labor leader and possibly Prime Minister had he returned. His 
subsequent career embraced gold mining investments, a publishing company, and wartime service 
as a senior bureaucrat. When he died in 1950 he left a substantial estate of more than half a million 
pounds. Cain, N. (1990) ‘Theodore, Edward Granville (1884–1950)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
Vol 12, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
9 Hall, Peter & Soskice, David (2001) (eds) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
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of Australia’s model, especially with regard to labour market regulation.10 And 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ is an outdated term, relevant only to describing early medieval 
England. The term ‘Advanced Anglo’ has some relevance for categorising the 
English-speaking OECD countries but which are indeed a varied lot when 
considered that the group includes New Zealand and the Irish Republic as 
well as USA. Comparisons of Australia with New Zealand, Canada, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Chile, and South Africa, make more sense in important respects as 
all are post-settler, immigrant, societies which developed various degrees of 
social democratic movements in the early 20th Century but which also had 
divergent histories in very important respects later.11
Australia was not only one of the world’s first examples of a concerted 
attempt to regulate the structure of capitalism through strong state intervention 
in labour, capital, and commodity markets, but one which has later evolved 
further away from this general form than some later and more developed 
examples, thus possibly showing the future for other examples. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that Australia today still exhibits both significant features of social 
democracy and a degree of economic and social dynamism and success possibly 
unmatched in the Western world in recent years including during the current 
Western recession, which Australia has not experienced. 
The chapter will seek to provide a critical analysis of the origins, 
characteristics, and significance of the ‘Australian model’ in the late 19th and 
early 20th Centuries. First we have to examine the background that provided 
the structural context.
Economic and political history of Australia before the 1890s
After the gold rushes of the 1850s and reinforced by successive natural resource 
export streams this highly prosperous settler economy had emerged as a 
peculiar mixture of laissez faire and ‘colonial socialism’ with its development 
of a rudimentary ‘provider state’ model out of the foundation as a penal service 
economy for the British Empire. Colonial governments were invariably focused 
10 For a critique see Lloyd, C. & Ramsay, T. (2013) ‘From Social Democratic Welfare Capitalism to Regulatory 
Capitalism? Institutional Transformations of Australia’s Labour Regulation Since 1983 in the Light of 
Theories of Historical Political Economy’ [under journal review] 
11 cf Lloyd, C. (2013) ‘Institutional Patterns of the Settler Societies: Hybrid, Parallel, and Convergent’, in 
Lloyd, C., Metzer, J., and Sutch, R. (eds) Settler Economies in World History, Leiden: Brill.
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on how to develop the economy through encouraging immigration and staple 
extraction and providing urban services.12 
Indeed, the efficient resource-extraction and commercial export economy 
of the 19th Century needed and generated a large urbanised service sector 
of finance, land transport, shipping, education, construction, and associated 
urban services. Australia was not just the richest but the most urbanised 
country by the late 19th Century. The largest industrial sites that developed in 
the late 19th Century were mines, government railway workshops, ship building, 
government construction, and textiles. These sectors, as well as pastoralism, 
were becoming significantly unionised by the 1870s and 80s, in a context of 
de facto union legalisation from the 1840s and universal male franchise from 
the early 1860s. 
By the 1860s the initial gold output began to decline (although reviving in 
the 1890s) and a chief policy preoccupation was of how to generate sufficient 
employment for the highly urbanised population and immigrant inflow that 
was dependent upon upstream and downstream economic linkages to the 
very productive, efficient, but technologically-innovative and labour-shedding, 
resource export sector (chiefly gold and wool and later silver, base metals, and 
refrigerated meat from the late 1880s), which was itself highly dependent on 
world market prices. Like all resource-dependent (blessed or cursed) rich 
economies at that time (or since), the problem was of how to transfer the 
commodity rents and profits into a diversified and developed urban economy 
and society without incurring what would today be called a resource curse effect 
of excessive rent monopolization, inequality, and government corruption. Thus 
government policy centred on economic diversification through protection 
of import-substituting manufacturing in most colonies (except NSW, whose 
politics was dominated by free trading pastoral and mining interests); and 
the nascent labour movement concentrated on trade or craft unionism as 
the means to redistribute the benefits of national wealth into high material 
living standards, especially for skilled workers. This labourist13 strategy was 
12 Lloyd, C. (2003) ‘Economic Policy and Australian State Building: From Labourist-Protectionism to 
Globalisation’. Teichova, A. & Matis, H. (eds) Nation, State and the Economy in History, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
13 Labourism refers to the strategy of organised labour concentrating mainly or wholly on wages and 
conditions of work rather than wider political and social issues. In Australia the constitutional and 
civil liberties battles had been won to the satisfaction of most workers and liberals. The main issue 
for Australian organised labour was the right to bargain collectively and to then raise wages, reduce 
hours, and secure employment. Social welfare and security became intricately linked with employment.
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a successful in its own narrow terms whilever the economy delivered full 
employment, expansion, and surplus wealth for redistribution.14 
Thus Australia, as with all advanced western capitalist countries, developed 
a growing workers movement in the second half of the 19th Century. This 
organized movement took the form exclusively of labour unions based on 
crafts and trades. This model of organisation grew out of the British legal and 
socio-economic background of liberalisation and craft guilds. Before the direct 
formation of a political party by workers, consciously working class voters 
tended to support social liberals. No self-styled socialist or social democratic 
party existed before 1890 although there were socialists and even some 
Marxists.
The crisis of the 1890s and institutional innovation
The severe economic and social crisis of the early 1890s depression, in which 
occurred a series of bitter and protracted strikes, verging on organised armed 
conflict in places, and a collapse of almost the entire banking system, shook this 
‘paradise’ to its foundations and became an epochal moment. The defeat of the 
strikers and of their power to enforce closed shops and collective bargaining, 
by a combined force of employer associations and state coercive power, in a 
climate of severe unemployment in 1890–94, motivated unionists and some 
liberals to believe that the capitalist economy could not be ameliorated by 
union power alone in the interests of working class prosperity whilever the 
state was controlled by nakedly capitalist interests. But unlike some other parts 
of the industrialising world at that time, the only strategy they developed was 
one of organised political mobilisation for governmental capture via electoral 
strength in the expectation of then using state power for labourist outcomes. 
The Labor Party wished to capture parliamentary power in order to advance 
the causes of workers rights, collective bargaining, employment security, and 
state welfare measures. This programme placed the ALP squarely within the 
international social democratic / evolutionary socialist movement of the late 
19th Century in the sense of its agenda of amelioration of capitalist excesses 
rather than destruction of capitalism in either the short or long term.
14 Of course protectionism and labourism are themselves forms of rent-seeking. This issue, which became 
a topic of heated debate in the late 1920s by Brigden, Hancock, and Shann, inter alia, (see reference 
list) was really about the different long-term social and economic consequences of various forms of 
rent-seeking. As argued below, not all forms of rent-seeking are necessarily socially deleterious.
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That is, this was a resolutely reformist rather than revolutionary strategy, 
with a very limited horizon, led by and controlled by unions who were focused 
on bargaining over wages and conditions within a liberal democratic society. 
The prior constitutional liberalization, beginning in 1850, lack of a privilege-
defending aristocracy, full malehood suffrage, secret voting, and payment 
of members of parliament, all contributed to working class militancy being 
focused by and large on labourist demands and electoralism. Labour unions 
were hegemonic in organising the working class. No significant space for extra-
union political organisations opened in Australia during the long boom of 
1860–1890 nor during the bitterness of the class conflict of the 1890s (although 
the voices of radical and even revolutionary socialists were heard) and no 
form of unionisation other than craft and trade unions were able to gain a 
significant foothold in the labour landscape, although significant activities in 
the early 20th Century by One Big Unionists and the International Workers 
of the World were influential for a brief period before being bureaucratically 
and politically defeated by labourist trade unionists. The colonial Labor Parties 
that were formed in the early 1890s were always the creatures of unions and 
remain so until this day.
With the formation of Labor Parties in the 1890s there was, then, an 
immediate sea change in the electoral landscape. In the New South Wales 
election of 1891 the Labor Party and independent labor candidates together 
polled 21% of the vote and 22% in 1893. Similar outcomes occurred in the 
other colonies soon after. Their almost immediate parliamentary influence 
meant that centralised industrial relations in the form of state institutions for 
wage setting and/or conciliation and arbitration were legislated in coalition 
with so-called ‘Harmony Liberals’. This liberal ideology centred on the role of 
the state in providing welfare and justice in the interests of social stability at 
the same time as protecting the economy and society from harmful external 
forces of economic, social, ethnic, cultural and geopolitical power. This kind 
of ‘liberal-protectionist interest’, which had dominated most Australian states 
(except NSW) and the early Federal Parliament, was able to form a more 
or less united Lib-Lab front with Labor against large landed, mining, and 
foreign industrial interests until 1908. The free trade, laissez faire, interest 
was not able to command majority support, even until the 1980s, always 
remaining subservient to liberalism and old conservatism within the united 
anti-Labor coalitions from 1908 until the1980s, when Neo-Liberalism swept 
out the old protectionist ideology and policies from both Labor and Liberal 
(Conservative) Parties. 
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This early and continuing success of the workers movement was one of the 
world’s most advanced in the electoral sense. The world’s first working class 
governments (minority and then majority) were elected in Australia before 
the First World War.15 In the 1910 Federal election the ALP scored 50% of 
the vote. The Fisher Labor governments of 1908–1909 and especially the 
majority government of 1910–13 were able to legislate more of the Party’s 
social democratic programme including formation of the Commonwealth 
Bank (a government-owned ‘peoples’ bank’), maternity allowances, workers 
accident compensation, land reform, and improvements to invalid and aged 
pensions. The First World War, however, had a major deleterious effect on 
the Party, causing a split in 1916 on the issue of conscription for the war. The 
right wing nationalist (minority) faction of the Party, in favour of conscription, 
split to form a government with the conservatives, forcing Labor out of office. 
But the two conscription referenda were lost and Australia remained the only 
major participant in the war to have an all-volunteer army, which numbered 
over 400,000 soldiers by 1918. Social and industrial conflict was also greatly 
engendered by the war involvement and in 1917 a nearly general strike occurred. 
Thus from the 1890s period of severe class conflict sprang the ALP, 
centralised industrial relations regulation, women’s suffrage (beginning in 
1892 in New Zealand and 1893 in South Australia), Federation of the Australian 
states, radical-nationalistic culture, and, by the early 20th Century, a new regime 
of political economy that its designers hoped would ‘civilise capitalism’ away 
from the causes of the financial, industrial, and social turmoil and degradation 
of the 1890s.16
 Labourist/Protectionism as ‘the Australian settlement’ 
The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration enacted by the Federal Parliament 
in 1904 was a key component of the Lib-Lab strategy, along with industrial 
protection, White Australia immigration policy, and social welfare provisions, 
15 It is usually reckoned that the first elected working class government in the world was in Queensland 
in 1899. After Federation the first national Labor Party government was in office for four months in 
1904. In 1908 the unofficial Lib-Lab coalition of Alfred Deakin dissolved and Labor took office alone, 
prompting the centre-right groupings of Protectionists and Free Traders to coalesce under an anti-
Labor, Liberal Party banner. 
16 Nairn, B. (1989) Civilising Capitalism: The Beginnings of the Australian Labor Party, 2nd edition, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. But see the ironic and insightful discussion of the limitations of 
this programme in Fitzpatrick, B. (1941) The British Empire in Australia 1834–1939, Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, (2nd ed 1949), 265–268.
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many tied to employment, to regulate capitalism in the interests of labourism 
and social harmonisation. In enacting this ‘Labourist-Protectionist’ regulatory 
regime of political economy, liberals and labourists believed they were 
building a working-man’s paradise17 The role of the state as economic and 
social mediator and protector was, then, a key dynamic in Australian public 
policy. In the early federal parliaments there was a clear majority in favour 
of this programme and the consensus continued through most of the 1920s, 
supported by then by the new Country Party (representing farmers and rural 
districts who had previously mainly supported Labor) despite the Labor Party 
being out of office after the split over military conscription in 1916.
Thus the so-called cross-class ‘Australian Settlement’18 that had emerged in 
the first decade or so of the 20th Century, especially during the time of the Deakin 
Liberal Government of 1905–08 and Fisher Labor Governments of 1908–09 
and 1910–1913, and reinforced in the early 1920s by organized agricultural 
marketing, was a consensus around labourism, the centralised IR system, 
manufacturing protection, and organised rather than free markets.19 But the 
consensus was far from complete and uncontentious, as revealed by vociferous 
debates and splits on both sides of politics as the century went on. The Labor 
Party was internally divided between radical socialists and nationalists, on 
one hand, and labourists on the other. Nevertheless, the breaking of the 
consensus and subsequent attempt by the conservative Bruce Government 
in 1929 to undermine or destroy the industrial arbitration system resulted in 
his disastrous electoral failure.20 The 1930s Depression undermined the regime 
and it might have collapsed but it was restored by the social solidarity and full 
employment engendered by the anti-fascist war experience and the centrally 
planned wartime economy, especially with the return of Labor to office in 1941–
49. Then in the early post-war years the Chifley Labor government attempted 
to extend the welfare system and the social democratic strategy in a manner 
similar to Britain’s postwar Attlee Government, including a Keynesian full 
17 Lloyd 2002, Lloyd 2003.
18 The idea that there was a cross-class ‘settlement’ or egalitarian historic compromise around 
protectionism, collective bargaining, and arbitration in the early 20th Century, which lasted in effect 
until the 1980s, has been much debated but there is no space to examine that debate here. See Kelly 
P. (1992) The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1990s. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, and Stokes, G. (2004) 
‘The Australian Settlement and Australian Political Thought’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 39: 
1, 5–22.
19 The full expression of protectionism was later called ‘protection all-round’ in the 1950s and 60s and 
most strongly defended by the Country Party.
20 An echo of this occurred in 2007 when the conservative Prime Minister Howard lost an election and 
his own seat over the issue of de-regulation of the labour market. 
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employment strategy, a more comprehensive welfare transfer system, public 
health improvements, tertiary education expansion, and nationalization of 
the private banks. But the constitutional division of jurisdiction and High 
Court narrowness prevented implementation of much of this Labor social 
democratic programme (including a national health scheme a la the United 
Kingdom) before losing office in the 1949 election. Subsequently, despite 
winning more than 50% of the votes in 1954, the ALP remained out of office 
until 1972 because of gerrymandered electorates and a split in 1955 over 
communism and the Cold War. This long conservative era (1949–72) saw the 
welfare system stagnate but centralized industrial relations and protectionism 
were not unwound by the Liberal-Country Party coalition governments due 
to a complete dependence by many sectors on protection-all-round. And 
Keynesian-full employment bolstered the regime in the post-war decades. 
The institutional path dependency remained very powerful, as in many parts 
of the advanced Western world. The Labourist-Protectionist regime continued 
despite a growing chorus of neo-classical economistic voices against it by the 
1960s and it finally began to be dismantled in the 1970s.21 
Was the Labourist-Protectionism / historic compromise a form of 
Social Democratic Welfare Capitalism?
There are several ways to conceptualise and assess the significance of the 
Australian labourist-protectionist model. First, there is an economistic/public 
choice approach, which builds on and theorises arguments made in the late 
1920s early-1930s in Australia22, arguing that Labourist-Protectionism was 
the path dependent and deleterious consequence of the centrality of the state 
in Australia’s developmental history from the foundation in 1788. It’s true 
that being strongly influenced by the tyranny of distance as well as being a 
state foundation in a very difficult context, economic activity was necessarily 
subordinated to state criminological and geopolitical needs from the beginning. 
By the late 1820s, however, when significant free immigration and a rampant 
private economy of pastoralism and land squatting got under way, wool 
producing rent-seekers became powerful and almost beyond the control of 
21 Battin, T. (1997) Abandoning Keynes: Australia’s Capital Mistake, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
22 Hancock, H. K. (1930) Australia, London: Ernest Benn [new edition: Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1961]; 
Shann, E. (1930) An Economic History of Australia, Melbourne: Georgian House.
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the state.23 But, unlike Argentina, state power was reasserted, partly through 
the Wakefieldian and other philosophic radical influences at the Colonial Office 
in London, and the ‘frontier interest’ did not capture the state.
The gold rush era from 1851 then transformed the private economy 
and opened new possibilities for market development. But the failure of 
private railway investment and the increased flow of revenue to the colonial 
governments opened greater possibilities for public provision of infrastructure, 
particularly railways, in a context of private sector inadequacy and failure. 
Government developmentalism was always the central theme of policy. 
Internal tyranny of distance was also a significant factor. This set a pattern for a 
wide range of public provision of services and infrastructure (schools, hospitals, 
railways, roads, ports, telegraphs, food shops, post offices, and so on) that then 
linked directly to electoral politics of vote-seeking in local constituencies from 
the 1860s. In effect, this so-called ‘colonial socialism’ became a mechanism 
for transferring the wealth from booming staple exports, via the final demand 
linkage, to the highly urbanised population. The particular kind of democratic 
political process made this a structural trajectory beyond the power of the 
free-trade, market-liberal, opponents to overturn. The Labourist-Protectionist 
regime then continued from the mid-1890s in a more developed form what 
already existed from the 1860s, in order to create a kind of ‘paradise’ of working 
and lower middle class prosperity and security as a rejection of the capitalist 
failings evidenced in the 1890s depression.
The anti-state critics24 failed, and still do, to understand the differences 
between beneficial and deleterious rent-seeking and how rent-seeking relates 
to the culture of fairness and equality. Taking a very long-term perspective on 
Australian socio-economic history it is possible to see that the economically-
diversified and egalitarian-urban society that developed in the 19th Century, 
made possible by the wealth of staple exports, industrial protection, and 
high wages, represents a socially desired and beneficial form of rent-seeking 
by urbanized and increasingly unionized working classes, who ‘chose’ this 
redistributional outcome via the electoral process. 
The powerful path-dependent culture of egalitarianism had grown out 
of the early struggles over acceptance of the validity of a form of convict, 
post-convict, and emancipist society (strongly influenced by Irish radicalism 
and Catholic socialism) that rejected notions of inherited class and imperial 
23 McMichael, P. (1984) Settlers and the Agrarian Question: Capitalism in Colonial Australia, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
24 For example: Butlin, N. G., Barnard, A. & Pincus, J. J. (1982) Government and Capitalism in Australia: 
Public and Private Choice in Twentieth Century Australia. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
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inequality and authority. Related to this was an ideology that the role of the 
state was indeed to ensure that equality prevailed. Unlike the United States, 
subsidiarity was never a strong theme. The advent of the Federation, however, 
placed the principle of equality under strain for some peripheral regions began 
to feel neglected and unable to pursue their self-interest through independent 
policies and so Western Australia tried to secede in 1932. This problem was 
solved by implementation of national egalitarianism through the non-partisan 
Commonwealth Grants Commission (1933), which saved the federation 
through redistribution of public finance (derived from progressive taxation 
revenue) to achieve horizontal fiscal equalization across the nation.25
The Australian model contrasts with a deleterious form of rent-seeking that 
was occurring in Argentina at the same time where a small oligarchic landed 
elite enriched itself through the monopolization of land, staple industries, and 
state patronage and produced weaker linkages into the wider society. The lack 
of de facto democracy made this possible and reinforced the non-democratic 
and unequal nature of the society, thus also preventing further liberalisation. 
Argentina suffered resource-curse while Australia was undergoing a resource 
blessing. 
Furthermore, rent-seeking (or seeking for economic advantage beyond 
the normal rate of return) is a universal phenomenon (part of a wider set 
of phenomena of social inequality) at all levels of societalisation from small 
groups and institutions upwards. The problem is not to eliminate it (for that 
is impossible) but control and direct it into beneficial outcomes. It can be 
argued that this was the consequence of labourist-protectionism. Of course 
there were some costs of inefficiency but as the Brigden Report (1929) found, 
there is a social and economic case for protection, subsequently labeled ‘The 
Australian Case’. This was a view eventually conceded by some prominent 
neo-classical economists 50 years later,26 and further reinforced by Krugman’s 
new strategic trade theory in the 1990s and Stiglitz’s and Krugman’s defence 
of Keynesian intervention in the global crisis. Of course the critics of free trade 
imperialism in India, for example, from the mid 19th century (including Marx) 
and up to the present, have always understood the negative consequences of 
free trade, especially in contexts of unequal exchange. That is, so-called free 
25 This Australian episode has interesting parallels with the travails of the European Union in the 2000s, 
where moves towards federation have lacked fiscal equalisation measures to compensate for the 
deleterious effects of the single currency on the less developed regions and the unequal development 
between regions. 
26 Manger, G. J. (1981) ‘The Australian Case for Protection Reconsidered’, Australian Economic Papers, 
Vol 20, No 37, 193–204; Samuelson, P. A. (1981) ‘Summing Up the Australian Case for Protection’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 96: 1, 147–160.
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trade, or efficient market freedom more generally, does not necessarily always 
produce desirable social outcomes.
Taking this argument further, then, a quite different way of understanding 
labourist-protectionism is as a rather radical attempt at first (not very successful 
to be sure and with large gaps) to embed capitalism within democratic society 
and assert democratic control of markets in a dominant way via state-established 
institutions, including the Court of Arbitration (1904), the Harvester principle 
of wage justice based on needs (1907), the Commonwealth Bank (1911), the 
Tariff Board (1921), and organized agricultural marketing (1920s). This kind 
of argument about democratic embedding, obviously not articulated as such 
by Australian leaders or policy makers, but developed explicitly in similar 
ways by Polanyi and Streeck27, provides a way of reinterpreting attitudes 
towards the state as the instrument of popular democratic desire to control 
capital and prevent a repeat of the disastrous crisis of the 1890s, a crisis 
in which the standard of living of many ordinary people was first eroded 
by unemployment and/or wage cuts and then through their savings being 
destroyed by badly managed and rapaciously greedy, speculative, and corrupt 
banks that collapsed in 1893. Trade unionists, labor politicians, small farmers, 
and harmony liberals were united in a desire to make the state the instrument 
of, in effect, a social democratic programme of intervention in markets for 
desirable social outcomes. 
It should be said, therefore, that Labourist-Protectionism was in fact a 
programme to regulate capitalism as a whole system of political economy, 
in a context of lack of theorization (‘socialisme sans doctrines’) and indeed 
of an explicit rejection of grand theory as being somehow ‘unAustralian’. 
This was later misinterpreted as anti-intellectual but was really just practical 
and gradualist, as Reeves perceptively understood in his insightful 1902 
summation. This ‘bottom up’ and piecemeal approach to social reform and 
political economy was nonetheless wide-ranging and coherent. As Frank 
Castles has argued at length, a ‘wage-earners welfare state’ emerged in Australia 
more or less by design in the first decades of the 20th Century.28 This was 
based on the increasingly powerful centralised industrial relations system, 
which was underpinned by a culture of fairness, egalitarianism, harmony, and 
redistribution via the wage bargain and its associated welfare implications. 
Full employment and very high male labour force participation were essential 
27 Polanyi (1944) and Streeck (2011, 2012)
28 Castles, F. G. (2002) ‘Australia’s Institutions and Australia’s Welfare’. In Brennan, G. & Castles, F. G. 
(eds) Australia Reshaped: 200 Years of Institutional Transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
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to maintaining the best outcomes from the system, which was supplemented 
by an increasing range of state-provided welfare measures. Of course the 
limitations were very significant, especially regarding the place of women and 
indigenous people in the regime, limitations that were not overcome in the 
post-1949 period, as happened to a much greater extent in northern Europe, 
largely because of electoral failure of the Labor Party (see below).
Was this form of welfarism and economic regulation a special kind of social 
democratic welfare capitalism? Social democratic welfare capitalism can be 
conceptualised as an idealised abstraction from a combination of empirical 
description and generalisation from actual cases of capitalism that is defined 
essentially by the following features:
• The government/state/market relationship is one in which the 
establishment of equality, justice, efficiency, and investment is a 
public/private co-operative developmental project requiring a degree 
of national planning, or at least agreement about key goals, and 
Keynesian-type fiscal policy to ensure full employment. Corporatist 
consensus and co-operation (but not authoritarianism in any strong 
sense) by capitalist, labour, and civil society interests are significant 
underpinnings that are mediated via pluralistic parliamentary 
democracy.
• Regulation of industrial relations via state-established or state-
supervised collective bargaining at industry and/or national level, 
which aims to civilise or institutionalise conflict, maintain employment 
and raise standards of living and working conditions for workers and 
families, equalise standards throughout the society, and reduce societal 
inequality.
• Extensive social welfare provisions that rely upon a provider/investor/
redistributive state.
• High and progressive taxation at sufficient levels to maintain a capacious 
state for provision of welfare and investment and maintenance of public 
infrastructure. 
• Provision of welfare, services, and investment activities from a social/
market mixture that aims at allocative efficiency within an egalitarian 
and inclusive framework.
Like all models of capitalism, there are both conceptual difficulties with this 
list and, moreover, insofar as there are real world instantiations of the model, 
contradictory tendencies within SDWC political economies and societies. 
Nevertheless, the model is capitalist rather than socialist in any strong sense 
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that verges towards communism, in the sense that private property is still 
dominant, private investment and consumption decisions are paramount, the 
capital/wage labour relationship is the dominant form of economic exchange, 
which remains fundamentally unequal; and capital accumulation from private 
profit still drives the behaviour of the owners of capital. But the public, non-
profit sector can be as large as the private sector and the level of taxation and 
the size of the public (non-profit) sector can be at least half or more of all 
economic activity. This rough equality of socialised and privatised sectors is a 
hallmark of social democratic welfare capitalism in its most developed form. 
And, furthermore, it is important to emphasise the role of liberal democratic 
processes in organising the society although some liberals have always criticised 
the relative lack of individualism, personal freedom, and public criticism of 
the fundamental institutional structure of consensus and co-operation. 
Compared with other models of capitalism historically and 
contemporaneously, SDWC places definite limits on the power of capital but in 
some places where it has been developed it’s clear that capitalists have not only 
been happy to co-operate with social democratic states and labour interests 
but have been very comfortable with a lack of market freedom. Protectionism, 
tolerance of cartels and monopolies, and market distortions of various sorts 
have obviously not undermined the rate of return on capital and that rate 
has been important to the public/private investment climate.29 Australia in 
the early 20th Century had some of these features in a rudimentary form and 
the rhetoric of the time by Liberal and Labor thinkers was that a consensual 
society was being built, partly as a deliberate response to the conflicts of the 
1890s. The class-divided society could be ameliorated and a new kind of society 
built by institutions created precisely for that purpose.
The idea of the state as provider, redistributor, and regulator was firmly 
entrenched in Australia and the vigorously democratic politics was largely a 
contestation over controlling the state in order to refine its interventionist 
capacity and promote certain sectional interests. Thus Australia exhibited 
some basic features before the First World War and more so in the 1920s of 
what developed into a more all-encompassing structure in northern Europe 
in the post-war decades. But the settler capitalist foundation, the continuing 
dependence on resource exports for wealth creation, and the Anglo-Liberal 
ideological and cultural tradition, blunted the social democratic agenda 
compared with Europe in later decades. A good case has also been made by 
29 cf. Swenson, P. A. (2002) Capitalists Against Markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Castles and others30 that social democratic agendas are difficult to advance 
in federal polities where there are many regional interests and a states-rights 
ideology that resists federal power. The Australian Senate, like the United 
States Senate, is a very powerful chamber and so is able to give effect to state 
and local interests. Labor Party government programmes in Australia have 
often been stymied by hostile Senate majorities, the present Rudd / Gillard 
Labor Government being no exception.31 
Furthermore, the negative side to this Australian model, much debated in 
the 1920s and perhaps shared by other SDWC states to varying degrees, was 
about the growing inefficiency and non-viability of the protectionist framework, 
by then encompassing all sectors of economy and society. The lack of capacity 
of governments to promote efficiency via competition in any market came to 
a head in 1928–29 with the defeated attempt to undermine the centralised 
industrial relations system. The depression of the 1930s temporarily derailed 
the wage-earners welfare system. The full-employment war economy of 1939–
45, however, and the ideological framework of Labor, after the Depression 
and war experience, of national planning and nationalistion of key economic 
sectors, including banking, the promotion of full employment, and an improved 
social welfare system, looked set to move the welfare state to a new level in the 
post-war era. The failure to move to this new level of a more mature form of 
SDWC can be attributed not to an ideological shift but in part to the federal 
constitutional structure of Australia, which has limited the capacity of national 
governments to carry through extensive social democratic reforms because of 
both the limited jurisdiction and incapacity of federal governments to persuade 
all sectional interests to co-operate. A majoritarian, two-party system and 
Senate obstructionism has always meant the centre-left struggles to gain office 
and use it effectively for major reforms that threaten unfettered capitalist 
interests. Once Labor got back to office in 1972 the Whitlam government did 
try to catch up with the social democratic agenda, including national health 
insurance, but again the Senate was the problem. 
30 Castles, F. G. and Uhr, J. (2005) ‘Australia: Federal Constraints and Institutional Innovations’. In H. 
Obinger, S. Leibfried, and F. G. Castles (eds) Federalism and the Welfare State, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
31 It was said of the Scullin Labor Government of the early 1930s, which was attempting to implement 
a progressive and even radical (for the time) Keynesian-type or New Deal-type of depression policy, 
that, lacking a Senate majority, was ‘in office but not in power’. 
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Path dependencies and contingencies: shocks on the rocky road of 
the Australian model – towards oblivion?
It used to be said in the early 20th century (such as by Reeves, 1902), and 
more recently with a reminiscing tone, that Australia and New Zealand were 
social laboratories, experimenting with new forms of social organization 
and institutions that were designed somehow to resolve the fundamental 
problems of class-divided, unequal, capitalist societies. This antipodean new 
world, free from the constraints and legacies of old world social structures 
and ideologies, was supposedly able to more freely experiment with ways of 
organizing and regulating the socio-politico-economy. But, as elsewhere in the 
capitalist world, class conflict lay at the heart of Australia’s ‘experiments’ and 
the social democratic political movement was itself divided among various 
factions, seemingly inevitable within liberal, democratic polities. Many forces 
of structural continuities and contingencies operated. 
Throughout the history of Australian SDWC, no less than anywhere else, 
we can discern the shifting dynamics between institutional path dependencies 
(especially the centrality of state intervention), cultural continuities and 
commitments to egalitarianism and co-operation, public ideologies (not always 
coherent), formal reform, and the path of economic development, including, 
crucially, economic shocks of both supply and demand types. On the later topic, 
it’s clear that ad hoc reactions to shocks or the inability to respond adequately 
have played a significant role in this history of SDWC as have more careful 
responses and other longer-term forces. 
The long-term effects of reactions to shocks have depended on both their 
degree of intellectual framing and far-sightedness. Reactions to the great 
shock of 1890–94 played out over the following two decades in a profound 
way because of the ideological, cultural, and politico-constitutional context. 
Conservative and even laissez faire reactions to the 1930s depression would 
doubtless have had very long-lasting effects if the World War Two shock 
had not intervened and established an economic and social climate for more 
social democratic policies with Keynesian ideological confirmation, which, 
nevertheless, could not be well-established in Australia, again because of the 
politico-constitutional, economic, and geo-political context of the immediate 
post-war years. The long boom of the post-war decades was dependent on the 
initial demand shock of the Korean War and its successive waves of resource 
exports to NE Asia up to the 1970s. The 1970s stagflation shock had very 
long-term effects because it contributed to the de-legitimation of Keynesian 
interventionism and therefore of the social democratic programme of the 
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Whitlam Labor government of 1972–75.32 The 1991–2 recession, on the other 
hand, simply cemented the beginnings of the shift to more privatisation and 
marketisation of the 1980s. 
The rightist, labourist, faction within the ALP, having become dominant by 
the early 1980s, moved decisively to Neo-Liberalism. The wages and incomes 
Accord of the early Hawke/Keating ALP government (1983–96), tried to 
combine a corporatized labour market and limited improvements to social 
welfare with marketisation in other areas. The contradiction was abandoned 
in favour of Neo-Liberalism all-round in the crisis of the early 90s. The degree 
of convergence between the dominant faction of Labor and the conservatives 
on the fundamentals of policy was remarkable.33
Finally, in the 2008–13 crisis, we are seeing in many countries a widespread 
disenchantment with the lack of an organisational and socialised foundation 
for economic behaviour. That is, perhaps the beginning of an epochal shift, 
comparable in significance with the Neo-Liberalism of the 1970s and early 80s, 
may be happening in which all markets, including labour markets, will again 
be seen as requiring greater central regulation that brings them closer into 
line with social needs. Another way to express this is in terms of the Polanyian 
understanding of economies being embedded within societies and that the 
past decade or two could be seen as a period in which economic behaviour 
and its market contexts were ‘dis-embedded’ to a significant degree from their 
close connections with social organisation and politics. The issue would then 
become one, as Wolfgang Streeck has argued, of how to re-assert democracy 
into the economy. Rudd’s Labor Government (2007–2010) made some moves 
in this direction but not very far.
In conclusion, this story of Australia’s labourist/social democratic/SDWC 
history reveals several important points for understanding both the Australian 
and the more general history of Western capitalism. First, the ALP became the 
sole ‘carrier’ of the social democratic impulse from 1908, aided a little by the 
inheritors of colonial socialism among certain sectors of the economy, and so 
the history of social democratic reform became dependent on the fortunes of 
the ALP alone. Secondly, however, the electoral system limited those fortunes 
very considerably, in contrast with northern European social democrats within 
their proportional representation systems who were able to forge and dominate 
centre-left coalitions in favour of further developing social welfarism in the 
32 Battin (1997).
33 Ecclestone, R. and Marsh, I. (2011) ‘The Henry Tax Review, Cartel Parties and the Reform Capacity of 
the Australian State’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 46: 3, 437–451.
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post-war decades. In Australia the electoral spectrum remained shifted to the 
centre-right whereas in northern Europe it was shifted to the centre-left in 
most places, at least in terms of consensus on fundamentals of SDWC, with 
significant consequences for the development of SDWC in both regions. 
Thirdly, in hindsight, the frustration of and then electoral defeat of Labor 
in 1949 was pivotal. The Whitlam ‘experiment’ was never given space to 
breathe. Once the ALP became electorally dominant again in 1983 it had 
moved towards the centre-right and became imbued with neo-liberalism to 
a greater extent than social democrats in northern Europe. The crisis of the 
early 90s reinforced that trend. Once back in office again in 2007 the global 
crisis of 2008 onwards again undermined the attempt to move leftwards, a 
frustration again flowing in part from the Senate. Adding to the problem has 
been the enormous power being asserted by the ‘new sqattocracy’ in the shape 
of mining companies during the current resources boom.34 
Finally, it’s doubtful in the 2010s if Australia still belongs to the SDWC 
club. The convergence on Neo-Liberalism, Prime Minister Gillard’s internal 
coup against Rudd, the formation of a precarious minority government, 
subsequent weakness of the ALP in the face of internal factional conflict and 
external enemies (especially big capital), and its domination by neo-liberals 
and unprincipled careerists, has further undermined the ideological and 
programmatic strength of the ALP and pushed it to the right. The fiscal straight 
jacket of a low-taxing, populist rhetoric flowing remorsely from the right, 
adhered to without a peep by Labor, undermines any capacity to strengthen 
the state again and thus improve welfare and public provision. The ALP has 
expressly abandoned the last vestiges of social democratic rhetoric as well as 
most activism. The contestation in politics has ceased to be about ideology 
but about efficient management and reductions of the role of the state. The 
self-imposed fiscal straightjacket of low taxes and balanced budgets pushes 
Australia towards, if not a failing state, at least an inadequate state.35 The 
election of 2013 will be a decisive moment. 
34 Lloyd, C. (2012) ‘Resource Rents, Taxation, and Political Economy in Australia: States, Public Policy, 
and the New Squatters in Historical perspective’, Australian Policy Online, 28 May 2012. http://apo.
org.au/research/resource-rents-taxation-and-political-economy-australia.
35 The taxation to GDP ratio at about 28% is now near the bottom of the OECD table. 
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Politics in the making of sickness insurance in 
Finland
OLLI kANgAS, MIkkO NIEMELä AND SAMPO VARjONEN
The introduction of social insurance has taken place in a certain chronological 
order in Europe. As a rule, the first act to be carried through has been work 
accident insurance, followed by sickness insurance, pensions, unemployment 
insurance and family benefits1. Contrary to the other developed OECD 
countries2, in Finland sickness insurance was the last of these five major income 
transfer schemes to be adopted. Furthermore, by international standards the 
implementation of sickness insurance took place at a late stage in Finland, 
be the yardstick either chronological time or society’s diachronic prosperity 
level. The Finnish Sickness Insurance Act of 1963 was lagging 80 years 
behind Germany (where the first law was adopted in 1882) and more than 
70 years behind Sweden (1891) and Denmark (1892). As regards diachronic 
comparisons, Finland was Europe’s most prosperous country when its first 
sickness insurance act was introduced: when sickness insurance legislation was 
enacted in Finland, the GDP per capita was three times higher than in Sweden 
and five times higher than in Italy when the two countries implemented their 
first sickness laws. If sickness insurance had been implemented in Finland 
at the same GDP per capita level as in Italy, it should have come into effect 
already by the end of the 1890s, or, if compared with Sweden, in the 1920s. 
Usually Finnish laggardness has been explained by various structural 
factors, such as the country’s late industrialisation and the large proportion 
of rural population.3 However, structural factors are not sufficient to explain 
the extremely late introduction of sickness insurance in Finland. When seeking 
explanations we should examine the different kinds of insurance desired 
1 Alber, Jens (1982) Von Armenhaus zum Wohlfahrtsstaat. Analysen zur Entwicklung der 
Sozialversicherung in Westeuropa. Frankfurt: Campus.
2 Except Andorra (1966), Guernsey (1964) and Moldova (1993). 
3 Niemelä, Heikki (1994) Suomen kokonaiseläkejärjestelmän muotoutuminen. Helsinki: Kela, 146–160; 
Kangas, Olli (1991) The Politics of Social Rights: Studies on Dimensions of Sickness Insurance in OECD 
countries. Edsbruk: Akademitryck; Hellsten, Katri (1993) Vaivaishoidosta hyvinvointivaltion kriisiin. 
Hyvinvointivaltiokehitys ja sosiaaliturvajärjestelmän muotoutuminen Suomessa. Helsinki: University of 
Helsinki.
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by different political actors and how political contradictions hindered the 
implementation of sickness benefits in Finland.4 
 The role of politics has, in fact, been one of the most debated themes in 
welfare state research. Many of the questions of comparative socio-political 
research revolve around the impact of politics5 in the development of the 
welfare state. The issue has been investigated from two different viewpoints. 
On the one hand, historical case studies, as practiced by proper historians, 
have drilled into the detailed political genealogy of reforms. On the other 
hand, quantitative methods have been used to outline the effect of political 
power on the coverage of systems and benefit levels – this tradition has been 
strong in macro-sociology and political science. Only in very few studies6 have 
these two approaches been combined to see if similar results can be obtained 
on the basis of a detailed historical narrative and a more straightforward 
numerical analysis. Our aim in this study is to examine the making of sickness 
insurance in Finland by combining these two approaches and to see the extent 
to which they lead to same conclusion. We identify agents, some of whom, in 
the historical part, are individuals but who are mostly collective actors. In the 
numerical treatise we only look at collective actors. 
 We start by sketching a historical ‘grand narrative’ of the making of 
sickness insurance in Finland. With slight variations the same story applies 
to many other forms of social policy as well. The narrative part is based on 
the ideographic tradition in social sciences and is a ‘thick’7 account of the 
making of sickness insurance in Finland. This historical description takes a 
lion’s share of our presentation. Two basic lines emerge: the ‘a little for all’ 
principle demanded by the representatives of the rural population, versus 
the principle of workers’ insurance basing on income-relatedness that served 
the interests of urban employees. The historical overview is followed by a 
more condensed section which examines trends in sickness benefits during 
various governments from 1964 to 2010. The main question is whether the 
4 For a general presentation see e.g., Kettunen, Pauli (1986) Poliittinen liike ja sosiaalinen kollektiivisuus. 
Helsinki: SHS. Kettunen, Pauli (1994) Suojelu, suoritus, subjekti. Työsuojelu teollistuvan Suomen 
yhteiskunnallisissa ajattelu- ja toimintatavoissa. Helsinki: SHS.
5 ’Politics matter’ thesis; see, e.g. Kangas, Olli (2006) ’Politiikka ja sosiaaliturva Suomessa’. In 
Paavonen, Tapani & Kangas, Olli Eduskunta hyvinvointivaltion rakentajana. Helsinki: Edita, 189–366.; 
Kangas, Olli & Palme, Joakim (2007) ‘Social Rights, Structural Needs and Social Expenditure’. In 
Clasen, Jochen & Siegel, Nico (eds) Investigating the welfare state change: the ‘dependent variable 
problem’ in comparative analysis. Cheltenhamn: Edward Elgar, 106–132.
6 A good example of a combinatory study is Huber, Evelyn & Stephens, John (2001) Development and 
Crisis of the Welfare State. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
7 Geertz, Clifford (1973) Interpretating Cultures. New York: Basic Book.
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previous historical legacies are reflected in benefit levels. We seek parsimony 
of explanation and through statistical devices we extract an ‘analytic narrative’8 
out of a more ideographic historical account. Thus, we attempt to repeat the 
historical narrative by quantitative means and see if similar results can be 
obtained by the two different approaches.9 The concluding section discusses 
and summarises our findings at a more general level. 
Was the lateness of the Finnish insurance the Agrarian League’s 
fault but the universalism its merit? 
 The debate on sickness insurance started in Finland simultaneously with 
other European countries. The issue was discussed in several committees and 
working groups, but discussions did not lead to implementation of compulsory 
insurance. There were two basic arguments against a mandatory programme. 
First, the poor relief already in place would take care of the sick. Another 
justification against an obligatory scheme was the fear that the insurance would 
erode individuals’ own responsibility to take care of themselves.10 The desire 
was to move forward on the basis of voluntary measures, and consequently, 
legislation on voluntary funds was issued already in 1897. In international 
comparative research, the birth of a certain form of social security is usually 
dated to the year the state has either decided to provide economic support to 
voluntary funds or decreed a compulsory insurance.11 If the Finnish government 
had participated in the funds even with a very small sum – as was done in 
Sweden, for example – the time of creation of the sickness insurance would 
have been dated back to the decree of 1897, and Finland, the country later 
known for its laggardness, would in one stroke have become one of the pioneers 
of social policies. However, unlike most other countries, in Finland the state 
did not decide to support the funds, and in international comparisons Finland’s 
sickness insurance is not dated until the implementation of a universal scheme 
8 Bates, Robert, Greif, Avner, Levi, Margaret, Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent & Weingast, Barry (1998) Analytic 
Narratives. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
9 The time periods covered by the historical and analytic narratives are not exactly the same. Of obvious 
reasons the historical analysis goes longer back in history than the quantitative analysis that can begin 
only after the introduction of the sickness insurance scheme. However, that is not a major problem 
since our idea is to see if the grand narrative based on historical story telling still is valid and can be 
replicated by a numeral exercise.
10 Niemelä, Heikki (2004) ’Suomen sairausvakuutusjärjestelmän synty’. In Hellsten, Katri & Helne, Tuula 
(eds) Vakuuttava sosiaalivakuutus? Helsinki: Kela, 91.
11 E.g. Alber 1982.
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in 1963. This anecdotal story shows that the timing of the first laws and the 
classification of pioneers and laggards in comparative research may indeed 
be an arbitrary exercise. Some countries qualified pioneers with a very limited 
coverage of the first insurance programmes. 
 Sickness insurance featured prominently in the election programmes of the 
parties preparing for the first general parliamentary election in 1906. Already 
at this stage some basic divisions appeared that would condition Finnish social 
policies. When other parties demanded a German-style workers’ insurance in 
the case of sickness, the Agrarian League prioritized universal and compulsory 
pension insurance over other forms of social insurance. In the first elections 
the Agrarian League got only about six per cent of the votes but later the party 
obtained a strong position in the Finnish politics and followed its socio-political 
principles on flat-rate universalism sketched in the early programmes. 
 Already in the year 1906 – prior the first elections (1907) – a new committee 
was set up to consider implementing sickness benefits mimicking the German 
workers’ insurance. In its report from 1911 the committee recommended 
compulsory sickness insurance for factory employees. For an employee fallen 
ill, the proposal would have guaranteed a daily allowance which, after a three-
day waiting period, would amount to two thirds of the wage.12 The Government, 
however, did not make a proposal on the matter. 
The Senate of independent Finland returned to the matter, and among its 
first orders of business was setting up a committee to examine the possibility 
to implement sickness and maternity insurance. Although the Agrarian League 
was not represented, the committee proposed a national insurance.13 The 
justification was that the country’s large agrarian population could not be 
left outside the scope of the insurance. Again the Social Democrats argued 
that Finland should proceed gradually and follow along the lines of a workers’ 
insurance, as was done in many other countries.14 Even then the Government 
did not carry out the legislation and progress in the matter was left to legislative 
motions made by single members of parliament and political parties.15 
 The next serious attempt for sickness insurance was made by Väinö 
Tanner’s social democratic minority government (1926–1927) which in 1927 
made a proposal on a broad employee insurance programme, from which 
income ceilings limiting the scope of the insured had been removed. Also 
12 KM 1911:10; Hellsten, Katri (1993) Vaivaishoidosta hyvinvointivaltion kriisiin. Hyvinvointivaltiokehitys 
ja sosiaaliturvajärjestelmän muotoutuminen Suomessa. Helsinki: University of Helsinki.
13 KM 1921:22.
14 Niemelä 2004, 94.
15 EE 24/1926.
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white-collar workers were now included because ‘their probability of falling 
ill is the same as the probability of manual workers’.16 The amount of the 
daily allowance for the first day would be three-quarters of the wage, and 
the compensation would have an upper limit. No proposal was made about 
establishing a separate state authority to carry out insurance, i.e., the insurance 
would be administered by separate sickness funds. In the Parliament, the 
bourgeois parties opposed the social democratic proposal and finally also the 
left-wing socialists rejected the bill. The conservative National Coalition Party 
feared the too high costs of the reform, and instead suggested a voluntary 
scheme. The Agrarian League once again could not accept a scheme that did not 
benefit the rural population. According to the party, the conditions in Finland 
were fundamentally different from the conditions elsewhere in Europe, where 
‘the main source of income was large-scale industry’. In Finland those who 
were most ‘in need of social services’ were not employees but smallholders and 
tenant farmers.17 The Socialist Workers and Smallholders Party (STPV, which 
was a disguised communist party) criticised the scheme because of the income-
relatedness of the daily allowance. Income-related benefits ‘would endanger 
the workers’ spirit of solidarity and bring a pernicious caste system among 
the wage-labour population’. According to the STPV, the linkage to income 
demanded by the SDP in fact caused and maintained inequality. Therefore, 
the bill was to be rejected.18
 According to the Social Democratic Minister of Social Affairs Johan Helo 
the conditions in Finland at the time were similar to those in which most of the 
European countries had passed their first sickness insurance acts. In fact, many 
countries were poorer than Finland when they implemented sickness benefits, 
which in Finland were regarded too radical and expensive.19 This attitude 
discloses an interesting difference in the political discourse or rhetoric through 
which comparisons between countries were being made and how the issue 
was framed in parliamentary discussions. Based on the diachronic method of 
comparison used by Helo, Finland could afford to enact the law, especially if 
it were to be initially implemented in a more modest form, as had been done 
in other countries. Helo thus compared the present situation in Finland to 
the situation in other countries at the time they each had carried out their 
sickness acts. The comparison of the proposal’s opponents, on the other hand, 
16 HE 2/1927.
17 PTK 1927, 45–51.
18 PTK 1928, 783–785. 
19 PTK 1927, 53.
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was chronological. The prevailing level of socio-economic development and 
social security in other countries (rich, industrialized countries with extensive 
legislation) were contrasted against the poor Finland, and the conclusion was 
that Finland could not afford a similarly comprehensive system as richer 
countries.
 In the Parliament the Committee for Labour Affairs suggested that the 
scope of the scheme should be extended to also cover agricultural employees.20 
The change would have doubled the number of the insured and increased costs 
considerably. Even this did not satisfy the Agrarian League still opposed to the 
bill, but on the other hand, the STPV, the liberals (National Progressive Party 
and a section of Swedish People’s Party (RKP)) and the National Coalition 
Party voted for the bill in parliament, and consequently, it was passed in March 
1929. However, the conservatives, agrarians and the RKP voted the bill to be 
‘dormant’21 until the next elections were held.22 When the new parliament 
(elected in 1929) re-examined the act, the opponents’ front was joined by the 
Communists in the Socialist Workers Party who were more preoccupied with 
the Komintern’s interpretation on ‘the third crisis of ‘capitalism’ the possible 
collapse of capitalist order in Finland than implementing sickness insurance.23 
The Parliament rejected the bill in November 1929.24 The greatest vigour 
behind sickness insurance had disappeared, and the legislative machinery 
began to concentrate on the preparation of the National Pensions Act. In 
the parliament, sickness insurance was, however, repeatedly brought up in 
single legislative motions submitted above all by Social Democrats (1930, 1934, 
1945 and 1952) and, after the Second World War, by the Finnish People’s 
Democratic League (SKDL) (1948 and 1954). Sickness insurance was not on 
the right-wing political agenda at all.
 The Social Insurance Committee that operated after the war recommended 
in its 1949 report a gradual implementation of compulsory sickness insurance. 
Initially, the insurance would apply to workplaces with more than 50 
employees. A daily allowance, to be paid for a maximum period of 90 days, 
would equal to 60 per cent of the insured person’s income. The costs would be 
20 TyöVM 1/1928.
21 Finnish parliamentarism included strong minority rules for decision-making to prevent changes from 
being too radical and to protect various minority groups. One third of the parliament (67 MPs) could 
prevent the adoption of a new law by voting it ‘dormant’ until the next elections were held. After that 
the new parliament could adopt the bill by a single majority. The one-third minority rule was abolished 
in 1992 and since then all bills except constitutional ones may be accepted by a simple majority.
22 Niemelä 2004, 98.
23 Kettunen 1986, 282, 376–380
24 Niemelä 2004, 99.
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divided equally between employers and employees.25 The recommendations of 
the report were not implemented. Neither K. A. Fagerholm’s (SDP) minority 
government (1948–1950) nor the four successive Urho Kekkonen’s (agrarian) 
governments (1950–1953) were capable or willing to prepare a bill. It was 
not until 1954 that Sakari Tuomioja’s caretaker government (1953–1954) 
submitted a legislative proposal on sickness and maternity insurance based 
on the 1949 committee report. The benefits were generally the same as those 
in the committee’s report and it was estimated that the coverage had been one 
fifth of the employees26, which from an international perspective would have 
been a reasonable proportion for the first law.27 In their customary manner, 
the agrarians opposed the proposal because the rural population would have 
been left outside. The proposal lapsed, and the parliament concentrated on 
reforming national pensions.28
 Based on Tuomioja’s proposal, a new committee to consider the 
implementation of sickness insurance with a wider scope was nevertheless set 
up in 1955. The committee proposed an insurance that would cover the whole 
population.29 However, V. J. Sukselainen’s agrarian government (1959–1960) 
did not take any action upon the matter. In the parliament the SKDL and SDP 
tried to hasten the legislation and submitted their own legislative motions for 
sickness insurance, until finally in October 1961 Martti Miettunen’s (agrarian) 
right-of-centre coalition cabinet (1961–1962) set up a new committee. Already 
in November the committee submitted a proposal according to which the 
daily allowance would be applicable to the entire population. A minimum 
flat-rate daily allowance would be paid to those with no monetary income 
(mainly working in agriculture) and income-related benefits were to be paid 
to blue- and white-collar workers.30
 Political activity related to sickness insurance became more animated 
in the parliament, and many previously passive parties submitted their own 
requests or legislative motions. The National Coalition Party’s motion pointed 
out that due to economic considerations it was not possible to implement the 
sickness insurance all at once. Initially compensation would only be offered for 
medical treatment and only later, within the capacity of the national economy, 
25 KM 1949:23; Niemelä 2004, 102.
26 HE 15/1954.
27 Alber 1982, 240–241.
28 Niemelä 2004, 102.
29 KM 1959:6; Niemelä 2004, 104–105.
30 KM 1961:39; Niemelä 2004, 106.
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progress would be made to compensate losses of earnings.31 A motion with a 
similar content was also submitted by RKP.32 
 The SDP and the Agrarian League submitted their own motions at the 
same time in 1961.33 They quite adequately brought to light the parties’ differing 
views on the basic principles of social policies and their implementation. The 
SDP stressed that, naturally, its aim was to insure the entire population, but 
it was not possible to implement this all at once. The first step would be to 
insure the wage-earners; for others, a voluntary scheme would be created. Thus 
the social democratic model would have been a typical employee insurance 
model, where in return for earnings-related payments the insured person 
would receive earnings-related benefits. Following its socio-political ideology, 
the Agrarian Party still demanded universal insurance: the system should 
cover everyone living in Finland. 
 In order to push the legislation forward, the SDP submitted a new motion 
in 1962. Now the SDP had moved towards a national insurance model 
with universal coverage. The insurance would be based on sickness funds 
operating under the control of The Social Insurance Institution (Kela) that was 
established in 1937 to run the National Pension Scheme. The daily allowance 
would be income-related (1.5 per mille of annual income) with a minimum 
amount (400 Finnish markkas corresponding almost to 20 per cent of an 
average worker’s wage, APW) and a ceiling (2,250 markkas that was close 
to the APW).34 The Agrarian League submitted its own motion, which was 
mostly similar to the one submitted a year earlier35 and the SKDL, for its part, 
proposed a model excluding high-income earners and wealthy persons. As 
regards the benefits, the SKDL went along with the Agrarian League’s flat-
rate principle, but proposed higher benefit rates.36 
 The higher the probability of the enactment of sickness insurance was, 
the more active became also the parties that previously had been against the 
scheme and an intensive period of political credit-seeking began.37 By referring 
31 TA 677/1962; PTK 1962, 1865–1866.
32 TA 678/1962.
33 LA 156/1961; LA 157/1961.
34 Data on benefits is derived from LA 254/1962 and compensation levels, i.e., the value of benefits 
expressed in relation to average wage are calculated on the basis of wage income data gathered 
in Social Citizenship Indicators Program (SCIP) housed at the Swedish Institute for Social Research, 
University of Stockholm; https://dspace.it.su.se/dspace/handle/10102/7
35 LA 257/1962.
36 LA 256/1962; LA 257/1962.
37 Pierson, Paul (1994) Dismantling the Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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to a particular motion a party had submitted, it could assure its voters that it 
was the activity of the party that pushed through the act. All in all, 11 legislative 
motions were submitted to the parliament. All political parties had realized 
the inevitability of the insurance, and subsequent political debates did not deal 
with whether or not the sickness insurance law should be enacted – as had 
been the case previously – but the debates revolved around the institutional 
set-up of the scheme.
 In the end of 1962 Ahti Karjalainen’s (agrarian) right-of-centre government 
(1962–1963) submitted a bill to the parliament. The bill followed the lines of 
the committee recommendations with the exception that the administration 
of the scheme was to be centralised and run by Kela.38 While the Agrarian 
League together with left-wing socialists and communists supported the Kela 
model without reservations, the National Coalition and the SDP together with 
the major labour market organisations favoured a decentralized model based 
on sickness funds in the fear that the centralised design would concentrate too 
much power in Kela, where the Agrarian League had strong positions.39 The 
National Coalition Party’s front was however not completely unified, because 
the party’s Minister of Social Affairs (Kyllikki Pohjala) strongly supported the 
Kela model. 
 The parties on the left criticised the meagreness of the benefits and the 
length of the waiting period which benefits were not paid for. However, at 
the final stages, the socialists did not want to endanger the establishment of 
sickness insurance and supported the government’s proposal. The Sickness 
Insurance Act was passed on May 21, 1963. The insurance model included 
income maintenance, maternity allowance and reimbursements for costs of 
medical treatment. Income maintenance guaranteed minimum and earnings-
related daily allowances. The minimum daily allowance was paid to all whose 
yearly income remained below a certain earnings threshold – thus it also 
guaranteed transfers to people without any nominal income; thus, e.g. 
home-wives, non-paid family workers and students became eligible for daily 
allowances. Whereas the minimum daily allowance reflected the agrarian socio-
political alignment (flat-rate benefits plus supplements for dependent spouse 
and children financed by income-related contributions), the earnings-related 
daily allowance reflected the interests of the employees, mainly represented 
by the SDP. As a whole, the history of Finnish sickness insurance is a good 
example of the build-up of the Finnish welfare state. The Social Democrats, 
38 HE 129/1962.
39 Niemelä 2004, 108–110; e.g., the Director General of Kela was the chairman of the Agrarian League. 
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with their demands on workers’ insurance, were the most diligent in the matter 
and made numerous attempts to get the law passed. By utilising the strong 
minority regulations and veto points40 the Finnish parliamentary system 
allowed, the agrarians, with clever alliances – at times with the Communists, 
at others with the Conservatives – managed to block all proposals that would 
have led to a workers’ insurance. The Agrarian League’s strategy of ’if not 
for us then for no one else either’ delayed the insurance coming into effect. 
Sickness insurance was delayed both chronologically and diachronically – in 
other countries laws were implemented in significantly poorer conditions. On 
the other hand, when the law was finally passed, its coverage was universal 
and it was one of the most comprehensive in the world – only Sweden had a 
coverage rate as extensive as Finland. 
From flat-rate to earnings-related benefits
One of the basic problems in the 1963 law was that daily allowances were 
not indexed to keep abreast with general income development. Increases in 
benefits were to be decided by the government. After 1970, the maximum daily 
allowance was not increased even once. Due to rapid increases in wages the 
benefit payable to the average-paid worker very soon exceeded the maximum 
daily allowance, and the person did not receive the earnings-related daily 
allowance in full. The Finnish compensation level, which in the mid-1960s 
had been close to the OECD average (about 60 per cent of the APW), became 
one of the lowest (about 30 per cent of the APW) in Europe. The situation 
of low-income earners had been improved by increasing the minimum 
daily allowance, but the majority of employees received the maximum daily 
allowance. Thus, towards the end of the 1970s, Finnish sickness insurance 
had in fact changed into a flat-rate system. Without any deliberate decision 
the underpinning logic of the system had been altered. A political drift based 
on non-decisions produced what, in Peter Hall’s terminology, could be called 
a gradual ‘third order change’41. 
40 In this issue Finnish history strongly supports studies emphasizing the role of legislative structure 
and various veto points built in the system. See e.g. Immergut, Ellen (1992) Health Politics. Interests 
and Institutions in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Skocpol, Theda (1995) 
Protection Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in United States. Harvard: Harvard 
University Press.
41 Hall, Peter (1993) ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State. The Case of Economic 
Policymaking in Britain’. Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, 275–296.
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One reason for this drift was the fact that most members of the Parliament 
did not consider the development problematic. The parliamentary debates 
at the time mainly dealt with the level of basic benefits: the low level of 
minimum allowance became contrasted with the ‘lavish’ maximum benefit. 
This ‘injustice’ was extensively used above all, in the rhetoric of the Centre 
Party (former Agrarian League) and the Finnish Rural Party (SMP). Some of 
the representatives of the Centre Party even expressed their desire to move 
entirely to flat-rate benefits.42 
On a more general level, one could say that the rural rhetoric that favoured 
the flat-rate principle emphasised arithmetic equality: sickness affects all 
citizens, be they rich or poor. In the name of equality, the benefits should 
also be the same for all. On the other hand, not much weight was put on 
differences in income losses caused by incapacity to work – which idea plays 
the most important role in the traditional insurance philosophy. 
Even during this period, the National Coalition did not pay much attention 
to sickness insurance. Earnings-related daily allowance was more of a concern 
to the parties of the left, although, even for them, the greatest interest seemed 
to lie in the minimum daily allowance. In the beginning of the 1970s, the SKDL 
regarded the difference between the highest and the lowest daily allowance 
unreasonable and demanded the minimum allowance to be raised.43 A decade 
later, the party proposed an increase also to the maximum daily allowance, so 
that the level of compensation would increase approximately to 60 percent of 
the wage. For lower income groups, the percentage of compensation was to be 
higher. Thus, there was still a demand for a system with an earnings ceiling: 
the maximum daily allowance had to be raised but not abolished.44 In the 
beginning of the 1970s, also SDP favoured the ceiling and in fact demanded 
that the maximum daily allowance should be decreased.45 Towards the end 
of the decade, also the Social Democrats’ policy gradually changed. According 
to the party, the purpose of sickness insurance was ‘to compensate losses of 
earnings due to incapacity’46, but the ceiling was so low that this could no longer 
be realised. SDP’s motions also spoke out for the taxing of social benefits47. 
42 PTK 1970, 2554.
43 RA 158/1971.
44 LA 129/1981.
45 LA 322/1970.
46 LA 410/1972; KK 352/1975.
47 LA 438/1975.
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Apart from these motions, the earnings-related part of sickness allowance did 
not get much attention in the parliamentary debates of the 1970s. 
As statutory benefits lost their importance, new solutions were to be found 
among labour market organisations. In 1980, expenditure on the employer 
provided paid sick days was already greater than expenditures paid out by Kela. 
The situation naturally put a strain on the employers, who were responsible for 
the whole wage sum for the sick-pay period, which varied from one to three 
months depending on the labour market contract. Against this background, it is 
not that surprising that the Employer Federation together with social insurance 
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Social Affairs were the first ones to demand 
improvements in sickness insurance benefits. Thus, the initiative to reforming 
the daily allowance system came in fact from outside the parliament. Social 
insurance experts had already in the early 1970s proposed a comprehensive 
social benefits reform. The aim was that in Finland, as in the other Nordic 
countries, income from social insurance should be treated equally with income 
from other sources: in other words, social transfers should also be subject to 
taxation. The main problem was how to persuade the politicians and trade 
unions to agree to this.48 
The trade unions’ evasive attitude began to gradually melt away because 
the sick pay systems based on collective agreements had problems of their 
own. Different occupational categories had different arrangements. Generally 
the sick pay systems for white-collar workers were better than those for blue-
collar workers. In addition, high-income earners benefited more from tax-
free allowances than low-income groups. These circumstances made trade 
unions consider improvements in statutory benefits, and the representatives 
for both the employers’ and employees’ organisations decided to participate 
in a working group preparing a sickness benefit reform. Bureaucrats from 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health offered a compensation level 
corresponding to 60 percent of wage without benefit ceilings, but the trade 
unions managed to raise the compensation level to 80 percent. This is what 
the working group eventually proposed to the government.49
In 1981, the coalition cabinet of the left-wing parties and the Centre 
Party (1979–1982) led by Mauno Koivisto (SDP) prepared a proposal to 
transform the Sickness Insurance Act. The new taxable daily allowance 
would compensate 80 per cent of the earnings without benefit ceilings.50 
48 Kangas 2006, 326–327. 
49 Kangas 1991, 148.
50 HE 54/1981.
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In the Parliament, the proposal was received with criticism. Again, the 
SMP advocated equal benefits.51 The Centre Party was aghast with the 
proposal’s ‘antisocial’ character, saying that it reflected ‘the desire of strong 
labour organisations to obtain extra benefits to the better-offs’52. No cheers 
were heard from the leftmost end of the SKDL either, as the proposal was 
understood to be a concession to employers and ‘right-wing circles’. However, 
many political groupings, which initially expressed their criticism against the 
government’s proposal, eventually accepted the situation and voted for the bill. 
Back and forth
The extensive ‘SOVE reform’ came into effect in the beginning of 1982, and 
Finland moved from one of the most typical flat-rate systems to complete 
earnings-relatedness. The benefits were 80 per cent of a person’s income. 
However, already the following year, the earnings-relatedness was relaxed 
and a cut-off point was introduced: i.e., up to a certain income limit the 
compensation was 80 per cent, but for earnings exceeding that limit only a 
50 per cent compensation was paid. In 1984 another cut-off point came into 
effect, above which the compensation would only be 30 per cent. At the outset 
of the 1990s economic depression, there were thus two cut-off points and 
three compensation levels: 80, 50 and 30 per cent. This was the situation in 
which Esko Aho’s right-of-centre government (1991–1995) began to look for 
savings in the sickness insurance system in the midst of a deep economic crisis.
In October 1991 Aho’s government made its first proposal to reduce sickness 
insurance. The government proposed that, with the exception of the lowest 
daily allowances, compensations should be decreased by five percentage points, 
which would decrease the compensation levels to 75, 45 and 25 percent.53 The 
most critical attitude towards the proposal was from the Left Alliance (former 
SKDL), which wanted the law voted to be ‘dormant’. The Social Democrats 
criticised the proposal, but at best they showed only minor resistance and 
did not join in the Left Alliance’s demands to reject the proposal.54 In 1992 
the minority regulations were changed and since then laws could be enacted 
51 RA 1417/1981.
52 LA 157/1981.
53 HE 145/1991.
54 PTK 1991, 3801–3803, 4045–4051, 4106–4107.
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by a simple majority in the Parliament which increased the power of the 
government vis a vis parties in the opposition. 
In 1992 Aho’s government proposed further cuts in the compensation 
levels (to 70, 40 and 25 per cent). This time the Left Alliance announced 
that they would accept cuts only if they were made to the top end in the 
income ladder, whereas benefits for the low- and middle-income groups should 
not be touched. The SDP criticised the Centre Party for returning to the old 
agrarian flat-rate system.55 The government carried out the cuts by arguing 
that they would be in effect only temporarily, until the end of 1992. However, 
in November 1992 the Aho cabinet made a new proposal where the changes 
were made permanent and, in addition, the basic compensation level was cut 
from 70 to 66 per cent.56 
The discussion concerning the new proposal advanced along the same 
lines as it had done for the previous one. Representatives of the Left Alliance 
asked how the Centre Party, which depicted itself as the safeguard of minimum 
security, could punish the most disadvantaged sections of the population, while 
leaving the benefits of the highest income earners untouched. Also the SDP 
criticised the proposal, but it did not join the Left Alliance in their demands 
for a benefit ceiling. The Centre Party, on the other hand, claimed that the 
trade unions had prevented, by threats of a general strike, any cuts that would 
have hit the better-offs. Cutbacks simply had to be targeted towards low-
income earners because trade unions together with employers prevented other 
measures and selfishly took care of the labour market insiders: ‘the greedy 
are always raking in money for themselves’.57 
Paavo Lipponen’s (SDP) ‘rainbow’ cabinet (1995–1999), which consisted 
of the SDP, the National Coalition, the Left Alliance, the Greens and the RKP 
(Swedish People’s Party), decided to continue the savings policies. Already in 
September 1995 the government proposed that the minimum allowance would 
be abolished: in other words, without earnings there would be no right to a 
daily allowance. In the proposition, sickness allowance was first and foremost 
seen as compensation for lost income. If there were no earnings, there was 
no reason to pay compensation either. The proposal also aimed to tie benefits 
more closely to actual losses of earnings, and decided to restore the basic 
55 PTK 1992, 2146–2152, 2573.
56 HE 313/1992.
57 PTK 1992, 5477–5484.
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compensation level of the sickness allowance back to 70 per cent, as it had 
been in 1992.58
The proposal divided the parliament into two camps. The most vociferous 
was the criticism from a radical splinter group expelled from the Left Alliance59. 
The Centre Party concurred with their criticism and pointed out that the 
expansion of atypical employment would accentuate the need for adequate 
basic security. According to the Centre, the Lipponen government was moving 
Finland away from the Nordic welfare model towards a ‘European model’ that 
favoured the rich and where sufficient security was provided only to those with 
a permanent job.60 Criticism from the opposition ran into the sand and the 
new law came into effect at the beginning of 1996.61 The universal minimum 
daily allowance was removed and replaced by a means-tested allowance.
The victory of the earnings-based policy was nevertheless only a partial one, 
since political as well as structural pressures soon started working towards 
restoring the minimum daily allowance. Its restoration was kept on the political 
agenda by the Centre in particular. Furthermore, due to problems arising 
from the coordination of various social benefits, Paavo Lipponen’s second 
government (1999–2003) finally had to open the package that his first one 
had tied up.
In 2001 the government proposed that people without earnings should 
have the right to receive a minimum daily allowance of approx. 10 euros 
per day once the sickness had lasted for 55 days. Thus the benefit would no 
longer be means-tested. The proposal was a concession to the parties that 
had opposed the 1995 reform. The restored minimum daily allowance was 
not linked to the cost-of-living index either. The act also retained the earnings 
threshold introduced in the 1996 reform; in other words, those not reaching a 
certain income limit had only flat-rate compensation via the minimum daily 
allowance system.62
The parliamentary elections of 2003 were a success to the Centre Party, 
and its leader Matti Vanhanen63 formed a coalition cabinet (2003–2007) with 
the social democrats and the RKP. In 2004 the government proposed reforms 
58 HE 124/1995.
59 PTK 1995, 1761–1762.
60 PTK 1995, 3041.
61 PTK 1995, 3057–3058.
62 HE 171/2001.
63 Anneli Jäättenmäki’s Centre-SDP-RKP cabinet was very short-lived (17. April, 2003 to 24. June, 2003) 
and did not leave finger prints in Finnish social policy. 
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on the Sickness Insurance Act.64 Perhaps the most notable reform presented 
by the government was an increase of more than 30 per cent to the minimum 
daily allowance.65 The successive right-to-centre coalition (Vanhanen’s second 
government 2007–2011) introduced yet further improvements in minimum 
allowances.66 
Furthermore, Vanhanen’s second cabinet nominated a special committee 
(SATA-committee) to sketch a ‘total reform’ programme for social protection 
in Finland. The committee began its work in 2007 and delivered its report in 
2009. The committee was unable to take a unified stand on big issues and, 
therefore, the ‘total reform’ badly failed. However, important improvements 
in basic benefits were made: a guarantee pension was introduced, and all 
major basic benefits – including minimum sickness allowance – were tied 
to the national pension index, i.e., they will be automatically increased every 
year.67 The subsequent, short-lived (2010–2011) Mari Kiviniemi’s cabinet also 
implemented a number of decisions based on the SATA-committee’s proposals. 
It remains to be seen what the present Jyrki Katainen’s (National Coalition) 
‘six-pack’68 cabinet accomplishes in the field of social policy. However, analysis 
of the six-pack’s politics falls beyond the scope of this study.
Numbers and the analytic narrative of sickness insurance in Finland69
All in all, the historical narrative on sickness insurance in Finland provides 
strong support to theories emphasising the importance of politics.70 But does a 
64 HE 50/2004; Mattila, Yrjö (2011) Suuria käännekohtia vai tasaista kehitystä? Tutkimus Suomen 
terveydenhuollon suuntaviivoista. Helsinki: Kela, 256.
65 HE 164/2004.
66 HE 135/2008.
67 Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö (2009) Sosiaaliturvan uudistamiskomitean (SATA) ehdotukset 
sosiaaliturvan uudistamiseksi. Helsinki: Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö, 34–35.
68 The ’six-pack’ coalition cabinet consists of the National Coalition, the SDP, the Greens, the Left Alliance, 
the Swedish People’s Party and the Christian Democrats.
69 This section is based, to a large extent, on the article by Haataja, Anita, Honkanen, Pertti & Kangas, 
Olli (2010) ’Politiikka ja perusturva’. In Taimio, Heikki (toim.) Hyvinvointivaltion suunta – nousu vai 
lasku? Helsinki: Työväen Sivistysliitto, 56–71.
70 Korpi, Walter (1978) The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism. Work, Unions and Politics in Sweden. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Stephens, John D. (1979) The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. 
London: Macmillan; Esping-Andersen, Gösta (1985) Politics against Markets. The Social Democratic Road 
to Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Baldwin, Peter (1990) The Politics of Social Solidarity: 
Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875–1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lundberg, 
Urban (2003) Juvelen i kronan: socialdemokraterna och den nya pensionen. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & 
Högberg.
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numerical exercise, i.e., an analytic narrative lead to the same conclusions? Is 
political history replicated in numbers? The analysis focuses on the development 
of daily sickness allowances from 1964 to 2010. We are interested in whether 
the governments’ power relations are reflected in basic and earnings-related 
sickness benefits. Even though historical reviews may indicate that political 
power is important, it may be that a numerical analysis proves otherwise. 
There are many reasons for this. For example, economic cycles, the level of 
unemployment and other economic factors condition decision-making related 
to social policy to such an extent that the role of politics is blurred. A separate 
question, cherished by political scientists, is whether election years create an 
incentive for the cabinet to improve benefits in order to maintain its popularity 
among the voters71. Based on the above, we assume that: 
h1: Minimum daily allowance is increased during centre-led govern-
ments. 
H2: Earnings-related benefits are increased during SDP (or National 
coalition) -led governments. 
H3: Benefits are more likely to be improved during election years. 
Political variables reflect the balance of power in the government and in the 
parliament. For the key parties (National Coalition Party, Agrarian League/
Centre Party, SDP, SKDL/Left Alliance, ‘others’) we calculated the annual 
shares of seats in the government and in the parliament and weighted them 
with the number of days they had kept their seats. In our analysis, we pay 
particular attention to the impact of the prime minister’s party affiliation which 
mirrors the importance of the party in the cabinet
Politics is not carried out in a vacuum. Matters such as economic cycles, 
unemployment and globalization condition opportunities for political 
choices.72 A party may have forcefully insisted on reforms but gloomy economic 
prospects may circumscribe all possibilities to carry out those reforms. For this 
reason, we run regression analyses, where the effects of economic variables 
71 E.g. Paloheimo, Heikki, Wiberg, Matti & Koiranen, Hannu (1993) ’Hallitus ostaa ääniä – ja kansa maksaa. 
Poliittiset suhdannevaihtelut Suomessa’. Politiikka Vol. 35, No. 2, 77–93. 
72 Kettunen, Pauli (2011) ’Transnational construction of national challenges: the ambigous Nordic model 
of welfare and competitiveness’. In Kettunen, Pauli & Petersen, Klaus (eds) Beyond Welfare State 
Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 16–40. 
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were controlled for.73 The results of these analyses are discussed in the text, 
but for space considerations the regression models are not presented here.
 Sickness insurance refers to both the minimum and the earnings-related 
sickness allowance. Empirically, the most straightforward way is to measure 
the direct effect of a policy to the absolute level of the minimum daily allowance. 
We start with this approach. Minimum benefits (in absolute terms) have been 
deflated to the level of 2010 via consumer price index (CPI). In addition, we 
relate minimum benefits to average wages (current benefit / current wage, %) 
to see the development of the compensation level of minimum security in 
relation to average wages. 
 Measuring levels and changes in income-related benefits is more difficult 
than measuring the changes in minimum allowances. In most comparative 
studies the compensation level of earnings-related benefits is measured in 
relation to average wage.74 This is the case also in Figure 1, which in addition 
to absolute benefits in euros shows the compensation level of earnings-
related daily allowances (net allowance / average net wage), as well as the 
compensation level of the minimum daily allowance (net minimum daily 
allowance / average net wage, %). Also the prime minister’s party affiliation 
has been added to the figure to give a general picture of the relationships 
between the colour of the cabinet and outcomes in sickness benefits.
Figure 1 reveals a number of interesting things. First, it depicts the dramatic 
decline in income-loss compensation towards the end of the 1970s. In the 
case of an average employee, the compensation level (displayed in the right-
hand axis) declined by nearly 40 percentage points – from 70 per cent to 
nearly 30 per cent. One should remember, however, that during sickness 
most employees received a sick pay that covered the loss of earnings for a 
time period defined in collective agreements. Since we concentrate here on 
legislated benefits and neglect the impact of collective schemes, the magnitude 
of the change is somewhat exaggerated. Second, the picture depicts the huge 
increase in income-related benefits that the SOVE reform in 1982 caused. 
Third, the figure also displays how the compensation level in income-related 
benefits has gradually decreased from about 85 per cent in 1990 to close to 70 
per cent in 2011. Fourth, there has been a downward trend in the compensation 
level of the minimum allowance: from nearly 30 per cent in the early 1970s 
to 20 per cent in 2011. During the last Centre-led cabinets some increases in 
73 More about variables and methods, see Haataja et al. 2010.
74 see e.g. Social Citizenship Indicators Project (SCIP) and Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset at 
http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs.
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the absolute levels of minimum benefits have taken place – first in 2004 and 
then in 2009.
Table 1 shows the relation of sickness insurance benefits to the prime 
minister’s party affiliation and election years. The reforms are linked to the 
government that made the proposal for a change in legislation. In addition, we 
examine changes with a one-year delay, in order to see if the party affiliation 
of the previous year’s prime minister affects the following year’s levels of 
sickness benefits. 
The numerical display – or analytic narrative, if you like – in the table 
clearly provides support for the hypotheses H1 and H2. The minimum daily 
allowance has improved during Centre-led governments (H1) and income-
related benefits during SDP-led governments (H2).75 The results are consistent 
with the ideographic historical narrative. Also the notion about improving 
benefits during election years (H3) seems valid in the case of minimum benefits. 
When it comes to earnings-related benefits, the effect of the election year is 
more unclear, which may be due to the fact that changes in earnings-related 
benefits are dependent on many other factors than those directly related to 
75 The role of the National Coalition remains more unclear, partially because there has only been one 
government (Harri Holkeri’s Conservative-SDP coalition 1987–1991) led by the National Coalition Party.
Figure 1. Trends in minimum and earnings-related daily allowances and in the average wage (2010 
euros per month) and the relation of net daily allowances to net average wage (%).
290
Olli kANGAs, MikkO NiEMElÄ AND sAMPO VARJONEN
benefits, e.g., increases in wages, the inflation rate and tax rates have their 
impact. Thus, the impact of the government is more indirect and blurred. 
table 1. Prime minister’s party affiliation, election year and annual changes in the sickness benefits
Prime minister’s party affiliation
Election 
year
National 
Coalition 
Party
Centre 
Party sDP
All 
years
Annual change (%) in minimum daily 
allowance (2010 prices)1964–2010 3.0 6.1 0.6 2.9 9.2
Delayed by a year 4.6 9.7 -2.0 2.9 0.7
Annual change in minimum daily 
allowance/average wage (% points) 
1972–2010
0.0 0.7 -0.9 -0.2 0.0
Delayed by a year 0.3 1.3 -1.5 -0.2 -0.1
Annual change in earnings-related 
daily allowance/average wage  
(% points) 1964–2010
-0.1 -2.0 1.6 0.0 -1.0
Delayed by a year -0.1 -2.0 1.5 0.3 4.9
Annual change in cut-off points (%) 
1974–2010 1.4 -0.4 1.4 0.8 2.2
Delayed by a year 1.2 0.1 1.4 0.8 0.4
Unemployment percentage 1964–2010 4.5 8.2 6.2 6.6 6.2
Annual change in GNP (%) 1964–2010. 1.2 1.7 3.7 2.7 3.2
In the table, the linkages between politics and benefits are shown as a relation 
between two variables. These bivariate connections may be misleading in 
the sense that they may be due to a third intervening factor. To control for 
the impact of intervening variables, we constructed a simple multivariate 
model, where, in addition to political variables, we included growth in GDP 
and the rate of unemployment. Alternative analyses were also made by 
substituting the prime minister’s party affiliation with the shares of seats in 
the government and seats in the parliament and, to sort out parties’ strengths, 
with various combinatory variables that included both. These adjustments did 
not change the basic message of Table 1. Although the inclusion of GDP and 
unemployment decreased differences between the parties, those differences 
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nevertheless remain systematic. This makes sense. Pauli Kettunen76 has 
shown how national social policy making is conditioned by transnational 
economic processes. However, those processes are not automatic forces but 
they must be interpreted by political agents and transformed into national 
politics. Therefore, politics matters. All in all, the history of Finnish sickness 
insurance can fairly conveniently be summarised in the way illustrated in Table 
1. Although many of the intricacies documented in the detailed ideographic and 
thick storytelling may disappear in a numerical analysis, ‘the grand narrative’ 
is very much the same. 
Narratives and numbers: politics matters
The birth of the Finnish sickness insurance system was a long and variegated 
process and, seen from an international perspective, the first law was 
accomplished very late. In no other European country was the creation of 
sickness insurance postponed for such a long time. In this, the Agrarian League 
exerted an especially important influence: the agrarians were successful in 
blocking all early attempts to establish sickness insurance in the limited form 
of a workers’ insurance covering only workers, or at best, blue- and white-
collar workers. The Finnish form of parliamentarism with strong minority 
regulations offered the agrarians veto points77 to rule out all initiatives on 
such limited schemes. On the other hand, the Agrarian League also played an 
essential role in the coverage of the insurance: the first law was universal and 
covered the entire population. In that sense, the first Finnish law was perhaps 
the most radical reform in the history of sickness insurance worldwide. 
There has been a lot of debate over whom the credit for the universalism 
of Nordic social security belongs to. In Scandinavia, Social Democratic parties 
have often been credited for it.78 However, in Finland it has been the Agrarian 
League that has been the most ardent supporter of universal benefits, whereas 
the social democrats have been more in favour of a workers’ insurance model 
with limited coverage.79 On the other hand, the communists and left-wing 
socialists grouped in the SKDL have traditionally wanted to exclude the well-
76 Kettunen 2011.
77 Immergut 1992.
78 e.g., Korpi 1978; Stephens 1979; Esping-Andersen 1985.
79 cf. Therborn, Göran (1986) ’Neo-Marxist, Pluralist, Corporatist, Statist Theories and the Welfare State’. 
In Gatzansicil, Ali (ed.) The State in Global Perspective. Aldershot: Gower, 204–231; Kangas 1991. 
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offs from the coverage. Thus, on the basis of Finnish history it is difficult to 
credit the leftist parties for the universal character of Nordic social policy. 
 Is universalism then a merit of the agrarians? No and yes. The other Nordic 
countries ended up with systems of comprehensive coverage as well, even 
though their agrarian parties were not as politically influential as in Finland. 
It is thus probable that Finland, too, would have ended up with a Nordic level 
of universalism, even if the sickness insurance had initially been created in 
accordance with the proposals of early committees or with the bills proposed 
by Tanner’s government at the end of the 1920s or Tuomioja’s government in 
the 1950s. As in Norway80, new population categories would gradually have 
been added to the insurance, which would have resulted in a universal scheme. 
However, it was undisputedly due to the influence of the Agrarian League 
that sickness insurance was extended to cover also the parts of the population 
without earnings. Precisely as shown by Peter Baldwin81, Nordic universalism 
was not achieved because of solidaristic sentiments among the working class 
parties, but because the influential agrarian parties – due to their self-interest– 
did not accept excluding their constituents from statutory benefits. 
 As regards minimum benefits, our narratives whether ideographic or 
analytic give more credit to the agrarians than to the social democrats. But 
by the same token, it was in accordance with the agenda of the Centre Party 
that Finnish sickness insurance, affected by the inflation of the 1970s, moved 
from an earnings-related system to a genuine flat-rate one. The 1982 SOVE 
reform – mostly backed by the social democrats and social partners – then 
introduced full income relatedness without any benefit ceilings. As the reform 
proved to be costly, various cut-off points were soon introduced. These cut-off 
points offered possibilities for the government to manipulate the earnings-
related daily allowance during the crisis of the 1990s. Whereas Aho’s right-of-
centre government reduced income-related compensation levels more than 
once, Lipponen’s rainbow government cut minimum benefits. Even though 
Lipponen’s second government restored the minimum daily allowance once 
the economic situation had improved, it was not until the return of power to 
the Centre that actual improvements in minimum benefits were carried out. 
 While it may be safe to assume that the Agrarian League/Centre Party 
has supported universalism and the SDP, for its part, employees’ benefits, 
the preferences of the other parties are not as clear. Also in this question the 
policies of the SKDL/Left Alliance have balanced between basic and earnings-
80 Seip, Anne-Lise (1994) Veiene til velferdsstaten. Norsk sosialpolitikk 1920–75. Oslo: Gyldendal.
81 Baldwin 1990.
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related benefits. As far as improving earnings-related benefits is concerned, 
the party has been more reserved than SDP, wanting – like the Agrarian 
League/Centre – to introduce benefit ceilings in the name of equality and 
social justice. In the party’s earlier rhetoric there were demands for leaving 
high-income earners outside the coverage, which would have corresponded 
to the practice that was, and still is, prevalent in many Central European 
countries. The National Coalition Party has often aligned itself with the SDP, 
while constantly warning about the ‘too excessive’ costs of the reforms. Other 
parties’ policies have settled in between these extremes.
 The story is the same, whether we examine the issue through a multifaceted 
kaleidoscope of historical stories, or quantitatively, squeezing the thick 
narrative in a parsimonious analytic narrative presented in a few tables. 
The conclusion is that politics matters and the ‘grand narrative’ of Finnish 
social policy can be clearly distinguished in both aforementioned ways. The 
Social Democrats have been the strongest proponents of earnings-related 
benefits and the Agrarian League/Centre Party has defended minimum daily 
allowances. The other parties have balanced between these two policies. These 
political considerations have created a distinctive whole, which, as far as its 
generousness is concerned, is of the average European level, but with respect 
to its coverage is one of the most comprehensive schemes in the world. 
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Abbreviations used in Parliamentary documents
EE – (eduskuntaesitys) Private Member’s Legislative Motion
HE – (hallituksen esitys) Government Bill
KK – (Kirjallinen kysymys) Written Question (to a Minister)
KM – (Komiteamietintö) Committee Report
LA – (lakiasia-aloite) Private Member’s Legislative Motion 
PTK – (eduskunnan pöytäkirjat) Minutes of the Plenary Session of the Parliament
RA – (raha-asia-aloite) Private Member’s Budget Motion
TA – (Toivomusaloite) Private Member’s Request Motion
TyöVM – (Työväenvaliokunnan mietintö) Memorandum of the Committee for 
Labour Affairs
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coMPArison, MeAsUreMenT, And 
econoMiZATion
The origin of the retirement age of 65 in Finland
MAttI HANNIkAINEN
Pauli Kettunen writes how the educated elite in Finland used international 
comparisons when they defined socio-political tasks from the latter half of 
the 19th century onwards. 
The outside world provided a framework of external preconditions and 
constraints, hopes and threats, as well as impulses but also alarming 
ideas, models but also warning examples, points of reference but also 
boundaries of the possible.1
Comparisons were outstandingly visible in the reports of the committees for 
social insurance. Various state committees were an important institution 
to prepare reforms, not only in social policy but also in the other fields of 
society. The committee members wanted to avoid mistakes made elsewhere 
and adopt good practices from more developed countries. In addition to a 
comparative perspective the committee reports included two other important 
elements which reflected the new kind of modern society: the measurement of 
society and the economization of social reforms. These three dimensions have 
remained the essential features of socio-political planning over one hundred 
years.
As well as in the other latecomer countries, ‘the advantages of backwardness’ 
were, therefore, consciously utilized in Finland. According to Alexander 
Gerschenkron (1962), the more backward a country is, the faster the potential 
growth of industrial output; the more backward a country is, the more 
important a role the state plays in creating the preconditions for development.2 
Taking into account future challenges and what happened in other countries, 
1 Kettunen, Pauli (2006) ‘The Tension between the Social and the Economic: A Historical Perspective 
on a Welfare State’. In Ojala, Jari, Eloranta, Jari & Jalava, Jukka (eds.) The Road to Prosperity: An 
Economic History of Finland. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 288.
2 Gerschenkron, Alexander (1962) [1952] Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of 
Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
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governments promoted the move to the ‘new phase of development’, using the 
terminology of Simon Kuznets’ (1966) findings of modern economic growth.3
This article analyses pension planning in Finland in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries. First of all the state committees for social insurance had the 
most fundamental issue to be solved: should social insurance be compulsory 
or voluntary? The opinion changed between the first two committees. The 
choice made in the latter committee in 1908 was reflected in the stylized way 
that Kettunen calls ‘an avant-gardism of the educated elite of the peripheral 
country’.4 Moreover, the committee reports created the foundations for three 
dimensions in the social planning mentioned above: international comparisons, 
the measurement of society and the economization of social reforms. These 
were outstandingly visible in defining of an old-age retirement age. In this 
question the most important disagreement also appeared in the committee. 
This article is organized so that after sketching the forms of old-age security 
in the industrializing agrarian economy, the question of a compulsory versus a 
voluntary pension scheme will be examined. It is followed by an analysis of the 
retirement age in the pension committee report in 1908. The proposed system 
did not come in force but it created the foundation for later development. 
The last section entitled ‘History matters’ shortly describes changes in the 
retirement ages and reminds us how the retirement age of 65 is again, over 
100 years later, a central topic in pension policy. 
Old-age security in the industrializing agrarian economy
Social planning was connected to the profound changes in a society. Population 
growth, changes in land ownership circumstances and industrialization, which 
gave rise to a wage-work society, gradually broke up the agrarian rank society. 
This kind of society was an economically, politically and socially overtly unequal 
class society.5 People had unequal rights and duties which were also visible in 
the forms of livelihood. The questions surrounding old-age and other forms 
of social security were reflected largely by social rank. 
3 Kuznets, Simon (1966) Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread. New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
Univ, Press. 
4 Kettunen, Pauli (1994) Suojelu, suoritus, subjekti: Tutkimus työsuojelusta teollistuvan Suomen 
yhteiskunnallisissa ajattelu- ja toimintatavoissa. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 35.
5 Wirilander, Kaarlo (1974) Herrasväkeä: Suomen säätyläistö 1721–1870. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen 
Seura; Haapala, Pertti (2010) ‘Vallan rakenteet ja yhteiskunnan muutos: Mielikuvaharjoitus 
1800–2000-lukujen Suomesta’. In Pietikäinen, Petteri (ed.) Valta Suomessa. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 
27–28. 
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During the transition period to the modern society people transferred 
from agriculture into more productive work in manufacturing and services. 
In 1900 industrialization had already started but the employment share of 
primary production was still 70 per cent. Fifty years later, almost half of the 
population still earned their living from agriculture, forestry and fishing. By 
comparison with Western European nations, Finland experienced ‘belated’ 
structural change.6 
The juridical status of the employment contract also changed in the second 
half of the 19th century. This liberalist transformation meant ‘the birth of the 
modern wage-worker’ as Sakari Heikkinen has defined the change. The old 
paternalistic institution of legal protection and compulsory service—a master-
servant relationship—was gradually replaced by a bilateral and voluntary 
contract between the employer and employee.7 
The new kind of society and the growth dynamics adversely affected many 
people. Structural change and economic fluctuations increased the need for the 
new forms of social security because the established rural social safety nets were 
not suitable and sufficient for people earning their living from manufacturing 
and service. The change was not, however, sudden or revolutionary and took 
place over several decades. This was also visible in the forms of social security 
and social planning: old and new institutions entwined with each other.
Livelihood in old age was arranged in different ways in different parts of 
rural Finland. A traditional life-annuity (‘syytinki’) was common in southern 
and western Finland. It was an agreement by which the owner surrendered 
his farm (real estate) to another person—often his son—in exchange for free 
board and keep on the farm for himself and his spouse for the rest of their 
lives. In eastern and northern Finland, extended family households consisting 
of several married couples were more common.8 Measured by the standards 
of those days, these institutions offered a reasonable livelihood which varied 
based on how prosperous the farm was and how successful the crops were.
6 Hjerppe, Riitta (1989) The Finnish Economy 1860–1985: Growth and Structural Change. Studies on 
Finland’s Economic Growth XIII. Helsinki: Bank of Finland Publications, Government Printing Office; 
Hannikainen, Matti & Heikkinen, Sakari (2006) ‘The Labour Market, 1850–2000’. In Ojala, Jari, Eloranta, 
Jari & Jalava, Jukka (eds.) The Road to Prosperity: An Economic History of Finland. Helsinki: Suomalaisen 
Kirjallisuuden Seura, 166–170; Haapala, Pertti (2006) ‘Suomalainen rakennemuutos’. In Saari, Juho (ed.) 
Historiallinen käänne: Johdatus pitkän aikavälin historian tutkimukseen. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 91–124.
7 Heikkinen, Sakari (1997) Labour and the Market: Workers, Wages and Living Standards in Finland, 
1850–1913. Helsinki: The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, 25–31.
8 Charpentier, Axel (1896) Om sytning. Helsingfors; Waris, Elina (1999) Yksissä leivissä: Ruokolahtelainen 
perhelaitos ja yhteisöllinen toiminta 1750–1850. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura.
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A traditional life-annuity reflected, partly, traditional attitudes when it was 
time to stop regular working. It is probable that it also had a kind of connection 
to the farmers’ working ability. In Pohjanmaa (Ostrobothnia, western Finland) 
the starting age of a traditional life-annuity was on average 58.6 years in 
1810–1914 and a traditional life-annuity spanned over an average of 12 years. 
In the province of Satakunta (also in western Finland) the corresponding 
figures were 56.8 (1800–1913) and spanned 16 years (1863–1899). The figures 
went up at the end of the period. In the assembly of the Diet in 1863–1864 
it was discussed that farmers started a traditional life-annuity too early. One 
representative even presented that the lowest starting age of a traditional life-
annuity should be 60 years. This kind of regulation, however, was not realized.9
It is worth noting that when Finland was under Swedish rule, there was 
an established praxis of maintenance for state officials. This was formalized 
in 1788 when the monarch promised to provide for 70-year-old officials who 
had lost their working capacity. However, the pensionable age was sliding 
downward during the 19th century. Officials with a permanent post in Finland 
under the Russian Empire were granted a pension in 1826. Initially, the 
pensionable age was 65 years after 35 years in service, but was reduced to 63 
years in 1866. State officials had not, however, a mandatory age of retirement 
(‘pakollinen eroamisikä’) before the Constitution Act of 1919.10
In addition to state officials there were also other institutions which 
provided old-age security. Although the bourgeoisie and the craftsmen had 
mutual funds that offered security for, in particular, widows and children, these 
funds were also used for members who had lost their working capabilities. 
The length and amount of support was decided by the board and depended 
on the assets of the fund. The model of these funds corresponded to similar 
institutions in Sweden as well as elsewhere in Europe.11 
There were also various degrees of pension regulations in municipalities. 
For instance in Helsinki (1911), it was possible to obtain a full pension at the 
age of 63 years after 30 years in service. For firemen and nurses the retirement 
9 Koskikallio, Onni (1927) Maatalouskiinteistöjen eläkerasituksesta Pirkkalan ja Ruoveden tuomiokunnissa 
vuosina 1800–1913. Helsinki: Suomen maataloustieteellinen seura, 29–31; Jutikkala, Eino (1958) Suomen 
talonpojan historia. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 325–326.
10 Kungl. Maj:ts Förordning om den förbättrande Embets- och lösnings-Staten den 24 januari 1788; 
Ståhlberg, K. J. (1928) Suomen hallinto-oikeus: Yleinen osa. Helsinki: Otava, 227; Willgren, Karl (1934) Den 
historiska utvecklingen av Finlands förvaltningsrätt. Helsingfors: Söderström & C:o förlagsaktiebolag, 
136–137; Rytkölä, Olavi (1948) Valtion vakinaisten virkamiesten palkkaus- ja eläkeoikeus. Helsinki: 
Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys, 44–48.
11 Kuusi, Eino (1931) Sosialipolitiikka I–II. Porvoo: WSOY; Jaakkola, Jouko (1993) ‘Kun valtio ei auttanut: 
Työväen keskinäinen apu Suomessa’. In Haapala, Pertti (ed.) Hyvinvointivaltio ja historian oikut. Tampere: 
Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura, 25–56.
301
COMPARisON, MEAsUREMENT, AND ECONOMiZATiON
age was 50 years.12 In addition, in Lutheran countries in which priests were 
allowed to marry, the livelihood of a priest’s widow and children was secured 
in different ways.13 The pension institution for seafarers was founded in 1879. 
Here, the entitlement to an old-age pension was at the age of 55 after 20 years 
membership in the pension fund.14 
Along with industrialization, sickness and pension funds were established 
in the factories of the mid-19th century. Workers’ relief funds were based 
on the previously established craftsmen’s funds and also on the old farm 
owners’ maintenance liability within agrarian society. Workers’ relief funds 
were usually financed through employer and employee contributions.15 The 
entitlement to an old-age pension started on average at the age of 55–60. At 
least 10 years membership was usually required. Alternatively, the highest 
age when the membership should start was defined. This was typically at the 
age of 40 years.16 
Because of changes in land ownership circumstances, industrialization and 
urbanization, the growing part of the population did, however, not belong to 
any relief institutions. In rural areas this concerned especially the landless 
population in agricultural, forestry and floating work, and in urban areas 
outdoor workers, i.e. skilled and unskilled building workers, dockworkers 
and other casual workers. Furthermore, in the fastest growing wage-worker 
group, i.e. employees in manufacturing, relief funds covered only part of the 
employees, and pensions especially were often very modest. In favourable 
cases the elderly and those lacking the capacity to work performed lighter tasks 
or assisted family members or other relatives. For some people, municipal 
poor relief was the first and only, and for others the last, form of subsistence 
security resorted to.
12 Blomster, Peter (2004) Kunnallisen eläketurvan historia: Kuntien eläkevakuutus 1964–2004. Helsinki: 
Kuntien eläkevakuutus, 24–48.
13 Widén, Solveig (1990) Änkekassa och samhällsklass sociala strukturomvandlingar inom tre änke- och 
pupillkassors delägarkårer i det svenska riket 1741–1783. Åbo: Åbo Akademis förlag.
14 The Parliament closed down the seafarers’ pension organization in 1936 because of its financial 
difficulties. Pension provision for seafarers was rearranged through legislation in 1956. Hoffman, Kai 
(1974) Merimieskirstusta eläkelaitokseen: Merimieseläkejärjestelmän historia vuosina 1748–1936. Helsinki: 
Merimieseläkekassa.
15 Jaakkola, Jouko (1994) ‘Sosiaalisten kysymysten yhteiskunta’. In Jaakkola, Jouko, Pulma, Panu, Satka, 
Mirja & Urponen, Kyösti Armeliaisuus, yhteisöapu, sosiaaliturva: Suomalaisen sosiaalisen turvan historia. 
Helsinki: Sosiaaliturvan keskusliitto, 151–153.
16 The figures have been calculated from the report of the workers’ relief funds in 1899–1902 published 
by Statistics Finland. SVT XXVI B. Apukassat vuosina 1899–1902, Helsinki 1905. 
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Compulsory versus voluntary insurance
The first state committee for workers’ social insurance (‘työväen-
vakuutuskomitea’) was already founded in the late 1880’s.17 The committee 
argued for the employers’ responsibility to compensate for industrial 
accidents. The Workers’ Compensation Act (1895) primarily concerned 
dangerous manufacturing work, excluding agricultural and forest work, the 
biggest industries in the Finnish countryside. As Kettunen has emphasized, 
Finland was not a latecomer: although compulsory industrial accident 
insurance was legislated before Finland in Germany 1884, in Austria 1887 
and in Norway 1894.18
The committee argued (1892) that ‘the stage of development’ in Finland 
was not yet appropriate for compulsory sickness and pension insurance. They 
prevented ‘the progress of the nation’.19 According to the committee, compulsory 
insurance created a corrupt incentive to the individual responsibility. The 
committee believed that compulsory sickness insurance would increase ‘the 
pretence of sicknesses’. Moreover, the coverage of insurance would be very 
low, only 1.5 per cent of the population. In addition to the agrarian population, 
outdoor and domestic workers should be omitted from insurance. Since 
municipal poor relief already gave some support to sick people, new public 
and compulsory institutions were not deemed to be necessary. Instead, it was 
important to support the favourable development of the workers’ voluntary 
relief funds.
The minority of the committee supported, however, compulsory sickness 
insurance. According to them, it was important that the state encouraged an 
individual obligation to provide for himself and his family. It was also fair for 
those employees, ‘the best elements of workers’, who had paid contributions 
to the voluntary relief funds. Therefore, the outsiders of relief funds should 
also in some way contribute to the cost of sickness. Otherwise they would 
probably apply for poor relief.20 
17 KM 1892:5 & 1892:12; Hannikainen, Matti (2012) ‘Teollistuvan agraariyhteiskunnan sosiaaliturva’. In 
Hannikainen, Matti & Vauhkonen, Jussi Ansioiden mukaan: Yksityisalojen työeläkkeiden historia. Helsinki: 
Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 34–41; Hellsten, Katri (1993) Vaivaishoidosta hyvinvointivaltion kriisiin: 
Hyvinvointivaltiokehitys ja sosiaaliturvajärjestelmän muotoutuminen Suomessa. Helsinki, 147–152, 164–
168.
18 Kettunen 1994, 46–55 & Kettunen 2006, 45; KM 1892, 10.
19 ‘Järjestelmän, joka niin muodoin edistää yksityisten omantakeisen toiminnan hervastuttamista, täytyy 
ehdottomasti ehkäistä kansan yleistä edistystä.’ KM 1892:5, 5–34.
20 KM 1892:5, 77–92. 
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Compulsory pension insurance did not gain any support in the committee. 
In the transition stage from the agricultural and paternalistic society to the 
modern wage-worker economy, it was difficult to define and collect enough 
pension contributions.21 Many workers had multiple occupations in the several 
sectors of the economy and they still received a part of their reward in kind.22 
The disability insurance committee (‘invaliditeettivakuutuskomitea’) was 
founded in 1904 and the final report was published in 1908. This committee 
adopted a totally different position on the question of compulsory versus 
voluntary insurance. Because the law obliged an able-bodied person to work 
and in this way to maintain himself and keep his family, it was, according to 
the committee, also possible to oblige them to pay insurance contributions. 
Insurance helped to carry out the first and more profound principle: to 
maintain oneself by working.23 
According to the committee, the experiences from the workers’ relief funds 
did not support voluntariness. Although ‘the most advanced level’ workers 
understood the significance of voluntary insurance, many tried to manage with 
their own savings and without a membership in a relief fund. The majority 
of workers were not, however, at ‘this level of development’. Instead those 
people, who were most in the need of assistance, did not often belong to any 
relief fund and, moreover, had not enough savings. 
According to the committee, it was difficult to see how voluntary funds could 
be sufficient in Finland when they were not in the more civilized and wealthier 
nations. As such, the committee found support for compulsory insurance from 
the other European countries and presented three comparative arguments: 
The example from compulsory insurance was positive, the experiences from 
voluntary insurance were, as well as in Finland, less encouraging and, thirdly, 
there were currently many plans for compulsory insurance in Europe. 
The best example was Germany where the compulsory pension scheme 
for wage-workers had been in force since 1891 (Act 1889). Almost 14 million 
of 15 million wage-workers were included to the scheme at the end of 1905. It 
was 23 per cent of the 60-million population. The committee argued that the 
compulsory insurance for workers was seen in Germany as ‘a great blessing’.24
21 KM 1892:12, 2–14.
22 Heikkinen 1997, 42.
23 Invaliditeettivakuutuskomitean mietintö ja ehdotukset (V, 1908); Peltonen, Matti (1992) Talolliset ja 
torpparit: Vuosisadan vaihteen maatalouskysymys Suomessa. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 
47–50.
24 Invaliditeettivakuutuskomitean mietintö ja ehdotukset (V, 1908), 14–15.
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Proposals for compulsory pension schemes increased in Europe in the early 
1900s, also in the countries which were previously in favour of voluntariness. 
For instance in France, only the small minority of manufacturing employees 
was members in a voluntary relief fund. In Britain, almost half of the workers 
over 65 years old received poor relief despite friendly societies and relief 
funds organized by the trade union. There were also poor experiences from 
voluntary insurance in Italy and Belgium. Moreover, the committee mentioned 
Holland, Austria, Norway and Sweden where the committee proposals and 
the government bills for compulsory pension insurance had been made from 
the 1890s onwards.25 A similar message was told in the international social 
insurance conference in Rome in 1908. The principle of compulsory insurance 
was ‘entirely’ won among the congress representatives.26 
According to the plan made in the Finnish pension committee, compulsory 
insurance did not involve everyone, only at least 15-year-old ‘permanent’ wage-
workers. Compulsion did not involve civil servants and clerical workers or 
casual workers. Entrepreneurs, farmers and crofters were also kept away from 
compulsory insurance. They had, however, an opportunity to pay voluntary 
pension contributions. Earnings-related pension contributions would be 
equally footed between employers and employees. In addition to an earnings-
related part, an equal-sized amount of money would be paid to all insured. 
The proposed system would be administrated, besides compulsory industrial 
accident insurance, by one public pension provider. 
Disability pension and retirement age
The model for the Finnish pension committee in 1908 was the German pension 
system. In Germany, the compulsory pension insurance scheme primarily 
meant disability pensions. Originally entitlement to a disability pension had 
required a total incapacity to work, but this was replaced by the concept of 
two-thirds incapacity. It was measured by an inability to earn one-third of the 
applicant’s previous wages and an inability to earn one-third of the normal 
wages of ordinary labourers in the locality.27 
25 Invaliditeettivakuutuskomitean mietintö ja ehdotukset (V, 1908), 11–14.
26 ‘Kansainvälinen työväenvakuutuskongressi Roomassa’, Vakuutussanomia 12/1908, 12.
27 Hennock, E. P. ( 2007) The Origin of the Welfare State in England and in Germany, 1850–1914: Social 
Policies Compared. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 193.
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Moreover, it was possible to retire at the age of 70, although an employee 
still had the ability to work. This had not, however, a big significance in practice 
because the majority of insured workers became unable to work before reaching 
this age. The Finnish pension committee reported that 814 575 persons had 
an entitlement to a disability pension and 125 603 to an old-age pension in 
Germany at the end of 1906.28
In Finland, the main goal was, too, to create a system that insured against 
disability. However, a direct and practical method to measure the ability to 
work was difficult to find. As well as in Germany, an indirect and rather 
complicated method was chosen: inability to earn one-third of the wage in 
the same work in which an insured had previously worked in the locality 
where an insured had mostly worked during the last five years. Moreover, a 
wage comparison should be done to healthy workers with the same working 
ability and working skills that an insured had previously had. Therefore, it is 
noteworthy that the committee presented, instead of general disability, the 
concept of occupational disability. 
The committee argued that an age should not, in principle, be the reason 
to get a pension because the idea of pension insurance was to secure a 
livelihood for those who could not any longer earn their living by their own 
work. However, it was fair to also give a pension for those who had worked 
their whole life and, in this way, benefitted the society, although they did not 
lose their working ability. 
The problem was how this age should be defined. It seemed apparent that 
an age limit would be too low for some people and too high for others. If a 
retirement age would be so low that it also took into account those workers 
who lost their working ability at a relatively low age, there would be a large 
amount of healthy and able workers enjoying pensions. This was not possible 
for financial reasons. If an old-age retirement age was high, as it was in the 
German case (70 years), it would lose its significance. 
The pension committee collected the statistical data on the incidence of 
disability from the five Finnish municipalities: Tuusula which is near Helsinki, 
Humppila in Western Finland, Kymi and Räisälä in South-East Finland and 
Vihanti in Northern Finland (near Oulu).29 The committee did not choose any 
municipality from the area where poverty had traditionally been highest, i.e. 
in Savo and Kainuu (both in Eastern Finland). The following figures do not 
28 Invaliditeettivakuutuskomitean mietintö ja ehdotukset (V, 1908), 25.
29 Väestö, invaliditeetti- ja tulosuhteet Tuusulan, Humppilan, Kymin, Räisälän ja Vihannin kunnissa vuonna 
1903, Invaliditeettivakuutuskomitean julkaisut II, 1907.
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include persons who had a traditional life-annuity from their farm or persons 
who had become disabled in an accident or before in the age of 16 years. The 
following figures show the percentage of disabled in each age group in 1903:
Men
%
Women
%
56–60 5.5 9.9
61–65 10.4 13.2
66–70 17.0 23.8
71–75 30.6 35.1
76–80 35.2 43.0
The data illustrated that the incidence of disability increased at the age of 65, 
and substantially so among people over 70 years. The committee argued that, 
also taking into account the poor economic capacity of the lowest stratum in 
the society, the suitable retirement age would be 65 years. Younger workers 
had an opportunity to get a disability pension if it was needed. 
The pension committee admitted that when using the above figures a 
retirement age could be lower than 65. The committee presented, however, 
the figures on the cost of the proposed pension scheme. For them it was, again, 
needed an international perspective because the statistical data collected from 
the five Finnish municipalities was not satisfactory enough for the calculations 
about the disability and mortality rate of different age groups. In this case the 
comparison data was not from Germany but from Norway. Circumstances in 
Germany were so different from Finland that the data from Norway was more 
appropriate for the basis of the Finnish calculations. The Norwegian data, 
which had been collected from rural communities for the pension system to 
be planned in Norway, was five times bigger than the Finnish data. 
The calculations made by the pension committee showed how pension 
contributions would grow if a retirement age was lower. In the proposed system 
an earnings-related part and an equal-sized amount of money would be paid 
to all insured. When the committee proposed that an equal-sized part would 
be 50 FIM a year, an average annual pension contribution would be:
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6.15 FIM, if a retirement age is 70 years
9.90 FIM, if a retirement age is 65 years
20.75 FIM, if a retirement age is 60 years
85.20 FIM, if a retirement age is 55 years
Therefore, the committee demonstrated that the retirement age of 55 years 
produced more than eight times bigger pension contributions than the age 
of 65. Comparing 65 and 60 years in the latter case, pension contributions 
would be more than two times bigger. If an old-age retirement age would be 
70 years, an average pension contribution would be two thirds of the reference 
value of 65. 
When creating a long-term tradition for Finnish social policy, the committee 
suggested a cautious start. If the retirement age was 65, an average pension 
contribution would be 1.6 per cent of an average wage. The committee proposed 
that this sum would be equally footed between the employers and employees. 
Therefore, the employers share (0.8 per cent of wage) would be 60 per cent 
of the costs that compulsory industrial accident insurance cost on average in 
1900–1906.30 This also meant that the retirement age of 60 years would not 
be much more expensive for employers than industrial accident insurance.
The retirement age of 65 was too high for the Social Democrats, which 
was the biggest party in the Parliament. The Social Democrat member in the 
committee Emil Perttilä, the chair of the Social Democratic Party in 1905–1906, 
presented that the retirement age should be 55 years. Otherwise it would be ‘the 
same as without insurance’ and the new pension system would be ‘the dread 
of workers because they have to pay contributions knowing that it is no use’.31 
Perttilä followed the decision made by the Social Democrats. The working 
committee in the party conference in 1903 suggested a retirement age of 
60 years but the address of Seth Heikkilä from Tampere reflected better 
opinions in the conference room: ‘It would be nice to retire after 10 years in 
the almshouse’. The majority in the party conference supported 55 years.32 It 
was possible that a 55-year-old worker had already worked 40 years.
30 Invaliditeettivakuutuskomitean mietintö ja ehdotukset (V, 1908), 54.
31 Invaliditeettivakuutuskomitean mietintö ja ehdotukset (V, 1908), 155.
32 Toisen Suomen Työväen puoluekokouksen pöytäkirjat 1903. Helsinki: Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen 
Puolue/Kansan Voima Oy:n Kirjapaino 1973, 56–67.
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History matters 
The pension plans proposed in the pension committee in 1908 did not come 
into force for many decades. The dissent of the political groups and the Russian 
administration’s reluctance to introduce change prevented any major reforms, 
also in the other social policy areas besides pensions. However, the knowledge 
of social insurance increased in the society. Especially, this concerned the 
German pension system. Moreover, the calculations of pension costs were 
produced. It seemed apparent that to create a pension scheme which was 
economically and socially sustainable was not an easy task.
Pension arrangements were finally organized during a post-Depression 
economic boom in the latter half of the 1930s. In line with an industrializing 
agrarian society, the arrangements were the result of cooperation and a 
compromise between the Centre (agrarian) and the Social Democrats. 
Eventually, the retirement age was set to 65 years, although the Social 
Democrats supported 60 years. The national pension scheme has now been 
in force since 1939 (Act 1937), although it was radically reformed in 1957. 
The earnings-related pension schemes in the private sector came into force 
in July 1962 (Act 1961). The retirement age in this system was also 65 years.33
The discussion of an appropriate retirement age continued from the 1960s 
onwards. It was higher in the private-sector than in the public-sector, where 
supplementary pension arrangements and occupation-specific retirement ages 
involved practically all employees. Attention was paid to three issues above 
all: taking account of war-time active service periods, the retirement age of 
employees in physically heavy occupations, and elderly persons’ problems of 
subsistence due to structural changes. 
New possibilities for early retirement were introduced in the 1970s and 
1980s. Concerning unemployment pensions, the lower age limit was originally 
60 years, but it was later lowered to 55 years. From the middle of the 1980s 
onwards, there was a shift from structural-political bulk retirements to 
individual consideration. The lowest age of individual early retirement was 
set at 55 years. It was a disability pension to which lighter medical criteria 
were applied. Other new types of pension were the early old-age pension and 
the part-time pension. The lower age limit for an unemployment pension 
was raised gradually from 55 to 60 years. During the deep recession of the 
33 Hannikainen 2012, 42–49; Vauhkonen, Jussi (2012) ‘Kansaneläkeuudistus ja työeläkelain synty’. In 
Hannikainen, Matti & Vauhkonen, Jussi Ansioiden mukaan: Yksityisalojen työeläkkeiden historia. Helsinki: 
Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 51–91.
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1990s, public-sector pensions were standardized with private-sector pension 
benefits.34
In the large pension reform in 2005, the old-age retirement age of 65, 
originally planned in the 1908 pension committee and firstly legislated in 
the 1937 National Pensions Act, was replaced in the earnings-related pension 
schemes by a flexible old-age retirement age of 63–68 years. In the national 
pension scheme, it still remained at 65 years. At the same time, individual 
early retirement was abolished and the unemployment pension was replaced 
with an improved unemployment allowance. 
In recent years it has again been discussed, whether the lowest old-age 
retirement age should be 65 years instead of 63 years. The Social Democrats 
and the trade unions have been skeptical of the higher retirement age. However, 
international comparisons are made, effects of the reform are measured and 
costs are calculated. History matters.
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313
decline oF ciVil serVAnT PriVileGe
A new look at the historical development of Finnish 
social policy1
tAPIO BERgHOLM
After the Second World War Finnish society experienced rapid structural 
change. These changes were turbulent. Employment shifted from forestry and 
agriculture towards industrial and service occupations and there was massive 
migration from peripheral countryside regions to more densely populated 
areas in Finland and Sweden during the 1960s and 1970s.
The making of the Finnish welfare state happened at the same time. This 
development has been discussed from many vantage points in earlier research 
and has generated a rich and voluminous literature. Structural changes in 
society, the corporatist settlement, the political process, hegemonic change, 
the actions of vanguard groups of workers, the initiatives of international 
organisations, the co-operation of Nordic civil servants and combinations of 
these have been offered as historical and sociological explanations for the 
1 I am grateful for the comments and criticism of the editor Jussi Vauhkonen. I am indebted to Senior 
Lecturer Mary Hilson, who helped substantially with language and with the argument.
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growth of the welfare state in Finland.2 Pauli Kettunen has also taken part in 
this scholarly debate, often from a comparative Nordic perspective.3
Instead of explaining these legal reforms again the purpose of this paper is 
to make a new assessment of the underlying current of all these reforms. This 
paper argues that many reforms were actually extensions or enlargement of 
entitlements which were previously exceptional civil servant privileges. From 
child benefits legislation to holiday legislation and pension reforms former civil 
servant privileges gradually and partially became rights for ordinary citizens 
and workers. 
It is common knowledge that Finnish social policy reforms enhanced 
equality. The other side of the coin – the decline of elite privilege – has until 
now been outside the spotlight of public debate and social science research. 
2 Mansner, Markku (1984) ’Suomalaista yhteiskuntaa rakentamassa. Suomen Työnantajain 
Keskusliitto 1940–1956’. Jyväskylä: Suomen Työnantajain Keskusliitto; Niemelä, Heikki (1988) 
’Suomen kokonaiseläkejärjestelmän muotoutuminen’. Kansaneläkelaitoksen julkaisuja, Helsinki: 
Kansaneläkelaitos; Mansner, Markku (1990) ’Suomalaista yhteiskuntaa rakentamassa. Suomen 
Työnantajain Keskusliitto 1956–1982’. Jyväskylä: Suomen Työnantajain Keskusliitto; Hellsten, Katri 
(1993) ’Vaivaishoidosta hyvinvointivaltion kriisiin. Hyvinvointivaltiokehitys ja sosiaaliturvajärjestelmien 
muotoutuminen Suomessa’. Helsinki: Sosiaalipolitiikan laitos; Smolander, Jyrki (2000) ’Suomalainen 
oikeisto ja "kansankoti". Kansallisen kokoomuksen suhtautuminen pohjoismaiseen hyvinvointimalliin 
jälleenrakennuskaudelta konsensusajan alkuun’. Bibliotheca historica 63, Helsinki: SKS; Pesonen, Pertti 
& Riihinen, Olavi (2002) ’Dynamic Finland. The Political System and the Welfare State’. (Studia Fennica, 
Historica 3), Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society; Bergholm, Tapio (2003) “Työmarkkinajärjestöt ja 
Suomen lapsilisäjärjestelmän synty.” Yhteiskuntapolitiikka No 1 (2003): 63–76; Anttila, Anu-Hanna 
(2005) Loma tehtaan varjossa. Teollisuustyöväestön loma- ja vapaa-ajan moraalisäätely Suomessa 
1930- ja 1960-luvuilla. Helsinki: SKS; Bergholm, Tapio (2005a) ’Sopimusyhteiskunnan synty I. 
Työehtosopimuksien läpimurrosta yleislakkoon. SAK 1944–1956’. Keuruu: Otava; Bergholm, Tapio 
(2005b) ‘Support to the Male Breadwinner or to the Responsible Mother: Employers, State and Trade 
Unions in the Making of the Finnish Welfare State 1947–1948’. In Prenninger, Alexander, Pellar, Birgitte, 
Garsha, Winfried R. & Himmelstoss, Eva (eds) "Mercy or Right". Development of Social Security Systems. 
"Gnade oder Recht". Entwicklung der sozialen Sicherungsysteme. ITH Tagungsberichte 39. Leipzig: 
Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 207–217; Kangas, Olli (2006) ’Politiikka ja sosiaaliturva Suomessa’, In 
Tapani Paavonen-Olli Kangas. Eduskunta hyvinvointivaltion rakentajana. Helsinki: Edita, 2006: 189–
366; Kangas, Olli (2007) ’Finland: Labor Markets against Politics’. In Immergut, Ellen M., Anderson, 
Karen M. & Schulze, Isabelle (eds) The Handbook of West European Pension Politics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 248–296; Bergholm, Tapio (2007a) ‘Sopimusyhteiskunnan synty II. Hajaannuksesta 
tulopolitiikkaan. SAK 1956–1969’. Keuruu: Otava; Bergholm, Tapio (2007b) ’Suomen mallin synty’, 
Yhteiskuntapolitiikka 5/2007, 475–492; Bergholm, Tapio (2009) ‘The Making of the Finnish Model: the 
qualitative change in Finnish corporatism in early 1960s’. Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 34, No. 
1, 29–48; Hannikainen, Matti & Vauhkonen, Jussi (2012) ’Ansioiden mukaan. Yksityisalojen työeläkkeiden 
historia’. Hämeenlinna: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura; Bergholm, Tapio (2012) ’Kohti tasa-arvoa. 
Tulopolitiikan aika. SAK 1969–1977’. Keuruu: Otava; Uljas, Päivi (2012) ’Hyvinvointivaltion läpimurto. 
Pienviljelyhegemonian rapautumisen, kansalaisliikehdinnän ja poliittisen murroksen keskinäiset suhteet 
suomalaisessa yhteiskunnassa 1950-luvun loppuvuosina’, Riika: Into Kustannus Oy. 
3 Kettunen, Pauli (2001) ’The Nordic Welfare State in Finland.” Scandinavian Journal of History, vol. 26 
no. 3: 225–247; Kettunen, Pauli (2006) ‘The Tension between Social and the Economic - A Historical 
Perspective on a Welfare State’. In Jari Ojala, Jari Eloranta & Jukka Jalava (eds) The Road to Prosperity. 
An Economic History of Finland. Jyväskylä: SKS: 285–313.
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In this paper I will simultaneously offer a general interpretation and a partial 
description of how civil servant privileges were eroded in the making of the 
Finnish welfare state.
These earlier civil servant privileges trickled down to ordinary citizens even 
in the private sector, when social partners or – to use the term normally used 
in the Nordic countries - labour market parties started to negotiate not only 
wages and hours but also so-called social wages, i.e. child benefits, holidays 
and pensions. In all three of these benefits Finnish civil servants had had a 
substantial advantage in earlier periods. This gradually diminished due to 
the changes in industrial relations and also in connection with the changes 
in social policy after the Second World War.
The description, analysis and interpretations presented here are based 
mainly on my earlier research on the history of the central organisation of 
the Finnish trade unions, SAK.4
Child benefit: a social right for all mothers 
Social security was only a minor part of public expenditure in Finland between 
the world wars. The redistribution of wealth to families with children was also 
small and actually favoured those with more income. From the beginning of 
1924 the central state,5 and later the public authorities in towns and some 
private employers, paid a family allowance to their male civil servants, clerks 
and salaried employees, which was connected to the size of the family or which 
was directly multiplied by the number of children. This family wage was mainly 
a civil servant privilege and thus it was limited to the middle class: the majority 
of parents did not have this kind of support for their dependent children.
During the Second World War the practice of paying a family wage gained 
more ground in Finland. Men serving in the armed forces who had families got 
the right to a wartime wage. This pay system was based on two components: 
military rank and family size. On the home front some employers started to 
pay an extra allowance to men with maintenance liabilities. The wartime wage 
and family allowances paid during the war extended the family wage system 
4 Bergholm, Tapio (2005c) ’Suomen säädeltyjen työmarkkinasuhteiden synty: palkkapäätös 19.6.1945’. 
Yhteiskuntapolitiikka 1/2005, 3–14; Bergholm, Tapio (2006) ’Tulonjaon murros ja vuoden 1956 
yleislakko’. In Ahvenisto, Inkeri & Mäki, Kirsi (eds) Kansalaisvaikuttaminen ajassa, Väki voimakas 19, 
Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura, Vaajakoski, 183–223; Bergholm 2003; Bergholm 
2005a; Bergholm 2005b; Bergholm 2007a; Bergholm 2007b; Bergholm 2009; Bergholm 2012. 
5 Laki valtion viroista ja toimista suoritettavan palkkauksen perusteista 29.12.1923, Suomen asetuskokoelma 
1924, N:o 299, 984–987.
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from salaried personnel to people working for wages. Family wage systems 
in other countries based on the male breadwinner model also became more 
familiar during wartime.
In 1941 the population committee, suggested a targeted family allowance for 
poor families with children. The reasons given for this reform were primarily 
that it would counteract the decreased birth rate and level the burden of 
family maintenance. The committee proposed that wage earners should get 
a higher family allowance. Due to a lack of consensus in the committee and 
fiscal restraints caused by the war, the family allowance was limited to poor 
families with many children. This allowance was for maintenance and it was 
controlled by municipal welfare boards and was mainly given in kind and 
not in cash transfers.6
Due to the scarcity of necessities and the heavy burden of war reparations 
to the Soviet Union, there was full employment and high inflation in the 
Finnish economy after the Second World War. Individual unions and the 
Confederation of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) often made claims for higher 
wages. Faced with accelerating inflation and continuing pressure for higher 
wages, the Finnish Employers’ Confederation (STK) tried to find new solutions 
in their effort to curb wage inflation. In the summer of 1947 STK developed 
the idea of the family wage targeted to families with children, which were 
hit harder by increases in food prices. If the pay of workers without family 
obligations could be frozen, this would be the best and cheapest way for 
employers to curb the workers’ wage pressures. STK had a plan for balancing 
the cost of the family wage system among companies, because families varied 
in size and workers with large families could become expensive burdens for 
their employers. Therefore all employers should pay a similar fee into the 
common fund and from there the state authorities would pay a family wage to 
those workers who were entitled to it or the common fund could compensate 
employers retrospectively for these new labour costs.7
Unrest in the labour market built up in the autumn of 1947. SAK made wage 
claims and suggested substantial changes to the wage control system.8 It also 
threatened a general strike. STK brought to the negotiations a well-prepared 
6 Perhelisälaki 30.4.1943, Suomen asetuskokoelma 1943, N:o 375, 651–653; Perhelisälaki, Sosiaalinen 
Aikakauskirja N:o 5–6/1943; Suonoja, Kyösti (1992) ’Kansalaisten parhaaksi – Yhteistuntoa ja politiikkaa. 
Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö 1939–1992’. In Haatanen, Pekka & Suonoja, Kyösti Suuriruhtinaskunnasta 
hyvinvointivaltioon. Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö 75 vuotta. Helsinki, 394–395; Bergholm 2003, 64–65; 
Bergholm 2005b.
7 N. Svanström K. Herra Eversti V.A.M. Karikoskelle 1.7.1947, liitteenä Selvitys perhepalkkaperiaatteesta 
1.7.1947, IH4:17 (T152), STK:n arkisto, ELKA; Bergholm 2005a, 149–163. 
8 About wage control in Finland 1942–1955 see Bergholm 2005a; Bergholm 2006; 
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plan for the making of a new family wage system. STK made its position 
clear. Only a family allowance targeted to those parents with children younger 
than fifteen years was needed to safeguard the purchasing power of workers 
in general. SAK hesitated because the trade union movement supported the 
equal pay for equal work principle. The labour market confederations made a 
compromise agreement, which included some parts of SAK’s wage claim and 
the introduction of the family wage system in the way that STK had suggested.9
The popular front coalition government of Communists, Social Democrats 
and the Agrarian League (power in 1945–1948) decided that the labour market 
organisations were entitled to negotiate the details of the new family wage 
system. The core of the government’s decision was that amount of family 
allowance should be the same as for civil servants, i.e. 500 FIM per child. 
Practical solutions were copied from the STK plan. As a part of a price 
settlement between the government and the farmers’ organisation, there was 
a mutual agreement that as soon as feasible the authorities should examine 
the possibilities of extending the family allowance to the farmers.10 
A temporary amendment to wage control statutes obliged all employers to 
pay the family allowance (500 FIM) multiplied by the number of dependent 
children under the age of 17 years, but due to legal technicalities it was 
impossible to connect to this decision any levelling system to share the varying 
costs of family allowances among employers. The real problem with this short-
term solution was that, some employers, especially in agriculture, had to pay 
more than others on average, while workers or salaried employees who had 
large families could be blacklisted or even sacked due to the special cost their 
employer incurred.11 
Recommendations from the wage control authorities and STK about the 
implementation of this provisional amendment made it clear that the allowance 
should normally go to the father. The committee, whose task it was to draft 
permanent legislation for the family allowance, also supported this view in its 
proposal. The family wage system that strengthened the economic position 
9 Bergholm 2003, 65–66; Bergholm 2005a, Mansner 1984, 286.
10 Bergholm 2005a, J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat I, 497–498; Hyvämäki 1977, 315–316; Kananen, Ilkka 
(1986) ’MTK ja Suomen maatalouspolitiikka. Elintarvikepulasta omavaraisuuteen 1917–1949’, Rauma: 
Kirjayhtymä, 216–217; Väänänen, Jouko (1987) ’MTK ja Suomen maatalouspolitiikka. Ohjakset omiin 
käsiin’. Rauma: Kirjayhtymä, 188–189; Peräläinen, Antero (1991) ’Yhteiskunnan tuki lapsiperheille’. In 
Taskinen, Ritva (ed.) Perheen puolesta. Väestöliitto 1941–1991’. Keuruu: Väestöliitto, 89; Mansner 1984, 
283–287.
11 Valtioneuvoston päätös työpalkkojen säännöstelystä annetun valtioneuvoston päätöksen muuttamisesta 
8.11.1947, Suomen asetuskokoelma 1947, N:o 808, 1271; Sosiaaliministeriön päätös lapsilisän maksamisesta 
metsä- ja uittotöissä 8.11.1947, Suomen asetuskokoelma 1947, N:o 809, 1272; Bergholm 2005a, 177–178.
318
TAPiO BERGHOlM
of the male breadwinner had nearly conquered Finland with the support of 
labour market organisations.12 
The wage settlement and family allowance targeted only to waged workers 
were heavily criticised by various groups. In this situation the trade union 
movement made it clear that child allowances were a part of the wage 
settlement.13 A small but efficient government committee rapidly prepared 
a law for the permanent family allowance. The committee had only three 
members: Chairman Aarre Simonen14 and representatives from STK and 
SAK. Their presence underlines the importance of the labour market parties 
in the making of this reform. In December 1947 the committee had already 
proposed a law based on the wage-earning male breadwinner model, but 
this model was never incorporated into Finnish legislation. The committee 
advised the government to reconsider the introduction of the universal child 
benefit in the same way as in Sweden, where the reform came into effect at 
the beginning of 1948.15 
A new committee was set up and it proposed a universal child benefit, which 
should in general be paid to women. The Swedish example paved the way for 
this female caretaker of the family model. Gender stereotypes supported the 
rapid change of hearts and minds. The new committee argued that the best 
way to ensure that the money received was used in the best interests of the 
children was to give it directly to the mother.16 
Peter Baldwin has criticised qui bono theories explaining behaviour, 
coalitions and outcomes in the making of welfare states.17 The universal child 
benefit system was fiercely supported by SAK and criticised by the farmers’ 
organisation to the very end even though it meant a substantial transfer of 
resources from industrial centres to rural areas.18 Child benefit reform was 
part of the labour market settlement. This made child benefits part of the 
12 STK kiertokirje N:o 183/47 18.11.1947, IH4:17, STK:n arkisto, ELKA; Osastopäällikkö Raf. Rinne, Ylim.
esittelijä Esko Kulovaara Väliaikaisen lapsilisän maksamisohjeet, IH4:17 (T152), STK:n arkisto, ELKA; 
Komiteamietintö Mon. 1947:8, 1 (lakiesityksen 2 §.). 
13 Bergholm 2003, 68–70.
14 Aarre Simonen was at that time secretary of Confederation of Finnish Towns.
15 Komiteamietintö Mon. 1947:8.
16 Komiteamietintö Mon. 1948:31, 8.
17 Baldvin, Peter (1990) The Politics of Social Solidarity. Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875–
1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 44–45.
18 Seppänen, Veikko (1954) Perhekustannusten tasaustoimenpiteiden vaikutus kansantulon alueelliseen 
jakaantumiseen, pro gradu –thesis in social policy, University of Helsinki.
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social wage package of workers from the perspective of SAK and therefore 
SAK defended the established system against any suggested cuts.19 
The birth of the Finnish universal child benefit system was the result of a 
sequence of unintended consequences, disparate events and interests. From 
the autumn of 1948 all mothers received the same amount (600 FIM) of 
money per child. This additional income for the mother also made the incomes 
of husbands and wives more equal. In the end, the employers’ initiative to 
supplement the wage packet of men brought more resources to the household 
budget controlled by women. What was previously a male civil servant privilege 
had become the social right of every female citizen with a child.20
Holidays for ordinary people
The right to holiday or freedom from duty was privilege of civil servants and 
those in the highest ranks of private companies in Finland from quite early 
on. Some kind of holiday for agricultural workers was put into Finnish law 
already in 1865. This was the week (‘sign up freedom’ –pestuuvapaa) when 
these workers signed up for work making employment contracts for the whole 
year. The reason for this holiday was thus to give farm workers and their 
employers an opportunity to make new connections and employment contracts 
after harvest. This ‘cat week’ (kissaviikko) was tumultuous, because workers 
were temporarily outside the control and the oversight of the master or the 
owner of farm.21
Finnish legislation divided wage earners into several sub-groups. The first 
law on more modern employment relations, which also included holiday rights, 
concerned employment conditions in shops, offices and warehouses. This was 
the so-called shop assistant law of 1919, according to which workers in these 
sectors got one week’s holiday after a year of service. In 1922 holiday rights 
improved substantially for shop assistants, when they got the right to one 
week’s holiday after half a year of employment, and this was increased again 
after 1922: one year’s service gave two weeks, five years three weeks and ten 
years four weeks. Employers had to allow their shop assistants to take this 
free time during the summer between 15th May and 15th September. These 
19 Bergholm 2005a, 269, 355–357, 381, 383, 386–387.
20 Bergholm 2003; Bergholm 2005b.
21 Anttila 2005, 87. 
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employees were considered to be white collar workers and therefore the first 
to be entitled to the holiday privilege.22 
Other workers got their holiday rights later and at first these holidays were 
only half of what shop assistants had gained by law. After 1922 all workers 
were entitled to one week’s holiday after one year of service. The Finnish 
Parliament enacted a new general annual holiday law in 1938, which came 
into force on 1st May 1939. This law also gave the workers the right to a 
summer holiday, because according to annual holiday law the holiday period 
was between 1st May and 30th September. The difference between white 
collar and blue collar workers diminished as the general holiday law gradually 
improved. From 1973 statutory annual leave was four weeks for all workers 
in permanent employment.23 
Summer cottages, motoring holidays and even package holidays in the 
1960s and 1970s were not only for the privileged few but for all working 
citizens in Finland. These rights were connected to employment relations, 
but due to the strength of the farmers’ lobbying organisation Central Union 
of Agricultural Producers (Maataloustuottajain Keskusliitto – MTK) and of 
the Centre Party (former Agrarian League), the farmers got also their own 
holiday law in the 1970s. The farmer and his wife had shorter holidays than 
workers, but this innovation from Norway delivered new opportunities for 
people in agriculture. The right to a proper holiday – free from occupational 
and employment obligations – became the right of nearly every citizen in 
Finland. The old social distinction between ordinary people in permanent toil 
and the upper class on their holidays had nearly vanished.24 
Holiday rights were on the agenda of the trade union movement, which 
gained strength in Finland during and after the Second World War. Private 
sector employers and their organisation, STK, were very unhappy indeed 
about the developments in the 1920s and especially the 1960s. They opposed 
statutory holiday rights for employees and the enlargement of these rights. They 
argued – quite correctly – that these reforms were expensive for private sector 
companies. But the employers could not oppose the democratic dismantling 
of old privileges by the Finnish Parliament.25
22 Ala-Kapee, Pirjo & Valkonen, Marjaana (1982) Yhdessä elämä turvalliseksi. SAK:laisen 
ammattiyhdistysliikkeen kehitys vuoteen 1930. Helsinki: SAK, 581.
23 Anttila 2005, 91–99; Bergholm 2007a, 121–127; Bergholm 2012, 207. 
24 Sauli, Liisa (1987) ’MTK ja Suomen maatalouspolitiikka. Maatalousyhteiskunnasta teollisuusvaltioksi 
1950–1980’. Rauma: Kirjayhtymä, 321–325.
25 Ala-Kapee-Valkonen 1982, 576, Bergholm 2007a, 123–127. 
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Anu-Hanna Anttila has argued that holidays had different meanings for the 
bourgeoisie and working class. She claims that for both the middle class and 
the workers holidays were a cultural field of distinction. She also points out 
that social educators tried to persuade the working class to spend their free 
time more usefully for themselves and for society at large.26 This paper has 
another perspective on these reforms. Instead of looking at the differences in 
holidays and their meanings for different social strata, it is possible to argue 
that actually the length and meanings of holidays gradually converged when 
holidays were no longer a privilege for the few. 
Pensions also for working-class people
In Finland there have been political and institutional tensions between pensions 
systems, institutions and principles. The earnings-related pension based on the 
insurance principle, equal flat-rate pensions based on the citizenship principle 
and graded pensions based on social levelling ideas have been on the legislative 
agenda of political parties, interest groups and bureaucrats. This struggle has 
been described in detail in earlier research.27
It is likely that too much attention has been given to these tensions and too 
little discussion and analytical vigour has been given to the gradual process 
by which the old privileges of the civil servants were eroded. This is also 
the case in the field of pensions. The National Pension reform in the 1930s 
aimed to create payment-related pensions based on obligatory individual 
pension accounts. This reform collapsed due to wartime inflation. Even after 
the Second World War the difference between civil servants with generous 
pensions (for themselves and their widows and orphans) and farmers and the 
working class almost without any pension coverage was considered to be a 
great social injustice by trade unions and farmers’ organisations.
The National Pension reform of 1956 brought social justice to the fore, when 
the equal pension principle was complemented with needs- and income-tested 
additional increases to the basic pension. The Finnish Parliament enacted 
an earnings-related pension system system through two laws in 1961. Later 
farmers, entrepreneurs, artists, the self-employed and receivers of grants also 
got their own pension schemes. Following the pension reform of 2005, nearly 
26 Anttila 2005, 35–85.
27 Häggman, Kai (1997) Suurten muutosten Suomessa. Kansaneläkelaitos 1937–1997. Jyväskylä: 
Kansaneläkelaitos; Kangas 2006; Niemelä 1988; Kangas 2007; Bergholm 2007a; Bergholm 2012; 
Hannikainen &Vauhkonen 2012.
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all earnings and also some other societal activities contribute to pensions 
earnings in Finland. 
This last reform actually made the principles of working class pensions 
and the civil servants’ pensions system similar. The high pension compared 
to earnings, lower pensionable age and some other features still favourable 
to civil servants in the late 1980s started to disappear during the 1990s and 
2000s. Some of the actuarial rules in the new pension system still benefit civil 
servants compared to the working class. Civil servants have better possibilities 
for enjoying the accelerated accrual rate of 4.5% on the pension of a person 
who continues working beyond the age of 63. But in the long run there has 
been a gradual decline of social and economic distinction and privilege of civil 
servants in the field of pensions.28
* * *
This paper has looked at the development of the welfare state not from the 
perspective of winners but from the perspective of losers. The levelling of 
social rights delivered relative decline for the privileged civil servants and 
other members of the upper class. This paper shows that a gradual erosion 
of civil servants’ privileges occurred in many fields of many fringe benefits 
or social wages. After the Second World War there are also other examples 
where ordinary workers caught up or came closer to the employment terms 
of civil servants. 
The egalitarian project was problematic, contested and sometimes did 
not deliver socially equal outcomes. But when we look at the development 
and reforms concerning social wages from the perspective of privileged civil 
servants, this egalitarian ethos was still strong and efficient in the making of 
the pension reform of 2005.
28 Hannikainen & Vauhkonen 2012.
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bAsic incoMe And deMocrAcy
jORMA kALELA
The idea of basic income, a sum of money provided without conditions by 
the state to every person in working age permanently resident in the country 
was about to come to the fore in Finnish public discussion at the end of the 
1980s. The same was true of responding to the discontent with representative 
democracy among citizens. The two issues that were kept apart from each other 
stayed, however, in the background since the depression of the next decade 
changed the direction of politics: the new agenda that has later been termed 
neoliberal was not favourable for these kinds of reforms. Since the turn of the 
century a new situation has gradually emerged as the present article suggests. 
Carrying out basic income implies a new kind of politics: policies generated 
also from the citizens’ situation, their demands and initiatives.
Basic income emerged in the 1980s, in the case of the present writer, as 
a solution to the contradiction created by unemployment policies based on 
means testing: satisfying the demand of labour by administrative means was 
obstructed by measures aimed at securing the livelihood of those out of work. 
This conclusion ended my treatise on unemployment in 20th century Finnish 
politics that was commissioned by the then Ministry of Labour and published 
in the spring of 1989.1 
Two decades later it is my contention that the policies of the welfare state 
have to be reassessed because the sources of livelihood have been profoundly 
transformed and the risk of prolonged unemployment has markedly increased. 
At the same time, the culture of labour has been altered in a way that has 
made life uncertain in a novel way and triggered mental problems to displace 
physical burden as the employees’ main worry. Basic income is an adequate 
starting-point for reorienting the welfare state. 
As regards democracy, the legitimacy of the existing political institutions 
was shaken by the late 1980s because of the citizens’ dissatisfaction. New 
conditions for civil activity had emerged since the 1960s with the disappearance 
of the traditional misery at the same time as the age-old social structure 
was broken down. Freedom from cultural predestination and the sense of 
1 Kalela, Jorma (1989) Työttömyys 1900-luvun suomalaisessa yhteiskuntapolitiikassa. Helsinki: Valtion 
Painatuskeskus ja Työvoimaministeriö, 208–227.
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increasing opportunities had been reinforced by a general rise in the level of 
income and the basic services provided by the welfare state. However, the 
citizens’ new perspectives on the future were not reflected in politics.2
Political parties were, as Pauli Kettunen wrote in 1987, imprisoned by 
patterns of action that had materialised during the first years of the twentieth 
century. The way they responded to people’s resentments and sought to 
redress what were regarded as injustices did not work any longer. The logic 
of combining ‘interest articulation from below’ and ‘knowledge from above’ 
was out of date. Politicians did not realise that their solutions were taken as 
patronising since people regarded themselves as capable of looking after their 
own interests.3 
At the outset of the twenty-first century there is hardly any reciprocity 
left. Political parties represent the state in relation to citizens rather than the 
other way round. They seek justification from the citizens for state policies 
rather than argue for the needs and interests of their voters. In this kind of 
situation that is common to all EU countries basic income opens an avenue 
to creating a citizen-generated democracy. 
Employment as the source of livelihood
The possibility of determining one’s way of life advanced in parallel with the 
emergence of paid work as the dominant source of livelihood from the 1960s 
on. In turn, with the depression of the 1990s the context of everyday life began 
to assume new features as a result of ever advancing commodification: social 
relations are nowadays mediated by purchase-power, for instance. Individual 
competitiveness determines the view on unemployment: not having a job is 
regarded as a personal defect rather than a social evil.
It is in the social circumstances that came into view with the first years of 
the 21st century, sometimes characterised with the term consumerism, that the 
new topicality of basic income has its origins. The reform has also got a new 
kind of backing. The idea was presented by individual scholars and politicians 
in the 1980s and 1990s while it has had constantly increasing popular support 
2 A summary of the new conditions for civil activity that had emerged since the 1960s was the theme 
of Kalela, Jorma (1990) ‘Kansalaiset, poliittinen järjestelmä ja yhteiskuntamoraali’. Tiedepolitiikka, Vol. 
15, Issue 2, 5–16.
3 Kettunen, Pauli (1987) ‘Vuoden 1906 Suomi, vuoden 1918 Suomi, Nyky-Suomi. In Alapuro, Risto, Liikanen, 
Ilkka, Smeds, Kerstin & Stenius, Henrik (eds.) Kansa liikkeessä, Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 284–287. 
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from the turn of the century on. Even two political parties, the Greens and 
Left Alliance, endorse officially the reform.4
A new stage began with the foundation in 2011 of a network that affiliated 
itself the following year to Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN). The Finnish 
organisation unites people from all points of the political spectrum; they are 
convinced of the need to realise the reform, their different views on its substance 
notwithstanding. In February 2013 BIEN Finland launched its campaign for 
a citizens’ initiative that obliges the parliament to take a stand in the matter 
if the 50 000 signatures required have been collected.5
In accordance with the idea of BIEN Finland the present article represents 
only the views of its author even if he is an active member of the organisation. 
My interpretation is that the enlarging support of basic income reflects two 
kinds of attitudes. There is, firstly, the uncertainty of life resulting from changes 
in employment. A particular source for popular dissatisfaction is the various 
effects of the transforming culture of labour. Secondly, there is popular 
resentment about public policies with a special source for anger in the jungle 
of forms needed to apply for benefits. In addition to the unmanageability of 
the welfare state, opposition arises from its obliging undercurrent. 
The function of this article is to demonstrate that the recent changes, 
shared by most EU countries, have made basic income a sensible political 
aim. The idea is, however, not to discuss the merits and weaknesses of the 
several different suggestions regarding the substance of the reform since the 
available space does not allow it. Besides, such a deliberation is inevitable if 
the parliament takes the citizens’ initiative seriously. Discussing basic income 
is like opening Pandora’s box: it compels one to take a stand on all the present 
fundamental political issues.
As a historian of politics, my interest in basic income is related to the present 
state of democracy characterised as it is by two renegaded basic features. 
The need to curb arbitrary use of power, appearing as it does today, in the 
guise of decisions made beyond the reach of representatives for citizens has 
practically passed from sight in most EU countries. At the same time, the 
idea of policies generated and advocated by the citizens themselves plays a 
4 About the idea of basic income in Finland from the 1980s to the present, see Pertti Koistinen and 
Johanna Perkiö (forthcoming) Good and Bad Times of Social Innovations – The case of universal basic 
income in Finland.
5 The activities of BIEN Finland can be followed at www.perustulo.org See also Johanna Perkiö ja Kaisu 
Suopanki (eds. 2012) Perustulon aika. Helsinki: Into. A similar kind of citizens’ initiative was endorsed 
by the EU commission in January 2013; the required number of signatures within EU is one million.
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minimal role in public affairs. What potential for a revival of democracy is 
embedded in basic income? 
Transforming sources of livelihood from the 1990s on
‘Work is the best way to social security’ has been the emblem of all Finnish 
governments. This status was not shaken by the collapse of its economic 
foundation during the booming late 1990s and early 2000s. The country 
experienced the probably most powerful upswing in its history which also 
saw the formation of an unprecedentedly large body of people who were 
permanently or repeatedly out of work. It became apparent that joblessness 
did not disappear with rapid economic growth and that such a growth did not 
presuppose full employment. Instead, poverty had increased during the boom.6 
The 1990s change in the labour market has turned out to be irreversible, and 
yet it has been paid hardly any attention to in the public discussion. By contrast, 
the unspecified slogan ‘the need to create new jobs’ serves as justification for 
practically all economic policy measures. That the risk of prolonged shortage 
of paid work is a constant part of life for the families of about two hundred 
thousand Finns has been virtually swept under the carpet. The new situation 
as regards regular employment results in part from changes in the demand for 
labour; the general influence of these changes has also been underestimated.
Full-time steady employment is not any longer the normal way of earning 
the necessities of life even if the majority of people still do traditional paid work. 
As early as by the first years of the 21st century it was apparent that hundreds 
of thousands people had ‘atypical labour relationships’. They were hired to 
do temporary jobs, doing short-time labour, linked to employment agencies. 
employed themselves e.g. as graphic artists or had become superficial and often 
unwilling entrepreneurs as the result of outsourcing. It is the irregularity of 
employment that unites these people and justifies calling them, to paraphrase 
the sociologist Guy Standing’s vocabulary, the ‘new labour’.7 
6 Kalela, Jorma (2002) ’Syntyikö Suomeen 1990-luvulla uusi alaluokka?’. In Blomberg, Helena, 
Hannikainen, Matti & Kettunen, Pauli (eds.) Lamakirja. Näkökulmia 1990-luvun talouskriisiin ja sen 
historiallisiin konteksteihin. Turku: Kirja-Aurora.
7 Standing’s term for the same group of employee’s is ’precariat’. Standing, Guy (2009) Work after 
Globalization. Building Occupational Citizenship, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward 
Elgar.
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The permanent rise of unemployment to a higher level8 and sporadic 
employment have thrown the welfare state off balance because the benefits 
granted presuppose that the recipients have stable full-time employment. This 
characteristic has been strengthened by the post-1980s social policies in which 
the level of benefits has been related to wages and salaries. As a result, the 
present welfare state discriminates, even at retirement, against those with a 
weak position in the labour market. There is a distinct inequality with regard 
to benefits. 
Speaking about ‘unusual jobs’ in the way part of the media and even some 
trade-unionists still do in the case of about every fourth employed Finn is 
unreasonable. There simply are not traditional jobs for everyone any longer. 
This aspect of the labour market is intimately connected to the appearance 
of the ‘new work’ analysed, in addition to Standing, by sociologists Richard 
Sennet and Jussi Vähämäki, for instance.9 ‘New work’ is distinguished by a 
ceaseless conversion of the culture of labour. 
Workers are today expected to think of their own life as a project, the idea 
of which is to produce a self-sufficient member of the staff. A carefully devised 
portfolio, not any longer a bare CV, demonstrates the potential employee’s 
capabilities. Being able to keep the job, in turn, demands constant updating of 
one’s occupational competence, in most cases by the employees themselves, 
in their own time and at their own expense. The worker is also expected to 
internalise the company view on the production; entrepreneurial approach 
has been elevated to the status of the norm that dominates working life. This 
kind of a profile for the employee is quite a challenge to the trade unions, 
especially since the border between the worker and the entrepreneur has 
become a line drawn in water.10
The three Finnish governments at the 21st century have elevated 
entrepreneurship to a crucial objective of public policies. As is to be expected, 
the number of companies has grown remarkably but with an interesting 
nuance connected to changes in the culture of labour. Some of the people 
8 Before the depression the rate of employment was about 74% while during this century it has been 
well under 70 %.
9 More detailed about ‘new work’, see Kalela, Jorma (2008) ‘Markkinavoimat ja ”uusi työ”’. In Ojajärvi, 
Jussi & Steinby, Liisa (ed.) Minä ja markkinavoimat. Yksilö, kulttuuri ja yhteiskunta uusliberalismin 
valtakaudella. Helsinki: Avain. About Sennet, see his (2006) The Culture of the New Capitalism (Yale 
University Press; New Haven & London, and for Vähämäki, Kalela 2008 that discusses his texts in 
relation to those of Sennet’s.
10 Kettunen, Pauli (2002) ‘Suunnitelmataloudesta kansalliseen innovaatiojärjestelmään’. In Blomberg, 
Hannikainen & Kettunen, 38–40. More generally about changes in the culture of labour, see also 
Kettunen, Pauli (2008) Globalisaatio ja kansallinen me. Kansallisen katseen historiallinen kritiikki. 
Tampere: Vastapaino. 
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who constitute ‘new labour’ have simultaneously many sources of livelihood: 
one may be at the same time, say, a company director, a journalist, a supply 
teacher, a personal trainer, a caretaker and a graphic artist. This development 
does not mean that the contradiction between employer and employee has 
had its day; what is needed is separating the questions of livelihood and 
employment in politics.
Managing one’s occupation has also been impeded in way that makes 
establishing one’s own identity difficult. The life span of many skills is 
shortening and the institutions in relation to which the employee has to situate 
him- or herself are fragmenting. Celebrating potential ability is about to replace 
craftsmanship in ‘new work’ and the employee is expected to orient to the 
short term and be willing to abandon past experience. Drawing on social 
memory has been thwarted and one’s own life-narrative has to be created 
out of disjointed bits. 
Competition between workers is also a key aspect of ‘new work’. At the 
place of work this characteristic is often realised by the way of creating rivalling 
teams or by linking wages to the execution of tasks. Outside work the same 
function is performed first and foremost by the scarcity of jobs. These methods 
of intensifying the workers’ performance antagonise structurally the basic idea 
of the trade unions that is based on the elimination of competition between 
workers.11
‘More working days are lost each year as a result of stress than through 
strikes’ is one way of illuminating the change from physical burden to mental 
problems as the crucial characteristic of ‘new work’12. The impressive sales of 
Juha Siltala’s book, dealing with ‘the brief history of worsening working life’, 
in turn, indicates that a large number of Finns have recognised their own 
situation in its pages. Work is not only distressing but the very concept of it 
has become ambiguous.13 
The consequences of ‘new work’ outside the place of work have been 
considerable since they are in line with the other aspects of what Sennet calls 
the ‘culture of new capitalism’. Income disparities have significantly increased 
in all industrial countries since the 1990s and their effect has been strengthened 
11 Kalela, Jorma (2009A) ’Denial of Politics as Government Policy’. In Tiitinen, Seppo & al. (eds) Challenges 
for Finland and Democracy. Parliament of Finland Centennial 12. Helsinki: Edita. 
12 The quotation refers to present-day Britain (Madeleine Bunting’s review ’Loose connection’ of Sennet’s 
book mentioned in the note 9, New Statesman 13 March 2006), but undoubtedly applies to Finland 
as well.
13 Kalela 2009A, note 14.
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by the austerity measures characteristic of economic policies in the 2010s. 
Poverty has intensified.14
Finland has not ratified the European Social Charter as regards fair 
remuneration because of the country’s collective bargaining system. The 
argument is that there is no need for minimum wages because the pay and 
minimum conditions of employment in the agreements are binding for all 
employers in the branch in question. This has not, however, hindered the 
increase of relative poverty. A constantly growing number of employed workers 
have fallen below the 60% of national median income, the relative poverty 
line set by the EU.
That there are persons whose earnings are not sufficient to provide a decent 
livelihood either because the wage is too low or the employment is sporadic has 
been a constant theme of discussion everywhere in the Western world since 
the beginning of the present century.15 The burden of personal reproduction 
is especially heavy on the unemployed who have to maintain their capacity 
as a potential employee. Searching for a job, applying for welfare benefits by 
filling an infinite number of forms and seeking additional income are time-
consuming and costly efforts. 
Food queues that do not disappear remind us of the harsh conditions in 
which many employees have to take care of their personal reproduction, not 
to speak of the unemployed. Keeping up one’s capability to work by way of 
continual training, for instance, is expected from the employed poor, too. The 
question is of meeting requirements that are necessary for the functioning of 
a market economy but have been marginalised in public policies. The same 
is true of collective bargaining; the unions should also recognise work that is 
not labour instead of concentrating only on labour. 
Taken together, the risk of prolonged unemployment, ‘new labour’ and ‘new 
work’, highlight a life with uncertainty and the associated sense of insecurity 
as the uppermost aspect. The worst drawback from the point of view of those 
in precarious jobs is the unpredictability of their own and their family’s life 
situation. Difficulties in planning for the future impose a mental strain, make 
it difficult to start a family and have children and may even be an obstacle to 
14 Kalela, Jorma (2006) ’Nollakuusi ja vasemmiston poliittiset arvot’. In Ahvenisto, Inkeri & Mäki, Kirsi 
(eds) Kansalaisvaikuttaminen ajassa.Näkökulmia suomalaiseen kansalaisvaikuttamiseen suurlakosta 
2000-luvulle. Helsinki: Työväen historian ja perinteen tutkimuksen seura.
15 Key incentives for discussion have been Barbara Ehrenreich’s two books: (2001) Nickel and Dimed.: 
On (Not) Getting By In America. New York, NY.: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and (2005) Bait and 
Switch: The (Futile) Pursuit of the American Dream. New York, NY.: Metropolitan Books.
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obtaining a loan or a mortgage. Steady livelihood has become an unfulfilled 
dream for a growing number of Finns.
As regards the response of the welfare state16, the confused public debate 
about shortage of employment introduces its fundamental weakness. The 
level of unemployment that is presented as a precise percentage, for instance, 
gives the impression of a uniform body while the question is, in fact, of the 
very opposite. Secondly, there is much of futile debate about exact numbers 
characterising those out of work; the very constitution of this diverse group 
makes every definition controversial. However, it is possible to divide the 
unemployed in three groups that are relatively indisputable even as regard 
their sizes.17
Those with a good change to find a job at a relatively short interval constitute 
only about every seventh of all the unemployed or, starting from the 210 000 
according to Statistics Finland, some 30 000 people. The point is that the 
vast majority are chronically or permanently out of work. Included in the 
larger part are the other extreme of the unemployed: those who have already 
lost their faith in life and may hardly ever find, or even seek for a job. The 
number of these social excluded people may be as high as 50 000 meaning 
that there are about 130 000 people who ‘want to work but can’t find it’, as 
Sennet describes their situation.
The largest group of the unemployed does not constitute of ‘losers’, as 
they often are characterised in public; they do not dip into their neighbour’s 
purse for their livelihood. They are neither poorly educated nor do they lack 
expertise; among them are even many with a higher education degree. The 
difficulties they have met while seeking for a job originate in outdated skills 
or skills that are not in demand, and this calls for expanding and recycling 
their competence as the way to find a job. However, this is what the state has 
refused to provide and this denial justifies the term displaced. Worth noticing is 
that the kind of retraining needed is the very thing one would expect from the 
public authorities with a view on the current debate around the labour market.
The main worry of the economic decision-makers and the experts in the 
Finland of the 2010s is the shortage of labour expected to arise in the near 
future. Various remedies for addressing the problem have been suggested, 
raising the retirement age and importing skilled foreign labour, for instance. 
16 More detailed about government policies, see Kalela 2009A and Kalela, Jorma (2009B) ’Politiikan 
kieltämisen politiikka’. In Taimio, Heikki (ed.) Kurssin muutos: Kestävään kasvuun ja hyvintointiin. Helsinki: 
Työväen Sivistysliitto.
17 The three groups come close to the three segments of customers applied by Ministry of Employment 
and Economy. See Henkilöasiakkuusstrategia. TEM028:00/2009, 10–12.
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Considering the heat of this discussion it is, logically, surprising that hardly any 
attention has been paid to the potentials embedded in the displaced majority 
of the unemployed. On the contrary, these people have virtually been thought 
of as a burden on the economy.
Expressing surprise at state policies is, actually, superficial since there was 
already in the 1980s a tendency to split the country’s workforce into two 
parts on the basis of employability. In the 1998 reform of public policies on 
labour administration the division was finalised. Since then the main focus has 
been on ‘fulltime jobseekers’ while the majority of the unemployed has been 
approached in terms of preventing their marginalisation.18 This pre-emptive 
aim, and alleviating poverty in general, ‘will be conditional upon meeting the 
goals set for employment’, as is stated in the Government Programme from 
2003, for instance. Unless the authorities can arrange jobs for the unemployed 
in question, they may grant the support needed only at their discretion. This 
principle leads, among other things, to counterproductive results with a view 
to an imminent shortage of labour.
The discretion originates in the late 19th century thinking which calls 
for oversight in order to prevent abuses of reforms; this principle remains 
imperative in the 21st century even if it hinders efforts to increase the rate of 
employment. The unemployed who cannot be provided with jobs are actually 
treated, to use Sennet’s vocabulary, as ‘useless people’. The retraining courses 
organised are regarded by the unemployed, unavoidably, simply as requirements 
for receiving unemployment benefits - instead of opening a perspective for 
improving their own conditions of life. As a result, the compulsoriness of the 
training rules out learning skills that expand the trainee’s existing competence 
and are in demand from the employers’ angle. This potential for strengthening 
the trainee’s motivation might be realised by basic income whereas the present 
stipulations have brought about training that is experienced (in most cases) 
as senseless and quite seldom leads to a job. 
The realisation of basic income has been, in other words, prevented by 
the spectre of moral decline that is the alleged result of obtaining support for 
livelihood without something being given in return. What should be discussed 
is the enduring viability of this moral idea, and that is a political issue. Still, 
denying complementary public support for securing the necessities of life 
is irrational from an economical perspective too, as was argued above. Two 
additional arguments should also be remembered. Firstly, with regard to the 
much-discussed public indebtedness it is possible to realise basic income cost-
18 Kalela 2002, 367–370.
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effectively, and secondly, the reform would make the country’s economy more 
competitive through inviting the people to contribute to the official ‘national 
innovation-boosting project’. 
Policies towards the misplaced majority of the unemployed serve as an 
introduction to the general problem at issue as regards the welfare state. What 
has pulled together criticisms from various angles is the conclusion that there is 
too much bureaucracy. It is an insuperable task for both politicians and scholars 
to manage a totality consisting of more than one hundred different, often 
mutually contradictory, benefits - not to speak of citizens in need of support. 
At an everyday level the anger is created by the ‘benefit jungle’ consisting of 
an infinite number of forms to be filled that frustrates the applicants and 
prevents local authorities both in social and labour administration from 
availing themselves of the training they gained in higher education. 
Dissolving the unnecessary bureaucracy is the logical remedy and there 
also is a large consensus about its necessity. The way to proceed is, however, 
disputed. The merit of basic income is to provide a well substantiated starting-
point, but it also offers a perspective beyond mere reorganising public benefits 
to those in need of support. Once realised the reform demonstrates that it may 
not be futile in the future to try to press those in power to admit the usefulness 
of the independent activity of citizens. 
New conditions for civil activity up to 1980s
The emergence of paid work as the dominant source of livelihood from 
the 1960s on was accompanied by strong optimism concerning the future; 
the country was developing towards brighter times. The new opportunities 
were highlighted, for example, by the disappearance of traditional forms of 
pauperism; ‘the faces of poverty changed when unemployment came out as 
the main cause of poverty’.19 In general, the Finland of the 1980s did not lag 
behind other industrialised countries as regards its socio-economic structure 
nor are its present economic and political problems any longer distinctively 
Finnish ones.
From the angle politics the time from the 1960s to the 1980s was a 
transitional period into the present circumstances. Struggles around issues 
19 Quotation from Antti Häkkinen and Jarmo Peltola (2001) ‘On the Social History of Unemployment and 
Poverty in Finland 1860–2000. In Jorma Kalela & al. (eds) Down from the heavens, Up from the ashes. 
The Finnish economic crisis of the 1990s in the light of economic and social research. VATT-julkaisuja 
27:6. Helsinki: Government Institute for Economic Research. 332.
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which in retrospect can be called the building of the welfare state engaged 
political parties to such a degree that they missed the profound changes that 
took place at the level of everyday life. First and foremost, they failed to see 
the way people apprehended their transformed social reality.20
With the view on civil activity the most profound novelty from the 1960s 
and 1970s was the breaking up of the previous, pyramid-like structure of social 
inequality based on the source of livelihood. The lowest rung of society had 
consisted of workers and smallholders, the next level of farmers, then came 
the middle class with the very small upper class at the top. This order was 
replaced by one based on purchase-power after the depression of the 1990s; 
the pyramid has been substituted by a cube balanced on one of its corners as 
the metaphor. The lowest stratum consists today of the socially excluded and 
the highest of the really rich with the huge ‘middle class’ in between.
The disappearance of the traditional structure of social inequality was 
attended by the citizens’ transformed position: political independence and 
activity took the place of dutiful compliance. The new guise acquired by 
authorities at the level of everyday life illuminates one of the crucial aspects 
in this change: local officials did not any longer appear as agents of public 
power but as persons supplying the various services that citizens are entitled 
to demand. Instead, for example, of queuing to be accepted onto the register 
of those without a job a person was entitled to unemployment benefit.
As regards their relation to politics, the citizen took on the same attitude 
as they did to their way of life. There was no question of compromising one’s 
freedom of judgement: s/he makes his/her own decisions even though the 
opportunities to choose might be limited, freedom of choice largely illusory and 
even the alternatives ready-planned by the various markets. Yet, the political 
parties talked down to the citizens. They were imprisoned, as was noted earlier 
(000), by practises characteristic of a society that had already vanished. 
The last two decades have been distinguished by a difference between 
the political views of the citizens and those of the political parties that was 
well under way during the depression of the 1990s. Although both sides were 
united in the belief that economic inevitabilities cannot be changed by political 
means, the interpretations of what had taken place diverged. From the citizens’ 
point of view, politicians had surrendered in the face of the social difficulties 
that globalisation had brought with it while the decision-makers thought that 
they had opted for the correct societal policy presupposed by preserving the 
Finnish competitiveness.
20 This conclusion could be verified already 1990, see Kalela 1990.
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Denial of politics as government policy from the 1990s on
The thinning of democracy, shrinking spheres of democratic governance and 
the citizens’ missing protests in the face of it have characterised Finnish politics 
since the 1990s.21 Two processes have been crucial here. The dominating one 
started with the elevation of international competitiveness in the course of 
depression to the position of the supreme criterion for all policy decisions. As 
recently as the 1970s it had been just one prerequisite for economic growth, 
equitable with, say education. Survival in the globalised competition has been 
the justification for policies that have led to the tightening subordination of 
politics to economic growth. 
The second process emerging in the post-depression Finland is actually 
a consequence of the first one: silent popular acceptance of the growing 
inequality and uncertainty of everyday life. For the governments the two 
trends, the inevitable effects of globalisation and minimising their harmful 
repercussions, belong to their stated agenda. The problems are regrettable but 
it must be understood that the freedom of action in solving them is limited 
since without a competitive and solid economy there will be no citizens’ welfare 
either. The official rhetoric conveys the belief that the problems of citizens will 
also be solved just as long as economic growth continues.22
A kind of competition-state that acts for the ‘national competitiveness 
community’, as Pauli Kettunen puts it, is the image governments have in mind 
when getting down to politics. The presumption is that there exist ‘correct’ 
ways of guaranteeing success in the globalised world which calls for specifying 
the targets on the basis of a competent prediction of economic development. 
In this sense, both the starting-point and the aims governments pursue have 
been taken for given, that is, the direction of politics has been reduced to 
responding to changes in the global environment. This logic of approaching 
competitiveness has been summarised in the so-called managerial language 
or discourse.
21 This chapter is an abridgment of Kalela 2009A and Kalela 2009B. See also Kalela, Jorma (2005) 
‘Perinteisen politiikan loppu’. In Pernaa, Ville & Niemi, Mari K. (eds) Suomalaisen yhteiskunnan poliittinen 
historia. Helsinki: Edita.
22 The various aspects of the managerial discourse is a theme running through Kettunen 2008. The idea 
was first presented by Leena Eräsaari (2002) in her Julkinen tila ja valtion yhtiöittäminen. Helsinki: 
Gaudeamus. It is important to note that the discourse in question is not just a Finnish phenomenon, 
but an international one. See for example Ross McKibbin (2006) ‘The Destruction of the Public Sphere’, 
London Review of Books, 5 January, pp. 3–6, that would be an apt description of the way of thinking 
that also dominates Finnish politics.
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As a framework for political activity the managerial discourse has acquired 
the status of the politically correct way of thinking. It is accepted as pre-set 
frame of reference within which debates about government and opposition 
policies must remain. As a paradigm this discourse embraces all societal 
phenomena that influence competitiveness and interprets what is involved 
in them. It also determines the matters that are relevant in light of any given 
situation, in other words, defines the current agenda. 
Embedded in the managerial discourse is the idea that Finland’s 
attractiveness as a location for capital and production is a matter that unites ‘us’. 
Each individual is shown that s/he can promote national competitiveness and 
the ensuring economic growth. By participating in working life they contribute 
to national innovation-boosting project and in this way fulfil their civic duty. 
Mobilising the people for ‘our’ common task is reflected also in the official 
rhetoric: welfare society has replaced welfare state. In a similar way raising the 
employment rate has taken the previous place of fighting unemployment. The 
weak point of the managerial logic is, of course, the insidious nature of ‘we’ as 
a concept. It conceals both people’s inequality and their divergent priorities 
The managerial logic is illuminated by the virtual non-existence of the 
large majority of the unemployed. Neither those regarded as marginalised 
nor the displaced do constitute an obstacle to international competitiveness 
and have, as a result, no place in the primary agenda. Such a position would 
require either that the existence of these groups seriously harms Finland’s 
image or that providing them with a livelihood becomes a burden on public 
finances. Until then the vast majority of those without a job remain an isolated, 
secondary ‘political’ problem. This tendency to value people on the basis on 
their contribution to international competitiveness has also contributed to the 
missing attention paid to the displaced as a labour reserve. 
The welfare state has also been approached in terms of the managerial 
discourse: the question is of the infrastructure needed for success in global 
competition. The logic of reacting to problems in the system is piecemeal 
corrections since there is no need to touch the sound basic idea. The result 
has been an unmanageable totality of benefits with their contradictions as 
was underlined above (336) Claims that the very idea of the public assistance 
allowances is in danger, not to speak of the allegations that the welfare state has 
been gradually dismantled, are in the government way of thinking defamation, 
at best. The same approach is displayed in the subordination of benefits as a 
means of regulating the labour market (above 335): the welfare offered has 
an instrumental rather than an intrinsic value. 
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With a view to citizens’ participation the essential element in the managerial 
discourse is thinking about the use of power one-sided ‘from above’. The 
governments vow to advance the welfare of citizens but since their perspective 
on this task is kept within the bounds of international competitiveness their 
policies are remote from how the people experience their situation. It really 
is difficult for the citizens to see the connection between matters that are 
central to their everyday lives and the political agenda. And since the political 
parties share this agenda it is no wonder that dialogue between the citizens 
and political parties hardly works any longer. 
Consensus about the managerial discourse as the framework for politics 
has also decreased differences between the political parties. From the citizens’ 
perspective they disagree about the ways of dealing with current problems 
rather than about the substance of what should be done. The citizens’ position 
comes close to the status of judges at a figure skating or a diving competition. 
They give points for the style by voting or through opinion polls, but do not 
themselves participate in the performance. Nor do they choose the competitors. 
Quite a few citizens do feel that they are treated as the objects of the 
parties’ activities and a resource for them rather than political subjects. They 
have hardly experienced any alternative kinds of politics. The idea that those 
who have suffered from some shortcoming would themselves both define the 
problem and point out the resolution is for them a mere theoretical possibility 
at best. 
Citizen-generated politics
With a view on politics in present Western democracies, there is an unmistakable 
need to terminate the trend towards people’s increasing inequality. A means to 
this end but as well as a goal in itself is the necessity of developing ways that 
ensure a real effect for the citizens’ views on the political agenda and for their 
priorities. An alternative to the present form of representative democracy is 
called for and basic income opens a perspective in that direction.
In addition to securing a minimum level of income for the unemployed; 
basic income would also provide a stabilising and supporting effect in 
everyday life. While counterbalancing the growing insecurity it would also 
be a compensation for the unpaid reproduction work. As a policy target basic 
income would function as an incentive to those out of work to expand and 
recycle their existing competence.
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Furthermore, the reform should be viewed in the same perspective in which 
the various schemes of citizen’s wage like child home care allowance and study 
grants have been devised. As a gratuitous system, basic income would enlarge 
this way of thinking, since no particular activity is required for this benefit.
As regards politics in general basic income means using carrots instead of 
sticks, it is a step towards trusting people. In everyday life the reform would 
lessen the role of individual competitiveness in dealings with others. Basic 
income might also give courage to live to people whose lives are dominated 
by fear of being marginalised. 
The realisation of basic income would imply that growth-based policies 
are not an adequate way to ensure people’s welfare. The reform would also 
demonstrate that securing international competitiveness is not the supreme 
criterion for making political decisions. Contributing to the good life of citizens 
is the dominating substance of politics, and interventions in the economy 
serve this goal. 
The idea of democracy is to guarantee that the use of power serves the 
citizens’ good life and that necessitates conditions in which their voice really 
makes a difference. Public spaces, institutions and policies must reflect views 
that originate in people’s own experiences as well as their initiatives and 
demands. 
Bottommost, the reform would open the perspective for a brighter future, 
a society in which people have the possibility of choosing their source of 
livelihood and constructing good life for themselves. Steps in this direction 
are provided, among other things, by the citizens’ initiative with a view on 
political practices and basic income as regards a context for political discussion. 
The future might seem, for the first time since the 1980s, a brighter one.
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welFAre serVice reForM 
Advancing the social investment paradigm?
HELENA BLOMBERg-kROLL
Introduction
The social investment paradigm has been a topic of scientific and societal debate 
for more than a decade. This paradigm has often been depicted as a modern 
alternative to the more straightforward neoliberal critique of traditional welfare 
state policies, which claim that social policies generate negative economic 
outcomes, a perspective that is said to have lost its appeal by the mid-1990s.1 
The social investment paradigm, which has recently become more popular 
within influential international economic and political institutions such as 
the European Union and the OECD as well as among many national decision 
makers, recognizes, in contrast to the neoliberal stance, that social policies 
can be brought into play in an increasingly positive role to enhance economic 
competitiveness, e.g. through emphasising investments that enhance human 
capital.2
This chapter investigates the extent to which policy principles and solutions 
regarding issues of welfare service reform that are concordant with the social 
investment paradigm have been a part of policies promoted by the Finnish 
central government administration through the publication of an ‘expert 
magazine’, hallinto [Finnish for ‘Administration’]. 
To date, research on the influence of the social investment paradigm has 
focused mainly on issues pertaining to the labour market and/or social security 
1 Jenson, Jane (2009) ‘Redesigning Citizenship Regimes after Neoliberalism. Moving Towards Social 
Investment’. In Morel, Nathalie, Palier, Bruno & Palme, Joakim (eds) What Future for Social Investment? 
Stockholm: Institute for Future Studies Research Report, 27–44.
2 Mahon, Rianne (2012) Social Investment According to the OECD/DELSA: A Discourse in the Making. 
Welfare Societies Working Paper, 3; Nygård, Mikael & Krüger, Nicole (2012). Poverty, families and the 
investment state. The impact of social investment ideas on political elite discourses in Finland and 
Germany. European Societies, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2012.726368; Jenson 2009.
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policies, while giving less attention to the fact that a substantial share of the 
investments in human capital in the Nordic countries are realised through 
the provision of public (welfare) services, e.g. extensive day- and elderly care 
services, free education at all levels, and various labour-market-related services. 
Existing research on Finland, which has focused primarily on areas such 
as family or employment policies, has shown that social investment ideas 
have indeed become more visible in Finnish political documents—government 
and party programmes—during the first part of the twenty-first century.3 The 
question that needs to be addressed here is whether investment ideas have also 
influenced the lines of reasoning within the central government administration, 
which has been ascribed a fairly important and generally independent role 
within process policy development in Finland both historically4 and today, 
when the Ministry of Finance in particular has been claimed to have become 
a central player.5 
Thus, the chapter seeks to answer the following questions: what kinds of 
principles regarding the financing, administration and provision of public 
(welfare) services are promoted at the central government level? Are they 
concordant with the social investment paradigm?
The social investment paradigm – service policies and governance 
characteristics
As the social investment paradigm seems to have gained in popularity in many 
countries, and especially among different elite groups, it has also become 
obvious that there are quite different interpretations of the ideas making up 
the paradigm (or perspective). Neither is the social investment paradigm an 
exclusively new way of seeing the role of social policy; it draws on elements 
both from the Keynesian paradigm, which was dominant after the Second 
World War, the ‘golden era of the welfare state’, for example when it comes 
to investing in human capital, and from the neoliberal paradigm, for example 
when it comes to activation.6
3 Nygård & Krüger 2012.
4 C.f. Kettunen, Pauli (2008) Globalisaatio ja kansallinen me. Kansallisen katseen historiallinen kritiikki. 
Tampere: Osuuskunta Vastapaino.
5 Kantola, Anu & Kananen, Johannes (2012) ‘Seize the Moment: Financial Crisis and the Making of the 
Finnish Competition State’. New Political Economy, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2012.753044.
6 Nygård & Krüger 2012, 5.
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Thus, while keeping in mind that the social investment paradigm can be 
interpreted in different ways, it still seems useful to try to discern certain 
typical, or often mentioned, characteristics of this paradigm when it comes 
to public (welfare) services as a basis for analysing their prevalence in public 
sector reforms and reform rhetoric in the past decade. 
First, one essential component of the social investment state paradigm is 
that it advocates more active policies in different social policy fields. Thus, 
the state should—together with the market, family and community—have an 
active role, but under the prerequisite that public spending focus on investing 
in the development of human capital. Social investment is thus characterised 
by, for example, public support for early childhood education and care.7 
Second, the social investment perspective, like the neoliberal perspective, 
focuses on the future as opposed to the immediate effects, which are of primary 
concern within the Keynesian paradigm. However, whereas the neoliberal 
perspective sees social spending as a burden, both at present and in the 
future, the social investment paradigm accepts social spending at present, 
but not merely, or mainly, as a way of meeting current social needs so much 
as a way of investing in the future.8 Thereby, third—and in contrast to the 
traditional Keynesian paradigm, which focuses on publicly funded services 
(mainly universal but also targeted) in order to achieve high standard services 
for everyone—according to the social investment paradigm, public resources 
should, to the extent that they are not clearly investments in human resources 
for the future, be limited to (presumably mainly means-tested) services that 
improve the immediate situation for those who are economically disadvantaged 
and/or who cannot afford the market prices for services.9
As mentioned above, some scholars have highlighted various viewpoints 
within the social investment perspective as well. For example, Mahon makes 
a distinction between the inclusive liberal version and the social democratic 
version of social investment, although she does not explicitly discuss how 
the two versions differ from each other when it comes to welfare services. 
One notable difference between the two different understandings of the social 
investment paradigm however has to do with the fact that the inclusive liberal 
version favours investments in human capital mainly via education (including 
early childhood education) and emphasises equity throughout the course of 
7 Morel, Nathalie, Palier, Bruno & Palme, Joakim (eds) (2009) What Future for Social Investment? 
Stockholm: Institute for Future Studies Research Report; Jenson 2009, 37.
8 Jenson 2009; c.f. also Mahon 2012; Nygård & Krüger 2012. 
9 Jenson 2009.
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a person’s life, while the social democratic version accepts a broader range 
of investments in human capital based on the idea of social protection for 
everyone and a concern for equality also in the present.10 Thus, it seems as if 
the latter perspective would come fairly close to what has also traditionally 
been included within the Nordic welfare state model. 
Although much emphasis has been put on the rights and duties, 
responsibilities, target groups, and so forth, of the social investment paradigm 
(see above), the paradigm is also about governance arrangements. As Jenson 
states ‘Instruments of governance are not neutral tools; they import objectives 
into a programme as much as they translate policy goals’.11 
According to Jenson, the Keynesian perspective on the preferred forms 
of governance is characterised by a ‘Weberian hierarchical/bureaucratic’ 
view, while the neoliberal perspective advocates ‘corporate models and 
privatization’. The social investment perspective, in turn, favours ‘networking 
and partnerships’.12 
By using the concept of ‘social investment’, the advocates of this paradigm 
also try to create an image of successfully combining a ‘more businesslike, 
market-friendly and dynamic entrepreneurial state’ and one that ‘[is] more 
responsive to community needs and concerns’ and which could make use of 
the advantages of local involvement.13 However, this emphasis on decentralised 
service delivery and design is present also in the neoliberal paradigm, 
and, taken together, especially when it comes to the preferred governance 
arrangements, the social investment paradigm seems to resemble that of the 
neoliberal paradigm more than that of the Keynesian paradigm.
Finnish public sector reforms
The first wave of modernisation of Finnish welfare services, which took place 
as part of the creation of a modern Nordic-type welfare state, can be dated 
to the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The time period was characterised by 
a centralisation of welfare service: the state mainly used financial incentives 
to get the municipalities to develop their welfare services in accordance with 
national policy goals, with the aim of achieving a nationally more uniform 
10 Mahon 2012, 4.
11 Jenson 2009, 37.
12 Jenson 2009, 39.
13 Jenson 2009, 35.
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system of service provision. Even though municipal self-determination was not 
formally limited or altered, the financial incentives were substantial and it was 
regarded by the municipalities to be in their interest to follow the nationally 
laid out paths for modernising their services.14
In the 1980s and early 1990s, however, criticism, mainly at the local 
administrative level, against too centralised a service system with too few 
possibilities to take into account local needs and variations became pronounced. 
At the central government level, there was, in turn, a growing concern with the 
growth in welfare service expenditures (covered to a substantial degree by the 
state), and the whole idea of centralised government systems seemed rather 
outdated not only in Finland but in many other European countries as well. As 
in the case with the first wave of reforms, international, mainly Scandinavian, 
influences were notable regarding the developments.15As a consequence, in 
1984 the so-called VALTAVA reform was launched, with the aim of reforming 
public services, e.g. through decentralisation. As a result of the criticism of 
centralised services, the State Subsidy Reform was also reformed (in 1993), 
replacing earmarked grants for various services with lump sum grants and 
allowing municipalities to buy services from private providers and to apply 
the principles of new public management more generally. In practice, the 
result was that the responsibility for and provision of welfare services became 
strongly decentralised.16
The recession in the 1990s, during which time state subsidies were severely 
cut, made it extremely difficult for municipalities to fulfil their obligations to 
provide sufficient welfare services.17 The recent abandonment of earmarked 
state subsidies just before the recession made it considerably easier for the 
central government (in practice, this pertained first and foremost to the 
Ministry of Finance, which had been given an increasing influence within 
central government through the introduction of new budgetary rules)18 to cut 
14 Kroll, Christian (2004) ‘Odemokratisk jämlikhet och orättvisa pålagor. Välfärdsservicen i svenska och 
finländska kommuntidningar 1985–2001’. In Blomberg, Helena, Kroll, Christian, Lundström, Tommy & 
Swärd, Hans (eds) Sociala problem och socialpolitik i massmedier. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 291–322; 
Kröger, Teppo (2011) ‘Retuning the Nordic welfare municipality. Central regulation of social care under 
change in Finland’. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 31, Issue 3/4, 148–159.
15 Blomberg, Helena & Kroll, Christian (1999) ‘Who Wants to preserve the ”Scandinavian service state?” 
Attitudes to welfare services among citizens and local government elites in Finland, 1992–6’. In Svallfors, 
Stefan & Taylor-Gooby, Peter (eds) The End of the Welfare State? Public Attitudes to State Retrenchment. 
London: Routledge, 52–86; Kröger 2011; Kroll 2003.
16 Kröger 2011, 151; Niemelä, Mikko & Saarinen, Arttu (2012) ‘The role of ideas and institutional change 
in Finnish public sector reform’. Policy and Politics, Vol. 40, Issue 2, 171–9.
17 Blomberg & Kroll 1999; Kröger 2011.
18 Kantola & Kananen 2012.
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the funding to the municipalities without being made directly responsible for 
the extensive cuts in local welfare services that were a more or less inevitable 
result of these cuts.19 
Another key shift in the welfare service policies occurred with the 
introduction of the so-called PARAS project, launched in 2005 with the 
outspoken objective to restructure local government and enhance the 
municipalities’ possibilities to provide adequate social and health services in 
a situation where research had pointed out severe shortcomings with respect 
to service delivery and substantial local variations in service standards. Other 
factors affecting the equation were the ageing of the population in general 
combined with the urbanisation process, which created various regional 
challenges. According to the project, this would require ‘intact and functioning 
municipal structures, the arrangement of services for a broader population 
base, collaboration between municipalities on service arrangement and 
provision and new working practices’.20
The present local government reform processes have, however, been 
advancing rather slowly, not least when welfare service structures are 
concerned.21 
The question remains of whether and to what extent the social investment 
paradigm has played a role in the reasoning of the central government 
administration in such a setting. Amidst this process of welfare service reform, 
one could assume that arguments related to this paradigm could be advanced 
– if the paradigm is considered important. 
Material and analysis
The analyses below are based on a total of 118 editorials, debates, columns 
and interviews concerning reforms of the local government and municipal 
services in the magazine hallinto during the period from January 2005 to 
December 2010. 
hallinto depicted itself as an ‘expert magazine’ with the aim of disseminating 
information regarding the development of governmental matters within 
public, mainly state-level, administration. The magazine has been published 
19 Kröger 2011; Lehto, Markku (2005) Takaisin tulevaisuuteen – valtion ja kuntien yhteinen taival. 
Kunnallisalan kehittämissäätiön Polemia-sarjan julkaisu nro 56. Pole-Kuntatieto. 
20 Niemelä & Saarinen 2012; Lag om en kommun- och servicestrukturreform, 169/2007.
21 Niemelä & Saarinen 2012.
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for more than 50 years. Appearing six times a year, it was published jointly by 
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior until 2008. Thereafter, 
it was published solely by the Ministry of Finance until 2011, when it was 
replaced by the Ministry of Finance’s Newsletters. The ‘main’ voices in hallinto 
included leading civil servants, particularly from the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of the Interior. Government ministers were also frequently 
interviewed, especially the minister of finance and the minister of the interior. 
Further, both academic experts as well as leading municipal administrators 
were interviewed and wrote pieces in hallinto. 
It is assumed here that the social investment paradigm is of importance 
for the reasoning provided by the central government and that it would 
be discussed openly in a magazine published by a branch of the central 
government, one which has the central task of addressing issues related to 
national economic development in general and state finances in particular. 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, it has been claimed that the 
Ministry of Finance has become an increasingly central player in Finnish 
decision making and its relative power in relation to other ministries has 
become stronger due to, for example, changes in budget making rules.22 
The method applied is deductive qualitative content analysis,23 that is, 
a qualitative classification of the data on the basis of guidelines defined 
beforehand, in this case they concern the kinds of measures/reforms that 
are being suggested and the motivation for them. Special emphasis has been 
place on whether or not the suggested reforms and motivation for them include 
possible elements of the social investment paradigm concerning public services, 
as sketched out above: public spending is seen as an investment in human 
capital, one which enhances global competitiveness, spending on services is 
viewed as an investment in the future, and to the extent that it is not, publicly 
funded services for the economically disadvantaged are favoured; governance 
arrangements should be characterised by networking and partnerships, by a 
more businesslike public sector and by a focus on local needs and decentralised 
service design and delivery.
22 Kantola & Kananen 2012.
23  Esaiasson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik & Wängnerud, Lena (2012) Metodpraktikan: konsten 
att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. 4 upplagan, Stockholm: Norstedts juridik.
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Findings 
The key idea/issue discussed in hallinto is the need for a radical reform of 
local government (mainly through large municipal mergers). The magazine 
argues that municipal mergers are needed because only large local government 
units are able to improve the productivity of services, and thus to secure 
their future survival. Overall, the magazine claims that municipal mergers 
lead to improvements in cost-efficiency and the quality of services (aspects 
mentioned more often at the beginning of the time period being studied) and 
to an increased variety and a better productivity within public service provision. 
Over time, an increasing emphasis has been put on productivity. However, 
during the period in question the magazine also makes it clear that ‘strong 
municipalities’ alone are not sufficient for securing the future of public services. 
Large service (social welfare and health care) units or regions are also needed.
Also, the magazine frequently mentions aspects of equality as arguments 
for such a development: administrative reforms (municipal mergers and the 
centralisation of services/and overall larger local service units) are supposedly 
needed since equality cannot be realised under the present system due to 
local variations in the quality and/or accessibility of various services. The 
magazine does not discuss other potential measures (such as national 
regulations concerning eligibility criteria for staff or user fees) for evening 
out local variations in services. Thus, while citizens’ social rights to equal basic 
services are emphasised in different statements, the idea that an investment in 
(some types of) welfare services can be regarded as an investment in human 
capital, and thus be a ‘productivity factor’ in the national economy, is not 
mentioned during the whole time period under study. 
Thus, while there is a pronounced general concern for future economic 
development in connection with welfare services, the perspective seems to be 
limited to the development of the municipalities’ economies: the economic 
resources of the often very small Finnish municipalities are not thought to be 
sufficient to provide services in the future if the local government structure 
is not reformed.
The above views are also criticized to a certain extent by academics 
and municipal-level elite representatives interviewed by the magazine. The 
criticisms are mainly from the perspective of municipal self-determination and 
the importance of local democracy. Moreover, these voices also point out that 
the prevailing market economy ideology has led to an ideal perception of the 
advantages of large local government units, while in reality small municipalities 
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may also be successful as economic units under certain favourable economic 
and administrative preconditions.
The criticism of the centralisation tendencies presented in the hallinto 
magazine becomes rarer towards the end of the period. Also, arguments 
in favour of the relative ‘re-centralization’ being promoted by the central 
government became more common. While experts often pointed out at the time 
of the launch of the PARAS project (in 2005) that municipal reforms should be 
the result of cooperation between municipalities and the central state, and that 
they should be carried out in a spirit of ‘consensus’, this type of argumentation 
decreases over time. Several years after the launch of the PARAS project, it 
has become rather clear that there is growing frustration within the central 
government concerning local self-government and municipal services. Voices 
in the magazine no longer refer much to local service conditions; instead, they 
now explicitly mention that municipal self-determination is problematic and a 
hindrance to the development of public (welfare) services. They clearly point 
out that the state has a responsibility to intervene in local-level problems (such 
as territorial inequality) when necessary. Overall, we can see a gradual return 
of the central state and its control mechanisms.
Many social investment scholars have also claimed that most European 
countries are today characterised by (or striving towards) ‘governance’ 
instead of traditional forms of government. The state and municipalities 
are not ‘governing’ directly; rather, they are governing through a process of 
collaborating with different actors or partners within networks (see the above 
sections). This is, however, not precisely the case with the argumentation 
provided in Hallinto, at least not when the state level is concerned. In fact, 
some of the leading ideas behind reforming the local services seem to be in 
sharp contrast with the social investment paradigm; some of the measures 
promoted seem to bear a close resemblance to traditional Nordic forms of 
governance, including centralised bureaucracies and hierarchical relationships 
of accountability.24 In Hallinto, the central state is clearly aiming to still govern 
the municipalities, at least when it comes to the municipal structure, the service 
structure, the availability and quality of services, and more generally, issues 
of equality from a national perspective. On the other hand, when it comes to 
the central government’s view on the role of the municipalities themselves, the 
picture is altered somewhat; the municipalities are supposed—in contrast to 
the state—to ‘govern’ not hierarchically, but in collaboration with and as parts 
of networks together with other partners. The municipalities are being urged 
24  Jenson 2009, 38.
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to develop new ways of producing services, and the magazine points out that 
collaboration between the municipalities, for-profit organisations and non-
profit organisations is essential when reforming the service system/structure. 
The municipalities are also called upon to become more businesslike. The 
idea of a more businesslike local government seems to be embedded in the 
argumentation in different ways. First, arguments in favour of large local 
government units and the positive effects of economies of scale concerning 
service production become more frequent over time and practically no 
alternative viewpoints are currently being introduced. The magazine claims 
that large units lead to, among other things, the possibility to organise, lead 
and produce services in an effective manner and also include elements such as 
competitive tendering of services. Second, the marketisation of public welfare 
services is an essential part of the argumentation. The magazine claims that 
municipal public services form an important market for enterprises, a market 
which is still not open for competition. At the end of the time period being 
studied, the suggested reforms are increasingly shifting towards promoting 
various marketisation ideas to an even greater extent, most notably concerning 
issues of tendering. The experts claim that the tendering of services is more 
effective than centralised steering because the process corrects mistakes and 
develops services ‘by itself’.
Thus, much emphasis is put on discussing how the public sector should 
produce services. The material in hallinto seems to reflect a certain annoyance 
at the central government level concerning what is regarded as a lack of 
understanding by the municipalities of the fact that the municipalities are 
not the only ones that can produce public services. This frustration is repeated 
time and time again: it is irrelevant in a changing world who produces public 
services at the state or local levels, since the most important issues, or goals, are 
whether the services are cost-efficient and qualitative (or whether the services 
are available at all). The ‘slogan’ that it is irrelevant who provides the services 
is also used in various other contexts in which territorial and service sector 
boundaries are discussed: the magazine emphasises that ‘administrative and 
municipality boundaries must be broken’, and that services can be produced, 
for instance, by surrounding municipalities or by joint municipalities. 
Thus, and in contrast to what was above depicted as a characteristic of the 
social investment perspective, there are not many signs of a more ‘responsive’ 
public sector that is taking into account community or local needs and 
concerns. Instead, the focus is on (other) ideas that emphasise the individual 
as a consumer or client and his/her service needs. 
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Although scholars have claimed that the social investment paradigm 
emphasises social policy measures that would enhance competitiveness, it 
does not have to be understood in the sense it is used in hallinto. Although 
competitiveness is mentioned in various connections in hallinto, it does not 
seem to relate directly to the meaning given to it in the social investment 
paradigm, that is, social policy measures as a means of increasing national 
competitiveness (through the competitive capacity of its citizens). Instead, the 
magazine discusses the ‘competitiveness’ of municipalities (mainly in relation 
to each other): the municipalities are urged to merge to form municipalities 
that are economically stronger and that can compete with one another. 
Competitiveness is also mentioned when discussing the relationship between 
the state and the municipalities. Here, it is pointed out that the municipalities, 
and the public sector as a whole, should not compromise the competitiveness 
of the Finnish state or national economy as a whole. 
In summary, on the basis of the arguments made in Hallinto there clearly 
seems to be a desire to regain central government control over service provision, 
reversing the far-reaching administrative reforms of the late 1980s and early 
1990s, which increased municipalities’ autonomy at the expense of state 
control over the organisation of welfare services. The decentralisation reforms 
of the early 1990s were based on a mixture of government concerns about 
service expenditure increases and municipal demands for more autonomy.25 
The centralisation reforms of the 2000s seem, in turn, to be based on a 
mixture of government concerns about service expenditure increases and 
the government’s concern about ‘too much’ local autonomy. Government 
experts now claim that local autonomy has increased inequality between the 
inhabitants of different municipalities and, perhaps above all, has made it 
difficult to apply more cost-efficient and productive ways of administrating 
and producing services. 
Discussion
The comparison of the ideas presented in Hallinto with previous research on 
reforming local government illustrates how strongly the pendulum once again 
has swung in Finland from a decentralisation of services to a centralisation 
of services. The change in this respect compared to the situation in the early 
25  Kroll 2003; Kröger 2011; Lehto, Markku (2005) Takaisin tulevaisuuteen – valtion ja kuntien yhteinen 
taival. Kunnallisalan kehittämissäätiön Polemia-sarjan julkaisu nro 56. Pole-Kuntatieto.
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1990s26 seems dramatic; during the first half of the 1990s, experts hoped 
to achieve greater efficiency and productivity through decentralisation, but 
already ten years later this was dismissed as an outdated idea. Increased cost 
efficiency and productivity through centralisation and marketisation are clearly 
the core arguments behind the latest (suggested) administrative reforms. 
Scholars have proposed at least two different kinds of explanations for the 
latest shift: Bergmark and Minas27 have put forward the idea that sudden 
shifts in how welfare services are organised might be caused by a development 
where certain core values are deeply threatened. Perhaps the centralisation of 
services could be regarded as a reaction against the ever-increasing territorial 
inequality with respect to the availability and quality of services, thus being 
in line mainly with the ideas of the traditional Nordic welfare state model. 
Another explanation might, however, be that the main goal of the central 
government now is a more businesslike and market-friendly welfare service 
system, one that would in practice require larger local government (or, at 
least service providing) entities than those that exist today. It is a fact that 
the experts who contribute to Hallinto frequently argue in favour of the latter 
idea and that this point of emphasis has become even stronger over time.
In any case, there is not much discussion concerning welfare services as 
an investment in human capital, a factor which would help improve economic 
performance and global competitiveness in the future. Furthermore, if the 
social investment perspective would function as a basis for the argumentation 
regarding service reform, one would expect that the emphasis would be on 
developing services as a way of investing in human and social capital, such 
as early childhood education and care,28 maybe even at the expense of other 
services. No such notable pattern in the argumentation can be discerned, 
however. 
All in all, the focus does not seem to be on the long term. Instead, the 
argumentation seems to be more in line with typical neoliberal views, according 
to which the focus is on the present ‘so as not to hobble the future’.29 Whether 
directly or indirectly, (especially publicly produced) welfare state services are 
seen more as a burden than as investments that will pay off in the future, 
and it is quite clear that the voices in the magazine are placing their trust in 
26 Niemelä & Saarinen 2012.
27 Bergmark, Åke & Minas, Renate (2007) ‘Decentraliserad välfärd eller medborgerliga rättigheter? Om 
omfördelning av makt och ansvar mellan stat och kommun’. Socialvetenskaplig Tidskrift, årgång 14, 
nummer 2–3, 220–241.
28 Jenson 2009, 39.
29 Ibid.
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the advantages of market-based solutions in general and in welfare service 
production in particular. On the other hand, and somewhat paradoxically, 
there is a concern about the substantial and the growing inequality among 
those receiving services. Taken together, the view that emerges, according 
to which the creation of large service producing units that achieve a certain 
standard of effectiveness and quality through tendering and the extensive 
use of private service providers as a means of increasing equality in welfare 
service delivery, seems to some extent to be a Finnish interpretation of welfare 
service reform, one that differs both from the emphasis in other countries30 
and from the ideal models or paradigms, including also the social investment 
paradigm discussed above. 
Also, when it comes to the social investment paradigm’s view on governance, 
it seems that some of the central elements in the Finnish discussion are 
more or less incompatible with the paradigm. Jenson31 discusses one of the 
central characteristics of the social investment paradigm as follows: “With 
their emphasis on community involvement and social development, the 
design of ECEC [early childhood education and care] often reinforces a more 
generational shift, pioneered under neoliberalism and continued into the 
present, towards decentralized service delivery and sometimes design”. This 
is obviously not the case with the service ideas promoted in Hallinto (see the 
above discussion on creating substantially larger service units). One possible 
explanation for this might be the fact that the public sector in Finland has—in 
relative terms—a long tradition of being decentralised and the public sector 
reforms in the early 1990s made Finland even more decentralised. 
On the whole, the ideas presented in hallinto do not give the impression 
that the state’s actions are primarily being guided by the social investment 
paradigm, in contrast to the argument made by many scholars. The question 
then is of course, whether the social investment perspective is less useful when 
trying to understand the reforms in Finnish welfare services than when trying 
to understand the recent changes in social security? 
If the aim of the central government is to create, or at least to reflect, some 
kind of ‘cognitive map’ for the future of public services, it is in any case clear 
that the present-day model of taking into account local community needs 
and local services is not a part of the future vision that the government is 
promoting. The ways in which this discourse affects the views of the local 
30 See Koskiaho, Briitta (2008) Hyvinvointipalvelujen tavaratalossa. Palvelutalous ja sosiaalipolitiikka 
Englannissa, Ruotsissa ja Suomessa. Tampere: Osuuskunta Vastapaino.
31 Jenson 2009, 35.
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governments is beyond the scope of this chapter. The latest developments 
(in 2013) concerning the reforms to Finnish local government and services 
and the turbulence concerning the different reform suggestions, which can 
be seen in the public debate as well as in the resistance among municipalities 
to the mergers being put forward by the government — and in line with the 
reasoning in Hallinto — , however suggest that the principles guiding the 
reform of Finnish welfare services are far from being universally accepted.
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econoMiZinG The relUcTAnT 
welFAre sTATe
new rationales for child care in the United states in 
the 21st century
SONyA MICHEL
The United States, as is well known, has long been a welfare state laggard, 
relying largely on the market both to finance and provide the bulk of services 
in key policy areas and, as a result, producing vast inequalities in social 
citizenship. One of the most glaring gaps appears in child care, a policy 
domain in which the Nordic countries and France have famously taken the 
lead. While those countries have for decades offered universal, high-quality, 
state-funded and -organized provisions, the U.S., operating under ideological 
and political constraints, has developed a ‘patchwork’ of public, commercial, 
and voluntary services of varying quality, with the best generally reserved for 
those who can afford to pay the most. In recent years, however, new rationales 
for supporting public child care based on the economic benefits to be gained 
from an investment in children appear to be making headway, at least at 
the state and local, if not the federal level. Using such arguments, dozens of 
states and localities have since the mid-1990s increased their own funding for 
child care and also sought to engage ‘the business community’ in partnerships 
designed to expand and improve the quality of child care. As a result, while 
federal legislation and funding for child care and early childhood education 
have stagnated, some progress is being made at the subnational level, in both 
states and localities, and also in the voluntary sector. 
What does child care say about a welfare state? Is it a marker for a larger 
political culture? As I have argued elsewhere,1 the failure of the America welfare 
state to provide universal child care is not just a symptom of its liberal, neo-
liberal, or residual character, but has in itself served as one of the building 
blocks of such a regime. Rationales for or, as has largely been the case, against 
creating a universal child care system tend to be specific to that policy realm 
but they also reflect the broader culture surrounding the American welfare 
1 Michel, Sonya (1999) Children’s Interests / Mothers’ Rights: The Shaping of America’s Child Care Policy. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.
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state: a preference for bureaucratic minimalism, reliance on the family or the 
private sector for services of all types, and an acceptance of (or rationalization 
for) the inequalities that result. 
While this culture has remained relatively constant in most areas of social 
policy (a notable recent exception is ‘Obamacare’, the president’s effort to 
reform health care), the ground does seems to be shifting in the area of child 
care and the related field of early childhood education (ECEC), as economistic, 
productivist, or social investment/human capital arguments gain influence. 
Is this the key that will open the American social policy kingdom, and if so, 
at what cost to its liberal principles?
The heavy reliance on economistic rationales to promote social policies 
calls to mind patterns described by political scientist Jenny Andersson at 
the 2011 Nordwel Summer School in Sigtuna, and in her recent book, The 
Library and the Workshop.2 In this work, Andersson deplores what she sees 
as a transformation of values in contemporary ‘knowledge economies’ from 
social and cultural to economic. Focusing on Sweden and the UK, she argues 
that Third Way politics has allowed for a reconciliation of sorts between the 
principles of traditional social democracy and the demands of economic 
progress. ‘[T]he knowledge economy,’ she writes, ‘provided a new progressive 
narrative around questions of social justice—because social exclusion and the 
unequal distribution of opportunity are understood as problems for human 
capital that is at a premium in the new economy.’3 In a search for greater 
efficiency, Third Way politicians called for ‘social investment’—investments 
in people—not, Andersson explains, ‘to protect them from the market but…
to give them skills and opportunities needed to succeed in the knowledge 
future. In particular,’ she goes on, ‘this applied to those…who can most easily 
be molded for the future’—that is, children.4
The Third Way is harmful for a social democracy like Sweden, in Andersson’s 
view, because it erodes the country’s basic values of social equality, democracy 
and solidarity and replaces them with those of efficiency, competitiveness 
and economic growth. Is a similar sort of displacement occurring in the U.S.? 
America’s political culture is, of course, quite different from Sweden’s and 
even that of the UK;5except for the policies emerging from the New Deal of 
2 Andersson, Jenny (2010) The Library and the Workshop: Social Democracy and Capitalism in the 
Knowledge Age. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
3 Ibid., 2.
4 Ibid., 118–19.
5 Cox, Robert (2004) ‘The Path-Dependency of an Idea: Why Scandinavian Welfare States Remain 
Distinct,’ Social Policy and Administration 38, no. 2 (2004): 204–19.
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the 1930s (and that is, granted, a big ‘except’), the U.S. has never embraced 
social democratic principles to the degree that Sweden, or even the UK, in its 
own fashion, have.6 In that sense, one might say that the U.S. has much less 
to lose by following the Third Way. Indeed, one might argue, since liberal and 
then neo-liberal values have long been hegemonic in the U.S., social investment 
rationales should comport nicely with entrenched American political concerns 
and approaches. Perhaps they will add momentum to initiatives already 
underway and succeed in breaking some enduring policy stalemates. But do 
other, more classically liberal, values such as individual choice, autonomy, and 
dignity become vulnerable to the advance of economistic principles? Political 
philosopher Michael Sandel, in his recent book, what Money can’t buy: The 
Moral limits of Markets, thinks they do. ‘Markets,’ he writes, ‘leave their mark 
on social norms’ —even, I would add, in a liberal polity.7
Let’s consider these issues by taking child care and early childhood 
education policy as an example. Resistance to establishing universal, state-
sponsored ECEC in the United States draws on two ideological substrates: 
views of the family, and views of the role of government. Americans have 
long held the family as a realm apart, the last redoubt, if you will, against 
capitalism. Moreso than in the Nordic countries and perhaps even in the UK, 
Americans have regarded the family as the backbone of the private sphere, 
an institution to be protected from (and indeed seen as a corrective to) the 
predations of the market. Though hierarchically organized (for which it has 
been roundly criticized by feminists), the family has claimed credit as the realm 
in which individuals are to be cherished for themselves, not for any profit—any 
‘rentability,’ to use one of Andersson’s terms--they might offer.8 To protect 
such relations, Americans are convinced, both the state and commerce must 
be kept out of the family. Such views have since the nineteenth century slowed 
or blocked advances in many areas of social policy. ECEC in particular has 
suffered from the idea that child care must be preserved as a private practice 
centered around the mother-child bond.9 
6 Nor, for that matter, did it explicitly adopt the Third Way, though many trace its origins to the U.S., and 
Bill Clinton’s policies have frequently been compared to those of his close contemporary, Tony Blair; 
see King, Desmond & Wickham-Jones, Mark (1999) ‘From Clinton to Blair: The Democratic (Party) 
origins of Welfare to Work.’ Political Quarterly 70, 1: 62–74.
7 Sandel, Michael (2012) What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 64. But economic sociologist Viviana Zelizer cautions against positioning the realms 
of humanistic and economic values as ‘hostile worlds’; see Economic Lives: How Culture Shapes the 
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 174.
8 Andersson 2010, 120.
9 Michel 1999, passim.
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Enter social investment. As I noted at the outset, there is evidence that 
rationales based on this principle are beginning to make some headway, 
breaking through the protective barrier surrounding family prerogatives and 
opening a path for the expansion and improvement of child care through 
increased public spending and oversight. What are the benefits? What are the 
risks? I will consider these questions at the end of my paper. Before that I will 
present a very brief history of previous child care rationales in the U.S. (most 
of them unsuccessful) and then examine the current shift toward economism 
in the realm of early childhood education and care.
Child care ambivalence
From the early nineteenth through the early twentieth century, the U.S., like 
Canada and other industrializing countries in Europe, witnessed the rise of 
day nurseries—local, charitable institutions intended to care for children whose 
mothers, unable to depend on a male breadwinner (due to their absence, illness, 
disability or death), were compelled to work for wages outside the home.10 
Clearly intended as emergency or stop-gap measures, nurseries offered only 
custodial services and targeted a clientele that was largely poor and working-
class; their maternalist supporters had no intention of using their charities to 
challenge the prevailing male-breadwinner ideal by enabling women to work 
outside the home on a regular basis. As a result, though nurseries eventually 
reached tens of thousands of families across the U.S., they failed to establish 
the basis for universal public services.
In the early twentieth century, day nurseries became increasingly stigmatized 
as professionalizing American social workers blamed maternal employment 
for weakening the mother-child bond and early childhood educators 
contrasted the meager services day nurseries were able to muster with the 
vaunted developmental benefits of newly founded kindergartens and nursery 
schools. While nursery schools gained support from the voluntary sector and 
kindergartens found a niche in the public school system, day nurseries became 
a kind of ‘policy orphan’. The preferred option, for policymakers concerned 
with poor single mothers, was first state-based mothers’ or widows’ pensions 
and then, under the New Deal, federal Aid to Dependent Children – both 
measures designed to keep mothers in the home.
10  This section is based on ibid.
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World War II accelerated the development of public child care services 
across Western Europe and North America, but postwar outcomes differed, 
depending on national contexts. This was a time when both Sweden and France 
regularized, improved, and increased public funding for a growing supply of 
child care, but in the U.S., public child care centers lost their federal support 
immediately after the war, causing most to shut down. When wage-earning 
mothers clamored to keep them open, government officials reminded them 
that public support for child care had been intended ‘for the duration only.’11 
Maternal employment, however, did not disappear; after an initial dip, it 
continued to rise over the ensuing decades (the baby boom notwithstanding), 
but neither voluntary nor commercial child care could keep pace with the 
need for services. 
From the 1960s on, U.S. child care policy was buffeted by two countervailing 
forces: second-wave feminism and the shift from welfare to workfare. Both called 
for child care to promote maternal employment, but with very different goals. 
While feminists saw it as a means to achieve gender equality, conservatives 
were bent on using it to stem the rising tide of welfare dependency, particularly 
among African Americans. Feminist demands for ‘free universal 24-hour child 
care’ made no headway in Congress, but a bipartisan consensus began to form 
around the idea that welfare recipients should be required to work. Although 
lawmakers acknowledged that child care would be needed to implement such 
a policy, they were reluctant to fund it adequately. As a result, the shift from 
welfare to ‘workfare’ proceeded in fits and starts. In 1996, however, with 
passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act ‘ending welfare as we know it,’ work requirements tightened and funding 
for child care rose. But because it was linked to workfare, this new form of 
public child care once again failed to provide a basis for universal provisions. 
Meanwhile, maternal employment was becoming the norm among 
American women of all classes, increasing demands for child care that were 
met by an expansion of non-profit and even more strikingly, private market 
services. The high cost of formal, center-based care, coupled with erratic 
quality and lax regulation, drove many parents to seek informal, family-based 
services for toddlers while leaving older children in ‘self-care.’ In recent years, 
dissatisfaction with limited hours as well as the level of quality of public care 
has prompted parents with sufficient resources to hire live-in nannies—many 
11 Stoltzfus, Emilie (2006) Citizen, Mother, Worker: Debating Public Responsibility for Child Care after the 
Second World War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press; Fousekis, Natalie (2011) Demanding 
Child Care: Women’s Activism and the Politics of Welfare, 1940–1971. Champaign: University of Illinois 
Press.
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of them low-paid female migrants from the developing world. Because of what 
I have called a ‘divided constituency,’12 universal child care has subsided as a 
political issue, although the need remains – greater than ever.
Current rationales
In short, except during the ‘emergency’ of World War II, the most successful 
rationales for child care in the U.S., whether public or voluntary, have been 
associated with prevention of poverty. Arguments for gender equity, social 
justice, or child development – the kinds of rationales that have prevailed 
in the Nordic countries--or school readiness, a central purpose of France’s 
child care policy, have never gained traction in American political culture. 
But as economistic rationales have gained sway in the U.S., beginning in the 
late 1990s, funding for public child care has increased and the number of 
slots has grown. 
These rationales break down into several categories: direct benefits to 
the economy (child care as a business in its own right); direct benefits to 
parents (child care enables parents to work); indirect benefits to the economy 
(the ripple effect from parents’ spent wages); benefits to business (reduced 
absenteeism and the long-term development of a skilled labor force); and 
economic benefits to society as a whole (lowering rates of social ‘deviance’—
crime, school failure, teen pregnancy reducing educational and other costs to 
taxpayers). Cost-benefit ratios have been estimated at anywhere between $2.62 
and $14 saved for each dollar invested in early childhood interventions, and 
incalculable returns on the creation of a productive labor force for the future.13 
Abundant evidence of this type of thinking may be found in the dozens 
of local and statewide studies of child care needs and provisions conducted 
since 1998,14 as well as in the literature of many of the voluntary, non-profit 
organizations and projects dedicated to advancing child care and early 
childhood education and improving outcomes for poor and low-income 
12 Michel 1999, chap. 7.
13 Jane Jenson and Denis St. Martin (in ‘New Routes to Social Cohesion? Citizenship and the Social 
Investment State.’ Canadian Journal of Sociology 28, 1 (Winter 2003): 77–99) note the future-oriented 
time arc of social investment policies; unlike many social policies, their benefits are not intended to 
be immediate, but to accrue and come to full fruition in the long term.
14 Much of the activity has taken the form of studies; indeed, it appears to have been a boon to the 
consulting and independent research community. So many have been conducted that Cornell University 
has set up a clearinghouse of sorts, ‘Linking Economic Development with Child Care’: http://government.
cce.cornell.edu/doc/reports/childcare/matrix.asp. (Accessed January 2013)
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children. A random sampling of these materials reveals that economistic 
rationales appear with far greater frequency than social justice arguments, 
whereas references to gender equity are virtually negligible.15 These findings 
suggest that, at least in the realm of policymakers and social policy advocates, 
the idea of social investment has rapidly become hegemonic—at the expense 
of social justice and gender equity.
The origins of the social investment rationale
One of the foremost exponents of ‘investment in children’ is James Heckman, 
a Nobel-prize-winning economist from the University of Chicago. Over a 
decades-long career, Heckman’s research has ranged widely, but one can 
follow the thread, through hundreds of publications, that led to his present 
interest.16 In the 1970s he wrote about female labor force participation; in the 
1980s about the relationship between skills and income; and in the 1990s, 
about the Coleman Report, a 1960s study which argued that high investment in 
K-12 education could not offset the cognitive deficits produced by early social 
and financial privation. But it was not until the 2000s that he zeroed in on 
the economics of ‘human capital investment’—investment in young children—
looking first at family influence on child development,17 and then working out 
his productivity argument in a pair of working papers written with Dimitriy 
Masterov, a micro-economist from the University of Michigan,18 and finally in 
a major article.19 Building on this work, Heckman has in recent years turned 
15 It is worth noting that while the economic rationale reprises some of the anti-poverty undergirding 
of nineteenth-century day nurseries, it couples such thinking with observations about the effects of 
services on the individuals themselves. That is, early childhood education and care do not simply benefit 
society by preventing crime, increasing high school graduation, and producing skilled workers, but 
they also benefit the children who participate, both at the time and in their future lives. The individual 
dimension is, however, far less prominent than the “collective good.”
16 For a complete list, see Heckman’s c.v. at: http://jenni.uchicago.edu/home_page/vitae.pdf. (Accessed 
January 2013)
17 See Carneiro, P.F., Cunha, F. & Heckman, J.J. (2003) ‘Interpreting the Evidence of Family Influence on 
Child Development,’ in The Economics of Early Childhood Development: Lessons for Economic Policy 
(Minneapolis: Federal Reserve Bank).
18  Heckman, James J & Masterov, Dimitriy V. (2004) ‘The Productivity Argument for Investing in Young 
Children,’ Working Paper 5, Invest in Kids Working Group (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Economic 
Development, October 2004); and Heckman & Masterov (2006) ‘The Productivity Argument for 
Investing in Young Children,’ Early Childhood Research Collaborative Discussion Paper, August 2006.
19 Heckman, James J. & Masterov, Dimitri V. (2007) ‘The Productivity Argument for Investing in Young 
Children.’ Review of Agricultural Economics, 2, 3: 446–493.
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himself into a one-man institute, marketing ‘The Heckman Equation’ on his 
website.20 Heckman’s argument goes as follows: 
Approximately 25% of children are now born into single parent homes. 
while the percentages of children living in poverty and born into poor 
families have fallen recently, they are still high, especially among certain 
subgroups. Adverse environments place children at risk for social and 
economic failure. The accident of birth plays a powerful role in determin-
ing adult success.
we argue that, on productivity grounds, it makes sense to invest in 
young children from disadvantaged environments. substantial evidence 
shows that these children are more likely to commit crime, have out-of-
wedlock births, and drop out of school. early interventions that partially 
remediate the effects of adverse environments can reverse some of the 
harm of disadvantage and have a high economic return. They benefit not 
only the children themselves, but also their children, as well as society at 
large….
investing in disadvantaged young children is a rare public policy with 
no equity-efficiency tradeoff. It reduces the inequality associated with the 
accident of birth and at the same time raises the productivity of society 
at large. because of the dynamic nature of the skill formation process, 
remediating the effects of early disadvantages at later ages is often 
prohibitively costly. skill begets skill; learning begets learning. early 
disadvantage, if left untreated, leads to academic and social difficul-
ties in later years. Advantages accumulate; so do disadvantages….[P]
ostschool remediation programmes… cannot compensate for a childhood 
of neglect for most people….
Growth in both the quantity and the quality of the labor force tradi-
tionally has been a major source of U.s. output growth. Given current 
trends, U.s. growth prospects are poor. labor force growth is slowing, 
especially that of young and skilled workers who are a source of vitality 
20 Heckman: The Economics of Human Potential (n.d., http://www.heckmanequation.org/). Heckman, 
James. N.d. Website: The Economics of Human Potential. http://www.heckmanequation.org/. (Accessed 
January 2013)
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for the entire economy. The composition of the future workforce will shift 
toward workers from relatively more dysfunctional families with com-
mensurately worse skills….21
At current levels of public support, America under-invests in the early 
years of its disadvantaged children. redirecting funds toward the early 
years is a sound investment in the productivity and safety of American 
society, and also removes a powerful source of inequality….22
It is important to note that Heckman specifically eschews social justice 
arguments: ‘Many have commented on this phenomenon [the positive impact 
of early childhood intervention], and most analyses have cast the issue of 
assisting children from disadvantaged families as a question of fairness or 
social justice.’ His argument, however, is based on ‘productivity.’23
Despite such disclaimers, Heckman relies heavily on some of those very 
‘social justice’ analyses to make his argument, including studies of the High/
Scope Perry Preschool project, begun in the 1960s,24 which became the 
foundation for Head Start; the Carolina Abecedarian Project;25 and Chicago’s 
Child-Parent Centers.26 He also invokes the 1966 Coleman Report, which 
notoriously concluded that ‘student background and socioeconomic status 
are much more important in determining educational outcomes than are 
measured differences in school resources (i.e. per pupil spending).’27 These 
studies were already quite influential, but Heckman’s insistence on mobilizing 
them for a purely economistic argument—one based on dollars and cents—
shifted the policy discourse decisively.
Indeed, only a year after Heckman’s first working paper appeared, the 
RAND Corporation published a major study entitled ‘Early Childhood 
21 Heckman & Masterov 2004, 446–9.
22 Ibid., 488).
23 Ibid., 446.
24 Schweinhart, Lawrence J. (2004) ‘The High/Scope Perry Preschool Study Through Age 40: Summary, 
Conclusions, and Frequently Asked Questions.’ Ypsilanti, MI: High/Scope Press, November 2004. www.
highscope.org/Research/PerryProject/PerryAge40_SumWeb.pdf (Accessed January 2013)
25 Carolina Abecedarian Project, n.p., n.d.: http://projects.fpg.unc.edu/~abc/ (Accessed January 2013)
26 Reynolds, Arthur J. et al. (2001) ‘Age 21 Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Title I Chicago Child-Parent Center 
Program,’ Executive Summary. Waisman Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
27 Coleman, J. S. (1966) Equality of Educational Opportunity. Washington D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Office of Education. At the same time, differences in schools, and particularly 
teachers, have a very significant impact on student outcomes. 
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Interventions: Proven Results, Future Promise,’28 which picked up on his 
central arguments. Notably, funding for this project came from the David 
and Lucille Packard Foundation as part of their ‘Preschool for All’ programme, 
indicating the breadth of Heckman’s growing influence. The RAND report, 
which was based on a study of a one-year quality public preschool programme 
offered to children throughout the state of California (not just low-income 
children), placed a dollar amount on the benefits of early intervention: ‘a one-
year high-quality universal preschool programme is estimated to generate 
about $7,000 in net present value benefits per child for California society 
(public and private sectors….This equals a return of $2.62 for every dollar 
invested, or an annual rate of return of about 10 percent over a 60-year 
horizon.’29 The report continued:
[B]enefits include lower intangible losses from crime and child abuse 
and neglect averted, reduced reliance on public welfare programmes, 
improved labor market outcomes for parents of preschoolers, improved 
health and wellbeing of preschool participants, and the intergenerational 
transmission of favorable benefits. Broader economic and noneconomic 
benefits are expected in other areas as well, including labor force recruit-
ment and participation rates, workforce performance, economic growth, 
international competitiveness, and the distribution of economic and 
social well-being.30 
And it concluded: 
Preschool has been scientifically demonstrated to generate a wide range 
of benefits, which can be conservatively valued as exceeding programme 
costs.…[i]t is worth noting that these investments may have additional 
advantages over typical investments designed to promote economic 
development….[T]he net gains to government and society as a whole are 
not zero sum but constitute real benefits in terms of lower government 
outlays, a more skilled future workforce, and a more responsible future 
28 Karoly, Lynn, Kilburn, Rebecca & Cannon, Jill S. (2005) ‘Early Childhood Interventions: Proven Results, 
Future Promise.’ Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. (http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
monographs/2005/RAND_MG341.pdf). (Accessed January 2013).
29 Ibid., 149).
30 Ibid., 116.)
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citizenry. Moreover, these conclusions rest on scientific evidence that 
these outcomes are attributable to the investment in preschool education 
itself and would not occur under the status quo.31 
While the RAND study reached many politicians and policymakers, it was 
the publication of Heckman’s ‘productivity’ article two years later (itself based 
on a major public lecture he had given earlier the same year) that launched 
the ‘social investment’ idea into the center of public discourse, where it has 
remained ever since.
Precursors
Although the ‘Heckman Equation’ made an enormous splash in the mid-
2000s, his ideas, as I suggested above, were not entirely new. A reading of 
some of the earlier state-level studies of child care indicates that elements 
of the ‘investment’ rationale had been in the air for several years before 
Heckman’s article and the RAND report appeared. These studies drew on the 
same research, starting with the Perry/High Scope Project and the Coleman 
Report, that Heckman would come to rely on,32 and they too pointed to 
the savings to be realized through prevention of social deviancy. But while 
anticipating Heckman’s argument about what might be called the ‘productivity 
of prevention’ in the future, these reports also focused on immediate benefits—
to parents, in terms of employment income; to businesses, in the form of more 
productive workers; and to the economy more generally through child care 
as a form of business and the ripple effects of income spent. 
Two of the earliest reports to deploy economistic rationales were prepared 
for Alameda County, California (home of Berkeley and Oakland, among other 
cities) in 1998 and 2002. The 2002 report pointed out that ‘child care is a 
major industry in [the county] and has a significant economic impact. Over 
the past few years, the child care industry has experienced significant growth, 
particularly in its workforce.’33 Between 1998 and 2001, the child care work 
force had increased by almost 15 percent, and the number of established child 
care businesses by over 4 percent. Meanwhile the number of child care spaces 
31 Ibid., 2005, xxvii (my emphasis). 
32 Indeed, the paucity of long-range research is one of the problems with this line of argument.
33 McCulley, Shelby & Upp, Stephanie (2002) ‘The Economic Impact of Child Care in Alameda County 
[California]: A Growing Industry Supporting the Local Economy,’ Alameda County Child Care Planning 
Council Report, December 2002, 4.
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available went up by over 22 percent.34 In addition, the report noted, ‘child 
care supports and increases labor force participation among parents. The 
availability of convenient, high-quality care also increases worker productivity 
and decreases turnover rates,’35 and produces ‘long-term benefits to the 
community in the form of decreased future public sector costs in special 
education, crime, and welfare; improved school readiness, and a decline in 
welfare dependency.’ But the report did not rely solely on economic rationales. 
It also made a social justice argument, pointing out that the ‘generally held 
view that all children should have an equal chance at success helps justify 
support for child care on grounds of equity, as well as economics.’36 
Using the 1998 Alameda County report as a model, the state of Vermont also 
conducted a survey in 2002, concluding that the child care industry ‘contributes 
directly and indirectly to the state’s economy,’ not only by producing jobs for 
child care workers, but also by creating a ripple effect in the form of ‘jobs 
supported by the goods and services that child care providers procure.’37 
Applying this formula, researchers found that child care yielded more that 
7000 jobs in the state—nearly 5000 in the industry itself, and more than 
2000 indirectly. ‘For every $1 million spent on child care,’ they reported, ‘35 
jobs are created (24 direct, 11 indirect).’38 All told, the child care industry was 
larger than three of Vermont’s largest employers. 
In addition, the report emphasized that child care allowed thousands more 
parents to hold jobs—nearly 37,500, employed by over 11,000 businesses. 
A majority of employers surveyed in the state linked child care with higher 
morale, reduced absenteeism, and reported increased productivity, while a 
third said it helped reduce turnover.39 By the same token, parents reported that 
a lack of child care caused them to miss work, give up overtime opportunities 
(and pay), and lose focus on their work because of anxiety about how their 
children were doing.
Like the Alameda report, this one too claimed that ‘society realizes long-
term savings in areas of crime, welfare, tax and schooling by investing in high-
quality early care and learning programmes,’40 and as did others, it pointed 
34 Ibid., 4.
35 Ibid., 5.
36 Ibid., 6.
37 Windham Child Care Association Windham Child Care Association and [Vermont] Peace and Justice 
Center, ‘The Economic Impact of Vermont’s Child Care Industry,’ n.p., June 2002, 1.
38 Ibid., 1.
39 Ibid., 2.
40 Ibid.
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to the handful of studies of experimental projects as evidence of the value 
of early childhood intervention. While conceding that this research did not 
‘shed light on children’s well-being throughout adulthood,’ the Vermonters 
noted, ‘the findings do underscore the positive foundation that high-quality 
early care and education lays in a child’s life.’ Participants ‘were shown to 
have significantly higher math and reading scores, lower grade-retention rates, 
higher high school completion rates and significantly lower rates of juvenile 
arrests than children not in the programme.’41
The Vermont report used these findings to make a plea for high-quality early 
care, which would entail, among other things, raising wages and improving 
benefits for child care workers. Those at licensed centers were earning 
minimum wage but less than short-order cooks and stock clerks at the time, 
while those who ran their own family-based services were in effect earning 
less than minimum wage and had to rely on a means-tested programme for 
health care.42 Pointing to the benefits for business, the report looked to that 
sector for financial assistance. 
Alaska, by contrast, preferred to fund its public child care by using state 
monies to draw down federal matching funds (at a very favorable ratio) for 
programmes targeted to low-income children. In FY 2005, the combined 
federal and state spending for early education and child care in the state reached 
approximately $88 million, of which the state’s share was only about 15 percent 
($13 million).43 A report on the ‘Economic Impact of Early Education and 
Child Care in Alaska’ found that the impact of child care industry was similar 
to that in Vermont. Moreover, it enumerated (citing the usual sources) the 
usual benefits from early intervention: ‘increased earnings capacity projected 
from higher educational attainment along with higher taxes paid from better 
paying jobs, lower criminal justice system costs, reduced welfare costs, and 
savings on school remedial services budgets.’44
Similar arguments found their way into the rhetoric of the Harlem Children’s 
Zone, the nation’s best-known non-profit comprehensive educational project 
for poor children. Seeking to ‘change the odds’ and ‘end the cycle of generational 
41 Ibid., 6.
42 Ibid.
43 McDowell Group, ‘Economic Impact of Early Education and Child Care Services in Alaska.’ Final 
Report, prepared for System for Early Education Development (SEED), University of Alaska 
Southeast, n.p., July2006, 1. http://dhss.alaska.gov/dpa/Documents/dpa/programs/ccare/files/
EconomicImpactFinalReport.pdf (Accessed January 2013).
44 Ibid., 2.
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poverty by addressing the needs of the entire community,’45 HCZ currently 
offers a range of social as well as educational services for children from ‘cradle 
to college’—offerings so broad and ambitious that they make Heckman’s call 
for early intervention appear quite modest by comparison.46 
 In a white paper, HCZ notes that ‘poverty now costs the U.S. about 4% of 
its gross domestic product annually in lost production, decreased economic 
output, and increased social expenditures….As today’s poor children enter 
tomorrow’s economy, under-educated and ill-prepared, the cost to America’s 
future competitiveness in the world marketplace is incalculable.…[T]he U.S. 
needs to build a workforce in which all of its members can contribute the full 
measure of their talents and skills.’47 Citing the usual litany of the negative 
consequences of poor education and lack of early interventions, the paper 
points out that 
[t]axpayers pay a high price when they skimp on the cost of preven-
tive programmes for children or, worse, fail to provide for those pro-
grammes at all. For example, the government spends more than $42 mil-
lion incarcerating a number of residents who live within the hcZ Project. 
The cost of locking up one young person in the new york juvenile justice 
system for a year is more than $200,000. with that same $200,000, 
hcZ could provide 50–60 young people with programmes that will help 
prevent them from going to jail.48
A cost-benefit analysis of the cost-benefit rationale
At first blush, the social investment rationale might appear to be a welcome 
addition to the ECEC advocate’s rhetorical quiver. In addition to addressing 
vexing problems such as crime and teen pregnancy, it resonates with 
45 Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ), ‘Whatever It Takes: A White Paper on the Harlem Children’s Zone,’ n.d. 
(no earlier than 2008), 1 (my italics):http://www.hcz.org/images/stories/HCZ%20White%20Paper.pdf 
(Accessed January 2013).
46 A voluntary project with a $75 million annual budget supported by a host of grants as well as individual 
contributions, HCZ’s roots lie in a series of small projects dealing with Harlem children, such as an 
anti-truancy programme, begun in the early1970s. By the early 1990, these had morphed into a pilot 
multi-service project, and in 1997, the permanent project was launched. Ten years later it was serving 
a 100-square-block area in 1997, with 8,000 children and 4,000 adults (http://www.hcz.org/about-
us/history). (Accessed January 2013).
47 HCZ ‘Whatever It Takes,’ 8.
48 Ibid.
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contemporary policy objectives such as efficient use of resources, accountability, 
and measurable outcomes – objectives that have become prevalent in other 
policy domains as well.49 As such, it might well lead to provisions that are 
high-quality, affordable, and widely if not universally available. So what are 
the downsides? 
There are, it turns out, quite a few, and they can be divided into several 
categories: practical/programmatic; social, political, and, for want of a better 
word, philosophical.
PRACTICAL/PROGRAMMATIC:
Social-investment-driven programmes are likely to be targeted at poor and 
low-income children rather than universal, not only because they are costly 
and thus must be rationed, but also because the cost-benefit ratios of targeted 
programmes strike policymakers as a more efficient use of resources. As the 
RAND study points out, however, such programmes can be administratively 
cumbersome. The difficulties include
administrative costs of determining eligibility and addressing changes in 
eligibility over time, stigma associated with participation, unavoidability 
of missing some children who could benefit but do not meet the criteria or 
are confused about eligibility rules. Universal programmes avoid these 
problems and allow children to participate in economically integrated 
programmes [which many educators see as beneficial in themselves—
sM].50 
In addition, programmes that are primarily developmental (whether 
cognitively-, socially-, or psychologically-oriented) are unlikely to work well 
as child care. They may have limited hours and/or calendars, thus denying 
adequate coverage to parents who work full-time/full-year; they may accept 
children only for the pre-school years (ages three to five), thereby excluding 
younger children who need services; and they may be limited to a single year for 
each child because of scarce resources.51 Finally, programmes that are heavily 
49 Such rationales have, for example, become all-pervasive in the realm of higher education, with its 
emphasis on ‘learning outcomes assessment,’ ‘entrepreneurship training’ and career-oriented curricula. 
For one critique, see Delbanco, Andrew (2012) College: What It Was, Is, and Should Be. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
50 Karoly et al. 2005, xxxviii.
51 Ibid. The RAND study contends that because a second year of the programme is not as cost-effective as 
the first, programmes should be limited to one year if adequate funding for two years is not available.
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focused on children may overlook parents’ need for support, except insofar 
as it affects children. Indeed, parents in general and mothers in particular 
are seldom mentioned by either Heckman or the state reports, except as 
pathologized single household heads (lone mothers) caring inadequately for 
their children.52
SOCIAL:
RAND notes in passing that participation in targeted programmes is more 
likely to be stigmatizing than participating in universal ones. The social 
investment rationale, I would argue, only intensifies that effect. Whereas 
children’s causes tend to be generally popular (the term ‘poster child’ did not 
arise from nowhere), the social investment rationale squanders that advantage 
by implying that most poor children are potential criminal offenders or social 
deviants. This in turn provides justification for programmes to intervene deeply 
into the private lives of poor families, challenging their status as privileged 
domains (although scholars like Dorothy Roberts would argue that poor 
people, especially minorities, have seldom enjoyed that status).53 The fact that 
targeted child care is often associated with workfare stigmatizes it even further.
POLITICAL:
The stigmatizing tendency of targeted programmes also weakens them 
politically. As Theda Skocpol (I think it was she) once famously quipped, 
‘Policy for the poor makes for poor policy.’ The authors of the RAND study 
would agree: ‘Political support may also be stronger for programmes available 
to all children, and they may be more likely to be funded at the level required 
for high quality.’54
Moreover, targeting programmes may, intentionally or not, alienate 
potential allies. As the social investment proposition fills the policy space 
available, it displaces not only feminist and social justice rationales for child 
care (which have been, admittedly, political non-starters), but also those 
addressing the needs of the middle class. Mildred Warner, a professor of 
regional and city planning at Cornell University, expresses her concerns on 
this point thus:
52 The Harlem Children’s Zone would be the exception here; HCZ targets parents virtually from the 
moment of conception with its ‘Baby College’ programme; see http://www.hcz.org/images/stories/
pdfs/ali_summerfall2002.pdf. (Accessed January 2013).
53 Roberts, Dorothy (2003) Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare. New York: Basic Civitas Books.
54 Karoly et al 2005, xxxviii.
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child care is now being recognized as part of the social infrastructure 
for economic development....Just as roads and public transit help people 
get to work, so does child care. but public subsidies for highways and 
transit allow the user to pay only a small portion of the total costs. in 
contrast, parents shoulder the primary financial burden for child care. 
Public support is largely limited to children of low-income families (for 
example, the head start programme or child care subsidies developed as 
part of the 1996 welfare reform effort). For the vast majority of working 
parents, there is no public support beyond the dependent care tax credit, 
which for most families averages only a few hundred dollars a year.55 
Two feminist economists, Suzanne Helburn and Barbara Bergmann, share 
Warner’s concerns, but they chose a different tack to advocate for services for 
the middle class. In their 2003 book, America’s care Problem: The way out, 
they assert that child care is a women’s right; thus ‘anything that increases the 
social pressure for having children cared for full time by their own mothers…is a 
step back in the direction of different roles for women and men.’56 Nonetheless, 
hedging their bets, they also give a nod to the ‘positive social externalities’ and 
the ‘productivity and full citizenship of the children [that child care] serves 
in the long term.’57 In their view, child care should be a ‘merit good,’ one 
provided to all citizens regardless of the ability or willingngess of consumers 
to pay for it.58
PHILOSOPHICAL:
Moving to the level of political culture, one can see how the social investment 
rationale would play into the corrosive trend that both Andersson and Sandel 
deplore—the displacement of social values by the market.59 This becomes 
apparent when we zero in on the specific context in which this rationale 
emerged: welfare reform. It is not coincidental that social-investment-driven 
proposals for targeted early childhood interventions arrived close on the heels 
55 Warner, M. E., Ribeiro, R., & Smith, A.E. (2003) ‘Addressing the affordability gap: Framing child care 
as economic development.’ Journal of Affordable Housing and Community Development Law 12, no. 
3, 294–313.
56 Helburn, Suzanne & Bergmann, Barbara (2003) America’s Child Care Problem: The Way Out. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 51.
57 Ibid., 153.
58 Ibid., 167. Here they are arguing against economist David Blau, who claimed in The Child Care Problem: 
An Economic Analysis (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001) that the reason much child care is 
low in quality is because parents are unwilling to pay for better-quality services.
59 Andersson 2010; Sandel 2012.
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of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 (PRWORA), with its mandatory work programmes for welfare recipients. 
PRWORA is not only a productivist policy but one that, in the view of some 
feminists,60 effectively devalues poor parents’ child caring by denying them 
the right to choose it over paid employment. 
To be sure, not all feminists agree that this is a problem. Some self-appointed 
advocates for poor women not only endorse PRWORA but do so in economistic 
language. Take, for example, this statement from the American Psychological 
Association’s Task Force on Women, Poverty, and Social Assistance: 
we come from a position that emphasizes a human capital approach. 
such an approach focuses on investment in the education, training, and 
productive skills of our national work force, an investment that is also 
extended to poor women. This approach is not antithetical to a work first 
approach if flexible and comprehensive services, supportive infrastruc-
ture, and opportunities for continuing education and training are made 
an integral part of the employment emphasis.61
While probably intended to signal some regard for poor women, the references 
to support and education cannot paper over the Task Force’s acceptance of the 
premise that the labor power of poor mothers, like everyone else’s, must be 
harnessed to the national goal of economic progress. Productivity, not having 
the choice to care for one’s children, is the priority.
Although the jury is still out, workfare seems to have fallen short of 
policymakers’ goals for many reasons, not least the recession.62 But even in a 
more robust economy, poorly educated, low-skilled women are seldom able to 
land jobs that pay a living or family wage. Thus employment by itself cannot 
serve them as an avenue out of poverty. In this sense, the failure of workfare 
sets the stage for the Heckman Equation. A reduction in welfare dependency 
60 See, for example, Mink, Wendy (2002) Welfare’s End. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, and Roberts 
2003.
61 American Psychological Association (APA), Task Force on Women, Poverty, and Public Assistance. 
N.D. (no earlier than 1997). “Making ‘welfare to work’ really work: Improving welfare reform for poor 
women, families and children,” preface: http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/poverty/welfare-to-
work.aspx. (Accessed January 2013).
62 Cancian, Maria et al. (2000) ‘Before and After TANF: The Economic Well-Being of Women Leaving 
Welfare.’ Special Report No. 77, Institute for Poverty Research, School of Social Work, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. May 2000: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irpweb/publications/sr/pdfs/sr77.pdf; Parrott, 
Sharon & Sherman, Arloc (2006) ‘TANF at 10: Program Results are More Mixed than Often Understood, 
‘ Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, August 17. 2006: http://www.cbpp.org/
cms/?fa=view&id=600. (Accessed January 2013).
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appears in most of the state reports as one of the long-term goals of early 
childhood intervention, but it is not unreasonable to speculate that many 
policymakers, seeing the current lay of the economic land, have simply given 
up on turning the present cohort of poor adults into productive workers and 
decided that it makes more sense to focus on their children, even if the results 
will not be apparent for many years.
Why is this a problem? Why should poor children be denied access to quality 
early childhood education and care simply because it is framed in terms of 
social investment? Because the goal is far too instrumental; there is a quid pro 
quo involved. In this scenario, the state provides ECEC not because every child 
has a right to it,63 much less because it would uphold the principles of gender 
equality or social justice, but in order to lower rates of crime and social deviancy 
and ensure the creation of future cohorts of skilled, productive workers. There 
is no mention here of liberal values such as individual development or the 
fulfillment of each child’s potential, whatever that might be. The Heckman 
Equation explicitly dismisses such rationales, claiming instead that preventing 
pathology and ensuring future productivity are the only legitimate measures 
of the efficacy of policies for children. 
The Heckman Equation is eerily reminiscent of the weary, regimented lines 
of industrial workers depicted in Fritz Lang’s 1931 dystopian film Metropolis. 
They, of course, were adults; Heckman and his colleagues would have us 
start preparing their modern-day equivalents in pre-school, turning ECEC 
into primary vocational education. In 1972, when Richard Nixon vetoed the 
Comprehensive Child Development Act, he sought to deflect two fears about 
child care then being expressed by the right: encroachment on the family, 
and the fear of ‘Sovietizing’ American children.64 Ironically, these fears may 
now be realized, but this time the threat is coming from the right rather than 
the left, as the dollar hand comes down on individualism in the velvet glove 
of early childhood education and care.
Finally, returning to Sandel’s concerns, let us consider what kind of mark 
the social investment rationale leaves on American social norms. ‘Sometimes,’ 
he writes, ‘market values crowd out nonmarket values worth caring about.’65 
As just noted, the social investment rationale certainly rides roughshod over 
values such as individualism and freedom of choice—values that liberals care 
63 Cf. the UN’s Millennial Goals; http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/education.shtml, of which Goal 2 is 
universal primary education. (Accessed January 2013).
64 Michel 1999, 151–2.
65 Sandel 2012, 9.
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about and policymakers must protect for young children, since they cannot do 
it themselves. Moreover, while stigmatizing and instrumentalizing the poor, 
this rationale appeals rather baldly to the self-interest of the middle class—the 
taxpayers—by assuring them that investment in ECEC will protect them from 
the harm and expense of crime and social deviancy. Such a strategy degrades 
social politics and widens the gap in an already class-divided polity. Perhaps 
this is the moment to invoke those poster children once again. This time, the 
slogan will be: Children are not human capital—they are human.
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